Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update: South China Sea – Japan proposes warship transfer to Philippines

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force proposes to transfer some or all of its six Abukama Class destroyer escorts to the Philippines Navy. This announcement follows a meeting between Japanese Defence Minister Gen Nakatani and Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro last month at the Shangri La Dialogue.

The new ships provide a significant capability increase for the Philippines Navy. The Philippines Navy is relatively small, the nation’s armed forces historically tending to be focussed on internal security operations. It is currently bringing three modern Miguel Malvar Class frigates into service, alongside two modern Jose Rizal Class frigates. However, most of the fleet is older, smaller and less capable vessels; corvettes and off-shore patrol vessels.

The transfer of up-to six Abukama Class warships will fill an important capability gap, expanding the force of general-purpose warships able to defend themselves, and to fight effectively if required. The Abukama Classis relatively old but is still a capable platform providing time for the Philippines to upgrade its fleet.

China has expressed its concern about the plan including urging Japan to reconsider the transfer. 12 July is the ninth anniversary of the international ruling confirming China’s 9-Dash line is not recognised as a legitimate legal claim by the international community.

On 11 July, Beijing’s position was re-iterated by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who said the historic ruling was a “farce” and claimed the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague’s decision was “orchestrated and manipulated by external powers.”

Concurrently, Admiral Stephen Koehler, commander of US naval forces in the Pacific, spoke in Manila providing reassurances about America’s commitment to protecting freedom of navigation, maintaining the rule of law and deterring aggression. Associated Press reported the Admiral’s blunt assessment of China’s hybrid operations in the South China Sea. “But despite these bullying tactics … China has failed to intimidate Southeast Asian claimants into surrendering their sovereign rights.”

A combination of activities that mean the South China is becoming an increasingly tense part of the Pacific. China indicating it still regards its claim as valid, while Philippine’s allies continue to support this nation’s claim.

Japan’s new base, what it tells us about the nation’s security concerns

Last week the Japanese Ground Self-Defence Force opened a new base for the nation’s fleet of VF-22 Osprey aircraft. The new base’s location at Saga, in the southwest of Japan demonstrates the nation is concerned about threats to its southern islands. It also tells us how Japan plans to mitigate these threats.

Immediately south of Japan there is a chain of small islands that link the nation with Taiwan. In any future war, these islands will be of considerable tactical importance. Additionally, the southern most chain called the Senkaku Islands are subject to Chinese territorial claims. So even if China does not invade Taiwan there is still a possibility that it could take action against these islands, especially since they provide excellent bases in the event of a future invasion or blockade of Taiwan.

The VF-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor tactical transport that can carry approx. 30 soldiers, about 700 km, within two hours. It can take off vertically and hover, but can also cruise at high speeds like a conventional aircraft. Japan’s fleet of 24 aircraft can carry roughly an infantry battalion worth of troops at once allowing for rapid reinforcement of garrisons in the southern island chain.

In Japanese service the VF-22 Osprey’s primary mission is transporting personnel and equipment for the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade. This brigade consists of three infantry regiments (battalions in US or UK terminology) supported by reconnaissance, light armoured vehicles and artillery. It is purpose-built to respond quickly to any threat to Japan’s island territories. The brigade is based at Sasebo, near Saga.

It is evident from the movement of Japan’s VF-22 Osprey airlift capability to Saga that the threat of Chinese activity in the southern island chains is a key security consideration. The ability to immediately reinforce a garrison is an important deterrent against such an intervention.

New Zealand and Japan sign a new logistics agreement

In previous posts we predicted that Japan will start to play a larger security role in the Pacific (See- https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/pacific-brief-2025-annual-review). Last week, a defence logistics agreement was announced between New Zealand and Japan.

The ‘Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement,’ is a logistics agreement to manage transfers of supplies and services between the two nations when they exercise or operate together. For example, paying for fuel when New Zealand and Japanese ships refuel each other on patrols or exercises.

New Zealand’s Defence Minister, Judith Collins commented that ‘Our militaries are already doing more together, and the agreement will provide practical support to help enable this cooperation.” An acknowledgement of the developing military relationship between the two countries, whose ships exercise together and conducted a transit of the Taiwan Strait together last September.

In the bigger picture, NATO’s Indo-Pacific Partners (Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand) are developing closer and more integrated operational relationships. The Indo-Pacific Partners are working hard to become more inter-operable, or being able to work effectively together during potential conflicts. An essentially administrative agreement like the ‘Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement’ is a small part of this wider trend.

Notably, Japan and New Zealand are also working on an ‘Information Security Agreement’ that establishes the legal protocols for the two nations to share more classified intelligence with each other, another important step towards greater inter-operability.

AUKUS review continues, US asks for stronger commitments from allies

The US is reviewing the AUKUS agreement, a worrying time for Australia and the UK, as both countries plan significant long-term commitments to the project. Like the US, Australia is concerned about potential conflict with China, a nation with advanced satellite observation capabilities and an arsenal of precision-guided missiles that can deny large areas of ocean to surface vessels. Therefore, submarines become an essential element of any future naval force because they can operate unseen by orbiting satellites.

Australian defence policy hinges on acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. The long underwater range of these vessels allows them to secretly infiltrate and operate deep inside areas of ocean subject to area-denial operations.

Last week, the US Under-Secretary of Defence Elbridge Colby, who is leading the review confirmed that the US would be seeking commitments from its allies about how they intend to use the submarines during a conflict. The US appears to be leveraging the AUKUS submarine deal to ensure that its alliances with the UK and Australia are well-guaranteed. In time, the details of the commitments requested will become public, but we can expect that a key element will be involve war-time command arrangements that prioirtise the US.

Melanesian update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

New Zealand artillery trains in Papua New Guinea

In another example of the trend towards greater military integration of Australian and New Zealand’s defence forces with Melanesian nations, New Zealand is sending an artillery detachment to Papua New Guinea.

The training will culminate in a live-firing exercise, and the New Zealanders will receive reciprocal training in jungle fighting. Although, the Papua New Guinea Army has some mortars in stock, it does not have a credible indirect fire capability. If it is going to operate effectively within an Australian led coalition its soldiers need to be familiar with indirect fire weapons, and this exercise contributes to that objective.

Enga province local elections require tough security measures

Regular readers will familiar with the ongoing violence in Papua New Guinea’s Enga Province. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported 17 July that the Papua New Guinea Police are enforcing a ban on the use of civilian vehicles in the area during forthcoming local elections. Another small example of the difficulty Papua New Guinea has managing internal security issues.

An agreement for New Caledonian governance announced.

France and New Caledonia have reached an agreement about future governance. New Caledonia has a long history of seeking independence, and recent proposed constitutional reforms ignited political violence in early 2024.

After the most recent outbreak of violence, French President, Emmanuel Macron led talks between France and representatives from New Caledonia’s political and civil leadership. Now after ten-days of discussion, an agreement has been reached. It is proposed that the territory will remain French but become a ‘state’ with an increased degree of local autonomy. Notably the agreement links voting rights in New Caledonia to long-term residency, aiming to reduce concerns amongst indigenous Kanaks that immigration from France will reduce their voting power.

Generally, the deal is being seen as positive. Radio New Zealand summarising the situation, on 17 July as follows “But to reach a compromise agreement, both sides have had to make concessions. The pro-French parties, for instance, have had to endorse the notion of a State of New Caledonia or that of a double French-New Caledonian nationality. Pro-independence parties have had to accept the plan to modify the rules of eligibility to vote at local elections so as to allow more non-native French nationals to join the local electoral roll. They also had to postpone or even give up on the hard-line full sovereignty demand for now.”

The next steps are; that both chambers of France’s parliament will meet later this year to vote on the deal. Then it will be submitted to New Caledonians for their approval in a referendum in February 2026.