BEN MORGAN: Bloodiest days of the war precede potential negotiations

The blood continues to flow in Ukraine and on 29 November Russia suffered its highest daily casualty rate of the war. Two thousand young Russians were killed or wounded.  A terrible figure that highlights the life and death struggle taking place as both sides press for advantage in potential negotiations led by the new US president, Donald Trump. Russia continues to press forward, capturing ground incrementally but at a terrible cost in human life. 

Russian casualty rates are often disputed, commentators arguing that because a primary source is Ukrainian intelligence they should be disregarded. However, Ukraine’s estimates of Russian casualties are generally consistent with Open-Source Intelligence reporting. In late-October the Guardian noted that “Using official reports, online obituaries on social media and images of tombstones, the BBC Russian service with the independent website Mediazona have identified the names of 74,014 dead Russians. They estimate the real tally to be between 113,000 to 160,000 deaths.” 

Ukraine is suffering too, its power grid constantly attacked and its soldiers dying in large but less well-studied numbers.  The UN estimating in October 2024 at least 39,081 Ukrainian casualties with 12,162 killed, a very low estimate.  Russia estimated that during the same period they had inflicted 700,000 casualties on Ukraine, a preposterously high estimate. The only certainty is that Ukraine’s true losses are somewhere in between these two figures.

Last week’s news included reports claiming that although Russia’s economy has to-date, withstood sanctions, warning signs of economic problems are emerging. High inflation, a plummeting rouble and chronic labour shortages are ‘red flags’ that sanctions and massive defence spending are crippling the nation’s economy.  A situation that is unlikely to change, making it hard for Russia to replace the staggering number of tanks, armoured vehicles and missiles that it has already lost.

However, on 30 November the biggest recent change in the strategic-level situation occurred when Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky spoke with Sky News. The interview included a subtle change in Ukraine’s position, a softening of territorial demands. Zelensky talking about the importance of people rather than terrain, saying that “This war (is) for independence of the people, not of the land.” A possible indication that he is open to a negotiated settlement that is not based on a complete Russian withdrawal from all occupied territory.  It was noteworthy and a sharp contrast from his previous ‘victory plan.’  Although, it is too early to interpret Ukraine’s position this may be indication that Ukraine is seeking to negotiate. Another interpretation is that Zelensky is positioning himself as ‘reasonable’ and committed to finding a path to peace. However, the military situation ‘on the ground’ will continue to be the most important influence on the situation. 

Meanwhile, there is still little information about President Trump’s intent, and the fighting will continue at this intensity until there is clarity. 

Did Russia’s strategic-level ‘show of force’ work?  

Last week, we discussed Putin’s use of nuclear threats like signing into law Russia’s revised nuclear doctrine and firing an advanced Oreshnik intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at Ukraine.  A carefully planned series of the actions, initiated in response to the US, UK and France’s decision to relax restrictions on the use of long-range weapons like Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles and ATACMs missiles. 

Putin’s actions made headlines around the world and caused considerable debate amongst commentators. But Ukraine continues to uses these weapons against Russia without exciting a nuclear escalation, or a direct attack on a NATO country.  ATACMs strikes were confirmed on 22 November when the weapons destroyed an S-400 air defence radar at Lotarevka and on 23 November when the Khalino Airfield was hit.  Storm Shadow strikes are also confirmed including one on 27 November that hit the Belbek Airfield in Crimea. Essentially, Putin’s nuclear threats have made little impact on Ukraine’s use of these weapons. 

Meanwhile, Putin’s information operation continues, and on 28 November, duirng a speech at the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s Security Council in Astana, Kazakhstan he highlighted the Oreshnik missile’s advanced capabilities. Statements some commentators interpret as a veiled threat to European nations supporting Ukraine.  A threat that does not appear to have stopped the US, UK or France from allowing Ukraine to use these weapons. Or convinced other NATO nations to stop supporting Ukraine. Further, Reuters reported on November 27 that since the Russian Oreshnik strike on 21 November, US intelligence assessments of Russian intent have not changed. US intelligence agencies still assess that Russia is unlikely to use a nuclear weapon. 

Therefore, it seems that Russia’s show of force on 21 November was not successful. 

Discussing Russian retaliation against the West 

Strategically, Russia is caught in a difficult dilemma because if it kinetically attacks a NATO member that action could trigger Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. This article guarantees members will go to war to protect a member state from attack.  Putin knows that if Article 5 is invoked, NATO has the military and economic power to defeat Russia. So, he is forced to play a delicate ‘game of chicken,’ threatening and attacking asymmetrically using methods like sabotage, political interference or cyberwarfare to hurt NATO members without crossing a threshold that would lead to Article 5 being enacted. A very difficult game. 

Putin’s threatening nuclear rhetoric continues, including statements about Russia’s ability to strike European cities using high-tech missiles.  We should expect to see more of this behaviour, nuclear threats are a low-risk way to intimidate Ukraine’s supporters and to demonstrate Russian strength to the domestic audience.

Direct action is a higher risk strategy, and already there are allegations of sabotage including vandalism of factories and damage to two internet cables in the Baltic Sea, one linking Finland and Germany and another Lithuania and Sweden. A recent plane crash in Lithuania was initially linked to Russian sabotage by media, but further investigation ruled out this cause.  Some of these incidents are likely to involve Russia, some will not being simple accidents but the most important impact is the fear and uncertainty created by the threat. The lives of people in NATO countries effected by the risk of Russian activity, even if it doesn’t eventuate.

NATO’s strong response is noteworthy, demonstrating that the attitude of alliance members is hardening. On 27 November, speaking to a think tank in Berlin, German intelligence chief Bruno Kahl said he expected Russian hybrid warfare operations to increase and issued a strong warning saying that “The extensive use of hybrid measures by Russia increases the risk that NATO will eventually consider invoking its Article 5 mutual defence clause.” Then on 29 November, Richard Moore, leader of the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) spoke in Paris, saying “We have recently uncovered a staggeringly reckless campaign of Russian sabotage in Europe, even as Putin and his acolytes resort to nuclear sabre-rattling to sow fear about the consequences of aiding Ukraine,” a statement confirming Russian hybrid activity that Mr Moore used to provide context for discussing the risk of failing to support Ukraine. Essentially, these NATO intelligence agencies are highlighting the threat posed by hybrid war and advocating for the alliance to take a strong line by continuing to support Ukraine, and by being ready to directly confront Russia. 

Operational-level update

At operational-level the situation remains the same as it has for months. A ‘see saw’ campaign in which both sides try to apply pressure at opposite ends of the frontline. Ukraine in the north near Kursk, and Russia after failing at Chasiv Yar, then at Pokrovsk is now applying pressure further south near Vuledhar, Kurakhove and Velyka Novilisilka.  

At operational-level Russia’s main effort is still likely to be Pokrovsk, its operations in the south are probably planned to culminate in an advance north towards the important transport hub. Likewise, Russian forces are keeping pressure on Chasiv Yar, and some advances here were reported this week.  

 In the north near Kursk, fighting continues as Russia masses a force to evict Ukraine from the territory it holds in the region.  Fighting is intense and estimates of Russian forces committed to this sector of the front range for 40-80,000 soldiers. It is too soon to judge the effectiveness of Ukraine’s advance into Kursk, it has clearly slowed down but has not stopped Russia’s advance in Donetsk. The real test of this the operations effectiveness is whether Ukraine can hold Pokrovsk and prevent a Russian advance on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, the largest Donbas cities still in Ukrainian hands. 

Russia is advancing, and its rate of advance has increased in recent months.  But the advances are the result of incremental pressure, rather than a collapse of Ukrainian lines. On 26 November, the Institute for the Study of War assessed that Russian forces have gained 574 square kilometres since 1 November, averaging 22 square kilometres per day. An area of about the same size as Sydney, Australia’s CBD, a relatively small rate of advance considering the open nature of the ground along most of the frontline.  And at a human cost of roughly 50-100 casualties per square kilometre it is hard to see how this approach can be sustainable in the long-term. 

Summary 

Although Ukraine appears to relaxing its negotiating position, allowing for the possibility of a ceasefire without Russia withdrawing from all captured areas, fighting is still intense.   The protagonists fighting hard to achieve the best possible negotiating position before talks start, unsure of their position within future US foreign policy.

Meanwhile, NATO countries are keen to ensure that the new US president is aware of the threat posed by Russia, and that their support for Ukraine is firm. The intelligence chiefs of two key NATO countries making powerful statements this week.  It is uncertain how this information will affect President Trump’s considerations. His nominations for key security related positions tend to be people more focussed on China, and who are keen to disengage from the Ukraine War.  

President Trump has nominated Congressman Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor and Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, two men with a historical focus on Sino-American competition.  For instance, in November Waltz wrote an article in the Economist arguing that the US needs to bring an end to the Ukraine and Middle East conflicts so that it can ” focus strategy attention where it should be: countering the greater the threat from the Chinese Communist Party.” 

Additionally, although Rubio is not a fan of Putin, and has commended Ukraine’s bravery he supports resolution of the Ukraine war stating on the Today Show on 6 November “But ultimately, what we’re financing here is a stalemate, and it needs to be brought to an end. I believe common sense should prevail.” President Trump’s selection of these advisors hints his desire to resolve the war, reducing US cost and allowing the nation to focus elsewhere.

However, there are several options for disengagement including massive support for Ukraine.  Russia’s economy is weak, its ‘red lines’ poorly thought out and there is evidence that with an injection of US support Ukraine could defeat Russia. Inflicting a catastrophic defeat on Russia may end Putin’s regime, creating the opportunity to re-evaluate the nation’s relationship with Europe.  An option that may be more cost effective for US policy-makers than the risk of years of European instability during a potential period of increasing Sino-American competition.  

 

 

 

 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack