GUEST BLOG: Ben Morgan – Tension builds in Ukraine; and why it really sucks to be a Russian soldier

Russia’s army in Ukraine is in a transitional phase; its offensive is defeated and now there is a lull as it transitions to defence.  And; a little discussed secret of war is that people matter more than anything.  Motivated soldiers with high morale can overcome enormous odds; and nothing destroys morale more than waiting.  Soldiers required to sit and wait for enemy activity suffer enormously. By their nature soldiers are active, ‘can do’ people trained never to sit still, to always be thinking ahead and trying to seek advantage over an opponent.  Russia’s offensive has petered out and now 400,000 of their soldiers are sitting idle, in boggy trenches waiting for the Ukrainian offensive.  Idle hands and idle minds allow time for soldier’s active minds to consider their situation, to think about the casualties their units have suffered and to ponder the impact of Ukraine’s next attack.  

Across Ukraine, there will be a lot of young Russian men doing a great deal of thinking about what the next few weeks has in store for them.  In an effective army, senior soldiers and junior officers would fill this period with planning, exercising and activity specifically to take their soldier’s minds off the coming offensive.  Unfortunately, junior leadership is something that the Russian army demonstrably lacks and it is likely that instead of reinforcing and building morale the defenders will be sinking into a cynical, fatalistic mindset ripe for exploitation by Ukraine.  

It is probably why in recent weeks we have seen videos of a Ukrainian prisoner being beheaded and reports of malingerers being executed.  The Russian command demonstrating; or tolerating a level of violence designed to reinforce soldiers fear of their commanders and to brutalise them into holding the line.  Violence of this nature is not a feature of sophisticated modern armies; it is a throwback to an older more brutal form of military organisation.  A medieval war band held together by fear.  

However, the offensive is coming when the ground dries out. And; a recent Pentagon assessment states Ukraine’s weather will dry out enough for a large offensive in early-May; so we can expect action soon. Ukraine has received about 1700 modern armoured vehicles including about 250 tanks. Significantly reinforcing Ukraine’s already sizeable armoured force of about 900 Soviet designed tanks and about 2000 armoured personnel carriers.  Ukraine is organising about 70-100,000 into two-three corps ready for the offensive; meaning that as well as defending its frontlines it can spare this number away from the battle training and preparing for the attack.  Further, within this organisation are nine mechanised brigades (each about 3000 strong) and full of tanks and mechanised infantry combat vehicles.  Considering the Kharkiv Offensive last year involved four mechanised brigades the potential hitting power is huge. Further, many of these men recently returned from training in NATO countries and are not only well-trained but highly motivated. It is clear that Ukraine has the physical resources required for the offensive. In fact, Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General recently stated that 98% of the material Ukraine requested has been delivered.  

Russia of the other hand is tiring, its offensive defeated, its senior command fractured and fighting amongst themselves while troops on the frontline suffer from low morale.  On 23 April, the Institute for the Study of War published a detailed assessment of Russia’s ‘ORBAT’ (order of battle) based on public source information. The assessment surmised that “Russian forces in Ukraine are operating in decentralized and largely degraded formations throughout the theater, and the current pattern of deployment suggests that most available units are already online and engaged in either offensive or defensive operations.”  

Essentially, the Institute believes that Russian units generally lack manpower, equipment and supplies. That more than a year of combat without sustainable logistics, replacement personnel and maintenance of equipment has left them ‘degraded’ and less able to fight.   However, the most important observation relates to the ‘current pattern of deployment’ in which the Institute observes that the Russians have essentially been throwing reinforcements straight into the frontline rather than training and building reserves in depth.  This means that between the soldiers defending sections of the frontline or attacking in Bakhmut there is not a significant, centrally commanded and uncommitted force that could be rushed to an area to counter a Ukrainian attack.  In terms of household finance, the Russian army in Ukraine has mortgaged the house, maxed out its credit cards and does not have any savings for a rainy day.  Or; in this case for the sunny day that dries out the ground and lets Ukrainian armour move.  

The Institute’s report also highlights the drain that the war has created for Russia’s whole military. The Ukraine War’s demands reducing the fighting strength of neighbouring Russian military districts. An assessment that supports reports of Russian soldiers being redeployed from across the country and global deployments to meet the needs of the war in Ukraine.  

Russia’s military bloggers understand the resource issues; and that is why we are starting to see ultra-nationalists discuss negotiations with Ukraine being a better option than a catastrophic defeat. And; throwing missiles at Ukrainian civilians is not going to change the situation. 

If the state of Russian forces is so parlous; Why hasn’t Ukraine moved yet? 

The simple answer is that Ukraine is moving, but slowly and carefully as predicted.  Even though the ground is still boggy a great deal of activity is reported. Ukrainian reconnaissance forces are active across the country with small probing attacks reported across the south along the Zaporizhian front line; and north of Kremina.  Ukraine is also targeting supply bases in depth, today they destroyed a large fuel depot in Crimea. 

In Bakhmut, we are starting to see a steady draw down of forces.  An indicator that this battle has completed its task and Ukraine is disengaging rather than suffer further casualties.  It is a pretty safe bet that it will ‘fall’ to the Russians soon; and that as that victory is being celebrated in Moscow the offensive will start.  Delivering a compelling narrative of defeat for the Russian people, for the silovaki (strong men) and for allies like China that support and enable Putin.  Wars are not won on battlefields, but in the hearts and minds of the people, and winning this war means Ukraine demonstrating to the people that enable Putin; that there is considerable risk in allowing him to continue this war.  Nothing demonstrates that better than answering a small defeat with a large victory. 

 Last week, the media was obsessed with Ukrainian forces crossing the Dnipro River and establishing a base area in marshy areas on the east bank near Kherson.  The crossing is very interesting because its intentions are unclear; but tactically it is a well-thought out and executed movement. Ukrainian forces crossed the Dnipro River in an area that Russia is not able to build defences because it is within artillery range of Kherson; and is boggy meaning trenches and earthworks cannot be constructed.  The lack of defences make a crossing by infantry difficult to stop; and being surrounded by swamps mean a Russian armoured counter attack is impossible. Further, Ukraine can provide artillery cover for their soldiers from the West bank so the area is well chosen from a tactical perspective.  The area held by Ukraine is also near the destroyed Antonovski Bridge; and to the town of Oleshky that sits astride the E97 highway to Crimea.  If Ukraine captures Oleshky, it will be a small step towards Crimea. 

The motive for this crossing is very hard to assess and there seem to be three options:

• It is a diversion. The area is defensible and is supported by Ukrainian artillery on the west bank.  Ukraine may be hoping that Russia will send forces away from other parts of the campaign to retake the area. Any Russian attack will be over difficult ground and can be engaged by artillery and attrited. Such a defensive battle could divert scarce resources away from defending against Ukraine’s main effort.

 

• It is propaganda. Ukraine is very good at information war and this operation may be a demonstration of capability to boost Ukrainian morale, demonstrate to NATO that Ukraine is still in the fight and undermine Russian morale.

 

• It is the start of a larger crossing. Older readers or military historians may recall the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the first act of which was a surprise crossing of the Suez Canal by Egyptian commandoes. The commandoes established a foothold protected by new and effective anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles that defeated initial Israeli counter-attacks; allowing a large armoured force to cross the canal.  Ukraine’s plan may include a similar tactic. 

 

The first two options, or a combination of them are the most likely outcome. However, the third should not be immediately discounted. Obviously, there are significant differences between the Dnipro River and the Suez Canal and although unlikely the possibility of a larger attack developing in this area should not be completely discounted.  Although, even a large crossing is highly unlikely to be Ukraine’s main effort because even with a secure base area on the east bank; crossing the Dnipro River with large numbers of tanks and vehicles would be very difficult and requires significant bridging support. An asset that to-date has not been seen in public source information about Ukraine. 

This week’s key thought is about how the lull in the campaign and the forced wait for Ukraine to move will effect Russian morale.  Everything points to Ukraine being ready to move when the weather clears and if I was in a Russian trench looking out; I would certainly be thinking carefully about the coming battle.  And; if my leaders were a gang of brutal cut-throats that consistently demonstrated they did not care about me and whose leadership extended only as far as demonstrating how brutal they were in order coerce me into fighting.  I would be practicing saying ‘I surrender’ in Ukrainian and doing everything I could to avoid putting myself at risk.  

Napoleon said that in combat ‘morale is to the physical as three is to one’ and Ukraine’s soldier certainly have not only a morale advantage but physical advantages as well; better tanks, better training, better artillery and better logistics.  The only advantage that Russia has is the size of its army; and that advantage is dissipated by its requirement to defend a long frontage; and by its poor logistics that mean it can’t quickly concentrate forces in an area.

In conclusion, I still predict that Ukraine’s main effort will be in the south aiming at cutting Russia’s Crimean Land Bridge.  However, expect blows to land all over the place before Ukraine reveals its main effort.  Don’t think that because Challenger or Leopard tanks are leading an assault that it is the main effort, it seems likely that NATO tanks would be used to help ‘sell’ a diversion.  Regards timing, expect Bakhmut to be handed over soon probably next week; and that after that we will see the offensive start in earnest.  Not with a single large thrust but with increasing probes looking for weakness. The ground should be dry in early-May so we could see something big by the middle of the month.  And; my thinking is that when the offensive starts the Russian units in its immediate path will collapse relatively quickly because of their low morale and poor leadership. Making the most important question – Can Russia stop a local collapse spreading across its army in Ukraine?  

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer and TDBs military blogger