Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update – Discussing geopolitical and military activity in the Pacific

US general proposes an integrated ‘kill web’ between US-led coalitions in Japan, South Korea and possibly Philippines

The US general in charge of US and United Nations forces supporting the defence of South Korea, General Xavier Brunson, recently proposed the development an integrated ‘kill web’ across Japan, South Korea and possibly the Philippines.  A tool allowing US-led coalitions to work together more effectively in the event of conflict. 

 In simple terms, a ‘kill web’ describes the use of digital communications to allow ‘sensors’ that locate targets (drones, soldiers, satellites, aircraft and ships) to instantaneously share information with ‘shooters’ that can attack the target (for instance missiles, bomber aircraft, drones, ships, and submarines).  The ‘sensor-shooter’ relationship is called a ‘kill chain,’ and multiple ‘kill chains’ combine to form a ‘kill web.’  The faster information travels through the ‘kill chain’ the more likely a strike is to be successful.  If multiple ‘chains’ are available they provide a ‘web’ of potential options that increases flexibility and resilience.   

A notable feature of a ’kill web’ is that it integrates battlefield ‘effects’ (for example, surveillance, target acquisition and strike) across several ‘domains’ (space, cyber, air, land and maritime).  See the diagram below.  

 

Essentially, a ‘kill web’ allows all the different components of a force whether they are on land, in the air, on the sea or in space to communicate quickly to identify enemy targets. Commanders therefore have information to provide good situational awareness when they plan an attack, or a manoeuvre.

Brunson’s thinking is notable because it reflects an expansion of this concept into a very large-scale integration of precision-strike and long-range surveillance. His proposed ‘kill web’ stretching approx. 5,000 km or 3,000 miles from the north of Japan to the south of Philippines. 

Brunson’s proposal is an extension of ideas he published in a November 2025 article, titled ‘The East-Up Map: Revealing Hidden Strategic Advantages in the Indo-Pacific,’  in which he argues US planners should re-orientate their geographic understanding of future conflict in the region by turning the map clockwise 90 degrees.  An evolution that places South Korea at the centre of US force projection in the 1st Island Chain, a forward base inside China’s planned zone of maritime area-denial.  

In the article, Brunson argues that “When the same region is viewed with east orientation toward the top, the strategic picture transforms dramatically. The first island chain, a cornerstone of Indo-Pacific strategy, takes on new meaning. Forces already positioned on the Korean Peninsula are revealed not as distant assets requiring reinforcement, but as troops already positioned inside the bubble perimeter that the U.S. would need to penetrate in the event of crisis or contingency.” 

Brunson argues that US and allied fire control should be integrated across South Korea and the 1st Island Chain.  US and allied forces on the South Korean Peninsular then become a ‘break in’ point for operations inside potential Chinese ‘area-denial’ plans.  The Japan Times states that “Brunson’s remarks underscore a broader shift in how the Pentagon views the region. Rather than treating the Korean Peninsula as a stand-alone arena focused on deterring North Korea, it is now seen as a critical hub in a wider defense network across the “first island chain,” which stretches from Japan to Borneo.”

This proposal is noteworthy and raises the following questions:

• Is the plan realistic? The idea of developing a ‘kill web’ across the 1st Island Chain obviously makes sense from a military perspective but at this stage is a proposal, not a policy or a plan.  The ability to manage surveillance, target acquisition and strike capabilities across this area in a fully integrated way is attractive and would give a US-led alliance a significant advantage.  However, putting this idea into practice may be harder than it looks because it involves the integration of a wide-range of US partners and allies including Australia, Canada, the UK, New Zealand and other NATO countries. Each with different ‘rules of engagement,’ technology and training levels.  Further, the cyber and space capabilities of potential adversaries are currently unknown and the digital networks that support the proposed ‘kill web’ are certainly going to be targeted in a future conflict.
• What new infra-structure is required? A ‘kill web’ requires a digital communications network. And, digital communication requires physical infrastructure like; servers, satellites, transmitters and cables. Therefore, implementing this proposal is likely to see a range of new physical infrastructure being built across Japan, South Korea and Philippines and in the surrounding oceans. A programme that is likely to be challenged by potential adversaries.  
•  What are the inter-operability requirements? US allies and partners will need the physical infrastructure to securely join the ‘kill web.’  This means that countries like Japan, Australia, Philippines, Canada and New Zealand will need to procure digital communications equipment that are secured too, and compatible with US standards, expensive but essential purchases.  Further, building digital infrastructure or installing new undersea cables in the South and East China Seas is liable to be contested by China, increasing regional tension. 
• What next? This proposal inevitably leads to speculation about the next step, and my assessment is that Australia is likely to be watching carefully and thinking about how a similar web could be developed over its northern approaches and Melanesia.  Therefore, we could see an Australian led ‘kill web’ advancing northwards to meet the US led web in the 1st Island Chain. Inevitably, this would lead to the nations of the Malacca Strait and southern South China Sea; Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia being asked to integrate their defence forces into the widening US-led networks.  A diplomatic advance that potential US adversaries would seek to counter, with implications for regional security. 

An update on the South China Sea 

The South China Sea remains tense, Exercise Balikatan a large US-led exercise finished on 8 May 2026. The exercise focused on littoral conflict – the US and its partners using the exercise to demonstrate their capabilities; aiming to deter China from using force to assert its territorial claims in the region. The exercise included:

• Live-firing defensive battles to practice defence against amphibious attack.
• Practising integrating drones, aircraft, ships and other assets in a coordinated surveillance and target acquisition plan.
• Anti-ship strikes by aircraft and by missiles. 
• Movement of troops and providing logistics to dispersed forces. 

Notably, Japan deployed and tested its new Type 88 surface-to-ship missile system in a live-firing exercise. Japanese missiles successfully sinking a retired World War II-era corvette formerly used by the Philippine Navy. The target vessel was located around approx. 75km or 46 miles off Northern Luzon. 

Using Type 88 missiles was a notable demonstration of inter-operability. The task involved Japan’s 1st Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment, the US Marine Corps 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment, Canadian and Philippines ships, and was coordinated by the US Army’s Multi-Domain Command Pacific.  

The attack is an example of a US-led task force working together to practice a ‘kill chain’ that started with US and Japanese drones locating the target. A range of US and Japanese long-range missiles were available carried on ships at sea or spread out on land. When the attack was authorised, Japan’s 1st Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment was allocated the target and attacked the ship. The Japanese attack was followed by US missile attacks from another launch site separated by approx. 50km or 30 miles. 

An operation that demonstrated coordination of multiple observation and attack assets across a range of nations, an important skill for any alliance and a key outcome of Exercise Balikatan.  By demonstrating these skills the US and its allies aim to deter China from using military power to enforce claims to territory anywhere in the 1st Island Chain. 

However, China continues to assert its claims in the South China Sea in other ways and is currently locked in a diplomatic dispute over Sandy Cay Reef with Philippines. Recently, Philippines civilians landed on the reef and raised their national flag, since then Chinese scientific research ships have visited the area.  Both claimants Coast Guards are now playing a game of ‘cat and mouse’ around the reef.

China and the Philippines are also fortifying territories they claim. For example, in recent months China has expanded Antelope Reef into a large, new artificial island. Forbes reporting on 11 April that “While the world watches islands in the Persian Gulf, China has seized an island in the South China Sea without firing a shot. Beijing’s dredgers have been hard at work developing an artificial island 400 kilometers off Vietnam’s coast with astonishing speed.”  In approx. four months Chinese engineers have expanded the usable land area from nothing to an island almost twice the size of Central Park in New York. A new base in the South China Sea that the New York Times reports is likely to be large and useful, stating that “Analysts say that given its size and the ongoing expansion, Antelope Reef is likely to become one of China’s largest military outposts in the region.”

Meanwhile, Philippines is upgrading and reinforcing islands that it claims and the South China Morning Post reports that “On Monday, China’s defence ministry criticised Manila over upgrades it was making to other disputed features in the South China Sea, including Nanshan and Thitu Islands. Both form part of the contested Spratly Island chain, and Thitu is close to Sandy Cay.”

In summary, Exercise Balikatan may be over but tension remains high in the South China Sea, and is likely to increase. President Trump’s comments after his visit to Beijing indicate that the US president views his Chinese counterpart favourably.  Historically, Trump seems to make policy decisions based on how he feels about other leaders. For example, his personal feelings for Russia’s president Putin appear to influence US policy towards Ukraine. Therefore, it is likely that Chinese analysts will have interpreted Trump’s recent visit as a ‘win,’ and an opportunity to push more assertively for greater control over the South China Sea. 

Chile drifting closer to the US and UK? 

On the other side of the Pacific, US F-35 fighters conducted their first in-flight re-fuelling with Chilean Airforce tankers, a small but interesting activity. Air-to-air re-fuelling is a technically difficult capability and the US decision to practice it with the Chilean Airforce demonstrates a high level of trust. This activity is a signal that the US sees the Chilean Airforce as a partner it can work closely with. An interesting development in Pacific security discussions because of Chile’s location.

Chile’s provides access to the Antarctic, the Eastern Pacific and to South America making it a useful security partner for many nations, including the UK that also appears to be developing its relationship with Chile. For instance, in January 2026 Indian Defence Review discussed UK air movement via Chile to either the Falkland Islands or Antarctica and opined that “These movements demonstrate an enduring strategy of distributed logistical access. By relying on regional facilities, the UK reduces dependence on maritime supply routes and bolsters its ability to project presence over long distances in both the South Atlantic and Antarctic sectors.” 

Interesting observations that remind us about the role of South America in Pacific geo-politics. A role that is only likely to increase as interest in and competition for influence in Antarctica becomes a higher priority.  

Melanesian Update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia. 

Solomon Islands political troubles an update 

Recently, the Solomon Islands parliament was rocked after a large group of MPs resigned from Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele’s coalition, called the Government of National Unity and Transformation. The resignations cited a lack of trust in Manele, and initiated a ‘No Confidence’ motion. Manele’s coalition tried to continue governing with a minority government.  

This decision was referred to the Solomon Islands High Court, that decided parliament should be called and that the ‘No Confidence’ motion needed to be addressed and the parliament met on 7 May 2026 to elect a new government. 

Matthew Wale won the election and is the nation’s new Prime Minister. Wale’s win is notable because he is a critic of Chinese influence in Solomon Islands. A position different to both Manele and his predecessor Manasseh Sogavare who both supported a closer relationship with China. 

The Guardian reported that international relations expert Alexander L Vuving from the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies said that “Wale has long advocated a more cautious approach toward China and as prime minister is likely to move the country further from aspects of its close security relationship with Beijing while strengthening ties with Australia and the United States.” 

Across Melanesia, politics are volatile and already Agence France Presse – Fact Check has reported false claims of post-election violence in the capital, Honiara, being circulated on the internet. The historic volatility of Melanesian politic is currently compounded by intense Sino-Australian competition. Therefore, it is will be worth watching Solomon Islands closely in the next few months to see how this significant change in government policy impacts on foreign policy.  

Ben Morgan is TDBs Military Blogger. a defence and security analyst specialising in modern warfare, military adaptation, and operational-level conflict analysis. He posts at Substack. If you like this content and want to support it you can ‘Buy me a Coffee’ here – buymeacoffee.com/benmorgan