BEN MORGAN: Pokrovsk – can Ukraine hold on?

The land campaign remains firmly centred on Donetsk where Russia and Ukraine continue to contest the town of Pokrovsk. The battle is important to both sides. If Russia captures Pokrovsk, it will hold an important road and rail hub that can be used as a base to capture more of Donetsk.

Specifically, Russia wants to ‘break into’ the belt of fortified cities and towns that are Ukraine’s last foothold in the Donetsk Oblast. A defensive line based on the cities and towns of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka. If Russia can take these cities and towns, it will completely control Donetsk, and therefore the Donbas (the region containing both Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts). Losing Pokrovsk will be a blow for Ukraine, but it is unlikely to be fatal.

At operational-level, Pokrovsk is important because capturing it would provide Russia with the logistics base it needs to attack Ukraine’s ‘Fortress Belt.’ If Russia captures Pokrovsk, it does not mean the ‘Fortress Belt’ will fall but Russia would be able to get a ‘foot in the door.’ In turn, that would influence the wider campaign because without Pokrovsk it becomes harder for Ukraine to supply and support the defence of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka.

Strategically, it is noteworthy that losing Pokrovsk is a propaganda blow for Ukraine. Russia has invested extensively in presenting its own propaganda based on the narrative that Russian victory is inevitable. Successful disinformation that has contributed to the US’s slow response to requests for support. Every Russian victory reinforces this disinformation campaign, and contributes to the idea that Russia cannot be defeated.

Losing Pokrovsk would be a tough blow for Ukraine when there are hints that its strategic situation in improving. Specifically, after President Trump surprised observers last week by issuing new sanctions on companies shipping oil out of Russian. Trump also deferred any discussions with Putin indefinitely, giving his former friend the diplomatic ‘cold shoulder.’ Although the President’s action provides only limited support for a set of existing NATO sanctions the decision will impact economically on Russia, further reducing revenue from trade. It may also signal a new approach from the White House, that may cause some concern in the Kremlin.

The battle for Pokrovsk

This week the battle for Pokrovsk has lost none of its intensity. Small teams of Russian soldiers have infiltrated into Pokrovsk and are working together to slowly try and takeover the town. The situation is difficult and last weekend Ukraine reinforced Pokrovsk rushing special forces into the battle to strengthen the defences[i]. Notably, on 4 November, Ukraine’s President Zelensky visited troops in the area[ii] and Ukrainian official sources remain ‘bullish’ about holding the town.

Last week, I opined that Ukrainian leaders would be seriously considering whether to remain in Pokrovsk, and suggested that it may be better for them to withdraw. Pokrovsk is surrounded to the north and west by open country, ground that could be dominated by Ukrainian drones to prevent Russian forces from exploiting the town’s capture. However, this activity is evidence that indicates withdrawal is not Ukraine’s plan.

Although the Ukrainian government claims it can hold the town, there is evidence that the fall of Pokrovsk may be imminent. Recently, the BBC reported that “While Ukraine’s official position is that it is holding its own against Russia, military personnel cited by a war correspondent for Ukraine’s Hromadske website said Ukrainian troops were outnumbered and more than 1,000 soldiers were at risk of becoming surrounded.”[iii] At this point Russia has huge resources committed to the attack and has developed a tactical system that appears to be working. The map below shows the situation a week ago (on the left) and how the Russians have slowly but surely expanded their foothold in the town. See the red circle.

But it is noteworthy that although Russia is advancing in Pokrovsk, Ukraine continues to slowly reduce the Russian salient north-east of the town. See the blue circle on the map. A situation that indicates Ukraine has some capacity available, and that not all its force is committed to the fight for Pokrovsk.

Can Ukraine hold Pokrovsk?

Whether Ukraine can hold Pokrovsk is impossible to judge and there are arguments both ways. For example, Russia appears to have developed a tactical system that allows it to advance, albeit slowly. The system is based on infiltration and evidence of its success is the steady rate of advance on the south-west axis of attack into Pokrovsk.

Regardless of changes in tactics, Russia has committed enormous resources to the battle for instance; tens of thousands of soldiers including elite units, drones and electronic warfare resources. The attacking force vastly outnumbers the Ukrainian force defending the town, making Russian success more likely.

However, it would be wrong to ‘write off’ Ukraine at this point because Ukraine has demonstrated the ability to hold a key town. Ukraine has defended Chasiv Yar against a long siege, and stills holds this important town. Like Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar is a town that provides access into the ‘Fortress Belt’ so is operationally important.

Another notable feature of Chasiv Yar is that it is located within drone and artillery range of another small urban area, Kostyantynivka about 10 km to the east. This proximity means that the defenders of the two towns can mutually support each other. Pokrovsk is similar and receives mutual support from Myrnohrad approx. 9 km to the east of it. Myrnohrad is also under attack but is close to the area where Ukrainian forces are destroying Russian forces in the Dobropilla salient. Essentially, capturing Pokrovsk requires Russia to capture or suppress the Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad. Possibly a difficult task, especially when Ukraine is successfully attacking near Myrnohrad.

In summary, Ukraine is under relentless pressure but the outcome is still unpredictable. Ukraine’s recent activity indicates that there is political and command will to hold Pokrovsk. If Ukraine is committed to holding the town it could end in sufficient attrition being inflicted that Russia’s attacks grind to a halt as winter arrives. Or, Russia may envelop the Pokrovsk and inflict a defeat on Ukraine. Another possibility is that Ukraine may withdraw suddenly to conserve resources hoping to ‘fix’ Russian forces in Pokrovsk using drones to make the open country to the north and west uncrossable. At this stage, it is hard to judge and only time will tell but my assessment is that Ukraine will continue to defend the town for sometime yet.

Tactical lessons from the fighting near Pokrovsk

Last week, we discussed new tactics and how this battle demonstrates their impact. A good example is provided by Russia’s infiltration tactics that are designed to evade Ukraine’s defensive ‘kill web.’ A ‘kill web’ is network of ‘sensors’ that are digitally linked to ‘shooters.’ Drones, ground surveillance radar, human observers and satellites are all ‘sensors’ and constantly monitor the battlefield identifying potential targets. ‘Sensors’ identify targets that ‘shooters’ like artillery, mortars, missiles and drones engage. Digital data moves instantly between the components of the ‘kill web’ so anything moving in the web can be decisively engaged almost as instantly.

Both Russia and Ukraine use sophisticated ‘kill webs’ that ‘freeze’ movement on the battlefield and make it very difficult to close with the enemy. Russian infiltration tactics are a response to this situation and were recently described in an excellent Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) article, written by Senior Research Fellow Dr Jack Watling titled ‘Emergent Approaches to Combined Arms Manoeuvre in Ukraine.’[iv]

Watling’s report is large and covers a wide range of topics but part of it describes these infiltrations, including the following description- “Russian soldiers usually infiltrate in groups of two to five Russian personnel, using thermal sheeting or tents that they hold away from their bodies with handles. The soldiers hang a radio around their necks and a torch between their legs to see their feet. The command post directs them, tracking their movement by UAV, to guide them to the position where they are expected to nest.”

The idea of Russian soldiers creeping forwards in small groups under a cumbersome thermal tent may sound strange to non-military observers but at night through ‘image intensifiers’ or ‘thermal imagers’ this technique will make the soldiers invisible. Like a hunter’s blind these structures block night observation devices and provide a means to infiltrate small groups within Ukraine’s ‘kill web’ during darkness. The use of remote guides to direct movement and torches under their camouflage ‘blinds,’ probably so the don’t trip over, indicates that Russia’s infantrymen are poorly trained and equipped.

The infiltrating group’s role is to ‘nest’ within Ukraine’s ‘kill web’ venturing out when ordered to attack targets and they are one part of a larger tactical system. Notably, the RUSI article highlights the link between infiltration by these groups and Russia’s wider combined arms operations. It discusses how the infiltrations are synchronised with hunting down and destroying the key elements of Ukraine’s defensive ‘kill web,’ including electronic warfare assets, radars, drones, command posts and fighting positions.

The development of infantry tactics is rapid and driven by necessity. Russia may have numbers but is technologically behind Ukraine, a situation that has allowed Ukraine to make extensive use of drones and to develop sophisticated defensive ‘kill webs.’ However, Russia is demonstrating the ability to adapt and overcome and that sometimes the best tech can be defeated by very simple actions.

Conclusion

In conclusion, a bigger question is whether Russia’s tactics are a direct response to the situation in Ukraine, with limited application globally. Or whether these tactics will evolve into doctrine that Russia’s autocratic partners will replicate. Therefore, Russia’s infiltration tactics should be studied closely because they may provide the model for a low-tech but numerically larger force to defeat a more technologically advanced military.

Ukraine developed sophisticated drone technology, that has changed how wars will be fought in the future. Russia has had to respond and through trial and error is developing a new form of combined arms thinking and related tactics that uses its advantages; vast quantities of men and ammunition to blunt Ukraine’s sophisticated ‘kill web.’ The fighting in Donetsk provides insight into how future conflicts around the world could be fought, so is worth studying closely.

[i] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/02/ukraine-deploys-special-forces-to-pokrovsk-in-effort-to-hold-key-city

[ii][ii] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0mxk9yw3n4o

[iii] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0jdv0623pno

[iv] https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/emergent-approaches-combined-arms-manoeuvre-ukraine#:~:text=Emergent%20Approaches%20to%20Combined%20Arms%20Manoeuvre%20in%20Ukraine

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack