BEN MORGAN: The NATO summit and F-16s, what next?

This week NATO celebrated its 75^th anniversary at its annual summit. The Ukraine War was a key topic of discussion and the alliance committed to long-term plans for supporting Ukraine. Meanwhile in Ukraine, movement on the ground is minimal. Russia is no closer to capturing Chasiv Yar but is threatening important road supply lines south of the town.  Further, there are reports that Russia’s use of drones to seek out and destroy Ukrainian HIMARS is effective and slowing down missile attacks on Crimea.

Probably the biggest military news this week is that Ukraine’s F-16 fighters are starting to arrive and we will discuss their potential impact on the campaign.

This week’s NATO summit, what are the potential trends? 

NATO’s 75^th summit demonstrated an alliance reinvigorated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  After two years of war and facing a rapidly evolving geopolitical situation that includes increasingly close alignment between China, Russia and North Korea the alliance retains its resolve and support for Ukraine.

The alliance’s joint statement at the end of the summit clearly articulates this support stating that “…we intend to provide a minimum baseline funding of €40 billion within the next year, and to provide sustainable levels of security assistance for Ukraine to prevail, taking into account Ukraine’s needs, our respective national budget procedures, and the bilateral security agreements which Allies have concluded with Ukraine.”  The commitment will be reviewed annually but is important because it provides Ukrainian planners with some certainty about the level of support they can expect.

Another noteworthy point is articulated in Paragraph 8, it starts with the following statement “We are resolved to deter and defend against all air and missile threats by enhancing our Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), based on a 360-degree approach” and discusses the new Aegis On-Land air defence radar that has just started operating in Poland.  The Aegis air defence radar system is very advanced and can track a wide range of threats including ballistic missiles and manage defence measures. This paragraph is an indication that NATO countries are concerned about Russian aggression in Eastern Europe wider than just Ukraine and are upgrading protective measures in the area.  Aegis cover working with local Patriot batteries to defend against ballistic missile attacks.

NATO’s slow but steady mobilisation of resources behind Ukraine will not win the war this year, but Ukraine is clearly wearing Russia down and that nation’s offensive appears to be reaching culmination. Over the last two years, Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s retiring Secretary General has demanded much of the alliance and the members appear to be answering.  According to the Atlantic Council, only six members met the 2014 commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence, now 23 members (two thirds) meet this level of expenditure.

NATO’s aid commitment means that Putin’s is stuck because his ceasefire offers are ’too little, too late’ and Russian information operations designed to influence European voters are failing. France rejecting the far-right and Britain’s new government committed to continue supporting Ukraine. Putin now needs to either face the political consequences of larger mobilisation or face the prospect of a long slow defeat because he currently does not have the resources to win the war.

In February 2024 Royal United Service Institute academics, Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds in their article ‘Russian Military Objectives and Capacity in Ukraine Through 2024’ opined that “Russian forces are likely to peak in late 2024, with increasing material challenges over the course of 2025” and that  “If Russia lacks the prospect of gains in 2025, given its inability to improve force quality for offensive operations, then it follows that it will struggle to force Kyiv to capitulate by 2026. Beyond 2026, attrition of systems will begin to materially degrade Russian combat power, while Russian industry could be disrupted sufficiently by that point, making Russia’s prospects decline over time.” Russia’s failure to make progress on the battlefield in 2024, when conditions were in its favour now combines with NATO’s commitment to continue supplying Ukraine to make Watling and Reynold’s prediction more likely to come to fruition.  (See – https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024 )

The next question is what happens if Putin does fully mobilise, in that case he is caught by the size of his economy. In March 2022, Paul De Gauwe a London School of Economics Professor discussed Russia’s economic weakness in a blog post ‘Russia cannot win the War.’ (See – https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/03/02/russia-cannot-win-the-war/) A prescient post, its predictions slowly becoming realities over the last two years. Essentially, Russia’s economy is too small to wage a long war because this requires either; large reductions in productive investments that grow the economy to buy weapons, or redirecting state expenditure on social services, education and health towards the war.  In the long-term, both options shrink the already small economy diminishing Russia’s war fighting potential.

My assessment is that current Russian strategy revolves around maintaining slow and steady pressure on Ukraine while undermining the cohesion of its supporters. Over time, as Ukraine’s support drops away Russia can use its larger size to achieve victory. However, the strategy is not working Russia’s threats and dis-information failing to drive away support, as evidenced by NATO’s continuing support for Ukraine.  Therefore, we should expect to see more threats; and within Russia more covert mobilisation of both manpower and economic resources.

Here is a link to the NATO’s joint statement – https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm

An update on the land campaign

Generally, the land campaign remains static, although Russia continues to attack along the whole length of the frontline from Kherson to Kharkiv.  In the Kharkiv Oblast, Russia is not advancing and is probably being pushed out of Vovchansk.  Russia continues to attack Chasiv Yar but has not made significant progress this week.

However, Russian pressure is dangerous around Toretsk and Orcheretyne.  Small villages south of Chasiv Yar that Russia is gaining ground near and this area should be watched closely because the villages are close by the network of highways that supply Chasiv Yar, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.  The Russians advanced near Orcheretyne months ago and recently started pushing in this area again. Orcheretyne is only about 15km from the T0504 Highway so an advance here could create logistics problems for Ukrainian forces further north.

A Russian counter to Ukraine strikes on Crimea

This week Politika Strani, a Ukrainian news agency reported that Russia is successfully using long-range surveillance drones to counter missile attacks on Crimea. On July 8, Russia’s Ministry of Defence claimed to have destroyed three HIMARS launchers.  In March 2024, this column discussed Russia’s evolving ability to strike Ukrainian targets in depth using long-range drones as spotters for cruise and ballistic missiles.  (See- ‘A chaotic Russian election week’ dated 18 March 2024) In this article, I speculated that Russia uses ‘hunter killer’ teams so that the systems operate in an integrated ‘sensor-shooter’ team. Transferring target information quickly enough to hit moving targets like HIMARS or Patriot launchers requires streamlined and efficient fire control that is achieved most easily by bringing the two elements together in one team. Drone operators working directly with dedicated missile teams to achieve quick reaction times.

In my opinion, this reporting is likely to be correct, Russia has previously demonstrated this capability and there can be no doubt that it will be used to defend Crimea. Regardless, Ukraine managed to make several successful attacks on Crimea this week hitting logistics centres and a drone storage base at Cape Fiolent.

F-16 fighters arrive in Ukraine

This week the first of 64 F-16s entered frontline service with the Ukrainian Air Force. The F-16 is a small, nimble multirole fighter that has an extensive and successful combat history.  Arrival of the F-16s represents the culmination of extensive planning including sourcing the aircraft, training pilots and support staff then developing logistics plans to support the fighters.

The F-16 is a multi-role aircraft, it can be used to destroy enemy aircraft in an ‘air superiority’ role or for ground attack missions.  It is not a modern aircraft but is a well-proven airframe.  The F-16s being sent to Europe are upgrade are designated F-16AM / BM Block 15, Mid Life Upgrade models, that were extensively maintained and modified in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

This upgrade includes a range of key capabilities including:

• A modern cockpit that allows the pilot to use night vision equipment.
• A computer system allowing for different software packages and mission specific hardware to be easily replaced or changed.
• Modern fire control radar because the original F-16 had limited onboard radar capabilities.
• Electronic warfare upgrades.
• A digital data transmission system.
• In an air-superiority role the F-16 can use AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles for close range combat that are lethal out to about 30km. Ukraine’s F-16 will also use the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) with range of about 150km.
• If used for ground attack, these F-16s can be equipped with the AN/AAQ-33 Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod. A targeting pod that uses GPS, high-definition TV, infra-red cameras and a laser range finder to accurately locate targets.
• The F-16s can also use the US AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation (HARM) missile, designed to knock out air-defence radars.

Modern air combat is as much about dominating the electro-magnetic spectrum as dog-fighting and modern tech is the F-16’s key advantage.  Russia’s air force is demonstrably behind the West with regards to GPS, radar and digital communication.  Early in the war, we saw videos of Russian aircraft with civilian GPS units gaffer taped to their cockpits. Recently, Russian Airborne Early Warning and Command (AWAC) aircraft have been shot down, their vulnerability an indicator of the superiority of Western tech.

Most commentators believe the F-16s will be used for air-superiority, specifically to defeat Russian glide bombs. The AIM-120 AMRAAM providing enough range overlap to hit Russian bombers at their release point roughly 60km from target without having to stray deep into Russian territory. In my opinion, we should expect to see Russian fighters being drawn into carefully laid traps. Russia’s glide bombs are a key battlefield capability, probably Russia’s most useful tactical tool. This means Russia is likely to use fighters to protect its bombers, introducing the opportunity for Ukraine to draw the escorting fighters into traps. Tactics like this are likely to be effective because Russia’s air warfare command and control is poor, their doctrine relies on centralised direction from command centres either in AWAC planes or on the ground.  This doctrine stifles tactical initiative and will struggle after the loss of Russia’s AWAC planes and their ability to ‘look down’ on the battle space and spot low flying aircraft.  It is hard to coordinate an air battle without ‘eyes in the sky,’ and when pilots rely heavily on that direction, the tactical implications are obvious.

Ukraine’s AWACs capability is hard to assess, we can be certain that NATO’s fleet of AWACs aircraft can see everything happening in Ukraine but we cannot say how much information is transferred to Ukraine, or how quickly. This makes it hard to judge its usefulness but hidden away in Ukraine’s aid packages are a couple of SAAB 340 AWAC aircraft, I am not sure if they have been delivered yet but these planes may provide Ukraine with an air warfare advantage when used in conjunction with F-16s.

It is also likely that F-16s will be used in the campaign to degrade Russian air-defences.  The AGM-88 Harm missile proven to be an efficient killer of air-defence radars and its use on F-16s will contribute significantly to Ukraine’s campaign.

Summary

The land battle appears to be culminating, Russian progress reducing each week.  The Russian offensive slowing down does not mean an immediate transition to Ukrainian offensive action, even as foreign aid and F-16s arrive in country.  Instead, both sides are likely to use the autumn wet season to re-constitute and prepare for next summer.  On 12 July, the Institute for the Study of War stated “Western and US officials reportedly assess that Ukrainian forces will continue to be on the defensive for the next six months and will not be able to conduct a large-scale counteroffensive operation until 2025.” An assessment I agree with, but that means a long slow period with little frontline activity, but expect plenty of action in the air.  Both sides continuing their long-range missile and drone campaigns and Ukraine trying to make best use of its new F-16s.