The Daily Blog Open Mic – Friday – 22nd April 2016

1. So the questions are to Mr Key Inc’,’

   Now are selling our country to rich Chinese PM?

   Are you more or less doing this through your new promotion using the slimy idea of NZ Tourism inc’ and laced with our taxpayers money to invite 10 000 rich Chinese on a cheap trip here just for a Tourism junket cheaply using our dwindling taxpayer funds?

   Are you keeping their hidden Trusts away from our public scrutiny?

   We are truly suspicious of you Mr Key as a carpetbagger and a traitor.

   • Hi Cleangreen … spot on there.

     Most deceitful, dirty leader and very cunning minister of tourism, “honest” John, wants to increase the volume of visitors (in this case, wealthy Chinese because there’s plenty of them), so he can give the false impression over the next 18 months (to the next election), that NZ is doing extremely well …

     ” just look at the number of tourists arriving here to admire what a great country NZ is. And it’s all due to me. Blah, blah, bleat, bleat BS, BS, BS …!”

     The worst aspect of this is, there are plenty out there who will believe him and vote accordingly!

2. Don’t trust doggy Key with his online election voting either as he is a snake.

   See how he would rob us of another election again.

   This only one of six or more prestigious studies papers on the lack of security with online elections.

   http://avirubin.com/e-voting.security.html

   (This paper is also available in PDF format, which is better for printing.)
   Security Considerations for Remote Electronic Voting over the Internet

   Avi Rubin

   AT&T Labs – Research
   Florham Park, NJ
   rubin@research.att.com
   http://avirubin.com/

   Abstract

   This paper discusses the security considerations for remote electronic voting in public elections. In particular, we examine the feasibility of running national federal elections over the Internet. The focus of this paper is on the limitations of the current deployed infrastructure in terms of the security of the hosts and the Internet itself. We conclude that at present, our infrastructure is inadequate for remote Internet voting.

   1 Introduction
   The right of individuals to vote for our government representatives is at the heart of the democracy that we enjoy. Historically, great effort and care has been taken to ensure that elections are conducted in a fair manner such that the candidate who should win the election based on the vote count actually does. Of equal importance is that public confidence in the election process remain strong. In the past changes to the election process have proceeded deliberately and judiciously, often entailing lengthy debates over even the minutest of details. These changes are approached so sensitively because a discrepancy in the election system threatens the very principles that make our society free, which in turn, affects every aspect of the way we live.

   Times are changing. We now live in the Internet era, where decisions cannot be made quickly enough, and there is a perception that anyone who does not jump on the technology bandwagon is going to be left far behind. Businesses are moving online at astonishing speed. The growth of online interaction and presence can be witnessed by the exponential increase in the number of people with home computers and Internet access. There is a prevailing sentiment that any organization that continues in the old ways is obsolete. So, despite the natural inclination to treat our election process as the precious, delicate and fragile process that it is, the question of using the new advances in technology to improve our elections is natural.

   The feasibility of remote electronic voting in public elections is currently being studied by the National Science Foundation by request of the President of the United States (see http://www.netvoting.org/). Remote electronic voting refers to an election process whereby people can cast their votes over the Internet, most likely through a web browser, from the comfort of their home, or possibly any other location where they can get Internet access. There are many aspects of elections besides security that bring this type of voting into question. The primary ones are

   coercibility the danger that outside of a public polling place, a voter could be coerced into voting for a particular candidate.
   vote selling the opportunity for voters to sell their vote.
   vote solicitation the danger that outside of a public polling place, it is much more difficult to control vote solicitation by political parties at the time of voting.
   registration the issue of whether or not to allow online registration, and if so, how to control the level of fraud.

   The possibility of widely distributed locations where votes can be cast changes many aspects of our carefully controlled elections as we know them. The relevant issues are of great importance, and could very well influence whether or not such election processes are desirable. However, in this paper, we focus solely on the security considerations as they relate to conducting online public elections. In particular, we look at remote online voting, as opposed to online voter registration, which is a separate, but important and difficult problem. We also focus solely on public elections, as opposed to private elections, where the threats are not as great, and the environment can be more controlled.

   The importance of security in elections cannot be overstated. The future of our country, and the free world for that matter, rests on public confidence that the people have the power to elect their own government. Any process that has the potential to threaten the integrity of the system, or even the perceived integrity of the system, should be treated with the utmost caution and suspicion.

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