Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update : The Pacific, an overview and what to expect in 2025

An annual assessment of current security situation in the Pacific, including my thoughts about the key trends and concerns in 2025. 

Sino-American competition, the ‘Big Picture’

In 2025, the Pacific’s key security remains Sino-American competition.  Although, the risk of direct confrontation is remote the region continues to be impacted by this trend in 2025. 

China and the US are economically interdependent, but have radically different world-views and compete for international influence. Currently, the US dominates international politics because of its role establishing and maintaining international legal and financial systems (referred to as the ‘rules-based order’). 

Strategically, China is challenging US hegemony, and part of this plan is to develop an alternative international order that allows it more freedom to act aggressively (i.e. absorbing Taiwan). Therefore, China is building alternative financial systems, economic partnerships and security alliances that support this objective. For instance, it encourages development of the BRICs partnership and courts the ‘Global South,’ large countries like India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and South Africa that no longer accept US and European leadership in global affairs. China’s aim is to create a new sphere of diplomatic and economic influence that its rival the US cannot dominate. This insulates Chinese trade against US-led economic sanctions allowing China to pursue its strategic goals (i.e. taking control of Taiwan, or the South China Sea) more effectively. 

Currently, China and the US compete diplomatically, but both side also plan for if competition ever escalates and becomes kinetic, by acquiring military bases and building alliances.  In a military sense, China’s key strategic weakness is that it trades via the Pacific Ocean. If China’s Pacific trade routes are compromised its economy suffers, as does its ability to project military power. Therefore, controlling access to the Pacific is an essential consideration in Sino-American military competition.

The US currently holds a strategic advantage because its allies and partners surround China. This means that during a conflict, China can be isolated within a ring of US partners and allies.  The US maintains bases across Micronesia and is allies with Japan, South Korea, Philippines and Thailand. Additionally it strongly supports Taiwan, and further south the Straits of Malaca the most important shipping route between the Pacific and Indian Oceanss is controlled by Singapore and Malaysia, both members of the Five Power Defence Arrangement with US allies and partners Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

 

Chinese strategy in the Pacific can be seen as a response to this situation.  Looking at the map it is easy to see why China is committed to trying to secure the ‘9-Dash Line’ it claims in the South China Sea (roughly indicated by the red circle) because bases in this area could help to defend a maritime trade through South East Asia. Likewise, China is building influence in Micronesia, Melanesia, and the Pacific. Using diplomacy during peacetime to reduce potential US warfighting capability in any future Pacific confrontation by building their own network of potential bases.

2025’s big question – What are President Trump’s plans? 

Donald Trump will certainly change the security situation in the Pacific. Unfortunately, it is hard to assess the situation because the new president’s positions are not clearly stated. During his election campaign, President Trump talked tough on China and threatened tariffs of up to 60% on Chinese imports to the US. Beyond this rhetoric we know that during his last presidency the US deepened its defence relationship with Taiwan. Some of President Trump’s  actions to-date suggest Sino-American competition is going to intensify. 

Some of the new president’s key officials are described by commentators as ‘China Hawks.’  The new National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz is a decorated special forces veteran, and has said that the US and China are locked in a Cold War.  Last  November writing in The Economist he argued the US needs to bring an end to the Ukraine and Middle East conflicts so that it can ” focus strategy attention where it should be: countering the greater the threat from the Chinese Communist Party.”  

 President Trump’s new Secretary of State, Senator Marco Rubio is another politician with strong opinions on Sino-America relationships, describing the China as the “threat that will define this century” and backing bills to restrict trade.  Currently, he is banned from entering China. 

The administration’s pick for CIA Director, John Ratcliffe was ‘hawkish’ at his recent Senate Intelligence Committee confirmation hearing.  Ratcliffe discussed plans for a more aggressive approach towards cyber-intelligence, saying  “I want us to have all of the tools necessary to go on offense against our adversaries in the cyber community.” PBS reported his position as follows “Ratcliffe said he views China as America’s greatest geopolitical rival, with Russia, Iran, North Korea and drug cartels, hacking gangs and terrorist organizations also posing challenges to national security.”  

It is notable that the new administration’s potentially ‘hawkish’ officials are taking office during a period of tension. China is actively enforcing its claims in the South and East China Seas, and conducts regular military exercise near Taiwan. In 2024, China’s intelligence agencies were accused of political interference and cyber-espionage across the Pacific, from the US, to Canada, Australia and New Zealand. China’s aggressive diplomacy in Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia is being actively challenged by the US, Australia and other nations.  

Further, both China and the US are increasing their preparations for conflict.  China is building new warships and developing accurate long-range anti-ship missiles aiming to achieve maritime area denial, aiming to deter the deployment US carrier and amphibious task group. The Chinese navy is now larger that the US navy the Centre for International and Strategic Studies reported in June 2024 that “China’s naval ship building programme is producing results, China now possesses the world’s largest maritime fighting force, operating 234 warships to the U.S. Navy’s 219.”  China’s build up includes new capabilities like aircraft carrier and amphibious operations.

Likewise, the US is building its own new capabilities, ones specifically designed to counter China’s military buildup.  Marine Littoral Regiments designed to operate in small, disbursed teams, infiltrating China’s area-denial bubble and Multi Domain Task Forces, equipped with long-range surveillance and strike capabilities able to support operations from outside the bubble. The US is also bringing its allies and partners closer, exercising more often and working hard to ensure it can work effectively with powerful allies like Australia, Japan and South Korea. 

It is important to re-iterate that there is unlikely to be direct confrontation but my initial assessment is that the Trump administration is likely to take a harder line in Sino-American diplomacy.  The most active areas of competition are likely to be cyber, information, legal and economic.  Both sides avoiding kinetic war-fighting but competing in these non-kinetic domains. 

We should expect more cyber competition, the US and its partners aiming to catch up with China.  Blocking hackers, securing infrastructure systems and probing each others commercial sectors.  Dominance in cyber space transferring into the information domain, as the competitors seek to shape public opinion.  So expect to see more revelations of intelligence operations targeting Chinese espionage, and vice versa.

Chinese ‘Three Warfares’ doctrine includes the concept of ‘legal war,’ or dominating international forums and courts to establish legal mandates for diplomatic or military action.  It seems likely that the new US administration will engage more aggressively to counter this activity, reinforcing and supporting the current international rules based order.  Specifically, in areas like the Taiwan Strait, South and East China Seas in which maritime trade could be impacted by unsubstantiated Chinese territorial claims.  

Economically, the new president has a history of tough talk on economic competition with China and we should expect to see threats of tariffs, and probably tit-for-tat sanctions and trade skirmishes between the US and China. 

Diplomatic and military activity will increase in the North West Pacific 

China, the Korean Peninsular, Russia and Japan cluster in the North-West Pacific.  An area already riddled with potentially serious issues that could escalate into kinetic war-fighting. China makes no secret of its ambition to re-absorb Taiwan and an invasion remains a popular subject for discussion in mainstream media. North Korea, continues its aggressive diplomacy and threatening behaviour.  China and Russia both have territorial claims that are opposed by US allies in this area.  

Last year, South Korea, Japan and the US signed new military agreements providing for closer military liaison, planning and training. We also witnessed US, Italian, Australian, Canadian, German, French and New Zealand ships working together to conduct ‘freedom of navigation’ patrols in this area.  The US, NATO countries and their ‘IP4’ Pacific partners (Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia) working together to deter Chinese aggression.

Taiwan

This year there was a notable increase is Chinese activity around Taiwan, large exercises and aerial intrusions testing defences and threatening the island. However, I believe it is unlikely any of this tension will escalate into kinetic war-fighting.  Taiwan’s strong defence force and geography make it an exceptionally tough target. An invasion would be opposed by both the US it’s local allies Japan, South Korea and the Philippines and would encourage a European intervention. The United Kingdom is almost certain to support the US, and NATO could commit forces to the conflict.   

So, even if China used its large navy and superiority in area denial missiles to blockade the island it is still strategically vulnerable to a US and allied intervention. The ring of pro-US nations surrounding China mean it be blockaded and therefore faces the inevitability of a catastrophic defeat, so an invasion is highly unlikely.

North Korea

The Korean Peninsular encloses the Yellow Sea and is directly east of Beijing providing China with ‘strategic depth,’ a buffer against an attack from Japan or the United States. North Korea’s economy would quickly collapse without foreign aid but China provides support because it is a useful proxy.  

Strategically, North Korea plays the role of a nuclear armed ‘wild card,’ it is a threat that is hard to judge and creates uncertainty for US policymakers. However, China can influence North Korea providing leverage in negotiations with the US. But any threat is most powerful, when it is not used. The theory of nuclear deterrence, for instance holds that the power of a nuclear weapon exists not in their use; but in the threat of their use.  Reasoning that any use of nuclear weapons is likely to be so catastrophic that everybody involved in the conflict loses.  

China’s use of North Korea is analogous, the nation is a dangerous, de-stabilising threat that can be used extract concessions from other nations, but if North Korea goes too far that utility disappears. In my opinion China has little to gain, and much to lose from letting North Korea go to war. In 2025, North Korea will continue to threaten and posture continue but a war on the Korean Peninsular is highly unlikely.

Japan’s increasing security role

On 1 October, Japan’s new Prime Minister, Shigeru Ishiba was sworn into office. Ishiba is a strong proponent of collective security and his cabinet is ‘hawkish’ with regard to security issues. The new Japanese government has important implications in the Pacific because it means a stronger defence relationship with the US. 

Further, Japan is worried about China, Russia and North Korea so is investing heavily in defence. Japan is also revising its historic position on deployment of military forces outside of Japan. Essentially, Ishiba is committed to Japan becoming stronger, and more engaged with its defence partners like the US, Australia and South Korea which will translate into a more active security role in the Pacific.  

Japan’s primary focus will be the direct threats it faces in the North West Pacific, and it provides a forward base for any US-led or supported operations in the area.  However, we should expect Japan’s influence to increase across the Pacific.  Japan is already working more closely with Australia, and continues its commitment to security in South West Pacific working closely with small Pacific nations.  

Japan is likely to become closer and more inter-operable with the US and Australia.  It may join AUKUS and it is possible that it could even be offered access to the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence network.  It also seems likely that Japanese forces will start to become more active in the South West Pacific, supporting and training with the smaller nations in a similar manner to the US, UK, Australia, France and New Zealand. Ishiba has called for an Indo-Pacific NATO, an idea that may be supported by the new White House, and Japan would be a lynch-pin of any future Indo-Pacific NATO. 

New Caledonia

In 2024, violence erupted in this French colony when indigenous Kanak’s protested against proposed changes to colony’s constitution that would make independence harder to achieve.  France responded initially with a security crack down, but is currently engaged in negotiations to resolve the tension.

This issue is unlikely to be resolved because New Caledonia’s location makes it strategically important to France. Therefore it is unlikely the French government will approve independence, so the island is likely to remain politically unstable and we can expect more violence.  

Access to the Arctic

The North West Pacific is important because it borders the Arctic region.  A region full of natural resources and important because it provides an alternative maritime trade route for China.  Although, this region is seldom discussed in mainstream media it is noteworthy that both China and Russia maintain large fleets of icebreakers and can support operations in this area. 

President Trump is also thinking about this region, and his desire to control Greenland is probably more than political rhetoric.  Journalist, Elise Labott summed this situation up in a recent Substack article, Jazz Hands and Hard Power, writing that “This time around, Trump’s erratic diplomacy may suggest a more strategic calculus. Yes, his talk of seizing the Panama Canal and acquiring Greenland prompted mockery – but beneath the bombastic delivery is a coherent focus on hemispheric security and countering Chinese and Russian influence in the Arctic.”  The Panama Canal and the Artic Ocean are linked strategically, both allowing China access to European markets and these  little reported linkages are likely to influence future activity in the Pacific. 

And, for anyone interested in the Artic or learning more about icebreakers check out Sixty Degrees North on Substack.

Conversely, US focus on the South West Pacific is likely to decrease in 2025

Even the White House has limited capacity to maintain situational awareness around the world, and as its focus shifts north it is likely that US activity in the South West Pacific will decrease. US activity increased in the region during 2024, providing development aid, disaster management training and using its Coast Guard to support law enforcement. However, despite these diplomatic success the region faces a range of destabilising issues from weak governance, to the impacts of climate change and deep-sea mining.  Melanesia also has several indigenous groups seeking independence and 2024 saw an outbreak of violence in New Caledonia.  Meanwhile, the long running war Indonesia is fighting in West Papua / Irian Jaya continues and Bougainvillian independence is being discussed in Papua New Guinea.

The biggest risk though is that the region’s nuanced politics are mis-interpreted because some larger nations do not appear to  appreciate the independence of Pacific Island and Melanesian perspectives on key issues.  For example, Australia and US surprise that small Pacific Island and Melanesian nations are keen to partner with China, or the angry reaction of Pacific nations to the sudden announcement of the AUKUS submarine deal in 2023.

My assessment is that in 2025, the US will be distracted by activity in the North West Pacific and China’s diplomatic activity will increase.  We should expect an increase in Chinese diplomatic activities and in informal operations to increase political influence. It seems likely that there will be more offers of security support to small Pacific Island and Melanesian nations, like training or supporting police forces.  It is also likely that China’s rapidly expanding Coast Guard will expand its activity outside the East and South China Seas into the South West Pacific.  

A key part of this activity will be an increase in cyber espionage, as Europe and the US become harder targets countries like China, North Korea, India and Iran will increasing look for opportunities in the South West Pacific.  For example, hacking into Australian or New Zealand companies or institutions that work closely with European or US counterparts to gain access to target in these areas.  This activity is likely to be linked with operations designed to cultivate political and commercial influence.  In 2024, a key trend was the ‘Five Eyes’ countries becoming more transparent about these threats, and this policy is likely to continue.

A  key risk is that the US is more likely to be surprised by Chinese diplomatic activity in the South West Pacific, increases the chances of a sudden escalation.  

Australia’s security role in the Pacific will increase during 2025 

Australia is a key ally of the US, committing to a close military and diplomatic relationship. Currently, Australia’s role in the Pacific includes a number of trends that are discussed below.

Security leadership in the South West Pacific

The US and Australia clearly share a close relationship, and there is evidence of tacit US approval for Australia taking a greater leadership role in regional security. For example, a ‘hot mike’ at the 2024 Pacific Island Islands Forum Leaders meeting provided insight when a discussion between Deputy US Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese about the Pacific Island Police Initiative was captured.  The US diplomat confirming Australia’s leadership, followed by the Australian Prime Minister joking about sharing the project’s cost. The light-hearted banter is noteworthy because it indicates the close relationship between the two nations. 

This trend follows a series of Australian diplomatic successes in 2024, including rebuilding its relationship with Solomon Islands. Additionally, Australia started providing senior command positions for smaller Pacific nations.  Fiji and Papua New Guinean officers being offered deputy brigade command positions and a New Zealand officer filling the position of deputy joint force commander in the Australian Defence Force.  An exchange programme designed to improve relationships and demonstrate trust between partner nations. Both these factors provide a basis for interoperability between nations, if a joint deployment is required. 

It appears that Australia is a trusted and capable ally of the US, and this means that its leadership role in the region is likely to increase.  In 2024, Australia hosted large contingents of NATO and US aircraft and soldiers for exercises and Japan is considering regular rotations of soldiers into Australia. Exercises and rotation like this are designed to encourage inter-operability, Australia practicing working together with a wide range of allies and partners in preparation for potential joint operations.

Fortress Australia

In 2024, the fortification of Australia’s north continued both Australia and the US continuing to develop large bases and improved facilities in and around Darwin and the Northern Territory.  The  large military bases and facilities that are being built in Australia provide the US and other allies with a ‘launch pad’ for operations in the Pacific. Another role for this area is that in the event of a war in Taiwan, Korea or the South China Sea is as a logistics support base. 

This trend is likely to continue in 2025, so expect to see more Australian investment in defence infrastructure. Initially, bricks and mortar like airfields and accommodation followed by cyber and communications infrastructure. Australia’s recent investment in improved air defence capabilities, including the long running Medium Range Ground Based Air Defence programme and 2024’s purchase of $ 4.7 billion of naval air defence missiles indicates a commitment to protect this infrastructure.  

AUKUS

It seems unlikely that President Trump will stop the AUKUS deal. The new administration appears to be very focussed on Sino-American competition, and AUKUS provides a range of benefits, including an increase in the size of the US-allied submarine fleet and a more income for the US defence industry.  

Another important aspect of the arrangement is improvements in inter-operability between partner nations that Pillar Two will provide, new technology helping participating nations to operate together more effectively.  Considering this point makes me speculate that Japan and South Korea are likely to be formally offered the opportunity to join AUKUS soon. 

NATO activity in the Pacific 

In 2024’s New Year review of the Pacific, we discussed NATO’s increasing interest in the Pacific. Starting with NATO’s 2022’s strategic concept that identified China as a threat to Europe stating that “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values,” and then discussing the developing relationship between the alliance and its Indo-Pacific partners, Australia, South Korea, Japan and New Zealand. 

Throughout 2024, NATO countries conducted training and other activities in the Pacific. NATO navies conducted ‘freedom of navigation’ patrols in the East and South China Seas and Taiwan Strait.  During Exercise Pacific Skies 2024, dozens of NATO aircraft exercised in Japan, Australia, India and participated in RIMPAC. This year, expect to see this trend continue and NATO’s presence in the region increase as well as the Japanese, South Korean, Australian and New Zealand militaries working more closely with NATO countries both in the Pacific and around the world.  

South China Sea  

In 2024, the South China Sea remained tense, and the situation is not likely to change in 2025. China continues to enforce its claim over the sea known colloquially as the ‘9 Line. ’ China’s claim  includes areas claimed by Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei.  China’s claim is not internationally recognised and the nation uses hybrid tactics to enforce its claim. 

China uses hybrid tactics based on this un-recognised legal justification to assert its ‘right’ to occupy islands, shoals and reefs within the South China Sea.  China then enforces the claim using paramilitary internal security forces like the Coast Guard and militia.  Using these forces instead of the military, plays to the narrative that the area is in fact Chinese territory i.e. it is an internal security issue or law enforcement matter rather than military activity.  A classic example of hybrid war tactics, using force including ramming and boarding vessels of other nations in a legal grey zone.  

In 2024,  Philippines elected a new president who is countering China’s hybrid war tactics by publicising aggressive Chinese tactics.  Further, in 2024 countries like the US, Japan and Australia demonstrated their resolve to support Philippines and joint task naval task groups conducted patrols in the area deterring Chinese aggression.  China is reported to have developed a permanent naval base at Ream in Cambodia.  A base that can be used to support its operations in the South China Sea. 

Therefore in 2025, the South China Sea will remain a security issue that is likely to become increasingly tense. It may be an issue the Trump White House decides to directly challenge China over, providing more support to Philippines, or sanctioning China.  Support that is likely to be matched by Japan and Australia, either deterring Chinese aggression or fuelling escalation.  

India and the Pacific

In 2024, Indian diplomats and warships visited the Pacific, and India announced its intention to build an embassy in Timor Leste. Indicating that India is taking more of a security interest in the Pacific.  Since the introduction of its ‘Look East’ doctrine in 1991 India has quietly extended its interests in South East Asia. Approximately 45% of India’s foreign trade is with South East Asia.

The success of ‘Look East’ prompted the Modi government to re-invigorate the programme.  ‘Act East,’ Modi’s new policy includes funding infrastructure projects and increased security cooperation with Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam a feature specifically aimed at securing the South China Sea.  India’s interest in the Pacific is likely to continue in 2025, especially working with Quadrilateral Dialogue security partners Australia and Japan  

State supported criminal activity 

In 2024, we discussed the use of criminal activity by nation states as a form of hybrid war.  For instance, allowing cyber criminals to target a rival’s financial institutions or supporting drug trafficking into a rival nation.  Some nations are even believed to be directly involved in cyber-crime to acquire foreign currency. North Korea was implicated in using cybercrime to raise foreign exchange in 2025 and there are reports that  Bashir Al Asad’s Syria profited from the drug trade.

In 2024 there were allegations of criminal cyber-attacks targeting infrastructure and defence networks sponsored by countries like Iran, Russia and China. Small nations in the Pacific lack the cyber security capability to defend or recover easily from cyber-attack, making them easy targets for this type of activity.

Additionally, throughout South East Asia and the South West Pacific a significant drug trade exists that can be used to undermine the security and stability of countries. By providing the financial and logistics infrastructure to support illegal drug trafficking nations states can weaken rivals, or smaller states they want to influence.  A number nations are alleged to support, operate or tolerate secretive ‘shadow banking’ systems that provide a way for criminals to move large amounts of money internationally. The economist Paul McCulley, first used the term ‘shadow bank’ in a 2007 and it refers to unregulated companies offering financial services and these organisations can provide the mechanisms to more illicit cash internationally. 

Conflict between nation states is evolving, and although kinetic war-fighting is rare, competition continues. Cyber space providing a low risk way to inflict inconvenience and economic harm on rivals, and covert support of criminal activity provides a way to undermine social stability in a targeted nation.  It is likely the South West Pacific will remain a target of drug trafficking in 2025, its remote harbours and lack of law enforcement providing safe transfer points for illicit trade between Asian and South American drug cartels. 

Deep-sea mining

Deep-sea mining is now legal, and its impact on the Pacific is not fully understood yet.  The world’s demand for the metals that become batteries and digital components is insatiable so there are enormous profits to be made mining the deep ocean. However, small and relatively poor Pacific nations may vulnerable to exploitation by large companies or bigger countries .  The exploitation of African oil provides a lesson for the Pacific, complete with political corruption, massive environmental damage and little improvement in the lives of most local people. The Pacific is on the cusp of an enormous ‘gold rush’ as nations and companies rush to exploit the region’s mineral wealth, so it is important that this trend continues to be monitored in 2025.

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack