Ben Morgan – Russian air offensive failing, NATO aid increasing and US aid impasse edging closer to resolution

The ground campaign may be static but last week the skies over Ukraine were busy. Likewise, in Europe and the US important discussions about the war were taking place.  On Wednesday, President Biden met with congressional leaders to negotiate a deal to deliver the White House’s ‘national security supplemental package,’ and a deal appears to be close. Senate Majority Leader, Chuck Schumer described the meeting as ‘productive’ and the release of another $61.4 billion of US aid to Ukraine may be imminent.  

The next day, Sergei Lavrov Russia’s Foreign Minister spoke strongly to the world re-stating Russia’s objectives, blaming the West for the war and threatening that the longer the war progresses the less reasonable a peace settlement will be.  This type of statement is an attempt to paint a picture of Russian confidence. By presenting this narrative, Russia hopes to win the information battle reinforcing public opinion in Russia and influencing voters and politicians in the countries supporting Ukraine. Bluster designed to create uncertainty about a Ukrainian victory and divide electorates in the democracies supporting Ukraine.  Regardless of Lavrov, the war continues and this week NATO countries committed more support as the skies over Ukraine were the focus of both sides’ military operations. 

 

European military aid 

“We need a warfighting transformation of NATO,” Dutch Admiral Rob Bauer, Chair of NATO’s military committee told a meeting of European defence ministers in Brussels last week.  Admiral Bauer’s comments reflect a wider trend within the alliance.  The aid impasse in the US forces Europe to reassess its traditional security relationship with the US.  After World War Two, the US guaranteed European security allowing the war-ravaged continent to rebuild by reducing the economic strain of Cold War defence budgets. This trend continued and the US consistently contributes the ‘lion’s share’ of the cost of defending Europe. This policy strengthens the US’s international hegemony, maintains its military industrial complex and stabilises the European continent for profitable trade.  However, post-Trump this relationship is more tenuous as American isolationists seek to withdraw from these historic arrangements. Last week the possibility of Trump’s election increased and the world is coming to terms with the uncertainty that this would create.    

It appears that Europe is starting to grasp this situation and increase its support for Ukraine.  Last year, the European Union failed to deliver on a commitment to provide one million artillery shells by the end of 2023. Last week European Union Internal Market Commissioner, Thierry Breton confirmed that the remainder would be delivered early this year and that European production is increasing and will soon match US production, about one million shells per annuum.  Breton also announced a 100-billion-euro, European Defence Investment Programme to increase European defence industry capacity.  

Additionally, even though about 70 billion euros of European aid are currently held up by Hungarian opposition, recent weeks have seen European nations making large bi-lateral commitments. The UK announcing a 2.5-billion-pound agreement. Estonia committed 1.2 billion euros and that it would directly contribute .25% of its GDP directly to Ukraine for the next four years.  Latvia pledged helicopters, drones and artillery. In February, French President Emmanuel Macron is scheduled to visit Ukraine and expected to commit more aid including long-range SCALP missiles.  

In the first column of 2024, we predicted that European and US aid would increase because these allies face a stark choice; either commit resources to Ukraine now, or face the threat of years of ongoing Russian aggression. Europe is mobilising and is it likely that the US will follow suit soon President Biden aiming to mitigate the risk of Trump being elected.

 

The air war over Ukraine 

In the air over Ukraine, both sides continue to trade blows using aircraft, drones and missiles.  Russia’s bombing offensive continues with regular attacks across Ukraine. However, reports indicate that this winter’s campaign is less effective. Civilians are more prepared and resilient limiting the impact of Russian attacks.  Additionally, Ukraine has ‘hardened’ its power grid meaning that attacks are less damaging and power for lighting and heating is restored more quickly than during last winter’s campaign. 

Ukraine continues to strike back, its drones and missiles successfully attacking Russian infrastructure. On Thursday, Ukrainian drones hit a St Petersburg oil facility. A strike, Ukraine told Reuters is the start of a new campaign targeting this important part of Russia.  The area around St Petersburg has a large concentration of military and civilian infra-structure including oil industry sites. Later in the week, Ukraine struck another oil depot in Klintsy, directly north of Kyiv and about 70km from the Ukrainian border. Attacks demonstrating Ukraine’s technical capability and undermining the credibility of the Russian government.  The cancelation of Orthodox Epiphany services in Belgorod on Friday 19th is an example of the effectiveness of Ukraine’s bombing offensive.  Belgorod is a key Russian staging area for the war and has suffered regular Ukrainian air attacks that are now demonstrably affecting the day-to-day activities of the city. 

Russian tactics are evolving though, attacks using different combinations of weapon systems (drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles) and surprising approach routes to confuse air defence command and control. Ukraine’s air defence network is relatively successful preventing most Russian missiles from reaching their targets, particularly near major cities like Kyiv and Kharkiv.  This success is likely to be the reason Russian attacks are spreading across the country hitting smaller towns and cities.  Ukraine’s key weakness is its supply chain.  Missiles like Patriot are enormously effective and Russia does not have a missile system able to beat it, but supplies of this missile are running low so Ukraine will be carefully preserving their remaining stocks. 

 

Russia loses important command and control aircraft 

Ukraine’s biggest military successes this week are successful attacks on two Russian airborne command and control planes, a Beriev A-50 and an Ilyushin22. The planes have large radars that can monitor the battlefield and the airspace above it; identifying and tracking Ukrainian helicopters, aircraft, drones and missiles.  The planes are used to coordinate Russian responses, guiding intercepting fighters or prioritising which targets ground-based air defences should attack, and in what order.  Public source information indicates that the A-50’s radar has a range of 650km, allowing one aircraft to monitor the situation deep into Ukrainian airspace. Additionally, planes like this can be used to jam enemy missiles guidance or enemy radio communication or to gather electronic intelligence. 

Performing these important roles requires sophisticated and expensive electronics so these planes are costly and rare.  Before the war Russia was estimated to operate about nine Illuysion 22 and half a dozen of the larger and more capable Beriev A-50s.  Another Beriev A-50 was damaged in a drone attack on Machulishchy airbase, near Minsk in Belarus during February 2023.   Any Russian airborne command and control plane is a high priority target for Ukraine. 

 

‘Patriot Traps’ 

Successfully, attacking an airborne command and control plane is difficult because they have a high level of situational awareness or the ability to detect attacking missiles and fighters. Then they can take steps to defend themselves, for instance directing friendly fighter planes to defend them or using very sophisticated jamming capabilities to neutralise attackers.  Therefore, shooting them down is difficult and takes some planning.  In the milblogger community there is debate about how these attacks were executed, and the consensus is that the Ukrainians are using their long-range and advanced Patriot missile systems aggressively to snipe at important targets.  Ukraine creates tactical situations that draw key Russian aircraft close to the border, where they can be engaged by Patriot batteries brought forwards secretly. Moving Patriot batteries close to the frontline is a risky tactic because they are vulnerable to Russian attack but the tactic seems to be paying dividends. The Sukhoi 34s shot down two weeks ago near the Dnipro River may be another example of the ‘Patriot Trap’ tactic being used.  

The Beriev A-50 was shot down over the Sea of Azov, near Crimea. Two weeks ago, we discussed Ukraine’s activity around the Dnipro River, Kherson and Crimea stating the “we should expect to see Crimea remain a focus of Ukrainian operations.  Already this month, Ukraine has attacked air-defence radar and command positions in Crimea including at Saky airbase, Yevpatoria and Sevastopol.  A focus of operations that may suggest Ukraine is preparing for more and bigger attacks on the peninsular.” (See Ukraine – Lessons from 2023 and what to expect in 2024).  It is possible that the attacks on Russian land-based air defence systems in Crimea forced Russia to deploy its airborne command and control planes into this area, where one was successfully engaged by a Patriot. If this is the case it is likely that Crimea and Kherson will continue to be a focus for any air war of attrition.  Ukraine slowly destroying Russian air defence capabilities, making Crimea vulnerable and, drawing other assets into the area, where they can be destroyed allowing Ukraine to attack other targets. 

 

Summary

While the ground war slows down during winter both sides are focussed on air operations.  Bombing each other’s infrastructure. Ukraine using its superior technology and tactics to attrit key Russian assets.  This campaign is likely to be part of wider air war plans, building up to the arrival of F 16s in the middle of the year.  Reducing Russia’s air borne command and control capability and its air defence network in Kherson and Crimea will contribute to a more impactful introduction of the new fighters.  Keep watching the air battle.

Europe’s continued and increasing commitment to supporting Ukraine does not bode well for Russia.  American politics have proven to be easier for Russia to destabilise and influence, meaning that into the future US support may become tenuous forcing Europe to shoulder the burden of supporting Ukraine.  Europe the economic and military muscle to defeat Russia, if it is mobilised and directed effectively.  Steps that it looks like Europe is starting to take. 

 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack