GUEST BLOG: Ben Morgan – What next? Can Ukraine recapture the initiative?

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In recent weeks, we have seen the rapid withdrawal of Russian forces from West of the Dnipro River and there is a steady stream of speculation about – What happens next?  Trying to analyse the situation is very difficult because it hinges on Ukraine’s capacity to fight; and we simply do not have good information about this factor. 

What we do know mostly relates to Russia’s situation and can be summarised as follows:

  • Russia appears to be holding its ground in Luhansk and Donetsk.  The Ukrainian advance into Luhansk has been stopped on a line running north south along the P66 motorway bisecting the towns of Kremina and Svatove.  
  • The withdrawal from Kherson, behind the Dnipro River should provide a firm defence against a Ukrainian offensive from that direction.
  • Using the Dnipro River to reinforce the southern defensive line, Russia minimises the length of front that it needs to defend. Russia can reduce the number of soldiers defending this section of the long front line; increasing the number able to be used to reinforce defences elsewhere or to attack.  This likely frees up 20-30,000 soldiers that can be re-deployed either in attack or defence. See below.

  • Russia is starting to generate forces outside Ukraine from its mobilisation; for instance the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Tank Army, trained in Belarus and now moving to Donbas. It has also been confirmed that freshly mobilised troops are moving into the Donbas.  
  • On 21 November, the British Ministry of Defence summed up Russia’s key logistics problems reporting that “Both Russian defensive and offensive capability continues to be hampered by severe shortages of munitions and skilled personnel”. Essentially, no matter how many new recruits or ex-conscripts are pressed into service Russia does not have a cadre of trained and experienced junior leaders and senior technicians. This means that there is a lack of small-unit leadership and that maintenance and repair of technical equipment will be suffering.  A situation that will only be exacerbated if numbers increase. 
  • Then there is logistics; Russia relies on rail transport to move ammunition and other supplies forwards. Russia’s key problem is that rail supply to Crimea is compromised by damage to the Kerch Bridge. 

Russian troops in the south of Ukraine are supplied from Crimea using this route.  The picture below shows how Ukraine has isolated Russian forces in the south. The black lines are rail lines. Damaging the Kerch Bridge cut Russia’s key rail supply line into the south-east of Ukraine because there is no direct east-west route in the south-east. Movement of freight by rail instead needs to run via Zaporizhzhia, held by Ukraine.  

Now, logistics support to troops in the highlighted area needs to be moved by road.  Much less efficient for moving heavy goods like artillery ammunition. Further, Russia started the war short of trucks and after 11 months of war their truck fleet has been significantly reduced further stretching their ability to maintain ‘logistics push’ to troops in the highlighted area.

Finally, after capturing Kherson Ukraine HIMARS is now in range of the east rail and road route out of Crimea.  So we know that Russian logistics in the south is in trouble.

  • The morale of individual Russian soldiers is low.  Consistent confirmed reports from both Ukraine and from Russia confirm that morale and willingness to fight is an issue effecting many Russian units.
  • However, Russia is defending and defence requires less initiative; and in defence soldiers are essentially fighting for their own self-preservation so morale and junior leadership are less important considerations.  Unlike the attack there is no requirement to convince soldiers to get out of their trenches and move forwards towards the enemy. 

In summary, the south-east coast of Ukraine currently held by Russia is in a precarious position because its defenders are isolated from logistic support and suffering from low morale.  Ukraine’s interdiction of the rail network at Kerch makes movement of logistics west into the area difficult and the recent capture of Kherson means Ukraine can further impede Russia’s ability to supply its soldiers.  The area is ripe for exploitation and if it falls will break the ‘Crimean land bridge’ and isolate Crimea.

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Aside from their high morale, sophisticated doctrine and good leadership the Ukrainians have one more key advantage.  Ukraine’s logistics train is lighter, more agile and not tied to the rail network.  The reason why is simple; the Ukrainians are using large amounts of precision weapons.  Using guided weapons and artillery ammunition means that the Ukrainians need less ordinance to achieve decisive results on the battle field.  

For instance, a Ukrainian artillery battery (normally six guns) firing precision guided munitions will probably destroy a target with ‘one round of fire for effect’ (each gun fires one round) a total of six shells.  The weight of that ammunition including propellent charges is roughly about 360kg.  A Russian battery using unguided weapons will need to adjust using two-six rounds then fire ‘three-five rounds fire for effect’; or a total of between 20 and 36 rounds to achieve the same result.  Getting that ammunition to the front requires moving approximately 1.2 – 2.2 tonnes of ammunition forward.  Even a small amount of precision guided ammunition makes a huge difference to a force’s logistics train. 

Likewise, every Javelin or NLAW anti-tank missile that is moved forwards is almost guaranteed to kill whatever type of vehicle it is fired at.  Russian anti-tank missiles are less accurate and to achieve the same result could take two or three equivalent missiles. At an even more basic level it is interesting to note the difference in individual weapons.  Ukrainian soldier’s rifles are often seen carrying specialist optics that make their fire more accurate; so less ammunition is needed. Greater precision increases lethality and reduces logistics burden meaning that the Ukrainians can more easily support the logistics of wide-ranging deep thrusts.  Combine this factor with their effective Starlink communications and excellent training and Ukraine has a very capable offensive force.  

If the Russians are caught ‘wrong footed’ and the Ukrainians can break through the defensive lines; then we can be pretty sure that there will be another Russian collapse.  However, the key question is whether or not Ukraine has the manpower available to switch to the offensive right now.  My gut feeling is that as we approach the northern winter; and temperatures drop Ukrainian soldiers; that have been in battle since February, need to rest and recuperate.  Further, even though Ukraine has good intelligence it seems that the Russian withdrawal from Kherson was unexpected. The Russians using civilian cars and buses to help mask the movement of troop. This means that it will take Ukraine a period of time to readjust their dispositions.  

Based on these factors I think that it is more likely that the next Ukrainian offensive will start in January or February when autumnal rain has stopped, troops are rested and moved into their start positions.  So where will the offensive be?  In the north, driving into Luhansk is an option. However, this seems unlikely to be Ukraine’s main effort because an attack there falls upon a pro-Russian area, one that is already holding against Ukrainian attacks and is well supplied from Russia; all factors that mean an attack will be difficult.  

Instead, it is more likely that Ukraine has drawn the same conclusions about Russian weaknesses and will attack in the south aiming to cut the ‘Crimean land bridge’ and two possible options are shown below either; an advance on Melitopol or against Mariupol. 

If successful, both options isolate Crimea and the Russian troops occupying the south-east who we know are logistically isolated, with low morale.  Further, this area is riddled with Ukrainian partisan activity that helps reduce Russian combat power. 

The question is which option will Ukraine take?   It is hard to say, an attack on Melitopol can be launched from Zaporizhzhia and the west ‘shoulder’ of the salient is secured by the Dnipro River.  Melitopol sits at the end of a long inlet that shortens the distance required to reach a defendable line; requiring an advance of about 100-120 km.  Capturing a salient here isolates Crimea and any Russian soldiers west of the offensive; likely forcing them to withdraw south into Crimea.  In turn capturing land immediately north of Crimea quickly, allows Ukraine to use artillery to attack into Crimea sooner than if they have to roll back Russian forces from Mariupol.   

An offensive aimed at Mariupol is the other likely option. This offensive would be harder to support, its eastern ‘shoulder’ resting on Donetsk Oblast’s (region’s) border.  However, Mariupol is Russia’s main rail hub with trains arriving here from Donetsk from which supplies are transferred onto trucks to supply Russian forces in south-east Ukraine. Losing Mariupol would further isolate the remaining defenders in the south-east by denying them use of the main rail hub in the area.   Mariupol is about 50-60km south of the nearest Ukrainian forces so the salient required to reach the city is shorter than attacking Melitopol. 

The Russians are currently ‘digging in’ around Melitopol, confirming that they can see the threat and believe that the blow will fall there.  Some months ago we observed that “The coastal strip is a long front for Russia to defend and tantalisingly some months ago the Ukrainians took the villages of Vulhedar and Volodymyrivka, 50km north of Mariupol on the Kalchyk River and the H 40 motorway” highlighting the possibility of a push in this area.  (See – Why the Russian army can’t deliver what their political masters want!) And; today the situation remains the same, a political and military victory tantalisingly close.  Capturing Mariupol closes Russia’s rail supply line into south-east Ukraine, directly threatens their developing offensive in Donetsk and would be a huge political win. Drawing the Russian’s east with operations on the Kinburn Peninsular and convincing them that Melitopol is the target are sensible tactical deceptions that may reflect Mariupol is being considered.

Unfortunately, none of us are in the Ukrainian planning team so any ideas are speculation and educated guesses. However, I do think that it is safe to say that Ukraine can regain the initiative and that Crimea will soon be isolated. 

 

 

Ben Morgan is a tired Gen X interested in international politics. He is TDB’s Military analyst.

54 COMMENTS

  1. Two little men with, no doubt, littler penises.
    Can we please dose them good on Methyl​enedioxy​methamphetamine then pop them in a spa pool with bubble blowers and fur lined bathing suits? A beach ball might be nice too. But NO alcohol.
    Two puffed up little primates manipulated by U$A foreign policy into a pissing contest is what they really are and I’m bored with it all. Let’s try a novel approach.
    Film:
    Men Who Stare At Goats.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Men_Who_Stare_at_Goats_(film)
    Fact:
    The Guardian.
    https://www.theguardian.com/music/2020/jan/01/sugar-sweet-rave-united-belfast-david-holmes-iain-mccready
    Or we’re fucked.
    Netflix:
    Love Death and Robots.
    ‘Night of The Mini Dead’.
    https://www.netflix.com/search?q=Night%20of%20The%20Mini%20Dead&jbv=80174608

  2. We keep hearing how Russia is in turmoil, running out of weapons, losing ground etc yet the map hasn’t changed much and they still seem able to bombard Ukraine at will. How much of what we hear is news and how much is propaganda?

    • The map has definitely changed. The Russians retreated from Kherson and withdrew all their forces from the east bank of the Dnieper river.

      Both sides are manipulating the information that we see and the western bias heavily favours the Ukrainian position but at the end of the day – who invaded who? – Russia – and they have been stopped.

      My own view is that the war is effectively strategically over with each side attempting to build their negotiating position with facts on the ground. Time will tell.

      One thing that I think is very evident is that from American perspective they will be very pleased with the strategic outcome here. Consider this:

      1) Europe’s dependency on Russian energy is strategically non viable.
      2) “Fear of the Bear” is back meaning the europeans will look after their own defence in the future freeing up the US to focus their ridiculous defence spend on the Pacific.
      3) All of the Russian/Ukrainian noise has given cover to a very significant tightening of technology restrictions on China by the US.
      4) The willingness of the west to go extreme on sanctions has put the fear of god into China who are far more export dependent than Russia.
      5) Russia has been shown itself to be a paper tiger with one exception – nuclear fear mongering
      6) The American defence establishment is not likely to tolerate the nuclear bullying of Russia any longer and and I can forsee a star wars 2 programme emerging over the next decade.
      7) The US is more confident than ever and more prepared to throw it’s weight around, expect more pressure to be brought on allies not deemed to be pulling their weight.

      For the rest of the world, unfortunately I think the outcome strategically is poor. Russia has made it clear that it is prepared to bully countries with the threat of nuclear weapons. This combined with the fear of US strategic unreliability (caused by Trump) will result in the collective realisation that you need to have a nuke in your back pocket to avoid being threatened by a nuclear bully. So unfortunately expect nuclear proliferation to become very much a thing over the next few decades. Expect Japan, South Korea, Germany, Poland and Australia to all go nuclear.

      Depressing!

  3. Let’s not forget that this war is unrighteous no matter the propaganda that is espoused. Human beings on both sides of the conflict are dying horrible deaths and suffering needlessly. Let’s not forget the power of the human spirit to overcome adversity and triumph over unrighteousness. The world is watching and the majority of our collective spirit has moved to end this conflict. War is part of the last paradigm(s). It is a new cycle now. This particular conflict will not last too much longer. JMO

  4. I think you are over exaggerating Russia’s logistics problems in the south. Three reasons. The Kersch bridge is repairable. Russia will have more trucks than you give them credit for. New Rail can be laid.

    However, as I noted in my comment to your last article, I think Ukraine will have a go at breaking the land bridge. They have to do so if they want to change the current situation. Otherwise the current situation will ultimately become the new international border.

    Will Ukraine succeed? In my view they have no better than a 50/50 prospect, for all the reasons you have outlined. Still at 50/50, Ukraine will think it worth having a go.

    Breaking the land bridge is such an important strategic goal for Ukraine. Of course the converse applies to Russia. Even if Russia has failed in their wider war aims, creating a land bridge and an expansion of the Luhansk and Donetsk provinces will be able to be painted by Putin as sort of a victory. Though not much of one considering the cost in human lives and the overall setback for Russia’s strategic position. These being the sanctions and Finland and Sweden joining NATO. Plus a strongly western leaning Ukraine. Even if not actually part of NATO, Ukraine will be heavily integrated into NATO

    I reckon a full twelve months to go before this is resolved. Basically through to the next Autumn rains.

    • You see the vid clown? a man in black came out firing and critically wounded 2 Ukrainian soldiers so as per the rules of a perfidy or false surrender everyone gets it. Always been this way always will be.

    • Sorry that was not cold blood. The last Russian came out firing and killed a Ukrainian service man. Return fire killed the whole troop. Notice the machine gunner set up prone in the grass.

      POW’s are not POW until the surrender is complete and all POW have been disarmed and searched. Geneva Convention rules. Seems like the surrendering Russians were a screen for the last gunman to take out the 4 Ukrainians service personnel.

      Worth a read;

      “His illegal act, defined by the rules of war, is called “perfidy” which are acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the law (of war), with intent to betray that confidence … Perfidious acts are prohibited on the basis that perfidy may damage mutual respect for the law of war, may lead to unnecessary escalation of the conflict, may result in the injury or death of enemy forces legitimately attempting to surrender or discharging their humanitarian duties, or may impede the restoration of peace …”

      https://funker530.com/video/nsfw-surrendering-russian-opens-fire-gets-his-squad-killed/

      • At no point of Gerrits link is there video evidence of Russians shooting ,,,, their is audio of a machine gun,,, but the only one pictured/shown is manned by a Ukrainian.

        The truth seems closer to the attitude displaued by tedheath ,,,”Russian soldiers are like possums, rats, weasels, ferrets or stoats in New Zealand ,,,” and the actions of war crimes and murder ( 8 years of them) stem from that.

      • Have you seen the video?
        Russian soldiers, unarmed, are lying on the ground, posing no threat to the Ukrainians.Kill anyone refusing to surrender , yes, but killing unarmed soldiers on the ground?
        No
        And its not the first time .

        • The soldiers on the ground had not been searched, disarmed or secured. Even face down, on the ground and hands up on the heads, they are considered by the rules of war to be enemy combatants until secured.

          The Russian soldier that came out firing, killed his fellow troopers by his actions. Ukrainians had no option but to return fire. There is a reason the squad automatic weapon (SAW — light machine gun) is set up at ground level (as per the video) to counter a “surrendering” soldier from using a pistol or grenade. Until secured the surrendering soldiers are still active combatants.

          Look up the meaning of “perfidy”.

        • Have not seen the video and don’t want to. If we are going start doing a moral critique of the engagement I am sure both sides have behaviour to answer for. Putin trying to freeze to death the people he is supposed to be liberating would be up there. Shelling innocent civilians may sometimes be an accident but cutting the power is not.

          • My thoughts also, there is always a difference between the official intentions of the countries involved & what happens in the heat of the moment with the individuals involved. There are obviously events that are plain evil but there will also be other incidents that were a result of people reaching their breaking point. It would be good if a post-war investigation was able to rectify the wrongs but I would not be holding my breath waiting for it to happen.

        • Afraid Francesca is right – kill the muppet who came out firing but not the Russians already surrendered and lying prone . . in saying that easy for us to pass judgement from the safety of our sofas.

          • Thank you James. I argued against you earlier on when I was not impressed with obvious one-eyed propaganda, but withdrew from commenting when it became a puerile procession of infantile insults. (I’m looking at you, tedheath.)
            We need more people to take an intelligent distance as you did in your comment above.

            • No problem In Vino and yes while I have not shied away from my condemnation of the Russian invasion that does not mean that I see all of this in black and white and those who wish to surrender should always have the ability to do so (whichever side they may be on).

  5. That you ignored the devastating attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure means ….? I take it you think it doesn’t matter or you’re more a military analyst. More the former, I have to assume.

    I have the pleasant image in my mind of Poland running an electric line over the border and every Euro country paying their bit. Otherwise they’re surrendering Uke to Russia.

  6. Ahh! Maps at last!
    Thanks Ben, A picture tells a thousand words.

    If I was a Ukraine general, I would be happy to sit back over Christmas:

    a) Defend the Luhansk and Donetsk line of control and let the Russians throw their conscripts at it and die in their thousands.
    b) Slowly starve out the Kherson Oblast south of the river by interdicting their supply lines. Let the Russians experience a cold, miserable winter without warm clothing and food all while picking them off with cheap drone hits. When summer comes, cut off the water supply to Crimea for good measure.
    c) Give the troops some R&R
    My two longer term focuses would be to:
    Firstly finish off the Kerch bridge. (Mr. Biden, can I borrow just one of your long range HIMARS please?)
    Secondly, engineer a solution to crossing or bypassing the Antonovskiy Bridge. With artillery and HIMARS to provide cover, they need to be able to get special forces over the bridge to force back Russian artillery positions while engineers effect a repair or use amphibious ops.

  7. Andrew, contemplate the question, “Can Ukraine recapture the initiative?” Seems to indicate they have lost it. Actually I think Ukraine never had the initiative.

    • Yes exactly. Which just proves Putin is a w*nker. All his talk of Ukrainians really being Russian and his claims of coming to liberate them are just bollocks. It that were true you wouldn’t be turning civilians into popsicles on purpose.

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