| By Geoffrey Miller
Last weekโs visit to New Zealand by US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman was another in a series of high-level calls on the country by top US military and political figures this year.
Shermanโs trip to Wellington came soon after a stop in New Zealandโs capital by Admiral John Aquilino, the head of the US Indo-Pacific Command, and only two months after a visit by Mark Lambert, a US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State with responsibility for East Asia and the Pacific.
A tangible outcome of Shermanโs trip was the signing of a new โFramework Agreementโ to underpin co-operation between New Zealand and the United States in the space sector.
On the surface, this might appear to be largely unrelated to growing geopolitical tensions.
But Rocket Lab, New Zealandโs main player in the space industry, is carrying out a growing number of satellite launches and reportedly undertakes a third of its activities on behalf of US military agencies.
In early August, Rocket Lab launched a satellite for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the US government agency responsible for constructing and operating the countryโs spy satellites.
Unsurprisingly, the company prefers to highlight its more science-focused missions, such as its June launch for NASA of a mini โCubeSatโ satellite bound for the moon.
The significance of US-NZ space cooperation is such that New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern laid the groundwork for the space deal when she met US Vice President Kamala Harris as part of Ardernโs trip to Washington DC at the end of May.
Away from the goings on in outer space, Sherman would have had much to discuss with Ardern in private when it comes to New Zealandโs immediate neighbourhood.
A brief State Department account of the meeting said Sherman and Ardern โhighlighted the importance of coordinating US-New Zealand efforts in the Pacificโ.
Notwithstanding recent recalibration attempts by Ardern, New Zealand has this year more closely aligned itself with US and Australian positioning when it comes to Chinaโs ambitions, especially in relation to the Pacific.
As Wendy Sherman was keen to point out, New Zealand recently joined the USโs new โPartners in the Blue Pacificโ grouping that also includes Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom.
Still, New Zealand remains outside the โharderโ security-focused arrangements such as the Quad and Aukus.
To this end, comments by Sherman on Aukus โ the new pact involving Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States โ provide some insights into the US strategy with regards to New Zealandโs potential future role.
Jacinda Ardernโs original line on Aukus when it was launched in September last year was that it had little to do with New Zealand, given that its main aim was to supply Australia with nuclear-powered submarines.
When asked at the time whether New Zealand had been asked to join, Ardern reiterated New Zealandโs nuclear-free policy and said โWe werenโt approached, nor would I expect us to beโ.
Last week, Sherman appeared to recognise New Zealandโs nuclear-free roadblock, but when asked about New Zealandโs potential participation she told an interviewer that there could be โscope for others to joinโ when โother emerging technologiesโ were considered.
The potential place that Sherman sees for New Zealand within Aukus is not without foundation. New Zealandโs views on Aukus have always been more ambiguous than they appeared on the surface. While Ardern seemed to rule New Zealand out of the group when it was unveiled last year, she also said โwe welcome the increased engagement of the UK and US in the regionโ.
And last November, Annette King, New Zealandโs High Commissioner to Australia, said New Zealand could potentially join Aukus to cooperate on cybersecurity technologies. In December, defence minister Peeni Henare appeared to endorse this approach when he cited the โtechnology gainsโ that Aukus would generate. At the time, Henare expressed a willingness to โleverage off that particular opportunityโ.
But by accepting, welcoming and even considering signing up to Aukus โ or at least elements of it โ for pragmatic reasons, New Zealand is arguably turning a blind eye to wider nuclear proliferation concerns that arise from the pact.
Helen Clark, a former Labour Prime Minister who is closely identified with New Zealandโs nuclear-free policy, last week called the original nuclear-powered submarine purpose of Aukus as a โdefining reason for NZ never joiningโ.
Australia and its US and British allies have been at pains to emphasise that Aukus deal only involves supplying Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, not nuclear weapons.
However, as Indonesia โ an Aukus sceptic โ pointed out in a submission to this monthโs UN review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the submarine deal effectively exploits an NPT loophole and sets a poor precedent for others.
In theory, the highly-enriched uranium in the nuclear-powered submarines being purchased by Australia from the US and UK could also be repurposed for nuclear weapons.
New Zealandโs nuclear-free principles motivated it to sign the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017, one of only a handful of Western countries to do so. After receiving ratification from 50 countries, the TPNW officially entered into force on January 22 this year.
Despite this success, 2022 is shaping up as a bleak year for nuclear proliferation and safety.
In Ukraine, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant โ Europeโs biggest โ is currently a target for shelling and is serving as cover for Russian tanks and rocket launchers, in part thanks to the plantโs strategic location on the banks of the Dnipro river.
Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin is poised to shift nuclear weapons into neighbouring Belarus, which is assisting Russia in its war on Ukraine. A referendum held in Belarus in February approved the revocation of the countryโs non-nuclear weapons status.
Elsewhere, prospects for the revival of the Iran nuclear deal seem mixed at best, despite some progress by EU negotiators who have reportedly brokered a final draft. The draft supposedly contains workarounds for sticking points โ such as the status of Iranโs Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). But it is far from clear that these compromises will be acceptable to the US side, especially after an apparent plot by an IRGC member to kill former US National Security Advisor John Bolton was revealed.
Phil Twyford, New Zealandโs disarmament minister, noted the dangers of the Iranian and Russian nuclear threats โ along with risks posed by North Korea โ in a speech to the NPT review conference held at the UN in New York earlier this month.
In his address, Twyford warned that the world was โin real danger of moving backwardsโ when it came to a goal of zero nuclear weapons, adding that โmore nuclear weapons โ whether in the hands of the existing nuclear weapons states or others โ will not make us saferโ.
Twyford made no mention of the nuclear proliferation problem posed by Aukus.
And there is no doubt that the Aukus arrangement is of a very different nature and calibre to the nuclear programmes run by the likes of Iran, North Korea and Russia.
Despite this, real nuclear risks remain from Australiaโs Aukus deal.
Surprisingly, nuclear-free New Zealand may be inching towards becoming part of it.
Geoffrey Miller is the Democracy Projectโs international analyst and writes on current New Zealand foreign policy and related geopolitical issues. He has lived in Germany and the Middle East and is a learner of Arabic and Russian. |
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