In recent days activity has returned to the frontlines of the ground war in Ukraine. The Russians now hold Mariupol, the last defenders isolated in the Azovstal Steel Works. Starving this group out rather than assaulting the area is sensible tactics. The Azovstal Steel Works covers about 11 square kilometres and it was built during the Cold War and designed to survive a nuclear attack. Complete with reinforced concrete bunkers, underground rooms and tunnels it would be a nightmare to fight through and clear out the defenders. The small remaining group of defenders can be easily contained and won’t be able to have any further impact on the local battle. This is a victory for the Russians and elsewhere they have also been busy developing their campaign.
Starting in the northeast, the Russians are currently active along a front roughly 280km long that arcs from Kharkov in the north, south east through Izium, to Rubizhne, Kreminna and Popasna in the east, then to Horlivka in the south. Across this arc the Russians are shelling, probing and generally maintaining pressure on Ukrainian forces. However, in a couple of areas they are particularly active making more concentrated assaults near Izium, Rubizhne, Kreminna and Popasna.
What is happening here and how will this situation develop?
An observation is that the Russian’s key tactical consideration in this sector is logistics. The northern and southern ends of this arc are tied to key Russian supply lines. In the north, the arc is anchored on Izium, a rail head for a network of lines that extends north all the way to Belgorod, a major supply depot in Russia. At the southern end, the arc is anchored on Donetsk a large pro-Russian city that provides the logistic infrastructure required to mount military operations.
Access to these supply lines at both ends of the arc ensures that Russian operations in this area are able to be supported. At both ends there is rail infrastructure able to feed soldiers, tanks, armoured vehicles and all the fuel, food and ammunition they need to the front line. Secure in this support the Russians are now a making careful tactical advances. Supported by airpower and artillery, their attacks are reported to be carefully staged conservative operations probably designed to test the Ukrainians and to look for weaknesses in their defences. Russian tactics are evolving and the lessons of the first phase of the war appear to have been learnt. So far, we are not seeing deep unsupported thrusts into Ukrainian territory.
Broadly, speaking Russian objectives in this area are likely to be Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, large population centres and rail junctions. The Russians have three options to seize these areas:
- Launch deep thrusts from both Izium in the north and Donetsk in the south aiming to cover a distance of about 50km from each start point, then meet up and encircle large numbers of Ukrainian soldiers on the Luhansk border.
- Launch one deep thrust from either the Izium area in the north or from Donetsk in the south, covering a distance of roughly 100km. Again, aiming for a large-scale encirclement of Ukrainians on the border with Luhansk.
- Conduct a series of small local offensives, most likely between Izium and Rubizhne or between Donetsk and Popasna. The offensives would cover roughly 40km at the most and aim to encircle small groups of Ukrainian defenders. Gradually, expanding the area controlled by Russia.
At this stage it is too early to tell how the battle will develop, however we can assess the viability of the options and predict a most likely course of action. In the last article, I discussed the important role of infantry soldiers, large numbers are required to achieve success in offensive operations because they are the soldiers that seize and hold ground. After starting the war with roughly 120 battalion tactical groups credible reports state that Russia can currently field about 70 battalion tactical groups with a further 20-22 still re-constituting. A battalion tactical group has about 1000 soldiers of which about 300 are infantry. So Russia’s available force is relatively small, probably around about 70,000 of which about third are infantry soldiers or about 20-25,000 fighting soldiers able to seize and hold ground. In time these numbers will increase as the battalion tactical groups being re-equipped come back into service. However, even with 90 battalion tactical groups the numbers are still only likely to be 30-35,000 actual fighting soldiers.
The Russians are supported by approximately 35,000 militia in Donetsk and Luhansk able to defend ground and possibly launch small attacks and by an unknown number of mercenaries and Syrian allies reported to be between 10-14,000. Counting every militia man and mercenary as an infantry solider gives the Russians a maximum total infantry force of about 70,000. This seems like a large force, however that force is spread from Kherson in the west all the way to Kharkov in the north a distance of about 700km. By conventional military wisdom the Russians will struggle to defend a front 700km long with their current numbers.
Putting these number into perspective, during the Cold War NATO’s 1st British Corps defensive front was 65km. 1st British Corps deployed two divisions forward, each covering half the frontage, both divisions were about 30,000 strong with about 6,000 fighting soldiers in each. 1st British Corps then had another division in depth to counter attack. The Soviets aiming to attack 1st British Corps, the famous 3rd Shock Army, planned to attack with their divisions each taking a section of the front about 4km wide and aiming to achieve a 10:1 superiority in soldiers, fire and material at the point of contact. The key point is that defending ground takes a lot of soldiers and attacking ground takes even more.
The current Russian army in Ukraine is a shadow of its Soviet ancestor, and with a maximum of 70,000 infantry spread over approximately 700km of front so it will struggle to concentrate a large offensive force and defend the areas they have captured at the same time. At this stage they are lucky that the Ukrainians do not appear to have an armoured force able to counter attack or they would be in real trouble. This is why the Russians are using artillery so much, firing artillery is a much easier and more economic way to harass your enemy and it conserves valuable infantry soldiers. It is also why across the whole front we are only seeing small concentrated attacks around Izium, Rubizhne, Kreminna and Popasna.
Kharkov is being shelled and probed with small attacks because the Russians need to ensure that Ukrainian forces in that city are ‘fixed’ and cannot enter the battle. The Russians need the rail lines that run from Belgorod to Izium to supply their forces and if the Ukrainians currently defending Kharkov are allowed to move, they could attack this vital supply line. Therefore the Russians need to maintain pressure on Kharkov to hold these Ukrainians in place so they cannot attack the supply line.
Realistically, the Russians do not have the numbers to mount deep thrusts so operations in the north east, so their most likely course of action is to progress a series of small offensives supported by massive amounts of artillery and airpower. However, we cannot completely ‘write off’ the Russians attempting a deep thrust. The first phase of the war demonstrates a high-level of arrogance and a lack of awareness and a general’s ‘big hands’ moving on ‘small maps’ sometimes forget that the most important equation in war is not the number of corps, armies, divisions or battalion tactical groups but rather the actual number of infantry with bayonets able to seize and hold ground.
In the south things are evolving very differently, Mariupol has fallen. A force will be required to secure the Azovstal Steel Works but most of Russian force in this area will be able to either recuperate after a tough period of fighting or be redeployed.
And the Russians are making progress in the south. Small offensives supported by lots of artillery have enable them to expand the area they control on the west bank of the Dnieper River near Kherson. This city is vital because it provides holding it and the surrounding area either provides a border secured by a river for a new ‘Donbas state’ or it provides crossing points and a base for an offensive to take Odessa.
This is an area of the ground war to watch, the Russians in this area are well supported from Crimea and either capturing Odessa or securing Donbas’s western flank against the Dnieper are likely to be important objectives. Further, in this area the Russians are demonstrating success pushing forward and Soviet doctrine was to always reinforce success, probably Russian commanders think the same way.
Yesterday, Gwynn Dyer a famous journalist and author wrote an interesting opinion piece about the potential for Russia to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. This is a possible threat and it is important that we understand some key facts about nuclear weapons. The first point is that there are two kinds; small ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons and large ‘strategic’ nuclear weapons. Some tactical nuclear weapons are small enough to be fired from artillery guns and strategic nuclear weapons are big weapons fired from silos in the ground or from submarines able to destroy whole cities. The battlefield effect of tactical nuclear weapons is not large many times smaller than the Hiroshima bomb. Doctrinally NATO countries developed them to break up Soviet armoured formations and the Soviets developed them to punch holes in NATO’s defensive lines.
In fact during the late 80s and 90s most armies moved away from using tactical nuclear weapons because artillery shells and aircraft bombs became more destructive. Some modern cluster bombs and fuel air explosives can do more damage than small nuclear bombs. Cluster bombs and artillery shells firing small bombs called sub-munitions are more effective against troops protected in tanks and armoured vehicles than small nuclear weapons. Likewise, fuel air explosives like the American ‘Mother of all Bombs’ (MOAB) or the Russian thermobaric weapons destroy defensive positions more effectively than small nuclear weapons. Both can be used without the stigma associated with nuclear weapons.
However, the next important point is that in Soviet doctrine and in Russian doctrine, chemical and nuclear weapons use is accepted as an inevitable part of war fighting. In this military tradition there has never been a moral distinction made between different types of weapons.
So, from the perspective of strict military efficiency using tactical nuclear weapons does not make a great deal of sense because there are other weapons that can do the same job and will not create outrage. However, war is not always logical and the Russians could see potential to use tactical nuclear weapons as a way to demonstrate their resolve and force NATO to ‘back off’ before Russia escalates further. This is unlikely, because its political impact will be very negative for Russia not only would it strengthen NATO resolve but is likely bring condemnation from around the world. For instance it is a pretty safe bet that after using even a small nuclear weapon European countries will immediately stop Russian gas imports. Further, the large powers tacitly supporting Russia like India and China are unlikely to support this action understanding full well that it sets a dangerous precedent for their inter-state conflicts. So use of nuclear weapons remains unlikely, however it is important to consider and to be prepared for just in case.
In summary, the war’s second phase is slowly developing, in the next few days the north east is likely to see continuing fighting as the Russians bomb and shell that front continuing to mount small local attacks. Over time a pattern will develop indicating whether the Russians are planning a major operation or if they intend to ‘bite off Donbas in small chunks’. The area around Kharkov and Izium is important and should be watched closely. Can the Ukrainians mount an offensive that threatens the Russian supply line between Izium and Belgorod?
Further south, the situation is evolving near Kherson. The Russians are making some progress, not much but they are going forwards, so in coming days there may be some rapid developments in this area.
Ben Morgan is a tired Gen X interested in international politics. He is TDB’s Military analyst.
Not being reported in the New Zealand MSM. Spontaneous combustion fires at important chemical and missile design plants and offices.
https://www.newsweek.com/russia-fires-tver-defense-chemical-iskander-dmitrievsky-1699970
With 2 million Ukrainians in Russia and an ability for Ukrainian special forces to “blend in” whilst in Russia. How safe are the rail-heads, bridges, roads, etc to guerilla attacks?
Guess those Moskva type instantaneous combustion fires are spreading.
What kind of half arsed NATO war strategy is it ,,,,, when a large RUSSIAN gas pipe-line runs through UKRAINE, and they are at war ,,,, but UKRAINE will not blow up this Russian pipe-line ??…. Even though this pipe-line is partly funding the Russian military.
So it’s not total war,,,, it’s not even conventional war ,,,, a contrived weapons manufacturers enriching bullshit war.
Glory to the war profiteering ….
Never mind the looming recession for the rest of us. https://youtu.be/OgvIeAgkUTA?t=514
A gas pipeline does not need to be blown up. You simply switch off the pumps if wanting to stop gas flow. Russia needs the money for the supplied gas to the west. Russia is still paying Ukraine to host and maintain the pipe network. How strange indeed.
Worth a read:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-22/war-is-raging-but-russia-is-still-paying-ukraine-for-gas-flows
“It’s been a month since the war started, but Russia is actually shipping more natural gas through Ukraine and Moscow is still paying Kyiv in full for transiting the fuel to Europe.” … “Ukraine has said before that Gazprom pays about $2 billion per year for gas-transshipment services. “
The commentary from Ben is just excellent. I generally only skim the mass of mainstream media stuff – who are just propaganda vehicles. Only Ben manages to give a picture of what is actually happening, and likely to happen, without emotional judgement.
Straight from the Pentagon to you…
Ben certainly appears to have good intelligence regarding the conflict & has been correct in his predictions so far. I would rate him as a more credible source than the comments on this site that expected Kyiv to be taken by Russia a few weeks ago.
Knowing the truth is more important than some ideological obsession holding on to any biased worldview.
‘For instance it is a pretty safe bet that after using even a small nuclear weapon European countries will immediately stop Russian gas imports.’
Whatever you say Wilfrid.
Check out Scott Ritter as well, good analysis
Christ on a stick.
Though it doesn’t address the big questions, of whether this war is justified, or which side will prevail
Surely this is the best blood and guts battlefield summation of the Russian strategic battle plan and balance of forces you’re gonna get.
The follow up must be of the Ukraine strategic battle plan.
“Surely this is the best blood and guts battlefield summation of the Russian strategic battle plan and balance of forces you’re gonna get.”
February 28, 2022– “Kiev remains the decisive point in the campaign. This is where the war will be won or lost. “
If you are suggesting that Ben is rapidly shifting his stance, I agree.
Very indepth and interesting account of operations Ben.
Reining in that initial over confidence means Russia is achieving its immediate aims.
I cannot see how Ukraine can win.
There are no “winners” or “losers”. Both countries are stuffed. Russia from China, Ukraine from Russia.
Ukraine will be rebuilt ($90 Billion in foreign aid) to make them dependent upon the west. Russia as an pariah state having to rebuild it military and social services from selling its resources. Resources from east of the Ural mountains it may want to sell but China has their eyes on those. Russia could loose all influences in Siberia and become a reliant state on the sino giant. Russia does not even have the resources on the ground in Siberia to stop Chinese illegal logging operations.
Worth a read
https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/was-china-betting-on-russian-defeat-all-along/
“Thus, the simplest explanation is that China doesn’t want Russia to win because a victorious Russia would likely become too assertive to handle, while a defeated, weakened, isolated Russia would have no choice but become a docile strategic ally of China, granting access to the natural resources of Siberia in the process. Given the fact that China seems to have been aware of the Russian plans to invade Ukraine from the very beginning, and encouraged Russia to do so, only to roll back its support once the war started, this all suggests that China may have been betting on a Russian defeat all along”.
According to the Key in this map https://dxczjjuegupb.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/word-image-56.jpeg
The new state of Ukraine ,,, meaning whats left of it ,,, may go back to their old flag 😉
One mistake, people make about China repeatedly is in only considering their moves a step or two into the future. The Chinese play the long game and they are always looking 50 years into the future and all the possible moves in between. I have said it before, ignore China at your peril. And that goes for China’s so called allies as well – Putin and she of the special relationship with China.
No mention of the collateral damage to the innocent population -elderly, woman and children from cowardly remotely directed bombing and missile attacks by a super power. Putin will go down in history as a pariah and butcher next to Stalin and Hitler. What’s Putins end game after he’s bombed the shit out of the infrastructure – establish a puppet government, import Russian sympathisers and rebuild. Putin cant be trusted not to use nuclear weapons thus starting WWIII and destruction to life as we know it. The western world needs to ramp up it military spending especially Japan and Germany who need to build up their defensive/offensive forces
And no mention from you, Nikorima, of the killing of pro-Russians within the Ukraine that has been going on since 2014.. Some balance, please?
Ben, all good. Thanks.
You spend a lot of time talking about Russia’s options but don’t forget the Ukrainians have options too. I don’t expect them to sit back and wait for the Russians to come at them.
For example There are reports this morning that they’ve successfully ‘droned’ a lot of Russian howitzers and as mentioned above, I expect they will attack supply lines well behind the border probably by drone. Newly arrived US 155mm howitzers and long range SAMs will even the score.
Overall Russia is bleeding to death on this battlefield: expending men, munitions and money it cannot easily replace.
Pretty good analysis but lacking one thing the morale of each side.
The thing that amazes me the most why dont the Ukrainians destroy the Crimea to Russia bridge.
Censor me Ben, you are still wrong.
Be interesting to know in what respect you think Ben is wrong. How about presenting your summation of what will happen next?
I think, geopolitically, Russia will desperately hang onto the land corridor to the Crimea and maintain control of the break away republics. I don’t think they will reach Odessa or link up with the Russian enclave in Moldova.
Russia will presently need to withdraw troops to stem the tide of stealthy and illegal takeover by China of Siberia.
Demographically Russia cannot survive a much longer war to take the whole Black Sea coast from the Ukraine. They simply could not commit enough troop to any greater area, they now occupy, to maintain the occupation. Ukraine will continue to harass the occupiers plus wage raids into Russia itself to disrupt the supply chain.
Economically Russia is going to have to keep pouring money into the breakaway republics and the coastal strip they occupy to rebuild infrastructure and maintain social cohesion. If the Crimea economy is any indication it is a big ask for a pariah nation. Worth a read;
https://www.ankasam.org/the-economic-effect-of-the-crimean-annexation/?lang=en
“The economic prosperity promised by the Russian authorities has not happened. The increase in wages and pensions did not last long: the increase in price of food products and the depreciation of the ruble quickly affected the consumer opportunities of the Crimean population. The social and economic situation in Crimea after its occupation is characterized by a rapid return to Soviet standards from the sectoral structure of the economy to the Social Security Indicators.”
Hey you all seem pretty clued up and all so can someone answer me this on behalf of a work place, crib room discussion. If two nations are at war and a third nation decides to supply one of the nation’s with weapons can the other nation try and stop the shipment?
Today I read the Russians suggested they are willing to do just that.
I vaguely remember reading that while the American public took the sinking of the Lusitania as an unprovoked act of war in 1916, the Germans were legally able to do it. Their intelligence and spy’s suggested rather strongly that she did in fact have weapons and ammunition on board and they had every good reason to stop it arriving in Europe. A fact that only became known well after the war. And by placing such material on board a registered liner the allies were even using the unwitting passengers as human shields. But then there have been blockades of sorts during war for millennia. And of course propaganda.
So anyway in theory at least could the Russians have legally shot down or prevented the RNZAF Hercules carrying the missiles over to the Ukrainians or indeed any other?
NZ is not at war with Russia anymore than the USSR was at war with the US by supplying weapons to north Vietnam.
As a matter of international law, there is no state of armed conflict between the countries supplying weapons to Ukraine and Russia. If Russia attacked an aircraft operating in western Europe that was carrying weapons into Poland for later transport into Ukraine that would be an act of war by Russia. That is well understood by Russia.
I thought Vladimir Putin explained Russia’s plans in the Donbas quite clearly on about Feb 24th.The plan seems to be unfolding about as expected as far as I can see. The 40 k line of vehicles seemingly stuck on the road to Kiev kept everyone guessing for a while and got much of the Ukraine military collected around that city so the could be isolated from where Russia needed to operate . Other than that they seem to be doing just what he said they would do.
D J S
A feint, as you seem to be prepared to believe that the attack on Kyiv was, would not involve nearly half the attacking force and 20,000 dead.
In any event such a feint would not have been necessary if the actual goal was to only capture the Donbas. That only required an advance of a few dozen miles.
Whether you care to admit it or not, the Kyiv assault was a serious attempt to decapitate the Unkrainian leadership, which was a specific war aim set out in February. And it was defeated.
I listened to the Feb 24 war aims live and I don’t believe that it contained any undertaking to decapitate the Ukrainian leadership. You would have to be inferring that from the “Denazification “comment which is not the same though I accept that that term is pretty ambiguous.
Lavrov’s explanation of it is that the laws outlawing the Russian language use and other legislation that discriminates against the Russian speaking population Which would be about the mildest interpretation.
My take from listening to the translation of Putin’ announcement was that he specifically did not want or intend to change the government. If you have evidence that a specific war aim to decapitate the Ukrainian leadership was set out by Putin in February please quote and link.
You will not be surprised that Russia acknowledges a far smaller casualty number than what you have taken from the far more reliable propaganda of the Ukrainian government.
D J S
20,000 dead ? Is that combined Ukraine Russian casualties ? Last figure I saw from the Russian defence ministry was about 1400 ( from memory ) and I don’t believe anything from Ukraine / western sources .
” half the attacking force ” ? Again from memory wasn’t it about 40,000 to 60,000 in the Kiev axis ? Which by sensible reasoning is way too small to take a city of 3 million with a militia of 100,000? And I do believe the Russian military is both sensible and competent .
” to decapitate the Ukrainian leadership, which was a specific war aim set out in February. ” by whom ? I only remember the Kremlin saying they were going to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine both of which they seem to be achieving .
“In any event such a feint would not have been necessary if the actual goal was to only capture the Donbas. That only required an advance of a few dozen miles”
Straight into the face of an heavily fortified deeply entrenched heavily armed professional army with unrestricted supply lines . I did say the Russians were
sensible and competent didn’t I .
The Russians themselves have recently reported 14,000 dead and 7,000 missing. Apparently it was from a military briefing which was reported on TV, but quickly taken down. The same thing happened about 4 weeks ago, when 10,000 dead was reported on Russian TV, also quickly taken down. So yes, 20,000 Russian dead is very believable.
Western reporters (yes, I know, they are all part of CIA disinformation) apparently counted hundreds of Russian dead on the battlefields north off Kyiv. I find it quite surprising that a modern Army would leave so many of their own dead. I would expect a few left in unrecoverable positions, but hundreds? No modern western army would do that. It speaks volumes about the Russian Army, either to their level of disorganisation, or to their cavalier disregard of their own casualties, and by implication a disregard of civilian casualties.
Watch Gorbachev’s recommendation to Putin to give it up after 10 years. I in someway agreed with Gorby’s view of the good Putin had done post the anarchy of Yeltsin. Apart from his probable fake Chechen attacks to get him into power and the Russkies bullshit undermining of the 2004 Ukraine election. Dictators and gangsters always stay on as long as they can – Sulla excepted.
This is the only article by this author that I partially agree with .
I’ve never believed Kiev to be the target as stated by western analysts , instead , as confirmed by the Kremlin they’re taking Odessa which I believe has been an axiomatic strategic objective since this cuts off Ukrainian access to the Black Sea with obvious military and economic repercussions for Ukraine .
Moreover if they link up with Transnistria they can install anti-missile forces to counter U.S missile forces in Romania aimed at ” Iran ” (as stated by the Bush administration ) . Seems like a logical objective to me .
I agree the with the stated targets and methods (small attacks ) but this I believe is because the Russians wish to minimize casualties and since the Ukrainians have no air support , armour , resupply ( 4 bridges destroyed yesterday major armoury captured ) the Russians can afford to take their time and methodically destroy Ukrainian forces in the east .
Finally ” At this stage they are lucky that the Ukrainians do not appear to have an armoured force able to counter attack or they would be in real trouble. ” Really Ben ? Lucky ?
Ra, well said. Seems Ben and acolytes are fighting the previous war with bad information.
It seems to me that a UN supervised referendum on independence in Donetsk and Lugansk , and the results accepted and acted on by Ukraine would end this war, and the endless speculation about what Russia’s motivation and objectives are, tomorrow if not sooner.
It also seems that Ukraine is putting it’s people through hell to keep control of those regions against the wishes of the population of those regions. A referendum properly supervised is the only way to know.
D J S
It would appear from reports overnight that the Russians have struck and crippled railway resupply routes to the east, in effect obviating any need to attack. These Ukrainian troops are in effect on their own.
Id suggest that Russia will instead overun the south coast reducing Ukraine to a landlocked rump west of the Dneiper.