Pacific Brief: Geo-political and military activity in the Pacific

Norwegian missiles for Malaysia
Another Pacific power is procuring Norway’s Naval Strike Missile (NSM). The Strait Times reports that the Royal Malaysian Navy plans to procure the NSM, with deliveries starting in March 2026.[i]
The stealthy and accurate NSM is fast becoming the anti-ship missile of choice for ‘Western’ navies. Built by Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace, the sea-skimming missile is designed to attack ships and has a published range of 2-300km depending on the variant. Already, the NSM is in service with Norway, Netherlands, the US, the UK, Australia, Japan and Poland. Further, Denmark, Spain, Canada, India, Indonesia, New Zealand and Belgium are also investigating purchasing the NSM.
Inter-operability is a term that describes the capacity for multi-national forces to work together during conflict. Any weapon system procurement provides an insight into a nation’s defence strategies because it demonstrates who the procuring country sees as its potential partners or allies; and wants to remain inter-operable with.
In this case, procurement of NSM is an indication that Malaysia sees its future partners being within the group of countries currently using the system, or that are considering procurement. Notably, alongside the US, Pacific ‘middle-weight’ powers Australia and Japan are included in this group. NSM is also becoming a standard system in NATO, an alliance that is increasingly active in the Pacific region. Malaysia faces territorial challenges in the South China Sea that it is not strong enough to deter alone, and its selection of NSM indicates the nation’s ‘allies of choice’ in a future conflict.
Australia and Indonesia update security arrangements
On Friday 6 February, Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed the bilateral security treaty that the two nations announced they were working towards late last year.[ii] The new agreement commits both nations to consult on security issues but is politically orientated rather than making firm military commitments. Regardless, it is noteworthy because it indicates a more thawing of the Indo-Australian relationship.
In 1999 Australia and Indonesia entered a period of diplomatic tension over East Timorese independence, and since then both parties have worked to rebuild the relationship. Starting with the Lombok Treaty in 2006, that was extended in 2014.
The new agreement’s timing indicates both nations security concerns. Australia is a US ally and competes with China for influence in the South West Pacific. It is concerned about the larger nation’s assertive territorial claims. Building a security relationship with Indonesia is important because it contributes to stabilising Melanesia and means the two countries can work together to address shared issues like trans-national crime, smuggling and local conflicts. Further, if Melanesia is stable, it is easier for Australia to exert influence and block Chinese diplomacy in the region.
Developing a security relationship with Indonesia also provides Australia with an influential partner in South East Asia. Already, it has close defence relationships with Singapore and Malaysia through the Five Powers Defence Agreement and Australia is also supporting Philippines to deter Chinese claims in the South China Sea. However, a strong security relationship with Indonesia further increases Australian influence in South East Asia.
Indonesia also benefits from stability in Melanesia, and although strictly neutral it has territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea. Currently, conflict in this area is focussed around the Philippines but Indonesia knows that a defence relationship with Australia may be useful in the future.
Japan’s elections signal hardening security policy
On 23 January Japan’s Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi dissolved parliament and called a snap election. When voting ended on 8 February her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had won a landslide victory, holding more than two thirds of seats in the lower house.[iii]

Last year, Takaichi set off a diplomatic confrontation with China by commenting in parliament that aggression against Taiwan was a threat to Japanese security. A statement that is notable because it demonstrates Japan’s increasing willingness to confront China’s assertive territorial claims in the region, a position that is backed by action. For instance, in 2025 Japan significantly increased its defence budget[iv] and moved its elite marine brigade south, closer to the Senkaku Islands that neighbour Taiwan.[v] Meanwhile, Japan’s amphibious warfare capability continues to grow[vi] and its large Izumo Class anti-submarine helicopter carriers are being refitted to carry F-35 fighter planes, turning them into aircraft carriers. A series of actions that demonstrate Japan is keen to develop greater capacity to project force and protect its island chains, or support allies.
Takaichi’s election with a substantial majority means that this trend is likely to continue. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation reporting that “Ms Takaichi’s strong mandate could accelerate her plans to bolster Japan’s defences, further angering Beijing, which has cast her as attempting to revive its militaristic past.”[vii]
The new government’s first security order of business is to review the National Security Strategy, the National Defence Strategy, and the Defence Buildup Program. Takaichi is committed to increased military spending and deterrence, and is likely to encourage development of the local defence industry.
A notable point is that with the LDP’s two third majority in the lower house, it can over-ride Japan’s upper legislature – the House of Councillors. In fact, the LDP’s majority is so large that the party could even change the constitution. This situation means that we should expect to see Japan’s role in Pacific security increase.
Japan has a powerful defence industry and its military is large, well-trained and very well-equipped. It also has an extensive range of security relationships in the Pacific, and with NATO countries. Coupled with an assertive approach to deterrence these could see greater willingness to confront any challenge from China, Russia or North Korea.
Further, Japan is likely to work more with Australia and possibly India to mitigate the risks created by uncertainty over US foreign policy. Therefore, expect predict more deployments of Japanese ships, aircraft and personnel around the Indo-Pacific region in 2026. It is even possible that constitutional changes could be made and we could see Japanese units deploying in support of allies or partners in security or peacekeeping operations. Finally, I expect Japan will also distribute more economic aid, law enforcement assistance and governance support to small nations across the Pacific seeking to reduce China’s influence in the region
Indian Prime Minister visits Malaysia
On 7-8 February Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Malaysia, and met with the Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. A warm meeting that finished with commitments from both nations to work more closely together economically and for greater security. [viii]
The meeting highlights two key trends in the Pacific region; India’s interest in South East Asia, and that countries in the region are keen to diversify their security relationships. Since the introduction of its ‘Look East’ doctrine in 1991 India has quietly extended its interests in South East Asia. Approximately 45% of India’s foreign trade is with South East Asia and the success of ‘Look East’ prompted the Modi government to re-invigorate the programme.
‘Act East,’ Modi’s new policy includes funding infrastructure projects and increased security cooperation with Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam a feature specifically aimed at increasing India’s influence in the South China Sea.
States like Malaysia are already faced with assertive Chinese claims to territory in the South China Sea, and now face uncertainty about US foreign policy. Therefore, they are keen to diversify their military relationships and defence supply chains. For example, Defence News reported recently that “Acquiring weapons and defence technology from India also reflects Southeast Asian countries’ reluctance to depend on the U.S. as the sole security provider or dominant defence supplier in the Indo Pacific.”[ix]
Modi’s visit reminds us that India is interested in the region, and that several Pacific nations are keen to encourage India to take a larger role in the area. This year expect to see more Indian activity in the region especially in South East Asia and Melanesia. For example, more diplomatic activities, Indian ships visiting and more Indian involvement in US or Australian led exercises.
Melanesian Update
A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.
Papua New Guinea highlighted in annual corruption review
Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perception Index (CPI)[x] highlighted issues with corruption in Melanesia, especially in Papua New Guina. The CPI is an international survey that studies perceptions of corruption in 182 countries around the world. It is impossible to accurately measure levels of corruption, so the CPI measures the perception and experience of citizens dealing with their state institutions.
A couple of Melanesian nations dropped in the international rankings:
- Papua New Guinea’s ranking dropped from 127th to 142th
- Vanuatu’s ranking dropped from 57th to 63rd
Across Melanesia, Solomon Islands improved its ranking and moved from 76th to 73rdplace, while Fiji improved by one place to achieve a ranking of 49th place and Timor Leste remains constant at 73rd place.
Papua New Guinea’s drop is significant and Radio New Zealand[xi] analysis highlighted a range of factors including:
- A lack of successful prosecutions for money laundering.
- Leadership concerns at the nation’s Independent Commission Against Corruption.
- Widespread abuse of logging permits.
- Endemic electoral corruption, including; ballot fraud, block voting, voter intimidation, bribery of electoral officers and tampering with electoral rolls.
Melanesian nations are small and young, meaning that their state institutions are not always strong. Corruption is therefore a significant risk that can easily destabilise a country, and create security risks. Monitoring agencies like Transparency International provide valuable insight into the problem.
Selling citizenship is a big industry in the Pacific, and sales of Vanuatu’s have surged
Several small Pacific nations generate revenue by selling citizenship, Vanuatu is one. In January, the Vanuatu Daily Post[xii] reported a ‘surge’ in sales. A significant portion of the nation’s revenue comes from this programme, and in 2025 approx. 2000 citizenships were sold earning US$ 31 million.
The Citizenship Programme is politically contentious in Vanuatu and an inquiry started in 2024 has recently culminated in a law change designed to limit political interference.
The sale of citizenship is an activity fraught with risk and it is likely that some Vanuatu passports are purchased for illegal activities. The European Union has already ‘black-listed’ the nation’s passport for financial transactions because of concerns about money laundering. Unfortunately, transnational crime is a significant risk in the South West Pacific and easy access to citizenship and new passports contributes to making it easier to move money or people illicitly around the region.
However, this practice is unlikely to stop because the revenue is too great for small Pacific nations to give up easily. Nauru, Tonga and Solomon Islands are also selling their citizenships and it is likely that this practice will spread further. This issue highlights why international economic development aid is so important in the Pacific. Small nations that cannot create wealth in more productive ways are likely to pursue activities like selling citizenship or providing ship registers, that create security risks.
China gifts Fijian President a new limousine
Radio New Zealand reports that China has gifted the Fijian president a new luxury car.[xiii] The upmarket Hongqi sedan was handed over to the Fijian President Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu in Suva last week.
This gift is another small example of how ‘soft power’ is utilised by large countries. A gift like a luxury car for the head of state is a way to acquire influence. The cost of luxury car is relatively small in the wider scheme of diplomatic expenditure but targeted gifts can strengthen relationships increasing the donor country’s influence.
It is another indication of how fierce competition for influence is between China, Australia and the US in the Pacific region.
Ben Morgan is TDBs Military Blogger. a defence and security analyst specialising in modern warfare, military adaptation, and operational-level conflict analysis. He posts at Substack.





