GUEST BLOG: Ben Morgan – What next? Can Ukraine recapture the initiative?

In recent weeks, we have seen the rapid withdrawal of Russian forces from West of the Dnipro River and there is a steady stream of speculation about – What happens next?  Trying to analyse the situation is very difficult because it hinges on Ukraine’s capacity to fight; and we simply do not have good information about this factor. 

What we do know mostly relates to Russia’s situation and can be summarised as follows:

• Russia appears to be holding its ground in Luhansk and Donetsk.  The Ukrainian advance into Luhansk has been stopped on a line running north south along the P66 motorway bisecting the towns of Kremina and Svatove.  
• The withdrawal from Kherson, behind the Dnipro River should provide a firm defence against a Ukrainian offensive from that direction.
• Using the Dnipro River to reinforce the southern defensive line, Russia minimises the length of front that it needs to defend. Russia can reduce the number of soldiers defending this section of the long front line; increasing the number able to be used to reinforce defences elsewhere or to attack.  This likely frees up 20-30,000 soldiers that can be re-deployed either in attack or defence. See below.

• Russia is starting to generate forces outside Ukraine from its mobilisation; for instance the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Tank Army, trained in Belarus and now moving to Donbas. It has also been confirmed that freshly mobilised troops are moving into the Donbas.  
• On 21 November, the British Ministry of Defence summed up Russia’s key logistics problems reporting that “Both Russian defensive and offensive capability continues to be hampered by severe shortages of munitions and skilled personnel”. Essentially, no matter how many new recruits or ex-conscripts are pressed into service Russia does not have a cadre of trained and experienced junior leaders and senior technicians. This means that there is a lack of small-unit leadership and that maintenance and repair of technical equipment will be suffering.  A situation that will only be exacerbated if numbers increase. 
• Then there is logistics; Russia relies on rail transport to move ammunition and other supplies forwards. Russia’s key problem is that rail supply to Crimea is compromised by damage to the Kerch Bridge. 

Russian troops in the south of Ukraine are supplied from Crimea using this route.  The picture below shows how Ukraine has isolated Russian forces in the south. The black lines are rail lines. Damaging the Kerch Bridge cut Russia’s key rail supply line into the south-east of Ukraine because there is no direct east-west route in the south-east. Movement of freight by rail instead needs to run via Zaporizhzhia, held by Ukraine.  

Now, logistics support to troops in the highlighted area needs to be moved by road.  Much less efficient for moving heavy goods like artillery ammunition. Further, Russia started the war short of trucks and after 11 months of war their truck fleet has been significantly reduced further stretching their ability to maintain ‘logistics push’ to troops in the highlighted area.

Finally, after capturing Kherson Ukraine HIMARS is now in range of the east rail and road route out of Crimea.  So we know that Russian logistics in the south is in trouble.

• The morale of individual Russian soldiers is low.  Consistent confirmed reports from both Ukraine and from Russia confirm that morale and willingness to fight is an issue effecting many Russian units.
• However, Russia is defending and defence requires less initiative; and in defence soldiers are essentially fighting for their own self-preservation so morale and junior leadership are less important considerations.  Unlike the attack there is no requirement to convince soldiers to get out of their trenches and move forwards towards the enemy. 

In summary, the south-east coast of Ukraine currently held by Russia is in a precarious position because its defenders are isolated from logistic support and suffering from low morale.  Ukraine’s interdiction of the rail network at Kerch makes movement of logistics west into the area difficult and the recent capture of Kherson means Ukraine can further impede Russia’s ability to supply its soldiers.  The area is ripe for exploitation and if it falls will break the ‘Crimean land bridge’ and isolate Crimea.

Aside from their high morale, sophisticated doctrine and good leadership the Ukrainians have one more key advantage.  Ukraine’s logistics train is lighter, more agile and not tied to the rail network.  The reason why is simple; the Ukrainians are using large amounts of precision weapons.  Using guided weapons and artillery ammunition means that the Ukrainians need less ordinance to achieve decisive results on the battle field.  

For instance, a Ukrainian artillery battery (normally six guns) firing precision guided munitions will probably destroy a target with ‘one round of fire for effect’ (each gun fires one round) a total of six shells.  The weight of that ammunition including propellent charges is roughly about 360kg.  A Russian battery using unguided weapons will need to adjust using two-six rounds then fire ‘three-five rounds fire for effect’; or a total of between 20 and 36 rounds to achieve the same result.  Getting that ammunition to the front requires moving approximately 1.2 – 2.2 tonnes of ammunition forward.  Even a small amount of precision guided ammunition makes a huge difference to a force’s logistics train. 

Likewise, every Javelin or NLAW anti-tank missile that is moved forwards is almost guaranteed to kill whatever type of vehicle it is fired at.  Russian anti-tank missiles are less accurate and to achieve the same result could take two or three equivalent missiles. At an even more basic level it is interesting to note the difference in individual weapons.  Ukrainian soldier’s rifles are often seen carrying specialist optics that make their fire more accurate; so less ammunition is needed. Greater precision increases lethality and reduces logistics burden meaning that the Ukrainians can more easily support the logistics of wide-ranging deep thrusts.  Combine this factor with their effective Starlink communications and excellent training and Ukraine has a very capable offensive force.  

If the Russians are caught ‘wrong footed’ and the Ukrainians can break through the defensive lines; then we can be pretty sure that there will be another Russian collapse.  However, the key question is whether or not Ukraine has the manpower available to switch to the offensive right now.  My gut feeling is that as we approach the northern winter; and temperatures drop Ukrainian soldiers; that have been in battle since February, need to rest and recuperate.  Further, even though Ukraine has good intelligence it seems that the Russian withdrawal from Kherson was unexpected. The Russians using civilian cars and buses to help mask the movement of troop. This means that it will take Ukraine a period of time to readjust their dispositions.  

Based on these factors I think that it is more likely that the next Ukrainian offensive will start in January or February when autumnal rain has stopped, troops are rested and moved into their start positions.  So where will the offensive be?  In the north, driving into Luhansk is an option. However, this seems unlikely to be Ukraine’s main effort because an attack there falls upon a pro-Russian area, one that is already holding against Ukrainian attacks and is well supplied from Russia; all factors that mean an attack will be difficult.  

Instead, it is more likely that Ukraine has drawn the same conclusions about Russian weaknesses and will attack in the south aiming to cut the ‘Crimean land bridge’ and two possible options are shown below either; an advance on Melitopol or against Mariupol. 

If successful, both options isolate Crimea and the Russian troops occupying the south-east who we know are logistically isolated, with low morale.  Further, this area is riddled with Ukrainian partisan activity that helps reduce Russian combat power. 

The question is which option will Ukraine take?   It is hard to say, an attack on Melitopol can be launched from Zaporizhzhia and the west ‘shoulder’ of the salient is secured by the Dnipro River.  Melitopol sits at the end of a long inlet that shortens the distance required to reach a defendable line; requiring an advance of about 100-120 km.  Capturing a salient here isolates Crimea and any Russian soldiers west of the offensive; likely forcing them to withdraw south into Crimea.  In turn capturing land immediately north of Crimea quickly, allows Ukraine to use artillery to attack into Crimea sooner than if they have to roll back Russian forces from Mariupol.   

An offensive aimed at Mariupol is the other likely option. This offensive would be harder to support, its eastern ‘shoulder’ resting on Donetsk Oblast’s (region’s) border.  However, Mariupol is Russia’s main rail hub with trains arriving here from Donetsk from which supplies are transferred onto trucks to supply Russian forces in south-east Ukraine. Losing Mariupol would further isolate the remaining defenders in the south-east by denying them use of the main rail hub in the area.   Mariupol is about 50-60km south of the nearest Ukrainian forces so the salient required to reach the city is shorter than attacking Melitopol. 

The Russians are currently ‘digging in’ around Melitopol, confirming that they can see the threat and believe that the blow will fall there.  Some months ago we observed that “The coastal strip is a long front for Russia to defend and tantalisingly some months ago the Ukrainians took the villages of Vulhedar and Volodymyrivka, 50km north of Mariupol on the Kalchyk River and the H 40 motorway” highlighting the possibility of a push in this area.  (See – Why the Russian army can’t deliver what their political masters want!) And; today the situation remains the same, a political and military victory tantalisingly close.  Capturing Mariupol closes Russia’s rail supply line into south-east Ukraine, directly threatens their developing offensive in Donetsk and would be a huge political win. Drawing the Russian’s east with operations on the Kinburn Peninsular and convincing them that Melitopol is the target are sensible tactical deceptions that may reflect Mariupol is being considered.

Unfortunately, none of us are in the Ukrainian planning team so any ideas are speculation and educated guesses. However, I do think that it is safe to say that Ukraine can regain the initiative and that Crimea will soon be isolated. 

 

 

Ben Morgan is a tired Gen X interested in international politics. He is TDB’s Military analyst.