Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update: South China Sea becomes more dangerous

The evolution of land forces in the Pacific: Part One – ‘Island Hopping’

‘Area-denial’ will be the defining tactical feature of any future conflict in the Pacific. Area-denial is a military term that means using accurate long-range missiles to ‘deny’ areas of land, sea and air to enemy units. Surveillance by ‘sensors’ like satellites, radar, drones, aircraft and human observers combined with accurate long-range missile fire creates a ‘kill web,’ within which any movement by surface ships, aircraft, or large concentrations of ground forces can be immediately and effectively attacked.

The components of the ‘kill web,’ either surveillance systems or the missiles they direct need to be located somewhere so across the Pacific, from the South China Sea to Melanesia and Polynesia there is a diplomatic contest underway to secure access to the small islands that will provide unsinkable bases from which area-denial missiles can operate. Likewise, this is why countries like China and Vietnam are furiously building artificial islands in the South China Sea.

It also shapes how Pacific land forces need to evolve because regardless of how accurate an area-denial missile system is, it is useless without ground to operate from. This means that nations preparing for conflict need to develop two key capabilities in their future force structure:

• The capability to capture islands; and
• The capability to hold islands.

Chinese area-denial and amphibious capabilities are increasing and are often discussed. China’s strategy is currently based on mass, or producing large numbers of missiles to swamp large areas of ocean to restrict US and allied movement. For example, if China does conduct an amphibious attack on Taiwan, or anywhere else, we would expect to see that island isolated using long-range missiles. Large US warships kept far away by a ‘kill web’ of accurate anti-ship missiles. The US and its allies are therefore developing a new set of amphibious capabilities based on small unit infiltration.

In the essay ‘Breaking Through the Modern Battlefields Defensive Kill Web’ I discussed the need to develop ‘break in’ forces to defeat area-denial, “a swarm of light, combined arms teams (i.e. EW, ground and air drones, mortars, light artillery and air-defence) that are self-supporting and can operate independently for days, in digital silence using auftragstaktik. Moving self-sufficiently without resupply, or new orders, and operating under the enemy’s area-denial zone. A force able to move and fight in complex terrain like woods, urban areas and broken country. Its objective is to ‘break in’ by compromising the defensive kill web’s ‘sensors.’ Human observers, EW monitoring stations, Ground Surveillance Radars, Remote Ground Sensors, and forward drone operating teams.“ The full article can be read here – https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/breaking-through-the-modern-battlefields

In recent years, ‘break in’ capabilities are developing in key Pacific militaries, using existing special forces units and light weight littoral infantry formations.

Special forces infiltration

In April 2019, Business Insider reported that “US and Philippine troops recently conducted a counter-invasion exercise focused on repelling an attempt by a foreign military to seize a small island and its airfield.” The small island was Lubang in the northern Philippines and the exercise involved US and Philippines special forces units landing by sea and air in a closely coordinated operation to seize an airfield and take control of the island.

On 24 August 2025, You Tube Channel – ‘Cappy Army’ provided further insight into US planning, specifically the use of special forces units to assault small islands. The post discussed an exercise on Thitu Island during which US special forces used High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) parachuting techniques to launch themselves from aircraft outside of anti-aircraft missile range, then glide close to the island before coming ashore to conduct an assault. After capturing an airfield, the initial assault group was reinforced from the air, High Mobility Army Rocket Systems (HIMARS) being deployed immediately so their missiles could deny enemy ships access to waters around the island.

HALO infiltration is extremely complex and only the most technically proficient militaries have the capability, and even then only in small numbers. Another sophisticated method of infiltration involves landing special forces swimmers from submarines. China’s area-denial dominance means that the US and its allies will be developing and practising techniques like these to infiltrate forces through air defence networks.

This year during Exercise Talisman Sabre, Australia practiced rapidly deploying HIMARS rocket launchers by air to Christmas Island, 1500km north-west of Australia. It is likely that part of the activity involved securing the airfield, probably using special forces.

We should expect to see special forces units of the US and its allies honing and developing their infiltration and assault capabilities. Special forces providing an ideal option for the capture of small islands or key objectives within a larger operation.

The development of specialist littoral units

Special force units are highly capable, but small and easily depleted during operations. Therefore, ‘line’ infantry units are also required to develop the skills required to infiltrate and ‘break in’ to an area-denial ‘kill web.’ We can already see changes in local forces, for instance:

• Australia’s 1st Brigade based in Darwin is developing as Australia’s lead unit for ‘littoral’ operations. In 2023, US Navy News reported that “The 1st Brigade will be transformed into a light combat brigade, which will allow it to be “light, agile and quick to deploy in the littoral environment” and “support land-based long-range fires.” Later, the 2024 Defence Strategic Review reinforced the need to develop littoral capabilities. In simple terms, 1^st Brigade’s role is to provide light infantry able secure areas for missile system, and this role means being able to infiltrate small groups into areas protected by missiles and drones.
• The US is well-advanced in the development of Marine Littoral Combat Regiments, specifically to organised infiltrate areas denied by missiles to seize ground. The aim being to ‘break in’ and provide friendly forces with the safe areas from which to fire their own long-range missiles.
• Japan’s recently created Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade is another example of this trend. Establishment started in 2018 and this formation is a littoral operations focussed brigade, specifically formed to rapidly respond to any threat to Japan’s offshore islands.

The key features of all these units can be summarised as follows:

• The soldiers in these units are expected to operate in small widely dispersed groups.
• Inter-operability is emphasised and these units are directly supported by landing craft and air transport.
• Each of these units exists to seize and hold ground to either for lodgement of a larger force or to provide firing platforms for area-denial missile systems.
• Unit tactical organisations often include organic air-defence and surface strike missiles.

The trend is likely to continue and to spread through smaller Pacific militaries, and within militaries planning to deploy to the region.

Sustainability, or being able to hold important ground

Being able to capture islands is one of the tactical capabilities required to fight in the Pacific. But a second capability is required, being able to hold ground that has been captured. Holding ground to sustain offensive operations and prevent raids, or counter attacks. Sustainability, includes;

• Being able to rapidly reinforce an assault force that has successfully infiltrated and captured an island, or being able to exploit the ‘break in.’
• Defending ground that has been captured.

Both tasks require a lager infantry component than Pacific nations currently maintain, and success in a future conflict requires two types of infantry:

• Immediate reinforcement forces. Well-trained and rapidly deployable infantry that can move by air or by sea to secure and hold ground captured by ‘Break In’ forces. Special forces or littoral specialists are a limited commodity and after the initial capture of island or key area they need to be reinforced immediately in case of a counter attack.
• Security forces. Large numbers of less mobile and responsive forces that can secure islands or areas of ground preventing them from being used as either as part of a ‘sensor’ network or sites for missiles to be launched from.

In this article – https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/break-out-the-infantry I discuss in more detail the counter-intuitive reasons why a battlespace with more drones and missiles requires more infantry.

The US and its allies are already looking at ways to increase the amount of infantry soldiers available. Sometimes by training local forces, for instance in March 2024 Asia Times reported that “US Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been permanently assigned to Taiwan’s frontline islands, preparing elite Taiwanese units for possible island defense and guerilla warfare operations against a Chinese invasion.” The US reducing the risk of Taiwan’s off shore islands being captured by maximising the efficiency of local Taiwanese soldiers.

Australia’s close relationship with Papua New Guinea, including exercising together and exchanges is a similar way of increasing the number of soldiers available to a coalition force in the region. Soldiers from Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Fiji and Tonga regularly exercise with Australia so these nations can easily contribute to an Australian led coalition. In previous posts we have discussed Australian plans to recruit soldiers directly from smaller Pacific neighbours into its armed forces.

Across the Pacific military planners are appreciating the need for more soldiers and it is likely the US, Australia and their allies will continue training with and developing the skills of smaller armies in the region. In larger Pacific nations, we should also expect to see an increase in the size of reserve forces, part-time soldiers that can be mobilised in times of conflict.

Island hopping

In summary, we can see that the US and its allies are evolving a new set of littoral infiltration tactics to beat area-denial. The‘ tip of the spear’ is small lightweight forces from the special forces community or from specialist littoral infantry units that can infiltrate into their opponents ‘kill web’ of drones and missiles. Removing ground sensors and capturing key terrain like airfields or landing areas through which reinforcements can deploy.

Air-defence and area-denial missiles will be an immediate element of these reinforcements. And alongside these weapons will be electronic warfare and surveillance assets. The objective being to exploit the captured territory as quickly as possible to extend their own forces area-denial ‘bubble.’ Already, the movement of these systems quickly by air is being practised and these skills honed.

In a conflict these tactical capabilities and skills would be used by the US and its allies to ‘hop’ from island to island within the area of operations. Reducing their opponent’s ability to deny movement by capturing ground used for ‘sensors’ or for missile firing points. Slowly, compressing their opponent’s ‘kill web,’’ allowing larger supporting units like amphibious ships and aircraft carriers to manoeuvre.

However, sustaining this type of campaign will require large numbers of infantry both to secure ground captured by more specialised units and to defend territory. US and allied combat capability depends on the ability to generate enough infantry, and we should expect to see more focus on this area in future years.

South China Sea becomes more dangerous

A dangerous combination of factors makes the South China Sea a more dangerous place this week. Chinese activity in the area is likely to increase after an embarrassing incident two weeks ago, in which two Chinese ships collided with each other while harassing a Philippine’s vessel. An example of poor seamanship that attracted worldwide attention, and that would be regarded by Chinese leadership as a significant loss of ‘face.’

After this incident there is indications of increased Chinese activity in the area. National Security Journal reporting in the article ‘China’s Unforced Error in the South China Sea Could Spark a War’ that “China is attempting to reassert dominance. A PLA fighter jet dangerously buzzed a PCG patrol aircraft, passing at an unsafe distance in a deliberate show of force. The message was unmistakable: the People’s Republic would not allow an operational blunder to undermine its claim to mastery over the South China Sea.”

Harassment of other nation’s aircraft operating in the area is not new, Philippines, Canada, Australia and Japan have all reported similar incidents in recent years. But based on Chinese doctrine and historic activity the latest unsafe intercept may indicate the start of wider hybrid operations aiming to reassert China’s supremacy in the region. For example, more Chinese naval, coast guard and militia vessels operating in the area, challenging Philippines and its partners to ‘step back’ or risk confrontation.

Notably, China’s incident roughly coincided with Exercise ALON 2025, a joint exercise involving warships from Australia, Canada and Philippines. The warships involved were all modern; BRP Jose Rizal, HMAS Brisbane, and HMCS Ville de Québec and the maritime component involved air-defence exercises including simulated attacks by Australian F-18 fighters.

This activity is noteworthy because HMAS Brisbane is equipped with a state of the art, US air defence system called Aegis. This exercise provided an opportunity for the Canadian and Philippines warships to practice operating within an Australian controlled air-defence system. Another small example of how Australia is evolving as a potential leader of US-aligned taskforces in the region. Australia is a very highly trusted ally with access to advanced American tech, and is increasingly trusted by the US and other nations to lead such activities.

On land, Ex ALON’s activity included special forces activities, amphibious assaults, live-firing practices and airlifts involving Australian, Philippines and US soldiers. The exercise demonstrated the evolving capabilities of nations committed to working with Philippines. In recent years Philippines exercises are becoming more complex involving land, sea and air forces from a range of nation working inter-operably together rehearsing for possible conflict.

New aircraft for New Zealand Defence Force

On 21 August, New Zealand Defence Minister, Judith Collins and Foreign Minister Winston Peters announced the nation would soon procure five new MH-60R Seahawk naval helicopters and two Airbus A321 transport aircraft. An investment of NZ $2.7 billion, roughly a quarter of the NZ$ 12 billion recently committed to country’s defence budget.

The Seahawks will replace the navy’s existing SH-2G(I) Seasprite helicopters. The Seahawks are a larger and more capable platform, and are newer than the venerable Seasprites so should require less maintenance. The decision to procure an older, but well-tested aircraft is sensible and may reflect the nation’s experience with NH-90 its existing utility helicopter. NH-90 is a newer design and has had a troubled service history in many nations, and New Zealand is now one of only a handful of nations still operating the aircraft.

Buying the Seahawk is a safer bet because it is a well-proven aircraft, with plenty of operational experience and robust maintenance support. Notably, Seahawk is Australia’s naval helicopter providing an integrated and inter-operable fleet. The purchase probably indicates that New Zealand’s future procurements will follow an Australian lead as both nations aim to be come more inter-operable.

The Airbus 321s will replace New Zealand’s aging and breakdown prone Boeing 757s. New Zealand’s Airbuses are the long-range, XLR variant with a range of approx. 8,700km, roughly twice the range of standard Airbus 321 and of the Boeing 757s they will replace.

An 8,000km range will allow these aircraft to fly to the Pacific Islands, Hawaii, Philippines, or Melanesia without refuelling. A considerable increase in New Zealand’s ability to move people and supplies around its area of interest.

Melanesian update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

More Sino-Australian diplomatic competition in Solomon Islands

The Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting is fast approaching and from 8-15 September Solomon Islands will host the leaders of Pacific nations.

In the run up to the forum both China and Australia are donating vehicles to support the event. Australia delivering 61 vehicles to the Royal Solomon Islands Police to support security operations, and China 27 SUVs to ferry delegates around.

This Pacific Islands Forum has already been defined by concerns about external influence, and the Forum members have agreed to exclude donor nations including China, Taiwan and the US from this years event. The donations of these vehicles are a small reminder of the diplomatic battle for influence that is currently underway in Solomon Islands.