BEN MORGAN: Russian opportunity near Pokrovsk, can they capitalise on it?

Although fighting continues along the length of the frontline, the last week saw few significant changes in the frontline. Both sides attacking and defending, generally without capturing significant new territory. Russia’s best opportunity to make rapid gains is to capture either Pokrovsk or Chasiv Yar.

Russian forces laid siege, unsuccessfully to Chasiv Yar earlier this year then switched main effort to Pokrovsk in August.  At this point both towns remain in Ukrainian hands but are under pressure, being systematically reduced by Russian artillery and bombs.

An interesting situation, since the weather in Ukraine is currently rather mild and the rain and cold of the autumn is not yet evident.  And, last week’s prediction that Russian offensive manoeuvre is culminating appears to be becoming an operational reality. However, the situation is not cut and dry because in recent days Russian forces near Pokrovsk have made potentially dangerous advances at Selydove.

Meanwhile, at strategic-level both sides are manoeuvring aggressively to improve their positions. Russia using the meeting of BRICs members to demonstrate how non-plussed it is by international sanctions, while European leaders cooperate to ‘Trump proof’ support for Ukraine.

The situation at operational-level

At operational-level Russia is trying to capture all of Donetsk, advancing west and trying to take Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, Ukraine aims to draw forces away by attacking into Russian territory in the north near Kursk.  In last week’s article, we assessed that at operational-level the ground campaign appears to be stagnating and turning into a battle of wills, both sides engaging in positional fighting and trading small amounts of ground for high casualties.

Ukraine does not have the manpower resources that Russia has so is fighting a slow battle of withdrawal, while it attrits Russia.  The aim being to reduce Russia’s material (tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery etc) to a point at which Russian manoeuvre is impossible. The lack of Russian advances indicates that Ukrainian casualties are not high enough to force withdrawals. Therefore, at operational-level, the current situation is in Ukraine’s favour because it is inflicting attrition on Russia without giving ground.

Strategically, Ukraine has appreciated that the Russian defence industry cannot produce replacement equipment quickly enough to sustain the campaign long-term.  Russia’s current material advantage results from its access to existing stocks of ex-Soviet equipment.  Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), tells us that Russia’s existing war stocks are disappearing and that by 2025/26 they will be exhausted. If Russia cannot produce enough tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and trucks at this point it will lose its material advantage.

Russia is on borrowed time and needs to manoeuvre to capture ground before its material advantage is lost. This is why towns like Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk are so important, both dominate important road or rail networks that lead to the two major cities in Donetsk that remain in Ukrainian hands, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Capturing either will not win the war but would provide a useful base for Russia to threaten these cities.

Additionally, in my opinion, Pokrovsk provides good ground for inflicting attrition on Russia. Further, that Ukraine’s operation in Kursk is designed to reduce Russia’s mass in Donetsk, forcing Russia to attack with less combat power thereby making it easier for Ukraine to inflict attrition. Ukraine’s aim is not to hold Pokrovsk indefinitely (although that is probably ideal) but rather to maximise attrition by forcing Russia to fight a tough battle, with limited resources. Essentially, not allowing Russia to use its mass to overwhelm the defences quickly with minimal casualties.

Russia is countering this tactic by avoiding a direct attack from the east. Instead, Russian forces are ‘propped’ near Selydove, Hordivka and Novohrodivka and probing south aiming to turn Pokrovsk’s southern flank. If they can, Pokrovsk’s can be attacked from the south or potentially enveloped.

In recent days, Russia has manged to make advances near Selydove, and it appears that while attacks from the east fix Ukrainian forces, the town is being enveloped to the south and north.  The approaches to Pokrovsk are constrained because to the north and south high ground, rivers and lakes canalise the approaches into a gap about 30km wide.  Selydove’s capture opens opportunities for manoeuvre.

The two most likely options are:

• Option A – The capture of Selydove extends the frontage of a future Russian attack on Pokrovsk. By widening the frontage, Russia forces the defenders to spread their direct and indirect fire resources across a wider area reducing its effectiveness.
• Option B – Pokrovsk sits on a ridgeline, using reserves Russia could advance quickly across the relatively open farmland east and south of Selydove and try to capture positions on the ridgeline. An attack along the ridgeline from the south-west against Pokrovsk would be difficult to defend, especially if it is supported from Russia’s current positions east of the town. This option would force Ukrainian commanders into a dilemma, having to choose whether to use reserves to reinforce the ridgeline or to defend Pokrovsk.

The situation a Selydove is noteworthy and worth watching because its capture provides the Russian’s with better chances of taking Pokrovsk.  Russia’s most dangerous course of action is Option B, but this is also the least likely because it requires complex combined arms manoeuvre. Russian forces would need to cover 15km, very quickly and then capture Ukrainian positions on the ridgeline.  If they do attempt this option, it demonstrates that they retain a large reserve in the area, and if they are successful a reassessment of Russian capability is required.

The reality is that Option A is the most likely option.  It is the easiest, and leverages off Russia’s key advantages; mass and the willingness to accept casualties.  Option A extends the frontage of the Russian attack making Ukraine’s ‘meat grinder’ less concentrated across the width of the attacking force.  For a force willing to accept casualties and that is less sophisticated tactically, this is the best option.  Keep watching Selydove, it is likely that in the next few days it will be captured and Russia’s actions after that will provide good insight into their forces.

The strategic battle, European nations mitigating the risk of a Trump presidency

At the recent Washington Summit, NATO leaders indicated further measures to ensure that if Donald Trump is elected president, Ukraine has enough resources to continue the war.  Trump’s isolationist, ‘America First’ foreign policy positions include reduction of US forces in Europe and funding for NATO, and forcing negotiations to end the war.  In most of Europe, his foreign policy statements cause grave concern.

The US has enormous military resources that underpin the security of Europe. A reduction in US support for NATO, including the alliance’s policy of support for Ukraine undermines collective security.  Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is very significant because it re-vitalised the use of military force to resolve political issues.  Essentially, that a larger country can use superior military power to force a smaller country to accede to its political demands.  Since World War Two, NATO has successfully stopped aggression against its members and inter-state conflict has not afflicted Europe.

Therefore, Russia’s invasion presents a very real threat to collective security because if NATO does not mobilise and support Ukraine, a democratic neighbour, it empowers aggression and creates the conditions for future conflict.  For example, in 2014 Russia invaded Crimea and NATO ‘looked the other way,’ and ten years later Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine.  NATO has learnt that if it does not act collectively and face Russian aggression in Ukraine, the next country to be attacked may be a member state.

And, that’s why Europe’s political leaders are busy planning and establishing commitments to support Ukraine, regardless of US foreign policy. In June, the European Union and Ukraine signed a Joint Security Commitment, all 27 members of the European Union committing to providing financial and military support to Ukraine for ten years.  France and the UK are both discussing deploying military personnel to train soldiers in Ukraine.

Some recent examples include German company Rheinmetall planning to open four new factories to build and repair armoured vehicles in Ukraine.  And NATO nations announcing at the Washington Summit they are increasing defence budgets, and plan much more collective training. Additionally, NATO troops are deploying to Finland, and members agreed range of technology sharing projects. Including a new space project, worth noting because Trump has threatened to reduce the amount of intelligence shared with NATO countries possibly limiting the availability of satellite imagery, vital in modern conflict.

The key point worth noting is that Europe appears to be strongly committed to mobilising support for Ukraine regardless of American foreign policy. However, the key question must be – Is European support too little too late?

Summary

Although there are signs that Russia is culminating, they have an opportunity at Selydove to create better conditions for a successful attack on Pokrovsk.  Whether Russia can exploit this situation is a moot point, so we need to wait and see how the situation develops.  If Russia has reserves in Donetsk, the capture of Selydove could be the trigger for their deployment, and a rapid advance.  However, it is more likely that the loss of Selydove will have little short-term impact and Russia will continue to advance painfully slowly towards Pokrovsk.

Strategically, Europe is hedging its bets and demonstrating its concerns about the outcome of the US elections.  A Trump presidency heralding a period of uncertainty for Europe, a risk NATO and the European Union have been working hard for months to mitigate.

The next few weeks will be incredibly important as the world awaits the results of the US elections, and how the outcome redefines American foreign policy. Meanwhile, in Ukraine the defenders of Pokrovsk and Selydove continue to hold on, inflicting as much damage on Russia as possible. Aiming to demonstrate to the world that Ukraine is continuing to fight and can beat Russia.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack