Ben Morgan’s Pacific Brief: The evolution of land forces in the Pacific: Part Three – Exercise Hedgehog 2025 – Why it matters for land warfare in the Pacific?
New technology is changing land combat and last year several NATO armies got an important ‘wake up’ call during Estonia’s Exercise Hedgehog 2025. In February, the Wall Street Journal published a review of the exercise that created international debate[i] because it highlights how several NATO battlegroups were defeated by a small force of Ukrainian drone operators.
Exercise Hedgehog’s objective was to test Estonian and allied NATO forces in scenarios that resembles the battlefield in Ukraine. Estonian and allied NATO forces were put under extreme stress in a contested exercise against a team of Ukrainians. Essentially, the exercise was a large wargame against a ‘live’ enemy actively trying to defeat them. RBC-Ukraine reporting that Estonia’s head of drones systems, Arbo Probal, said “…the exercise simulated a “contested and congested” battlefield designed to maximize stress and cognitive overload for units, testing their adaptability.[ii] Exercise Hedgehog’s aim was to break Estonia and its allies battlegroups and thereby demonstrate areas of weakness.
According to media reports, and commentator discussion, the exercise succeeded. Therefore, it should be studied closely in the Pacific because the result reinforces changes in land tactics imposed by new technology. Trends that should be studied carefully, because understanding the evolution of tactics will save soldier’s lives in the Pacific’s next conflict.
In my opinion the key lessons from Exercise Hedgehog 2025 can be summarised as follows:
Wargaming works
Contested wargames provide an invaluable tool for understanding tactical developments. Exercise Hedgehog 2025 was an opportunity for NATO countries to test their current tactics against emergent threats in a consequence free environment. Lessons were learnt and no-one was killed, a better way to learn than testing tactics on the battlefield.
An historic example of tactical level wargaming is discussed in Simon Parkin’s book ‘A War of Birds and Wolves.’ The book tells the story of the Royal Navy’s Western Approaches Tactical Unit (WATU), established during the Battle of the Atlantic. During this critical battle, the Royal Navy established a ‘battle lab’ staffed by ‘WRENS (Women’s Royal Naval Service),’ female naval auxiliaries to wargame anti-submarine tactics. WATU developed a system of contested wargames in which escort commanders ‘played war’ against an enemy commanded by WRENS. The programme delivered two key outputs, it provided an opportunity for escort commanders to work together in a consequence free environment, testing tactics and building relationships with their command teams.
WATU also developed new tactics like a manoeuvre used by escort forces nicknamed ‘Raspberry.’ The tactic was at odds with contemporary escort tactics but when used in action proved highly effective. The WRENS playing the U-boats developed the idea from their observation of tactics and experience playing the opposition. Most importantly, they brought new perspectives to the discussion and the WATU process allowed these ideas to be tested.
Exercise Hedgehog 2025 reinforces the usefulness of using contested wargaming to test tactics, especially during a period of technological change. The results of this exercise leave little room for debate and encourage the participants to re-think out-dated doctrine and procedures. A better way to examine the impact of new technology than learning about it on the battlefield.
Data is king – Ukraine’s ‘Delta’ information system
‘Delta’ is Ukraine’s battlefield information management system. Delta collects information in real-time, uses AI to analyse it and provides Ukrainian forces with excellent situational awareness. Specifically, prioritised lists of targets that can be used to coordinate strikes.
Delta’s key impact is that it shortens the ‘sensor-shooter’ link, or the time it takes from a target’s identification to it being engaged. A more difficult task than it looks on a complex and fast moving battle field where resources like indirect fire are rationed. Using Delta, the Ukrainian run opposition force was able to identify and engage targets within minutes.
Capabilities like Delta, increase the tempo at which a force can operate; enabling it to strike quicker and inflict ‘simultaneity’ on an enemy. Essentially, the side that can coordinate its fire better drives the speed of the battle, forcing the enemy to make poorly considered decisions – reacting rather than pro-actively shaping the battle.
Although the system was developed in conjunction with NATO, Delta uses easily available and modifiable cloud-based technology. If it is jammed, hacked or compromised it is easy to reset the system. Essentially, instead of trying to develop bespoke hardened networks and control access, Ukraine accepts electronic attack will happen and that the best way to manage it is to quickly reset the network.
In my opinion, Delta points to the future of drone operations. Already in Ukraine, drones are being brigaded into specific units like; Russia’s Rubicon or Ukraine’s Magyar’s Birds. A natural evolution that produces economies of scale for maintenance, and concentrates the best pilots in one unit. It means that an operation can be covered by a centrally controlled swarm of drones.
The next step is that swarms of drones will loiter over the battlefield waiting to be called into action by cloud-based apps. And, rather than using individual drone pilots located in their units, a commander will request an effect; for instance, surveillance or an attack using an app. The drone or drones will drop out of the swarm to perform the task piloted by AI. A simpler system for frontline soldiers.
Drones change the configuration of ground forces
My article ‘Breaking through the modern battlefield’s defensive ‘kill web’published In May last year discussed how the battle field is changing and how ground forces need to re-configure to suit the new environment.[iii]The feedback from Exercise Hedgehog 2025 reinforces May’s observations of the battlefield’s evolution.
A key feature of the modern battlefield is the drone-based ‘kill web,’ a space within which surveillance is combined with immediate strike capabilities. Inside a ‘kill web,’ any large unit will be detected, engaged, and may be destroyed. The ‘kill web’ the Ukrainian led opposition force deployed was relatively light. RBC-Ukraine states that the Ukrainian led opposition force deployed roughly 30 drones within 10 square kilometres, about half the current density on the frontline.[iv]
And, even with this low concentration of drones the effect was lethal. Any unconcealed movement was immediately identified and engaged. The Centre for European Policy Analysis reported that the “The attackers quickly “eliminated” two entire battalions and rendered the NATO force incapable of battle.”[v]
The drones were effective because NATO units operated in traditional tactical configurations. For example; moving vehicles in columns on roads or concentrating soldiers together in easily spotted groups. Trees providing less concealment than NATO forces expected.
Estonian news service, ERR quoted an exercise organiser Major Sten Reimann who summarised the lessons when he said “The old maneuver tactics — moving in large daytime convoys — just aren’t viable on the battlefield anymore. In a worse-case scenario, we could lose an entire brigade by evening, or at least most of its combat equipment.”[vi]
A lesson from Exercise Hedgehog 2025 is that tactical configurations need to evolve quickly; I have published my thoughts this subject here:
Pacific Brief – 25 September 2025 |
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The evolution of land forces in the Pacific: Part Two – ‘Kill webs’ and ‘missile defeat,’ what do these concepts mean for land forces in the Pacific.
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Breaking through the modern battlefield’s defensive ‘kill web’ |
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Victory on land, is the art of using operational, and ‘major tactical’ level manoeuvre to concentrate enough force to inflict decisive defeats on an enemy force. Most often this is achieved through offensive manoeuvre, attacking the enemy.
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- In summary, I argue that modern tactical success requires leaders to turn conventional combined arms force structures upside down, and to manoeuvre offensively in the following structure:
- A light weight, widely distributed ‘break in’ force that can infiltrate under the enemy’s ‘kill web.’
- A larger ‘exploitation’ force that is equipped to move forward very quickly from safer areas well behind the ‘kill web.’ This force will swamp an area enveloping the enemy defensive positions and establish a ‘kill web’ to deny access to the enemy. A safe, temporary bubble within which the following ‘echelon’ force can deploy.
- Using ‘echelons’ to hold ground captured by the ‘break in’ and ‘exploitation’ forces.
A change in force configuration that the results of Exercise Hedgehog 2025 appear to support.
Conclusion
The lessons of Exercise Hedgehog 2025 are probably widely distributed amongst the Pacific’s NATO aligned militaries but the question is will they be heeded. The changes that are required for survival on the future battlefield require significant changes to traditional tactical thinking, procurement pathways and organisational culture. And, unfortunately history demonstrates that peacetime militaries tend to be conservative and slow to adapt.
Australia signs contract for new landing craft
The Australian government has announced that Austal Defence Australia has secured an AUS $4 billion contract to build eight new amphibious warfare ships. The new Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) ships will contribute to Australia’s evolving force structure. Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review outlined the requirement for a new force structure that includes “A fully enabled, integrated amphibious-capable combined-arms land system.”[vii]
An effective land combat force in the Pacific requires the ability to move quickly across the sea. And, in an age of ‘area-denial’ tactics the next question is about balancing economy with risk and survivability. Essentially, is it better to move dispersed across several smaller ships or in one large vessel? This investment in smaller vessels indicates that Australia is planning for the reality of a future peer-peer conflict in which the ability to disperse a force across several ships and axes is vital for survival.
The new ships also provide a useful disaster relief and peace-support capability, each vessel large enough to carry an independent combat team. This provides the ability for a peace-support force to operate in small widely dispersed but highly capable teams.
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The new ships are based on Polish company, Damen’s LST 100. The vessels will be approx. 100 metres long and displace approx. 4,000 tonnes. The ships can carry approx. 200 soldiers as well as six Abrams tanks or nine Redback infantry fighting vehicles.
Australia is creating a new amphibious force designed to fight in a future Pacific war dominated by ‘area-denial.’ An article in The Strategist, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s journal reminds us that “Developing amphibious capability takes time. It requires not just platforms and training but also deep logistical, industrial and community ecosystems to sustain it.”[viii] This purchase and the decision to build the vessels in Australia contributes to all of these factors providing new vessels and the industrial capacity to maintain and support them.
Melanesian Update
A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.
Papua New Guinea faces being ‘blacklisted’ by international money laundering watchdog
Radio NZ reports that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has placed Papua New Guinea on its ‘grey list,’ a strong warning that it may be ‘black listed.’[x] The consequences of which would be a significant reduction in the nation’s ability to access international credit.
The FATF is a money laundering watchdog group established by G7 nations. It is based in Paris and sets international standards to combat money laundering and other illegal fund transfers between countries.
Papua New Guinea was ‘grey listed’ because FATF is concerned about “strategic deficiencies“ in government oversight. It is noteworthy that already 15 banks will not lend money in Papua New Guinea.[xi] Being ‘grey listed’ means that Papua New Guinea has a limited time to make changes before being ‘black listed,’ and finding it even more difficult to raise capital. It is a difficult time for the small nation, and hopefully it will be able to address the FATF’s concerns quickly.
New police station in the Solomon Islands causes concern in Australia
The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) recently reported concerns about a new police station being built in Honiara’s ‘Chinatown’ district.[xii]The area has a large ethnic Chinese community and historically has been damaged during riots in the capital. So, the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) building a new station in the area is probably a sensible idea. However, ABC reports that the station has become controversial because rumours have circulated that the station will be run by Chinese police staff rather than members of the local force.
China does have a history of establishing police stations in other countries, claiming that these offices are to deliver services for ex-patriate citizens. A position that has been challenged by NGOs and by some governments that claim the stations are used to monitor activism in ex-patriate communities, This story demonstrates the level of tension regarding China’s influence in Solomon Islands since 2022, when the two countries signed a new security agreement. It reminds us that Australia and its allies and partners remain concerned about the risk of increasing Chinese influence in Melanesia.
At this stage, the RSIPF has stated that the rumours are false but ABC reports that “It is likely Australia, New Zealand and other Western nations will still keep a close eye on the new police office after it opens on March 1.”This story is notable, and it will be interesting to see how it develops.
Ben Morgan is TDBs military blogger. If you like this content and want to support it you can ‘Buy me a Coffee’ here – buymeacoffee.com/benmorgan
[i] https://www.wsj.com/opinion/
[ii] https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/
[iii] https://benmorganmil.substack.
[iv] https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/
[v] https://cepa.org/article/
[vi] https://news.err.ee/
[vii] https://www.defence.gov.au/
[viii] https://www.aspistrategist.
[ix] https://www.ft.com/content/
[x] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/
[xi] https://www.canberratimes.com.
[xii] https://www.abc.net.au/news/
