BEN MORGAN: US lifts long-range missile restrictions, followed by a Russian ‘show of force’

This week was characterised by escalation, President Biden authorised the use of American ATACMs missiles on Russian territory.  A step immediately replicated by France and UK announcing similar releases of restrictions on their Storm Shadow and SCALP cruise missiles.  A series of strikes on targets deep behind Russian lines in Kursk and Bryansk Oblasts signalling the change in policy. 

By doing this, Ukraine’s supporters crossed another of Putin’s ‘red lines,’ an embarrassing and difficult situation for him that requires a response. Therefore, the remainder of the week included good examples of ‘information war.’ Putin posturing and threatening, appearing dangerous.  He successfully raised the spectre of nuclear war and created plenty of heated discussion in Western media about the threat Russia poses.

Russia’s strategic-level ‘show of force:’ a threat or showmanship? 

Russia’s response demonstrated Putin’s keen understanding of the Western psyche and his showmanship. Almost immediately he signed into law Russia’s new nuclear doctrine, ratifying changes that were first published in September. Putin picked this week to sign them into law, leveraging off the US, UK and French decision to limit restrictions on the use of long-range weapons. Around the world, mainstream media leapt on Putin’s soundbites discussing the change and the risk of further escalation.  

However, the reality is that, aside from the accompanying rhetoric blaming the US, UK and France for the situation, nothing has changed since September.  

Then, on 21 November, Russia acted kinetically, launching an advanced Oreshnik intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at Ukraine. This attack made headlines around the world; ICBMs are very sophisticated missiles, normally reserved to deliver nuclear warheads. It was a clever way to fan fears of escalation, a ‘show of force.’ A kinetic action designed to achieve a psychological objective. In this case, the aim is to make Ukraine’s supporters second guess their policies. 

ICBMs are almost impossible to intercept, their trajectory takes them into space where they cannot be intercepted.  Over their target they re-enter the atmosphere and hurtle towards their targets at super-sonic speed.  Additionally, ICBMs normally carry multiple independently guided warheads, each of which can hit a different target. Tracking and engaging multiple warheads, dropping out of orbit and at super-sonic speed is almost impossible.   Putin was demonstrating Russia’s ability to deliver unstoppable strikes against Ukrainian cities, or possibly targets in other countries.

Putin reinforced this message stating that “From that moment, a regional conflict in Ukraine previously provoked by the West has acquired elements of a global character,” and discussing a new US base in Poland. The objective is clearly to scare away support for Ukraine, to demonstrate that Russia has the capability to strike back kinetically.  Further, this dialogue provides an opportunity for Putin to highlight to his domestic audience that ‘Russia is at war with the West,’ rather than just Ukraine. A position that justifies Russia’s inability to win the war and steels the nation for further sacrifice. 

Analysing Russia’s show of force

In last week’s assessment we discussed how the war is at a difficult point, both sides suffering but neither able to generate sufficient combat power to achieve victory.  But both are holding on, waiting to see how the Trump Whitehouse changes the situation because new US policy is certain to have a significant impact on the situation.  

The new president holds enormous power; the US could easily supply enough war material for Ukraine to defeat Russia, and drive their forces out of the occupied areas. Likewise, if the US cuts financial and military aid to Ukraine, or lifts its economic sanctions on Russian then Ukraine is at risk of being conquered.  

However, the president-elect has not made a substantive statement about policy regarding Ukraine yet. Instead, there are rumours and general discussion about how the US may respond.  Listening to retired US general, Ben Hodges speak in a recent Times Radio interview I was struck by his observation that Putin appears baffled by Trump’s indifference. An observation that may have some merit because the newly elected president faces a huge range of problems, from the relatively simple process of forming his cabinet to the enormously complex like establishing policy on various issues in the Middle East, or what to do about the threat posed by competition with China. Compared to these issues, the Ukraine War probably does not rate as highly.  In fact, from President Trump’s perspective it is probably an annoying and difficult problem but not one that requires immediate attention. 

On 10 November, the Washington Post reported that President Trump called Putin and warned him against escalation.  A report denied by the Kremlin, but that is likely to be true. It doesn’t take much imagination to assess the impact of such a call. Putin concerned that instead of being treated as an equal, or even a dangerous threat was instead, rushed through a relatively cursory call and asked (or told) not to escalate.  Regardless of whether President Trump called Putin, we can speculate that the overall situation and lack of policy from the president-elect may be impacting on Putin’s decisions. This week’s escalatory rhetoric and ICBM use provided mechanisms to encourage action from the new President.

This raises speculation about how far Putin (and his supporters) are really, willing to escalate, and the key factors relevant to this decision have not changed. Any form of nuclear escalation or kinetic attack on a NATO nation is likely to result in a poor outcome for Putin.

A tactical nuclear strike, or use of an ICBM to deliver a nuclear strike against a Ukrainian city would immediately result in China, India, NATO and the US acting against Russia.  NATO’s nuclear planning ‘Tiger’ team was put into action two years ago and we can be sure that use of a tactical nuclear weapon would result in a very swift and powerful response. Likewise, a kinetic attack on any NATO nation would result in a similar response and probably war with the alliance. A war Putin cannot win. 

A strategic nuclear strike against the US or NATO countries is a terrible scenario but is highly unlikely because it results in the annihilation of Russia. And the key point to remember is that the men surrounding Putin are unlikely to lose everything supporting a lost cause. It is noteworthy that Reuters reported that “A U.S. official said Russia notified Washington shortly before its strike, while another official said the U.S. had briefed Kyiv and allies to prepare for the possible use of such a weapon.” This warning is a clear indication that Russia does not want nuclear war, making sure that the launch of its ICBMs against Ukraine is not misinterpreted by the US. 

Based on these considerations it is unlikely that Russia will make any form of kinetic attack against the US or its NATO allies.  However, Putin does need to demonstrate that he is relevant and dangerous so we should expect to see a variety of non-kinetic activity in the next few weeks. Some examples could be:

• More nuclear rhetoric, probably backed by activity like the redeployment of nuclear capable weapons and realistic exercises.
• Infrastructure sabotage, in recent weeks two internet cables in the Baltic Sea, one linking Finland and Germany and another Lithuania and Sweden were cut.  Suspicious activity that some sources have linked to Russia. It is likely that we will see more sabotage of European infrastructure.
• Cyberwar, a field that Russia is a leading exponent of, and that has the potential to inflict significant economic damage on the US and European economies. 
• Hybrid operations using proxies to destablise Europe’s fringes. For example, on 3 November Moldovan’s voted in their election. The new government is pro-European, aiming for membership of the European Union, and on 21 November signed a security deal with the UK.  However, Moldova’s breakaway Transnistrian region still has a Russian military presence, a small ‘peace-keeping’ force.  Russia’s Transnistrian presence could translate into a de-stabilising hybrid operation. In fact, a plan already exists. CNN report in 2023, that in 2021 Russian intelligence services wrote a plan for destablising Moldova titled “Strategic objectives of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Moldova.” 
• Hybrid operations outside of Europe.  Across Africa and the Middle East, the US and its allies are supporting local militaries. Activities mirrored by Russia, and that provide opportunities to strike at US and European military personnel in these areas. 

Operational-level update

Last week, Russia continued to maintain pressure along full-length of the frontline.  A rate of activity that is costing both sides dearly, estimated Russian casualties increasing to approximately 1,500 per day.  Ukraine’s losses are harder to estimate but are also likely to be high.  The key change in the situation in recent weeks is the increasing intensity of Russian operations south of Pokrovsk. 

After capturing Vuledhar, Russia is now attacking near Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka, creating an area of concern for Ukraine. Vuledhar was a strong position, held by an experienced unit, the 72nd Mechanised Brigade but suffered from not having sufficient reserves.  Probably, because Ukrainian forces have been drawn way to fight in Kursk. Since Vuledhar was captured, Russian forces have advanced and a number of sources are highlighting the risk.  Open-Source Intelligence analyst Andrew Perpetua stating that “The news coming from the Velyka Novosilka area is very bad,” and that “There is no way to sugarcoat it—the area has reached crisis and needs immediate intervention.”

Russia is taking advantage of the situation, aiming to flatten out their frontline in this area to provide a base for advancing north towards Pokrovsk. Fighting in this area is intense so it is an important area to watch next week. 

Summary 

The war is at a critical point as the newly presidential administration comes to terms with its victory and starts to establish policy with regards to Ukraine. This means that both sides are keen to demonstrate their strength and the capacity to continue the fight, hoping to win the support of the US in ceasefire negotiations.  Therefore, we should expect to see more threatening and escalatory behaviour in the next few months.  Putin keen to create uncertainty by projecting his willingness to escalate further. Ukraine countering this activity by playing a strategic game of ‘chicken,’ crossing Russia’s ‘red lines’ to undermine Putin’s plan. 

Likewise, European powers are revisiting their approach to the war accepting that the only way to curb Putin’s aggression is deterrence. This situation ensures that the next few months will be very tense. 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack