Ben Morgan: The media, information war and how the campaign could change

After months of politicking the US military aid bill was finally signed into law, releasing US$ 61 billion of support for Ukraine.  The aid will make little immediate difference to the situation in Ukraine, but provides the resources Ukraine needs to transfer to a new stage of the war.  The ‘lines on the map’ are unlikely to change, Russia’s offensive failing to produce significant gains on the battle field as each week Ukraine’s defences get stronger.  Instead, we can expect Ukraine to consolidate its position in the north-east and hold the Russian’s there while they transition towards a longer campaign focussed in the south. 

Meanwhile, recent events provide lessons about how protagonists manage the media in modern war. Recently, international media has told us about Ukraine’s shortages of artillery, ammunition, soldiers and air defence missiles. A dialogue that was not reflected in Russian gains on the ground and it is useful to ask – Why?

Information war in action

This war is fought as fiercely on screen as it is in any of the conventional ‘warfighting domains’ of land, sea and air. All parties trying to shape public opinion to achieve their strategic and tactical goals. The last few months provides a very good example of a situation in which all participants are aligned on key messages but exploiting them for different outcomes.

Essentially, in the last few months media carried two key messages, that:

• Ukraine is on the brink of collapse, running out of the resources it needs to continue the war. 
• Russia is not only on the offensive, but also has the initiative. 

Starting with Russia, these two key messages reinforced the idea that Russia is winning the war.  That further investment in Ukraine is useless because Russia is too big, too strong and has too much resolve to be defeated.  Europe and the US are ‘backing a loser’ and the smartest way to address the situation is to withdraw support from Ukraine rather than risk angering Russia.  On the other side of the Atlantic, the media supporting each of America’s two main parties were both keen to support this messaging.  Democrats to rally support for the brave defenders of Ukraine. Some Republicans to demonstrate the futility of supporting Ukraine.  Likewise, in Ukraine there was merit in portraying an image of weakness that encourages Europe and the US to provide weapons and equipment.  

A strange situation, the same key messages interpreted differently by each party, to achieve different political goals. This week, media messaging is different.  Suddenly, in Western media Ukraine’s position is now secure and the nation is ready to use the aid being provided effectively. An interesting change in opinion considering nothing has changed on the battlefield!

Getting to the facts

Although a Russian victory, the capture of Avdiivka in February was not a Ukrainian collapse.  The defenders withdrew in good order supported by spoiling attacks.  (See – Russia takes Avdiivka, what next? Dated 20 Feb 2024)  

Since then, Russia has very slowly plodded forwards and to date has captured about half the amount of ground that Ukraine took in its ‘unsuccessful’ 2023 offensive. Even with glide bombs, new drones, better fire control, improving tactics and a 5-1 advantage in artillery ammunition Russia has made very limited progress.  A situation that demonstrates that Ukraine’s land forces are not collapsing.  

My assessment in that Ukraine preserved considerable forces after its unsuccessful 2023 offensive (See ‘Russia’s tactical evolution. What next?’ dated 15 Apr 2024). Essentially, Ukraine is under pressure but is not, and has not been close to collapse this year.  And, even though Russia is innovating and has more artillery ammunition it has not been able to turn these advantages into advances ‘on the ground.’  

In fact, it could be argued that Ukraine and its allies have won a victory in the war’s ‘information domain.’  First, US and European aid has been secured. Secondly, Putin is clearly over confident because he did not fully mobilise after the election and is planning an offensive against Kharkiv. It seems that he has put too much weight on media opinion rather than on facts. A lesson for all of us, especially decision-makers, that we need to carefully assess what is reported in all forms of media and be wary of information warfare tactics aiming to ‘shape’ decision-making.   

What difference will US and NATO aid make? 

Aid is already starting to arrive in Ukraine, the million artillery shells that the Czechs sourced are scheduled to arrive in May and June.  US Army Tactical Missiles Systems (ATACMs) long-range missiles are already in Ukraine.  The arrival of F16 fighters is imminent. However, there is not likely to be movement on the battlefield in the short-term.  

Do not expect much change on the frontline

Russia’s attacks along the frontline, specifically along the Kremina-Svatove Line and around the north-eastern salient, centred on Siversk.  And, this slow advance into the Donbas is likely to continue because it is a simple and effective plan that takes Russia closer to the last large cities in the Donbas held by Ukraine. 

Further, it is in Ukraine’s interests (and their stated strategy) to allow Russia’s forces to maintain offensive action providing opportunities for attrition. Every tactician knows that defence is the phase of war that is used to drain an enemy’s resources. Ukraine is digging in when this is finished there will be a series of withdrawals as units ‘step back’ to the new defensive lines behind them.  Then it seems likely that Ukraine will remain static in defence rather than attempting risky offensive operations. 

Impact on the air battle

In recent months, Russia has been using its strategic air campaign to ‘shape’ conditions in the tactical battle. By attacking Ukraine’s power infra-structure Russia seeks to draw Ukrainian air defence missiles away from the frontline.  Less Ukrainian air defence missiles at the frontline means that Russian bombers can provide more and closer air support.  

Advanced long-range Patriot air-defence missiles are Ukraine’s key request.  Patriot is important because it provides Ukraine not only with an incredibly capable defensive system but with the ability to strike Russian airpower well behind the frontline.  Patriots can snipe key aircraft far inside Russian territory and have already taken a heavy toll on Russian airborne early warning and command (AWACs) aircraft. Likewise, their range is sufficient to prevent glide bomb attacks by shooting down the launch aircraft.   

If Patriot batteries can be found and kept supplied with parts and ammunition Russian airpower’s battlefield impact will decrease.  A trend that will be supported by the deployment of F16s.  Ukraine is receiving a relatively small number of these fighters.  I believe they will be held back initially and used to intercept drones, their excellent radar and lower cost munitions providing better value for money than more expensive missiles.  A tactic already being employed by the US and UK over the Red Sea and Israel. 

Creating a realistic threat to Crimea

Crimea remains Putin’s ‘centre of gravity,’ a military term that describes the one thing upon which an operation hinges, that if lost, you lose.  The most common example used in tactics training is bridging equipment for a force that needs to cross a river.  Lose the bridge and there is no way the force can cross the river.  Strategically, Russia’s war is about securing Crimea, the peninsula’s ports providing access to the Black Sea and Mediterranean. Controlling them has always been a driver of Russian and Soviet strategy. If Putin loses Crimea, or the peninsular becomes untenable; he loses the war. The silovaki (strongmen) that support him are not going to tolerate the suffering imposed on them by the war if Crimea is lost.

Therefore, it is likely that this area will remain an area of focus for Ukraine and we can expect to see:

• Offensive use of Patriot to provide ‘air denial’ near Crimea.  Ukraine has been testing the use of Patriot missile systems close to the frontline. It has also reduced Russian air defence surveillance assets in Kherson and Crimea by shooting down AWACs planes and destroying ground-based radar.  Expect to see Ukraine create an air denial zone over Kherson and the north of Crimea using Patriot.

 

• Use of cruise missiles and ATACMs to isolate Crimea. Ukraine already has advanced air launched cruise missiles like the UK/French Storm Shadow/SCALP and Europe’s aid commitment means they will get more. The big capability step though is ATACMS, long-range US missiles that Ukraine has been asking for since the start of the war. Fired from a HIMARs system their range is 300km, allowing all of Crimea to be targeted.  Russia’s ability to intercept these systems is not good so we should expect to see surgical attacks on Russian bases, radar facilities and logistics on the peninsular.  This activity will culminate in destruction of the Chongar Strait road and rail bridges, the Kerch Bridge and increasing attacks on the E97 motorway and rail lines that are the north-west crossing point into Crimea. 

The overall aim is to physically isolate Crimea, then reduce the garrison’s ability to prevent an invasion of the peninsular.  It is also possible that Ukraine is holding its bridgehead on the east bank of the Dnipro River, near Krynky, so that a crossing can be credibly threatened.  An operation that if successful would operationally outflank Russia. Although unlikely, Ukraine’s history of attacks on radar stations and AWACs in the south may indicate plans to contest air superiority in the area which in turn could be a prelude to a larger crossing.  

Summary 

In summary, Ukraine will continue to defend the existing frontline, concentrating on inflicting attrition on its enemy.  Russia is already struggling to advance and will slow down further as Ukraine receives more artillery ammunition.  Future foreign aid will then allow Ukraine to transition into a new phase of war, trying to isolate Crimea. 

Aid will quickly move the air war in Ukraine’s favour because more air defence missiles and fighters will be available to intercept Russian attacks on the nation’s power grid, allowing more longer-ranged Patriots to be used further forwards.  Denying key airspace to Russian aircraft, strengthening Ukraine’s defence in the north-east and increasing the chance of Ukraine successfully crossing the Dnipro River to threaten Crimea.

Long-range missiles are a key part of both US and European aid packages. Ukraine will probably use them to destroy the bridges that provide access to Crimea, aiming to isolate it.  Russia’s problem is that it cannot stop these weapons.  Its air defence systems are relatively ineffective and Ukraine can continue a war like this almost indefinitely, eventually developing its own logistics and procurement networks, providing a buffer against policy changes amongst its supporters. 

Russia on the other hand is broken, regardless of Putin’s claims of resilience and economic growth in the face of sanctions. Russia’s economy grew last year because soldier’s pay, compensation to families of those killed and wages for people building equipment or supporting the war effort put money into the consumer economy. Currently this is paid for from Putin’s ‘war chest,’ but when that money runs out Russia needs to either generate revenue or borrow to sustain the war.  And, Russia’s largest exports; oil and gas dropped last year by an estimated US$ 47.3 billion and US 27-34 billion respectively.

Win or lose Russia faces great economic uncertainty and the cost of rebuilding its economy and military. And, as Renaud Foucart, a Lancaster University academic eloquently pointed out in an op-ed for the Conversation “And it is a war that Russia cannot afford to win. The cost of rebuilding and maintaining security in a conquered Ukraine would be too great.” Russia’s second opportunity to win the war easily has passed, and now their only realistic option is to slow down and wait out the West. NATO and the US have the resources to support Ukraine to win, so should not let this happen.

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack