Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update A simple explanation of this week’s military and political developments in the Pacific

$95 billion US foreign military aid package, includes $ 8 billion for the Pacific 

The $95 billion US foreign military aid bill is currently in the Senate and will be signed off by President Biden soon.  Most news coverage has been about the aid for Ukraine and Israel but hidden away in the bill is $8 billion of military aid for countries in the Indo-Pacific region.  Aid that includes the following key expenditure: 

• $3.3 billion to build dry docks and facilities to support operating submarines in the region.
• $2 billion in the Foreign Military Financing Programme for allies and security partners.
• $1.9 billion to support defence infrastructure in partner countries. 
• $542 million allocated to improve US military capability in the region.
• $ 133 million toward production and development of artillery ammunition and missiles.

Much of the aid is specifically focussed on Taiwan but will ‘trickle down’ throughout the Pacific and the bullet points provide an indication of future planning.  The largest budget line is for the development of the capacity to support submarines operating in the region.  It reinforces US naval planning for a future conflict in which carrier task groups are vulnerable to Chinese long-range missiles. Therefore, the development or larger, more effective and well-supported submarine forces that are harder to target with missile is a US priority.

The second key point relates to reinvigorating defence production capacity in the US that will be supported through the Foreign Military Financing Programme. This programme allows select nations to purchase military equipment directly from US companies, using loans or aid from the US.  It allows countries like Taiwan to maximise their defence purchasing power, while stimulating the US defence industry.  

Finally, the bill includes funding for building infrastructure and purchasing ammunition and missiles.  In lay terms, the investment in infrastructure means that the US is helping is allies prepare bases for the future deployment of US and other allied forces to the region. In previous columns we have discussed how Northern Australia’s military infra-structure (bases, accommodation, airfields, hospital, dry docks etc) is rapidly developing to support future US deployments.  This is also happening in Taiwan, Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Papua New Guinea and lots of other places in the region. 

South China Sea update

On 23 April, a large exercise between the US and Philippines started in the South China Sea.  Exercise Balikatan will finish on 10 May and although it is a regular exercise, it is larger than normal this year with about 16,000 service people involved including soldiers from Australia and France.  Exercise Balikatan is regular activity designed to demonstrate America’s commitment to supporting Philippines. 

China has protested about this year’s exercise, specifically because it involves the deployment of American long-range anti-ship missiles in the Philippines.  Although missiles are not being fired as part of the exercise the US is testing deployment plans and will be learning about using high-tech equipment in the tropics. 

It is an interesting discussion because it indicates the nature of future conflict in the Pacific.  A war that will be dominated by area denial tactics. Both sides aiming to secure base areas for long-range precision-guided missiles that will be used to deny vast areas of ocean to the opposition.  

New Zealand to strengthen defence ties with Philippines

Last week New Zealand Prime Minister, Chris Luxon met with Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.  Security was a key topic for discussion and after the meeting the two leaders issued a joint statement signalling a closer economic and defence relationship developing between the two countries. Prime Minister Luxon stating that: “A key focus of the meeting was defence cooperation, including establishing the legal architecture to allow our defence forces to do more together by the end of this year. “

The Prime Minister’s statement indicates that developing the systems and process to allow for New Zealand and Philippines is a priority and that a full partnership agreement will be probably be developed in the next six months. Diplomatically, New Zealand’s decision to establish a closer relationship with Philippines indicates that the country is supporting collective security objectives in the South China Sea.  Philippine’s is engaged in non-military hybrid war with China over territories in the South China Sea.  China claiming large areas of the sea and enforcing its claim using para-military forces, even though their claim is not internationally recognised. 

In recent weeks, Australia, Japan and the US have demonstrated support for Philippines by sending naval forces to the South China Sea to demonstrate their resolve and deter Chinese escalation. New Zealand entering a defence arrangement with Philippines is probably part of a broader collective security strategy working with the US, Australia, Japan and other partners in the region to support the nation.  

Additionally, New Zealand is currently considering joining Pillar 2 of AUKUS, a security partnership that is likely to include the same set of nations and will provide the basis for future inter-operability between their defence forces. Inter-operability that is the basis for effective collective security.  Essentially, Pillar 2 of AUKUS is about jointly developing the technology that allows partners to talk to each other, share information digitally, defend their computer networks and on the battlefield to easily use each other’s long-range weapons.  AUKUS is a deterrent to aggressive unilateral actions like we are currently seeing in the South China Sea.  While New Zealand considers AUKUS membership, the nation should be prepared for diplomatic lobbying and possibly disinformation campaigns aimed at influencing public opinion against any move to join AUKUS, or developing closer defence relationships with other US allies.  

Solomon Islands election update

When this article was written vote counting just finished and the politicking to form a government is underway. The Governor General helping to manage the process. In Solomon Islands this period is always very tense as ‘behind the scenes’ negotiations take place and deals are struck between politicians. A process that has little transparency and sometimes ends in violence.  

Fortunately, there is a large contingent of New Zealand, Australian, Fijian and Papua New Guinean police and service people ‘on the ground’ meaning that if security issues arise, they should be dealt with quickly and easily. 

However, the outcome of the election is likely to be a defining feature of Pacific politics in the near future. Will Manasseh Sogavare win and move the country further into China’s sphere of influence? Or will the nation reject Chinese influence and elect a government that will move the nation back towards Australia’s sphere of influence? Perhaps it will be less binary and a government keen to use the nation’s strategic position to extract benefits from both sides will be elected?  

Myanmar update 

Previously, we have discussed the importance of Myanmar in the Indo-Pacific region (see ‘The Pacific Region – An Overview’ dated 10 Jan 2024). The nation borders India, China and Thailand and it is currently run by a repressive military junta that is fighting a bloody civil war against a variety of rebel movements. The junta is losing, the Council for Foreign Relations blogging this week that “Already facing a long string of battlefield defeats, defections, and loss of territory, in recent weeks, the Myanmar military seems to have reached a crossroads, in which several events suggest the bottom could be falling out for the junta—and that both Myanmar citizens and outsiders should prepare for an endgame.” 

If the junta falls there is likely to be a heavily contested power vacuum. Although China and Russia have supported the junta, Russia’s war in Ukraine means it no-longer has the capacity; and China is increasingly frustrated that the war sometimes ‘spills over’ into Chinese territory.

In the bigger picture if a pro-China faction took power, it could provide China with a new trade route and naval ports on the Indian Ocean, circumventing the US’s strategy of isolating the nation’s access to maritime trade via the Pacific. This would change the balance of power in the Pacific and may increase China’s appetite for risk in places like the South China Sea. Additionally, India and Thailand do not want an unstable neighbour on their border.  So, Myanmar remains a place to keep watching closely.

2024 Australian Defence Strategy released

Australia released its 2024 Defence Strategy last week. The document will not be a surprise for regular readers and builds on the 2023 Defence Review reinforcing the need for Australia to change its defence strategies and capabilities.  

Australia’s concerns about the current security environment are captured in this quote “Australia’s strategic environment has continued to deteriorate since the release of the Defence Strategic Review, consistent with the trends it identified. The optimism at the end of the Cold War has been replaced by the uncertainty and tensions of entrenched and increasing strategic competition between the US and China. This competition is being framed by an intense contest of narratives and values.” The strategy clearly articulates Australia’s increasing concern about tensions between the US and China.  

An observation is that New Zealand, Australia’s neighbour, ally and a nation that shares a long history of cooperation is mentioned only six times and five of those are as a partner. Only once as an ally, on Page 47 the document states “Australia will seek to enhance interoperability with New Zealand and – building on our alliance and long history of close cooperation – jointly pursue security and stability in our region.”  New Zealand has only one ally since leaving ANZUS in the 1980s, Australia. Therefore, Australia’s perception of the relationship is an important security issue for New Zealand. 

The strategy is designed to be read in conjunction with an Integrated Investment Plan and clearly states the following objectives for the Australian Defence Force (ADF):

• Defend Australia and our immediate region

• Deter through denial any potential adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches;

• Protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world;

• Contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and

• Contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order

The strategy and its objectives were signalled by the 2023 Defence Review and by subsequent announcements.  In my opinion, the key points can be summarised as follows;

• Australia is taking the threat of conflict close to home very seriously. Australian planners understand that the proliferation of accurate long-range drones and missiles means that an adversary located in Melanesia could directly attack Australia. Therefore, the security of Australia requires not only the capability to defend Australia but the ability to project combat power into Melanesia.  This is why the Australian Army is developing long-range missile units and the Navy is increasing in size and expanding its cruise-missile stocks. Likewise, the planned nuclear powered submarine fleet will provide a deterrent for an adversary trying to achieve an amphibious lodgement in any area that can threaten Australia. 

 

Along with ADF capability development like, re-roling 10th Brigade as a long-range missile unit or purchasing new ships expect to see lots more Australian involvement in Melanesia. Defence agreements, exercises and Melanesian officers training with the ADF. 

 

• The strategic important of alliances and partnerships. Australia’s expanding naval power, including the planned nuclear powered submarine fleet provides an expeditionary force able to deployed far to north. Australia plans to use its naval power working closely with Philippines, Japan, South Korea and the US to deter aggression as far from home as possible. 

 

• Acknowledgement of hybrid war tactics in the Pacific. The strategy states that “Grey-zone activities have also expanded in the Indo-Pacific. In addition to conventional military forces, some countries are employing para-military forces more frequently, including China’s actions in the South China Sea. Threats posed by state and non-state actors in the cyber domain are also multiplying.”  

 

Essentially, the countries that support the international rules-based order like the US, NATO, Australia, Japan, South Korea etc are starting to acknowledge that competition between states or power blocks is no longer defined by clear rules.  Instead, there is a large ‘grey zone’ in which hybrid tactics are used and the strategy acknowledges this evolution.  A change that is likely to see emphasis on deploying military force as a deterrent to aggression using hybrid tactics. 

The full document can be found here: 

 

Melanesian update 

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia. 

Fijian colonel removed from Deputy Commander position in Australia’s 7th Brigade

In an attempt to ‘bridge the gap’ with Melanesian militaries the ADF appointed senior officers from Fiji and Papua New Guinea to Deputy Command positions in their key operational brigades (units with a strength of a couple of thousand soldiers supported by artillery, armoured vehicles, engineers and logistics).  

The recent appointment of Fijian Colonel Penioni Naliva was challenged because of historic allegations of torture. An ADF investigation was initiated and last week the Fiji Times reported the Colonel has been removed from the Deputy Commander position.

Fiji ‘National Counter Terrorism Strategy’ and a ‘Counter Terrorism Bill’ proposed

Fiji’s Deputy Secretary for the Ministry of Home Affairs, Sainitiki Ravuso said last week that the Fiji government is starting to draft a ‘National Counter Terrorism Strategy’ and ‘Counter Terrorism Bill.’ Fijian officials aim to table a draft strategy with Fiji’s Cabinet in June this year.

A ‘National Counter Terrorism Strategy’ and a ‘Counter Terrorism Bill’ are laudable goals. However, counter terrorism laws have a history of being used repressively and with Fiji’s history of coups and political violence it is important that international partners support the nation to develop law that safeguards political rights.

 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack