BEN MORGAN: Russia failing in Donetsk, hybrid war, and are Ukraine’s tactics changing?

The Russian offensive in Donetsk is failing. Russian forces are not advancing, and the Dobropilia salient, north of Pokrovsk is being destroyed by Ukrainian forces. The land campaign is currently static, and the question is – What next?

Strategically, Russia continues its hybrid campaign against NATO states, testing the alliance both in the air and at sea. European nations are not backing down, and one of Russia ‘shadow fleet’ of tankers was seized this week. A dangerous precedent for Russia when it relies on these ships for foreign revenue.

Russia’s land campaign is faltering

Regardless of disinformation circulating about Russian military strength and success, recent months show Russia’s land campaign is faltering. From a Russian perspective the key metric in the land battle is not casualties because the nation is clearly prepared to suffer enormous losses to achieve its objectives. Instead, the key measure of success is whether Russia can capture the key terrain they need to defeat Ukraine in Donetsk. Specifically, Pokrovsk, Kostyantynivka and the ‘Donetsk Fortress Belt.’

Russia’s operation to turn Ukraine’s left flank by attacking near Sumy appears to have been defeated, and last month some Russian forces redeployed from this area to reinforce the attack in Donetsk. Russia has built a powerful force in Donetsk, including elite infantry units, armour and the ‘Rubicon’ drone unit, approx. a quarter of a million soldiers.

Russia is clearly trying hard, and in recent months there have been some successes. In September, Russia penetrated Ukraine’s defences near Dobropillia, driving a salient approx. 15km into Ukrainian territory. More recently, Russian forces infiltrated Ukrainian defences near Kupyansk, a small town that controls bridges over the Oskil River. If Russia captures Kupyansk it could advance west into Kharkiv Oblast potentially turning Ukraine’s left flank and forcing Ukraine to deploy resources away from the battle in Donetsk.

However, even though Russia’s force in Donetsk is getting bigger its effectiveness is diminishing. For example, Deep State an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) website that monitors the war reports that although Russia’s number of attacks has remained consistent their rate of advance halved in September 2025 compared to August 2025. The Institute for the Study of War also reports that in the second half of September Russian advances slowed considerably.

Russia is also unable to capitalise on its successes, the break through at Dobropillia is contained and being destroyed. Mick Ryan, a retired Australian general and commentator opining that “Russian operations along the northern arm of their envelopment in the Dobropillia area appear to not only have been halted by the Ukrainians but the isolated Russian unit remnants there now appear to be ‘tethered goats’ used by the Ukrainians to lure other Russian units in to rescue them. These ‘rescuing Russian units’ then provide more targets for Ukrainian drone forces.”

On 6 October, leaked Russian document’s recording casualties were published by Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” organisation. The documents list Russian casualties from January to August 2025. The data is noteworthy because it indicates that other OSINT estimates of Russian forces suffering over 1,000 casualties per day are accurate. Additionally, the leaks show immense Russian losses in the fighting around Pokrovsk 43,709 killed, captured or missing and 52,865 wounded. A great deal of attrition without a significant tactical gain.

At this point the land campaign is deadlocked, and it is likely that neither side will make progress until there is a change in technology or tactics.

Ukraine’s campaign, are tactics changing?

Ukraine’s operational-level plan appears to be evolving and incorporating a ‘missile defeat’ component. In general terms, Ukraine’s operational-level plan is to ‘hold the line’ forcing Russia to attack and suffer attrition. A risky plan for Ukraine because Russia has such an overmatch in numbers that inflicting enough attrition to stop Russia may not be possible.

However, Ukraine is skewing the conventional calculus of attrition by developing a ‘drone wall.’ A sophisticated web of ‘sensors’ linked to ‘shooters’ that can respond almost instantly to targeting information. ‘Sensors’ like drones, ground surveillance radar, human observers and satellites constantly watch the battlefield identifying potential targets. ‘Shooters’ include artillery, mortars, missiles and drones that can respond, and attack the target identified by the ‘sensor.’ Anything moving in this ‘kill web’ can be quickly and decisively engaged.

The recent fighting in Donetsk indicates that Ukraine’s ‘drone wall’ or ‘kill web’ is highly effective because a powerful Russian force is stuck, unable to advance. The effectiveness of Ukraine’s ‘drone wall’ means that it requires less soldiers on the front line so Ukraine can train and build reserves in depth, and that Russian penetrations can be quickly stopped, cut off and destroyed, inflicting further attrition on Russia’s land forces.

Ukraine’s long-term strategy is to attrit Russia enough to achieve one of two results, either:

• Forcing Russia to negotiate a ceasefire, or
• Defeating Russia and pushing them out of the occupied territories.

The final objective will depend on how successful Ukraine’s strategy is, specifically whether Ukraine can defeat Russia’s ‘kill web’ and transition into offensive operations. And, we could be seeing other indications that could signal the start of an operational-level campaign to take away Russia’s front-line ‘kill web,’ including the following capability developments:

• On 26 September, Ukrainian drones started attacking Russian transport aircraft at Kacha airbase in Crimea. An attack that lasted several days and damaged aircraft that carry Russian missiles and drones forward from factories to the frontline.
• On 1 October, the commander of Ukraine’s drones forces, Robert Brovdi announced he is expanding Ukraine’s long-range uncrewed strike capabilities and re-structuring his units to meet this objective.

An evolving tactical doctrine called ‘missile defeat’ was described by Lieutenant General Daniel L. Karbler, in a 2023 speech titled ‘Missile Defence to Missile Defeat.’ The general used ‘archers and arrows’ as a metaphor to describe the theory. He described current doctrines of ‘missile defence’ as intercepting the ‘arrows,’ while arguing for a more aggressive ‘missile defeat’ concept that involves stopping the ‘archer’ firing their ‘arrow.’

In my opinion, ‘missile defeat’ provides a doctrine to defeat the enemy’s tactical ‘kill web’ by starting in depth; isolating the frontline from long range fire support, damaging the command nodes that manage their ‘kill web,’ and destroying enemy missiles, drones and artillery shells before they reach the frontline. Notably, ‘missile defeat’ operations include multi-domain attacks. For example, cyber-attacks on the enemy’s digital networks or satellite down links.

Ukraine’s reorganisation of its drone forces may indicate a more strategic approach to the use of these assets to influence the land campaign that may be like the doctrine. Already we know that Ukraine is hunting down Russia’s missiles and drone launchers, and it is easier to hit warehouses with ammunition than to try and find and destroy individual launchers. The attacks on transport aircraft operating from Kacha are noteworthy because they may indicate an expansion of Ukraine’s campaign into a ‘missile defeat’ phase. Destroying Russia’s defensive ‘kill web’ by striking the facilities in depth that support it.

If Ukraine can disrupt Russia’s frontline defence it opens opportunities to attack and even if Ukraine do not, Russian commanders still need to plan for that threat. So, keep watching the battle in Donetsk to see if Ukraine has bigger plans.

Russia’s hybrid operations continue to test Europe

Russian hybrid activities continue to be reported across Europe including unidentified drones being flown near airports and military bases in Germany Denmark, Norway, Belgium and Poland. On 3 October a Belgian aircraft reported 15 drones flying near the Elsenborn military base, and that these drones had flown from there into Germany.

Germany is also dealing with drones operating near airports, critical infrastructure and military bases. Last week, German authorities were forced to close Munich Airport after a swarm of drones was observed in the area. The nearby Erding military base, a German centre for drone development and production, was also overflown. Frankfurt, Munich and Germany’s air police base near Gifhorn have all been subject to recent drone overflights. It should be noted that some of these incidents may not be Russian activity. For example, some could simply be pranks but the number of incidents indicates a pattern.

Danish authorities also reported Russian warships behaving aggressively in the Danish Strait. It is reported that Russian warships manoeuvred dangerously close to Danish ships and tracked Danish naval ships and helicopters with their weapons. Thomas Ahrenkiel, Denmark’s Defence Intelligence Service Director also stated that it was highly likely that Russian ships have jammed local sonar, radar, and even the local GPS network at least once.

Russia is clearly engaged in a largescale hybrid campaign to test the mettle of the NATO alliance. The intrusions, whether in the air or at sea, provide Russia with useful intelligence. Further, they force NATO countries to react and each reaction tests the alliance’s relationships. Russia’s intrusions are also part of a larger ‘information operation’ designed to project the narrative that Russia is militarily powerful and willing to challenge NATO.

However, European nations are not sitting back. Sweden and Poland are unequivocable that any Russian aircraft crossing into their air space will be shot down. And, on 2 October, French soldiers boarded an oil tanker, the Boracay off the coast of Brittany. The Boracay is believed to be part of Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ of sanction busting tankers that carry Russian oil to customers like India and China. An example of how European patience is starting to wear out. If European nations start targeting Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ it may have a big impact on Russia’s economy.

Conclusion

The strategic battle for US commitment is becoming less relevant because Ukraine is demonstrating that it can hold Russia. Ukraine is under pressure in Donetsk but it has not failed, and is systematically destroying Russian forces. Currently, there is no concrete evidence that Ukraine can transition into offensive operations but are signs that Ukraine may be developing more sophisticated tactical approaches.

This is forcing Russia to continue its hybrid operations. Specifically, threatening intrusions aiming to test NATO resolve. Russia’s hybrid operations do not appear to be successful and are probably having the opposite effect, solidifying NATO’s position.

In conclusion, this campaign will be won on the ground in Donetsk. Russia and Ukraine’s air campaigns are notable, and influence the land campaign, but history tells us that wars are won on the ground. At this point, on the ground, Ukraine continues to hold the terrain Russia needs to win the battle for Donetsk. And, more importantly Ukraine’s land forces are evolving quickly, creating more and better organised drone force to offset Russia’s manpower advantage. If this trend continues it is only a matter of time before Ukraine transitions to offensive operations.

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack