Ben Morgan: Art of the deal, Putin gets the best deal from the worst hand?

Putin might be unsuccessful on the battlefield, but strategically he is bluffing his way to victory. Last week, Russia’s Victory Parade passed unmolested by Ukrainian drones. The next day, European leaders met in Kyiv, and issued a ceasefire ultimatum to Russia. UK Prime Minister Kier Starmer saying that “if he [Putin] is serious about peace, then he has a chance to show it.” President Zelensky responded immediately accepting the terms – stop fighting for 30 days and start negotiating.

Putin on the other hand responded by chiding the Europeans for negotiating “in a boorish manner and with the help of ultimatums,” and suggested direct talks between Ukraine and Russian in Istanbul on 15 May. An offer probably made to appease President Trump, that started a game of ‘will he – won’t he’ as the international community buzzed with anticipation about whether Putin would travel to Istanbul to participate in the talks.

In the end, Putin did not attend, and the meeting lasted only about two hours. The most meaningful outcome was an agreement to exchange prisoners. Late in the week, Trump leapt back into the discussion saying “nothing is going to happen” until he meets with Putin, and that a meeting will be set up as quickly as possible. This intervention means that there is great uncertainty about what the next step will be, and that Putin is achieving his strategic goals.

What is Putin’s game?

Last week was a ‘win’ for Putin, his most likely current aim is to meet directly with Trump. Probably he believes that if they meet, he can charm Trump into backing away from supporting Ukraine. This would limit support to Ukraine, and contributes to achieving a larger goal, splitting the European-US alliance. By reacting the way he did, Trump is dancing to Putin’s tune.

Dividing the European-US alliance is an historic objective of Soviet, Russian and Chinese diplomacy. This democratic alliance is enormously powerful, economically and militarily. If authoritarians want to establish a new ‘rules-based order’ that favours their nations, weakening this alliance is a pre-requisite.

By dismissing the European ultimatum, but offering a ‘reasonable’ alternative Putin played a clever game. He kept Trump on side, and diminished the diplomatic weight of Europe’s leadership. Essentially, his actions and Trump’s response reinforce the idea that Europe is powerless without the US, and therefore less consequential in world affairs. Putin has been able to convey the image that Russia and the US are equals.

This diplomatic manoeuvring is a good example of strategic deception, or maskirovka, to coin the Russian term. Putin knows the Trump administration accepts his justifications for starting the war, and the image of military competence he projects. This means he can play the White House off against its European allies, who are better inoculated to Russian propaganda.

Putin demonstrates the ‘art of the deal’ and reinforces his bluff

Putin’s maskirovka, or strategic deception is carefully reinforced by several recent activities. The first is obviously the large and impressive Victory Day Parade. A large event that included soldiers from many Russian partner states, demonstrating Russia’s international influence. China’s leader Xi Jinping attended; and a cynic might argue his presence at the parade was to mitigate the risk of Ukrainian attack, as much as to serve a diplomatic purpose. But it certainly demonstrated that a Sino-Chinese relationship still exists, and Putin is careful to project Russia as an equal partner of the larger nation.

The second is a reported build up of military equipment near the Finnish border. The third, publicity about Exercise Zapad 2025, a joint Belarusian-Russian exercise near the Polish border in September.

Both activities were portrayed in some media, as threatening and dangerous, exactly the narrative Putin wants to project. Looking closer, Zapad 2025 is a relatively small exercise deploying approximately 13,000 soldiers between Russia and Belarus. The Polish Army has a very modern, well-equipped army of roughly 200,000 full-time soldiers supported by a reserve of approximately 40,000. Poland is a NATO member so any Russia aggression would immediately trigger a massive response.

Putin is not going to attack Poland, Finland or any other NATO country. Russia is already struggling to subdue Ukraine, let alone attack the most powerful military alliance on earth. The website Statista assesses that in 2025, the combined forces of NATO have approximately 3.4 million active-duty (full-time soldiers) military personnel, compared with 1.3 million in Russian service. The same source assesses the US military commitment to NATO at 1.3 million soldiers. So even without the US contribution, NATO easily outnumbers Russia and is technologically far superior to Russia.

Additionally, Putin has failed to carry through on so many threats, and ‘red-lines’ that the US and NATO should be comfortable that he is highly unlikely to escalate into a nuclear confrontation.

However, Putin is reinforcing the idea that Russia is a powerful nation, an equal of the US, that must be listened too. Unfortunately, the White House appears to be buying this bluff.

The real situation, Russian victory is far from inevitable

A key issue with most discussion the war is the conflation of the current Russian Army with the Soviet Army. When Russia crossed the border in 2022 it presented the image of a large modern ‘network centric’ military. Its heavily armed Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG), swarmed over the battlefield, penetrating deep into Ukrainian territory.

However, within days of starting, probably as the food, fuel, and ammunition carried by each BTG ran out, the weaknesses quickly emerged. The Russian army had limited logistics, the swarm of BTGs had little coordination. In fact, Russia’s generals appeared to operate independently driven by their own ambitions rather than a cohesive plan.

The BTGs ground to a halt as Ukraine destroyed their vehicles, and pushed them out of most of the territory they had captured. Since then, Russia has been trying to rebuild its capabilities. The battles for Bakhmut and Avdiivka provided an opportunity to test, and develop a new infantry and glide bomb based tactical system – Storm Z tactics. Small detachments of infantry advancing into Ukrainian positions that had been smashed by long-range glide bombs.

Ukraine kept fighting and developing its defensive tactics, General Oleksander Syrskyi Ukraine’s military leader embracing defence as method to attrit Russia. Syrskyi, aware of Russia’s numerical superiority, its strong defences and Ukraine’s need to reconstitute its military appreciated that the time was not right for offensive manoeuvre. Instead, Ukraine settled into a long defensive phase, the objective of which is to attrit Russian forces. A strategy that is proving successful.

The last four months of the war were recently summarised in two UK Ministry of Defence graphs that demonstrate the impact of Syrskyi’s strategy. In the first four months of 2025, Russian casualties are tracking higher than at the same time in 2022, 2023 and 2024. Additionally, in the first four months of the year the amount of territory captured per month by Russia has decreased.

Behind these infographics, there are more detailed indications that Russia is not winning. For example, Russia clearly wants to occupy Donetsk, and to do this needs to capture Sloviansk and Kramatorsk the oblast’s (region) largest towns. Capturing these requires capturing either Pokrovsk, Costyantynivka or both. Russia has failed to take either of these towns, and in recent weeks Ukraine is successfully counter-attacking near both.

Ukraine is trading fields, streams and woods to inflict massive casualties on Russia. Whilst retaining a firm grip on vital towns and infrastructure. And, the rate of attrition is having an impact forcing Russia to recruit soldiers internationally, adding additional cost to maintaining the war effort paying their wages.

At sea and in the air, Russia faces similar challenges, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet ‘locked up’ Novorossiysk and Ukrainian drones attacking oil and military infrastructure regularly and effectively. Further, in recent months Ukraine’s F-16s have started to have an impact on the battlefield, and on 2 May the US Congress authorised a Foreign Military Sale agreement for approximately US $ 310 million providing spares and training.

In recent weeks, Ukraine’s F-16s were reported to have struck a series of high value targets. The aircraft have advanced Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) suites, and use accurate NATO ordinance that are specifically designed to target important and well-defended targets. Weapons like France’s AASM Hammer, a long-range modular glide bomb that has Circular Area of Probability (CEP) of 1 metre. This means 50% of bombs will land within one metre of their target, and roughly 99% within three metres, easily accurate enough to hit a point target like a headquarters vehicle, command bunker or communications centre.

A good example of how Ukraine is becoming progressively more lethal, as it integrates new foreign weapons and develops its own defence industry. Russia’s economy, meanwhile is suffering under the weight of international sanctions, Ukraine’s attacks on oil infrastructure, and the loss of foreign investment.

Conclusion

Russia is clearly negotiating from a position of weakness, but Putin is managing an exceptional bluff. Russian maskirovka seems to be leveraging decades of dis-information to influence the White House. Projecting the illusion that Russian victory is inevitable, that the war is justified, and Ukraine is a corrupt regime. A narrative that some in the White House believe, and that influences negotiations.

European leaders understand the importance of keeping America at the table, and that splitting this historic relationship would be a great strategic victory for key authoritarian regimes including China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. So are stuck, trying to manage the Trump administration and ensure that the US-Europe relationship survives this electoral term.

Unfortunately, the opportunity cost of maintaining that relationship could turn out to be a less the ideal resolution to the Ukraine War.

The reality is that negotiations should be easy, despite the size of its army Russia is not making significant progress conquering Ukraine. It is losing too many soldiers and too much equipment to sustain a long war, and its economy in failing.

The quickest way to shorten the war is to call Putin’s bluff. A united and fulsome commitment from the US and Europe to increasing military aid, and economic sanctions is the only way to negotiate with Russia. If any room is left to manoeuvre diplomatically, or to split the alliance Putin will use it, and continue the war because his objective is the complete subjugation of Ukraine. Therefore, the week’s key question is whether Trump will allow Putin to continue to use these tactics, or if he will work together with European leaders to compel negotiation.

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack