Ben Morgan: Russian Summer offensive is likely, but is unlikely to be successful

Regardless of President Trump and his Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s talk, a ceasefire appears no closer. Putin continuing to reject ceasefire proposals, and requiring unreasonable terms to progress further. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, recently stating that Russia supports the idea of a ceasefire, before attacking the legitimacy of the Kyiv government, and its inability to control its “extremist nationalist units.”

Russia is procrastinating and making the US President look foolish, Putin maintaining Russia’s air campaign, bombing Ukraine’s cities, and power infrastructure. Trump has made statements about Putin’s unwillingness to accept a ceasefire, and condemns the loss of life but has not acted; either to economically sanction Russia, or to provide more military aid to Ukraine.

Whatever the motivation, Trump’s inaction incentives both sides to keep fighting. Unfortunately, Putin and Trump are reinforcing received wisdom, that you should judge politicians by their actions not their words.

Putin’s recent actions reinforce that he realises the weakness of US foreign policy so is preparing to continue the war. At strategic-level, the US has left a void that Europe will take time fill so Putin is moving quickly. A larger than normal Spring draft of 160,000 conscripts, and persistent Ukrainian reports of Russian preparations point to him planning for a Russian Summer offensive.

Putin’s strategic situation, why it makes sense to attack

Clearly, Putin has not achieved his initial strategic objectives and now faces significant military and economic issues. So, he has reduced his strategic objectives, from a complete capture of Ukraine, and regime change to securing the annexed territories (specifically Donetsk and Luhansk). This objective is reflected in Russia’s disposition of forces in the land campaign, attacking most strongly in Donetsk, near Pokrovsk.

Russia’s frontline units have suffered considerable attrition and increasingly deploy with obsolete armoured vehicles, and civilian transport. Throughout 2024, Russia maintained constant pressure along the frontline, suffering enormous casualties. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence estimates that 430,000 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded in that year alone.

Concurrently, the Russian economy is suffering, Reuters reporting on 8 April that “The Russian economy has slowed sharply in recent months, according to the latest economic data, and may be at further risk if a fall in oil prices and global market turmoil persist.” It has long been predicted that the Russian economy was not strong enough to maintain the war effort. However, Putin was able to maintain economic growth by using a large ‘war chest’ to pay soldiers high wages, and to fund defence spending but this strategy is not sustainable, and now Russia’s economy is starting to slow down.

Putin needs an operational-level victory in Donetsk

Russia has invested heavily in trying to capture Pokrovsk, an important logistics hub, and suffered significant attrition. The Institute for the Study of War summing up the situation on 8 April, as follows “Russian forces have spent the last 13 months and lost over five divisions’ worth of tanks and thousands of troops attacking towards Pokrovsk and trying to seize the town.” Losses that are unsustainable, especially in a country that’s economy is slowly collapsing.

In 2024, Ukraine dislocated Russia’s Donetsk offensive by attacking in Kursk. This drew Russian combat power away from the main effort and permanently extended the frontline, forcing Russia to disperse its resources. This meant that Russia has been unable to build sufficient combat power to achieve an operationally significant manoeuvre in Donetsk. For example, capturing Pokrovsk, or Kostyantynivka another important logistics centre.

At an operational-level, Ukraine is ‘fixing’ Russia in Donetsk and slowly attriting Putin’s forces. An unsustainable situation for Russia that needs to be addressed.

US foreign policy uncertainty

Currently, the US position seems ambivalent to the defence of Ukraine. The US administration clearly wanting to stop the conflict, but showing little desire to support Ukraine for any political or moral reason. However, the Whitehouse has expressed willingness to support Ukraine for profit, and this week Ukraine’s President Zelensky proposed a military aid package that might reset the US position.

Zelensky proposes a $30-50 billion programme purchasing US military equipment, financed by extraction of rare earth minerals. This proposal may bring the US back to the table, supporting Ukraine.

Further, the confusion and disruption created by Trump’s confused tariff policy is leading to a global economic crisis that is driving the cost of oil down, reducing the value of Russia’s most important export. A situation that will further reduce Russia’s ‘war chest’ and therefore the nation’s ability to sustain the war.

Greater European unity

On 11 April, the Ukraine Defence Contact Group met in Brussels and announced more aid for Ukraine. The BBC reporting that “Ukraine’s European allies have pledged €21bn ($24bn; £18bn) in a new tranche of military support for Kyiv in what they described as “a critical year” for the war.”

Additionally, the European Union, stung by the Trump administration’s bullying foreign policy decisions is now working hard to build Europe’s defence industrial base. A situation that bodes poorly for Putin, Europe’s economy is roughly nines times larger than Russia’s already damaged economy and if mobilised could produce vast amounts of military hardware.

Meanwhile, led by UK Prime Minster Sir Keir Starmer and French President Emanual Macron European countries are developing plans for a peace monitoring force, or security force in Ukraine. This is a significant risk for Putin, and Russia’s hard ‘No’ to deployment of NATO troops during negotiations indicates their level of concern. Any European force, on-the-ground in Ukraine would significantly complicate Russian activities, forcing Russia to avoid military action or risk escalation with European powers.

Essentially, the hardening of European attitudes means that ‘the clock is ticking’ for Putin, and his chances of winning militarily decrease as Europe’s support and commitment increases.

Summing up Putin’s position
Essentially, Putin feels he needs to attack because he is never going to be as strong as he currently is, and if he does not want to negotiate America’s position is naturally likely to evolve in one of two directions; Trump either walking away in frustration, or providing more aid to Ukraine.

Looking at the situation from Putin’s perspective, the latter option is unlikely, the President’s actions signal an ambivalent position towards Ukraine. And, inflicting a defeat on Ukraine would reinforce the narrative that Russian victory is inevitable. Putin would have noted how Trump and Witkoff both amplified Russian disinformation about the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Kursk, so is likely to believe they will do the same in the event of a Russian victory. This narrative could provide the Whitehouse with a justification for ‘walking away,’ essentially that it is a waste of money and lives to try and defend Ukraine.

Putin probably feels he has nothing to lose and lots to gain, therefore it is likely that Russia we will start a new offensive, but will it be successful?

Why a Russian offensive will probably fail

Regardless of Putin’s assessment of the situation, there are several indications that a Russian offensive is unlikely to be successful.

Factor One – Russia’s frontline forces are sub-optimal

Russia is recruiting another 160,000 conscripts, releasing more contract soldiers to fight in Ukraine. Likewise, it may recruit more soldiers from China or North Korea, but these factors do nothing to replace lost tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and experienced soldiers.

We can extrapolate from current Russian losses, and the pace of their operations that Russia’s combat capability is reducing. But the most important measure of Russian combat effectiveness remains the fact that they have not been able to capture key targets like Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar or Kostyantynivka.

It is unlikely that Russia’s army in Ukraine is suddenly going to transform into an organisation capable of a successful large-scale offensive.

Factor Two – Ukraine appears to be testing offensive options

Russian activity along the frontline does not appear to be very effective. In fact, in Belgorod, Kupiansk, and near Pokrovsk Ukraine is currently pushing Russian forces back. The most important example of this trend is at Pokrovsk, where Ukraine has drawn a Russian salient forward and inflicted heavy casualties. Ukraine now appears to be counter-attacking. See the map below.

This possible counter-attack would represent a tactical transition from months of attritional defence to manoeuvre. Ukraine’s dispositions, and the ground indicate that this attack is well-planned. Probably, it is a small test of Russian capability and resources, and could possibly be a prelude to a larger operation.

It is possible that Ukraine may beat Russia to the punch, launching its own offensive. We have seen Ukraine’s ability deliver large, surprise offensives in Kherson, Kharkiv, and Kursk so should not write off the idea that Putin’s resources may soon be needed for defence rather attack.

Factor Three – Ukraine’s defensive system is well-tested and highly effective

Since General Syrskyi announced Ukraine’s new strategy based on defence and attrition, Ukraine has developed a sophisticated and effective system of defence. A key aspect of which is using drones more effectively, for instance on 8 April the Institute for the Study of War said that Russian military bloggers report Ukrainian drones dominate the local battlefield.

The Ukrainian military demonstrates effective coordination between ‘sensors,’ like infantry, armoured vehicles, electronic warfare teams, radar teams, satellites, aircraft and drones with ‘shooters’ like artillery, missiles or attack drones. This means Ukraine’s indirect fire is accurate and timely. Ukraine’s integration of ‘sensors and shooters,’ makes concentrating a Russia force for a large attack very difficult.

Factor Four – Increasing Ukrainian airpower

Speaking to the Senate Armed Forces Committee, last week Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Chris Cavoli discussed the effectiveness of Ukraine’s F16 fighters including in a ground attack role. He told the committee that “They fly every day; they’ve defeated large number of cruise missile threats, and they’ve delivered an awful lot of offensive attacks as well, specifically bombing attacks in the east.”

Originally, the F-16s concentrated on air defence, intercepting missiles and drones. However, a long-standing objective of Ukrainian operations is to degrade Russian air defences, and recent long-range drone attacks indicate some success. So, it is logical that we would see F-16’s being used more to attack ground targets. And, aircraft like F-16s can drop much larger payloads that missiles or drones.

Meanwhile, Cavoli points out Ukraine is benefiting from its investment in pilot training and more nations committing to supply F-16s. It has taken a long-time but Ukraine’s F-16 force is finally starting to become a significant factor in the war. And, this strike capability would be a significant impediment for any Russian offensive.

Summary

Putin is clearly still committed to fighting, ceasefire discussions and the Spring rasputitsa, provided an operational pause. But long-term the numbers are against Russia, its army is battered and running out of equipment, its economy is failing and even if America stops supporting Ukraine, Europe is mobilising its military forces and industry to oppose him.

Putin either needs to win a clear victory and cement the idea the Russian victory is inevitable, or he needs to negotiate. Summer is on the way and a large offensive in the next few months provides another throw for Russia’s dice.

However, Ukraine has consistently demonstrated the ability to fight off Russian attacks, and this offensive is likely to be less dynamic and powerful that last year’s. In fact, Russia may be shortening the war if it attacks in Summer because it will lose more hard to replace soldiers and equipment, further straining its economy. It could also stimulate an American reassessment of the situation, Putin’s flagrant disregard for a negotiated peace making the US look weak.

My advice to Putin, would be to slow down, and think carefully before committing to an offensive this Summer.

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack