BEN MORGAN: More strategic and operational-level blows, Russia’s problems get worse

Currently the campaign highlights Ukraine’s superior operational-level planning.  In Kursk, Ukrainian forces are making Russia fight a battle of manoeuvre, that their forces are too poorly trained and led to win. Meanwhile 260km south-east, Russian forces are suffering attrition, fixed at Pokrovsk. At strategic-level Ukraine’s drone campaign is making a significant impact on Russia’s ammunition supply.

However, the most interesting insights last week came from Ukraine’s head of intelligence, General Kyrylo Budanov. Speaking at the Yalta International Strategy Conference in Kyiv, General Budanov discussed Russia’s situation and echoed a range of sources that assess Russia’s ability to prosecute the war will disappear in late-2025 or 2026. Essentially, that Russia’s economy is not strong enough to maintain the war effort. Instead relying on re-furbishing stockpiles of equipment, a situation that is not sustainable. If Russia cannot produce enough material to continue using attrition as its primary tactic, then it can be defeated.

General Budanov and Putin both know that the war is coming to a decisive point, that if Russia has not won by 2026, then it cannot keep fighting offensively. A situation that sharpens analysis of the war, and provides insight into Ukraine’s plans.

Putin’s political situation

Currently, the media is full of speculation about Putin and the likelihood of him being toppled in a coup. Speculation about Putin’s political position is a regular feature of any Ukrainian success, or Russian setback. My advice is to ignore it, Putin’s hold on power is very difficult to estimate, and only those closest to him are likely to have any useful insight. At this stage, there is no firm evidence of political weakness.

Mobilisation is another confusing political issue, media reports have discussed existing Russian plans to increase the size of the army, convoluting this with an emergency mobilisation of reserves. When this article was written though, mobilisation had not been ordered. Indicating that Putin either does not have the political mandate to order a larger mobilisation or remains confident that he has sufficient resource.  My assessment is that he is gambling on the latter, he knows that Russia is in a tough position. However, Putin is waiting to see how the US presidential election impacts his plans before taking a risky step like issuing mobilisation orders.

Last week, there were indications that there may be subtle changes in Putin’s foreign policy statements. The Washington Post writing that senior Russian diplomats have reportedly noted that Putin is rethinking his nuclear rhetoric because it is not deterring NATO and US support, and is causing concern amongst Russia’s supporters. The Institute for the Study of War commented on 22 September ‘that Putin may be developing an unspecified more nuanced and limited informational response to future Western approval of long-range strikes into Russia.” This is an inevitable consequence of the situation, if nuclear threats are not working Putin needs to find another way to threaten Ukraine’s supporters.

The question is – How? Putin clearly does not have the political mandate to use nuclear weapons, further any warlike act against NATO would provoke a response that he cannot counter. Therefore, Putin’s options are necessarily oblique; like supplying technology to Iran or North Korea, or undermining stability in Africa or the Middle East.

In 2016, it was alleged that Russia ‘weaponised’ refugees by diverting them from the Syrian conflict into Europe. In a briefing for the US House Security Committee, NATO supreme commander, US General Philip Breedlove, stated; “Together, Russia and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponizing migration from Syria. In an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve.”  Essentially, that the brutality of Syrian and Russian operations was calculated to create more refugees and drive them out of Syria. Forcing Europe to manage large numbers of displaced people, exacerbating existing, de-stabilising anti-refuge politics in European nations. A claim that has been challenged, but provides an idea of the possible breath of potential forms Russian hybrid war could take. It will be interesting to see how Putin’s rhetoric changes in coming weeks and how his threats evolve.

The ‘Big Picture’

At strategic-level, Ukraine continues to fight the information battle, demonstrating to its supporters (and the Russian public) that it can ‘bring the war to Russia.’  The week’s drone strikes were a powerful message that even though the US has not authorised use of its long-range weapons, Ukraine is capable of inflicting significant attacks on Russian territory.

The Toropets strike on 18 September, hit a large ammunition dump 500km from the Ukraine border and only 380km from Moscow. The attack is estimated to have destroyed 30-40,000 tonnes of ammunition.  Huge explosions, and the 6km wide fire filled international news as the world watched the depot burn. Toropets was a storage area for glide bombs, artillery shells and long-range missiles like Iskander and Tochka-U missiles. A strike clearly planned to influence the frontline by destroying these weapons.

Colonel Ants Kivisleg, head of the Estonian Military Defence Forces Intelligence Centre, estimates the Toropets explosion was big enough to have destroyed 750,000 artillery shells. Russia currently, fires about 10,000 artillery shells per day, so the strike is likely to reduce the amount of ammunition available to Russian forces.

Later in the week, Ukraine’s drones kept up the pressure on Russia’s ammunition pipeline, hitting targets across Crimea, and in neighbouring parts of Russian on 21 September.  The strikes involved more than 100 drones and damaged a range of Russian sites. An ammunition depot at Tikoretsk, about 250km east of the Kerch Strait, and roughly halfway between Russia’s large bases in Krasnador Krai and Rostov-on-Don was successfully attacked. The depot catching fire and forcing the evacuation of about 1000 people.

Russia is obviously striking back, but Ukraine’s accurate and effective strikes on large ammunition depots, well behind the frontline is clearly a strategy designed to reduce the flow of ammunition to the frontline.  It also demonstrates how effectively Ukraine has degraded Russian air-defences, ammunition depots like Toropets should be well-defended and safe.

Strategic-level activity, like the air campaign against Russia’s ammunition depots is designed to create operational-level impacts. Firstly, to influence the battle for Pokrovsk, a small town sitting on high ground. Pokrovsk is important because it secures the junctions of the following transport routes:

• The E50, a large highway linking the town to Dnipro.
• The T0504 that Ukraine uses to supply its forces in Chasiv Yar, Kostyantyivka, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.
• The T0515 that joins the T0514 and that runs north to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.
• Rail junctions linking these areas.

Losing Pokrovsk would be a significant operational-level blow for Ukraine. It would make a Russian conquest of Donetsk Oblast easier, but it is not a war-winning victory.  Currently, Pokrovsk is Russia’s main effort, and a 25-30km long salient now toward the town. Based on General Syrskyi’s statements, I have speculated that Ukraine is also aims to fix and attrit Russia at Pokrovsk

Ukraine’s attacks on Russian ammunition supplies impact further north, in Kursk. Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk aims to draw Russian resources away from battle for Pokrovsk, and creates conditions for mobile operations. A type of fighting, in which Ukraine has an advantage. One shown to good effect in recent weeks, as Ukraine responds to Russian attempts to break its soldiers out of the area, enclosed by Ukrainian forces and the Syem River.  And, as at Pokrovsk reducing Russia’s ammunition supply removes their key advantage over Ukraine, making tactical victories more likely.

An update on Pokrovsk

Russian forces initially advanced quickly towards Pokrovsk, but slowed down as they hit the first defensive line demarcated by Hrodivka, Novohrodivka and Selydove.  In the last three weeks Russia has advanced only a small distance west, towards Pokrovsk. Instead, as predicted Russian forces are swinging south, avoiding Ukraine’s engagement area immediately in front of Pokrovsk. Instead, they are focussed on closing a large Ukrainian salient, and seeking to turn Ukraine’s southern flank.

Additionally, Russian forces are filling in other small local gaps in the frontline. However, it is noteworthy that Ukraine is also making successful local counter-attacks.  This is unusual, since late 2023 Russian advances have been inexorable, once ground was taken, it was held. The success of local counter attacks may indicate that Russia’s overall combat power is decreasing, and that weak-points are starting to appear. Perhaps indicating that Russian frontline reserves are reduced, requiring commanders to pick and choose where to defend.

However, if Russia wants to advance west, they will be squeezed into an open, low-lying ‘bowl’ immediately east of Pokrovsk in which they can be engaged by the defenders, using artillery, drones, missiles, and long-range direct fire forces weapons to attrit the attackers. A situation that I have speculated, based on comments by General Syrskyi, is being shaped at the operational-level by the Kursk offensive.  The offensive removing the reserves required for Russia to withdraw or open a new axis of advance. Essentially, the Russian forces at the tip of the 25km salient are ‘fixed,’ ready for Ukraine to attrit them and with less ammunition available to counter this plan.

Summary

Soon President Zelenskyy heads to Washington and will present his plan for victory, an effort to convince US voters that Ukraine can win the war.  His aim is to get a ‘Trump proof’ commitment of support from President Biden, probably starting by lifting the restrictions on long-range strike weapons. But there is likely to be more, defence industry and technology agreements that aim to increase Ukraine’s sustainability and clear statements about the condition’s Ukraine needs for peace.  Perhaps NATO and EU membership, or US security guarantees. At this stage we do not know, however Ukraine is fighting an effective campaign, making it a good investment so it seems likely that President Zelenskyy will get some important concessions.

Ukraine’s current operational-level campaign looks like it will force Russia to culminate, that Pokrovsk is a step too far and that Putin will enter the winter ‘down’ 1200 square km of Russian territory and without the victory his soldiers have died in Donetsk to achieve.  The next question is how much Ukraine will attrit Russian forces near Pokrovsk, over the winter.  Can they inflict on operationally significant defeat?  Keep watching Pokrovsk because I think that when the cold comes, Ukraine’s drones, bombs and missiles will be inflicting severe attrition. Losses Russia will struggle to recover from before the summer, meaning 2025 may be the year of decision.