GUEST BLOG: Ben Morgan – The truth about Ukraine’s offensive

Tension is building in Ukraine. Russia’s winter offensive has been defeated and although the battle for Bakhmut continues the real action is elsewhere, as the world looks for signs of Ukraine’s spring offensive.  The ground is starting to dry out; and there are a range of indications that an offensive may start soon. Some are small and almost un-reported; others are large and well-publicised.  Regardless, there is an air of expectation; a sense that something is coming and that it will be big.  A clever Ukrainian information operation? Or; are we seeing signs that Ukraine is getting ready to punch back? And; would a successful Ukrainian attack be enough to stop the war?

Recently, several key indicators of a Ukrainian offensive have been observed, starting with reports two weeks ago that the number of Russian electronic surveillance and radar systems destroyed by Ukraine is increasing.   This is a good indication that something is in the wind.  Any military relies on networks of electronic surveillance systems; radar sweeps the air and ground across any battlespace. Air-defence radars track planes moving over the battle, monitoring friendly aircraft and targeting enemy aircraft.  On the ground, artillery locating radars spot enemy shells and missiles in the air and locate where they were fired from and ground surveillance radars sweep the frontlines monitoring the location of enemy vehicles and foot soldiers.  

The remainder of the electromagnetic spectrum is monitored; signals intelligence units listening to enemy radio and digital transmissions gathering information and locating where the transmission comes from.  Electronic surveillance gives good information about enemy force locations and intentions. Disrupting or destroying these assets makes any operation easier. 

In August 2022, the United States confirmed that it supplied AGM – 88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM) to Ukraine. So, Ukraine certainly has the capability to target Russia’s electronic warfare network, and if the increase in destroyed Russian equipment reported by Ukraine is real it could be part of a preparatory operation. 

Last week, we also started to see plenty of carefully scripted social media posts showing movements of Ukrainian troops and equipment.  Carefully, curated to demonstrate Ukrainian strength but to provide little or no indication of their location.  An indication that these images are more than a bluff is that ‘tac signs;’ simple logos like Russia’s ‘Z’ are painted on the vehicles.  Tac signs provide an easy way to identify friendly vehicles and are normally painted shortly before an operation.  Further, this week Germany and Poland signed maintenance agreements with Ukraine for Leopard tanks establishing a logistics pipeline for repairing and supporting these tanks. 

Then in recent days there are reports of increased Ukrainian reconnaissance activity in two key areas.  In the north-east, around Kremina and Svatove; and unsurprisingly along the Zaporizhian frontlines.  This activity is another indicator consistent with an imminent offensive, Ukraine testing Russian defences and looking for weak points.  Reports of Ukrainian villages being forcibly evacuated in the area north of Melitopol are also circulating, another action consistent with both sides preparing for battle. The Russians removing potential partisans and spies from the area.

And; on 21 April at NATO’s Ramstein conference Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was asked about Ukraine’s potential for success and said “I’m confident that they will now be in a position to be able to liberate even more land. One of the main issues here today has been to go through all the different capabilities, systems, supplies that the Ukrainians need to be able to retake more land”.  

Unfortunately, this activity does not confirm that an attack is imminent; or provide an indication of exactly where the blow will fall.  However, I think that we can safely say that an attack is coming. In previous articles I have stated that the main effort of the offensive will be to split the Crimean Land Bridge.  It may start with a feint elsewhere, but a successful push south from Zaporizhia to the sea isolating Crimea provides Ukraine with its best opportunity to finish the war.  It is a fact that wars seldom end with the total defeat of one side.  In most cases wars finish because the cost of continuing the conflict is too great and the protagonists agree to negotiate.  The truth about this offensive is that is not about destroying Russia’s army and finishing the war, but rather about creating the conditions for a negotiated peace.

In this case, Russia has continued past the point of sensible negotiation.  Prigozhin is right, if Russia wants to salvage anything from this conflict, it needs to stop throwing resources away trying to attack and get ready to hold what they have taken.  In fact, there are several points in the war that they could have taken this option and retained more territory. Imagine if Russia had started negotiations in August 2022, before the Kharkiv offensive.  The Russia could potentially have stalled Ukraine’s capability build-up, absorbed its newly mobilised conscripts and planned an effective offensive. 

Instead, military logic ‘flew out the window’ and campaign decisions were driven by Putin’s ‘personal good’ rather than by Russia’s ‘public good.’ Putin needs a victory; and is a gambler so he will keep on ‘throwing the dice’ until someone stops him.  And; this consideration is at the heart of Ukrainian strategy and likely drives this offensive’s objectives.   The offensive doesn’t need to remove every Russian soldier from Ukraine to defeat Putin.  It only needs to demonstrate to the people around Putin that Ukraine has the capability to inflict a catastrophic defeat on Russia.   

If Ukraine breaks the Crimean Land Bridge and isolates Crimea, then land resupply will be impossible; and worse the Kerch Bridge will be within missile range.  Crimea will become an island isolated; able to be slowly starved into submission by Ukraine.  At that point, the silovaki (strong men) who support Putin within Russia; and China will need to decide: Are they willing to escalate into a nuclear war to fight for Crimea? Or; is it more sensible to negotiate and try to hold Crimea in a negotiated peace?

The offensive is likely to start slowly, like we saw in August last year when Ukraine started probing and advancing slowly east of the Dnipro advancing on Kherson.  The Ukrainians slowly felt out the Russian defences, cut off their supply lines and eventually isolated Kherson forcing a withdrawal. Then as attention was focussed on Kherson, they switched and attacked from Kharkiv.  It is likely that this is how Ukraine’s current offensive will start because Ukraine does not have an air and artillery firepower advantage; so it can’t overwhelm the Russian’s defences with sheer firepower.  Instead, we are likely to see precision guided depth fire. HIMARS knocking out supply hubs and concentrations of reserves. Ukraine also lacks numbers so it can’t afford to risk resources in poorly planned attacks.  Expect widespread and persistent reconnaissance that’s tempo builds over time probably culminating in an axis of attack that is unexpected.  Finally, the south is now well-fortified so progress is likely to be careful and slow as Ukraine uses combined arms war fighting techniques to breech Russia’s defensive lines. 

Overall, expect a slow and steady offensive the Ukrainian’s protecting their assets and manpower.  This caution will lead to a slowly developing battle and the following four scenarios may develop:

 

• Russian defences hold.  Russian soldiers on the frontline repel the Ukrainian offensive and there is no significant territorial change.
• Ukraine’s gains are limited.  Perhaps they push forwards 10-20 km on a frontage of 25-50km, capture some villages or small towns but fail to reach the coast in the south or capture Starobilsk, about 60 km west of their current line in the north.
• The Russians suffer a significant defeat in an area.  Ukraine breeches Russian defences either in the south or in the north. A significant defeat for Russia would be Ukraine reaching the coast in the south, or capturing Starobilsk in the north, or a major town in the east.  A sudden advance of 60-80km on a frontage of 25-50km.  
• Russian collapse.  After Ukraine breeches the Russian defensive lines their morale collapses and there is a large retreat.   For instance, the Russians located on the Black Sea coast fail and withdraw east to Donetsk and south to Crimea. Or in the north, they vacate Luhansk withdrawing north and east into Russia and south into Donetsk. 

I weigh training and morale higher than numbers and believe in the superiority of NATO equipment.  Leopard tanks handled by motivated crews will inflict significant casualties on Russia’s un-motivated tankers.  And; Ukraine has also received approximately 1500 NATO mechanised infantry combat vehicles Marders, Bradleys and others and these vehicles are much more effective than their Russian equivalents.  Currently, in Bakhmut Ukraine is inflicting five casualties on Russia for every Ukrainian killed. This is during an infantry battle that does not include the significant advantages that come with modern NATO tanks and combat vehicles, that are a generation or two ahead of their enemy’s.  When this is factored into combat situation it likely that we will seem much higher ratios. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that Russia’s defences will hold.  

Instead, it seems more likely that Ukraine will be able to breech Russia’s defensive lines.  And; this is where Ukraine’s reserves and local ‘over match’ comes into play. In very simplistic terms; if Ukraine has 70-100,000 soldiers that can be deployed in the offensive; and they attack one axis it is likely to be an overwhelming force. Russia may have 400,000 men in Ukraine but they are covering a frontline that is about 650km long. This is 615 soldiers per kilometre of frontline, so if the Ukrainians concentrate and attack on a divisional frontage of 25-50 kilometres then in that section of front, they would meet 15-30,000 Russians; or have an advantage of three to one. The traditional ratio required for a successful attack.  Of course, this is a vast over simplification of the actual intricacies of the offensive phase of war but hopefully demonstrates how reserves can be used to achieve local over match even when an attacking forces overall strength is less than its enemy’s. 

The breech will take time to develop; and the crucial information is how many losses the Russians can inflict during this phase. If Ukraine applies the principles of combined arms operations effectively and limits its losses then the next phase will be exciting. The Ukrainians now free to advance quickly behind Russia’s frontline seeking to gain as much territory as possible before Russian reserves arrive and contain the offensive. If the breeching operation is punishing and Ukraine takes lots of casualties it will not be able to exploit its position and the offensive will culminate in the second option, a limited success. 

However, my assessment is that there is a good chance that Ukraine has learnt the lessons of combined arms war and will breech the frontline with relatively limited losses. This will open the opportunity for a fast-moving advance and for Ukraine to achieve a significant success. If the front line is breeched; Russia faces two problems that require capabilities that to-date they have not demonstrated.  First, they need frontline junior leadership able to rally their forces and quickly re-organise new defensive lines.  Secondly, they need massive logistics capability to move reserves to the area and limit Ukrainian success.  

In summary, Ukraine doesn’t need to take Crimea to win. Instead, it needs to demonstrate sufficient success that Russia’s elite and foreign supporters can see the country is progressing towards a potentially catastrophic defeat. A defeat that is intolerable and requires them to manage Putin; and force a change of strategy. And; Ukraine’s training, motivation and new NATO equipment completely outclass their opposition so we should be hopeful of a significant victory.   

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer and TDBs military blogger