GUEST BLOG: Ben Morgan – Russia’s offensive, slow and steady wins the race or will impatience win?

Pundits continue to discuss Russia’s impending offensive; and in recent weeks we have seen some interesting activity on the front line, from Orikhiv in the south to Kremina in the north there has been Russian activity.  At the same time approximately three divisions or about 60,000 Russians are in depth; providing a reserve in the east of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts (regions).  So while the mainstream media focuses on Ukraine’s cities being bombed, let’s look at what is happening on the battlefields where this war will be won.

In late January, the Russians moved on Orikiv, a city in Zaporizhzhia.  This move was soundly repulsed by the Ukrainians.  Then in the last couple of weeks, Russian forces have been on the offensive around Kremina and Svatove.  These cities in Luhansk Oblast, represent the eastern extent of Ukraine’s last offensive.  Both sit on the P66 Highway an important road for bringing supplies from Russia into Luhansk.   Kremina’s situation also makes it a possible ‘jumping off’ point for either attacking east into Luhansk or south into Donetsk.  However, at this time the action is further north about 50km north of Svatove. Reports indicate the Russians are attacking vigorously and that Ukraine is reinforcing this section of the front.

Further south, near Bakhmut fighting continues to rage as the Russians try to encircle the city.  Soledar, about 7km north-east of Bahkmut is in Russian hands and this week the Ukrainians seem ready to withdraw from Krasna Hora only a few kilometres north of Bakhmut.   South of the city the Russians are inching towards the villages of Chasiv Yar and Ivanivske about 8km southeast of Bakhmut and towards the T0504 Highway that supplies Bakhmut from the south.  It is likely that in the next few weeks the Russians will take Bakhmut opening an axis of advance north-west to Sloviansk, along the M03 Highway.  

And; about 100km south of Bakhmut the Russians attacked and were defeated near Vuledhar.  This battle caused a furore in the Russian military blogger community. Vuledhar, although small sits on the junction point between south and east Ukraine; roughly 40km south west of Donetsk city and about 80km due north of Mariupol.  The recent Russian attack was destroyed; and video footage is circulating that clearly shows a range of Russian tactical incompetence, launching an acrimonious social media debate in Russia.  In Russia military bloggers are an influential part of the ultra-nationalist community that supports Putin.  When they are critical of the Russian military, their criticism is taken seriously by politicians. 

Overall, we can see an increase in Russian activity and on 7 February the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence announced that the predicted Russian offensive has started. Later on 8 February, United States think tank The Institute for the Study of War’s daily brief stated that: “Russian forces have regained the initiative in Ukraine and have begun their next major offensive in Luhansk Oblast”.  Both are reputable commentators and noting the increase in Russian activity ascribe it to the start of the predicted Russian offensive.  

However, if we seek to analyse the developing campaign it is important to try and understand more about what we are seeing; and the key points that strike me are:

• The spread of Russian activity is wide, with attacks across a frontage of approximately 350km.
• The size and scale of the Russian activity is relatively small.  The fighting that we have credible reports of is normally company-sized combat teams; about 100 men and a dozen vehicles. At Vuledhar and Orikhiv, a battalion; about 3-400 men and 30-40 vehicles.
• Russian missile and drone attacks in depth are still concentrated on civilian power infrastructure rather than military targets.
• There has been not been a large concentrated assault. The Russians have about 60,000 men available in depth, but we have not seen a brigade or divisional sized push anywhere on the front at this point. 
• Winter in Ukraine has been unusually warm, so the ground is not frozen and we are fast approaching spring and the famous ‘mud season’ – rasputitsa or in Ukrainian bezdorizhzhia during which the snow that fell during winter combines with spring rain to make off road travel difficult.  

We can deduce from these observations that Russia is probing Ukraine’s defences.  This may be in preparation for a large (brigade or division) attack, but this seems unlikely for two reasons.  The first reason is NATO intelligence. It is likely that as soon as the Russians concentrate a large force in an attack formation it will be immediately noted and made public.  Secondly, it is highly unlikely that the Russians will launch a large offensive this month only to have it stopped by the rasputitsa next month.  

What seems more likely is that the Russians are playing smart.  Testing Ukraine’s defences; but more importantly building their own capabilities.  In Viscount Slim’s book, Defeat into Victory he describes rebuilding the British 14th Army after its defeat by the Japanese in Burma during World War Two.  A key part of his strategy was retraining his army to win, a task that he did by making numerous small attacks against weak Japanese units, building his forces confidence. Overtime the size and scale of the attacks increased until 14th Army was able to fight and win major battles.   So I don’t think we will see a major Russian ground assault for a few more months, instead we are going to see incremental progress as they test Ukraine’s defences and build their own tactical ability. 

This will also be a phase of testing new techniques, the Hindustan Times reported this week that Russia is deploying four small tracked robots equipped with light cannon and anti-tank missiles.  The small numbers and lack of reporting in the West hint that this may be a serious test rather than propaganda.  Based on what we have seen to date of Russian tech prowess this is unlikely to herald a game-changing new technology but it may indicate that Russia sees this as an experimental phase of the war. One in which Russia is testing both Ukraine’s defences and their own tactics. 

In these columns, I argue that the Russian army is often over-estimated; a product of both historical precedent and Russian propaganda. History shows that Russia’s vast size and huge population has traditionally defeated armies that were vastly superior tactically. Further, many of today’s senior NATO leaders were trained facing the Soviet army.  A vastly different and more capable beast, the fear of which Putin’s propaganda machine has successfully built on in recent years to scare NATO.  At the start of the war we heard pundits describing the Russian army as the second-best army in the world, after the United States. This war has proven that the Russian army is a paper-tiger, a shadow of the Soviet armies of World War Two and the Cold War.  This is logical, the Russian economy is tiny in relation to its supposed level of military capability. The money available simply does not equate to the capabilities trumpeted by Putin. Further, this war provides a view into Putin’s kleptocracy that shows us how corrupt and incompetent Russia’s military has become. 

However, we need to approach analysis with an open mind and Russia’s current operations tend to indicate a slow and steady approach to offensive operations.  Retired American General Phillip Breedlove recently opined in a Times Radio interview that this offensive activity will tell us a great deal about Russia’s capability and strategic thinking.  Breedlove’s position was that a slow offensive matched with Putin and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu’s recent statements and activities mobilising manpower and industry point to Russia ‘settling in’ for a long, slow campaign designed to outlast NATO.   

Essentially, at a strategic level Russia is mobilising its manpower and economy; not to defeat Ukraine by capturing terrain but rather to maintain enough offensive action that they can spoil Ukrainian attacks and don’t lose.  A sensible strategy that this column has identified before (See – NATO tanks and Russian offensives – What’s really happening? and Spring offensive, Russia’s quickest way to lose the war!).  If this is Russia’s strategy then it forces Ukraine to take risks because they are under a time constraint, knowing that one day NATO support will waiver. And; while the waiting game goes on Russia is slowly building its combat power, mobilising more soldiers, training them and testing them in limited operations along the front.  Keeping Ukraine guessing and building Russian soldier’s experience and tactical acumen. It is a long-term approach to the war but I’m sure you can see the benefits of this strategy.

 

 However, we need to wait to see if this is the plan and the only way to know for sure is; if or when the 60,000 soldiers waiting in the east of Luhansk are committed to operations.  It may be that they are already preparing to move; Putin demanding their sacrifice on 24 February the anniversary of his doomed invasion.  Or; it could be that the Russian generals simply don’t (or won’t) understand the capacity of their force and will launch an offensive soon.  Either way my assessment is that this would end in disaster for Russia.

If Russia does decide to play smart, how can Ukraine respond?  The simple answer is that; Ukraine is already preparing a response and will soon move to offensive operations.  Recent weapons support provided by NATO countries and interesting Russian activity may give us some clues about what could be planned.  Alongside the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, Ukraine is receiving a range of additional precision strike weapons including around 180 more long range NATO 155mm howitzers and more precision guided ammunition, more HIMARs missile and 600 Brimstone precision-guided missiles from Britain.  Precision is a hall mark of Ukraine’s war-fighting, the Ukrainians using their superior intelligence to locate and destroy key Russian targets deep behind enemy lines isolating Russian units from their lines of supply. 

Recently, there have been two large Russian operations in the south one near Orikhiv and more recently near Vuledhar.  Although, there has not been a lot of media coverage these areas are of considerable interest because they are on the northern border of the Crimean Land Bridge.  Russia may be probing Ukrainian forces in the area; or the attacks may be spoiling attacks intended to keep the Ukrainians in the area ‘off balance’. The swift and decisive Ukrainian response indicating that far from being ‘wrong footed’ Ukrainian forces in the area are strong and well organised.  Regardless, Ukraine’s main effort will not be confirmed until they move. But it seems likely that their recent increase in long range precision fires could be put to good use and be a key tool in an operation seeking to isolate Crimea, leading me to speculate that Ukraine will move in the south first and relatively soon.  Aiming to isolate Crimea, concurrently holding an eastern defensive line from Svatove to Vuledhar via Kremina and the area around Bakhmut and preparing in depth for when NATO tanks arrive in force later in 2023. The tanks being used for offensive operations in the open spaces of Luhansk. 

In summary, next week will be an interesting period as we start to see how Russia is planning to fight. Are they planning a long slow campaign, mostly defending and making incremental progress? Or will Putin’s ego and political pressure force a large offensive?  The tension is building and all we can really say is that regardless of Russia’s incremental progress Ukraine is still very much in control. 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer and TDBs military blogger