GUEST BLOG: Ben Morgan – Russia’s army, shambling towards defeat?

It was always uncertain if Russia actually has sufficient combat power to launch any sort of significant ground offensive in Ukraine.  A vital question, because regardless of what pundits are saying this week about a build-up of Russian air power, the only way to win a war is to put troops on the ground. Russia can try to bomb Ukraine back to the Stone Age, the Americans thought this strategy would work in Vietnam; but it did not and won’t in Ukraine either. A simple fact of war, is that until a Russian infantryman is on a piece of ground flying their flag, that ground is still Ukrainian.   On the battlefield possession is ten – tenths of the law and the bailiff’s men are the infantry. 

And; this week we are seeing increasing evidence that Russia just does not have the ground combat power for offensive operations.  Ben Wallace, British Defence Secretary made a statement to the BBC observing that 97% of Russia’s total land forces were already committed to Ukraine.  A sobering thought because for all of this effort Russia is not making any significant progress offensively; and as a number of commentators confirmed this week NATO intelligence is not reporting any significant massing of Russian forces.  Any offensive requires a large reserve that can be used to overwhelm the enemy by concentrating quickly at one point on the frontline.  It seems that the small company (approximately 100 men and a dozen vehicles) and battalion sized (three companies) attacks being reported are all the Russians are able to mount.  

In recent columns, we highlighted our assessment that Russia’s offensive should be seen as an ‘if’ rather than a ‘when’ and this information correlates with our assessment; that Russia has probably exhausted its combat power. More specifically, its reserves of trained infantrymen (for more detail see – Spring offensive, Russia’s quickest way to lose the war!) without whom all the artillery, aircraft and tanks in the world are useless.  Putin has demonstrated that he is not willing to parley yet therefore has one option, maintaining low-level sustainable attacks that prove to the domestic  political audience and to NATO that Russia is aggressively prosecuting the war and will continue to do so; again Putin is hoping that NATO will flinch first. 

Putin’s next step is likely to be increasing the bombing campaign against Ukraine’s cities and civilian infra-structure; aiming to create enough suffering that NATO countries feel compelled to stop the war.  Mainstream media links the reports of a build up of Russian air power near Ukraine to a planned escalation in the bombing of cities. However,  drones and long-range missiles are a safer option and it is more likely that the Russian air force’s build up near Ukraine is to counter Ukrainian armour.  After the capture of large amounts of Russian armour in Lyman and Kherson; Ukraine probably has more tanks than it started the war with, so even without Challenger, Leopard and Abrams tanks it has significant armoured combat power. 

And; the only way guaranteed to stop large armoured offensives is with airpower.  Neither Ukraine nor Russia has air superiority at this time.  However, Russia has enough airpower that it could possibly force air superiority for a long enough time to block a Ukrainian armoured assault.  It seems logical that this is why Russia is building up its airpower close to Ukraine.  It is a threat to a Ukrainian armoured thrust.  It may also be why Ukraine is increasing its calls for modern NATO fighter aircraft, not to defend its cities but to protect its armour as it advances. 

In fact, the build-up of Russian airpower could be signal that Russia is concerned about an imminent Ukrainian push. The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence recently reported that Russia continues to fortify the Orikhiv-Vasylivka line that demarcates the separation between Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia and the Crimean Land Bridge between the Dnipro River and Mariupol.  The Ministry also assesses that although Russia’s focus is on Donetsk and specifically Bakhmut,  Russia is deploying troops both north to Luhansk and south to Zaporizhzhia because of concerns about Ukrainian offensives.  

Ukraine appears to be imposing ‘simultaneity’ upon Russia, a term used in the military to describe a force being so overwhelmed with possible options and dilemmas that command paralysis sets in; and nothing happens.  Does this sound like Russia in Ukraine?  Fixated on Bakhmut whilst floundering to figure out where the Ukrainian attack will come, rushing troops around but without developing a clear, decisive campaign plan. 

Adding to this tension is NATO’s recent discussion at the Munich Security Conference about the possibility of Russia receiving Chinese military aid. United States Vice President Kamala Harris stating that “We are also troubled that Beijing has deepened its relationship with Moscow since the war began” and NATO officials reportedly discussing concerns about the possibility of China’s relationship evolving to include lethal aid; military equipment.  A concern that was echoed later by United States Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken.  Since the war started, NATO’s leaders have been concerned that China is helping Russia evade sanctions and providing covert support to Putin’s regime and these fears appear to be escalating.  So far, China has generally distanced itself from Russia and has served a useful and responsible political role toning down Putin’s nuclear rhetoric; and it would be sad to see this situation change.  

Although, Chinese support for Russia has always been a consideration, the United States and its allies work hard to maintain a relationship with China and limit the country’s support for Russia. Recently though, an increase in Sino-American tensions adds to the possibility of China starting to supply material to Russia.  Any aid is likely to be covert and therefore limited because China understands that Russia has very limited international support and publicly supporting Russia would have a negative impact on China’s international reputation. And; the reality is that nothing China can supply militarily will solve Russia’s key problem, its shortage of trained manpower.  The impacts of any support from China will vary but are unlikely to do much to affect the ground campaign which is where this war will be won. 

An effect of the discussion about China’s relationship with Russia is that it puts more strategic pressure on Ukraine to move quickly at the tactical level, to defeat Russia in case it gets ‘thrown a life line’. It is logical that Ukraine’s stated strategic goal Crimea is the key objective of their plans because without holding this territory Ukraine can never be safe.  Crimea’s position means that if Russia holds it; Ukraine will always need to worry about blockades of its ports by the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, another ground offensive into southern Ukraine or attacks on cities by planes or missiles launched from the peninsular. 

However, in order to take Crimea Russia must first attrit the Russian army enough to transfer from defence to offensive operations.  And; Bakhmut is the key to this goal. In military terms, Bakhmut is a ‘fix’, an action fought to hold an enemy and make them commit resources thereby removing combat power from other areas.  Ukraine is defending Bakhmut because it keeps the Russians away from larger cities like Sloviansk and provides an opportunity to ‘draw in’ Russian forces and destroy them as they assault the town’s well-developed defences.  Bakhmut will evolve to become the pivot around which the next Ukrainian offensive will be launched and the options are:

• North into Luhansk; or 
• South into the Crimean Land Bridge.

At this stage either option is worthy of consideration.  My speculation is that the first Ukrainian thrust will be in the south, likely on an axis roughly from Vulhedar to Mariupol, avoiding the concentration of Russian forces near Melitopol and cutting the Crimean Land Bridge.  It seems logical that this thrust will be sooner rather than later because this axis of advance is through relatively complex terrain in which new NATO tanks are less likely to maximise their impact on the battle, so there is no requirement to wait for their arrival and also because for Ukraine time is a consideration.  Although, NATO countries are currently backing Ukraine the risk that European support will dry up always needs to be considered. And; although it may be confirmation bias recent Russian offensives in the area around Vuldehar may be spoiling attacks and on 13 February the Institute for the Study of War reported that “A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also expressed concerns over the possibility of a Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine via western Zaporizhia Oblast in late spring to early summer.”  If Ukrainian forces are available, an attack in the south could be followed later by an attack into the more open country of Luhansk spearheaded by the new NATO tanks.  

However, after discussing this problem with an associate who knows much more about armoured operations their advice was that it made better tactical sense for Ukraine to wait, try to secure offensive aircover (i.e. get F16s from NATO) and to bring the new NATO vehicles into service before using them to attack in the north.  Luhansk is better country for tanks and this option could allow for a catastrophic defeat of the Russian forces that would make an operation against the Crimean Land Bridge in the south later, easier.  Further, my associate felt that holding the ‘shoulder’ (or the base side) of a salient near Vulhedar, close to Donetsk city would be very difficult because it is so close to a large concentration of Russian force. 

In summary, it seems to be increasingly apparent that Russia’s ground combat power is culminating.  The key issue being that they have too few soldiers, a situation that is unlikely to change.  Even after a good discussion between observers the only certainties that we could agree on were that:

• Bakhmut is a fixing operation, about which Ukraine will pivot when it goes on the offensive.
• The offensive could be in the north or the south, because both options provide good options.
• The Russians are unlikely to manage any sort of significant breakthrough in the foreseeable future. That their offensive is going to continue to shamble forwards incrementally, measured in metres, until Ukraine moves. 

And; that the key questions at this stage, that will be answered soon are:

• Is it resources; or weather; or waiting for NATO tanks to arrive; or the recent increase in forward positioned Russian airpower that is holding Ukraine back from starting an offensive? 
• Where will the Ukrainians move? In the south; or in the north? 

Unfortunately, although we can speculate, we are only making educated guesses and need to wait and see if our analysis is correct. Meanwhile, the most important battle for NATO is maintaining interest in and support for Ukraine’s war of self-defence.  And; across the remainder of the world supporting the international rule of law and the right of all countries to maintain their sovereignty regardless of the size or ambition of their neighbours. 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer and TDBs military blogger