GUEST BLOG: Ben Morgan – Even China knows Putin is a loser

At strategic level, last week was very significant for the War in Ukraine.  Xi Jin Ping’s visit demonstrating clearly the NATO alliance’s strategic dominance and China’s unwillingness to enter into a direct conflict with it.  Xi’s visit was marked by unwillingness to directly support Russia, a surprise given the current increase in tensions between the United States and China.  Instead of taking the opportunity to increase tensions and force greater United States effort in Ukraine, diverting resources from other areas of interest Xi gave Putin a ‘cold shoulder.’  The Institute for the Study of War reported on 21 March that “Xi additionally did not signal an intent to provide support for Russia’s war in Ukraine beyond vague diplomatic assurances, which is likely a step down from what Putin hoped to secure in negotiations. Putin has likely failed to secure the exact sort of partnership that he needs and desires.” In practical terms, Xi realises that Russia is losing, therefore it does not make strategic sense to support Putin; particularly when the cost is economic sanctions being imposed by China’s largest trading partners.

If Putin was on the cusp of victory, things might be different his challenge to the United States and United Nations led ‘rules-based order’ possibly ‘opening a door’ for a potential future invasion of Taiwan.   However, at this stage it seems that the potential economic cost of supporting Russia against a united NATO alliance, is too high so China is keeping its distance.  Instead, China used the meeting to push other agendas specifically positioning itself as a peace-maker, an alternative leader for countries that feel they are not part of the ‘rules-based order club.’  This was not unexpected and is likely to form a key part of Chinese global strategy for many years.

Xi did not add anything new to the peace plan already on the table, continuing to support an immediate ceasefire and discussions about resolving the conflict.  A solution that is clearly not in the best interests of Ukraine; and both Xi and Putin avoided significant discussion of the war. Putin blaming the NATO and the Ukraine for not being willing to seek peace.  It appears that Xi and Putin ‘agreed to disagree’ and moved on to other discussions.  

Another, prediction in last week’s column was fulfilled when Putin and Medvedev both made more nuclear threats. Medvedev’s threats were lost in the wind, his gratuitous statements are no  longer taken seriously and were barely reported last week.  However, Putin’s craziness was picked up by the media.  His claim that the United Kingdom sending depleted uranium shells to Ukraine was a nuclear escalation are insane.  Depleted uranium is a very hard metal that is used to make the penetrators of anti-armour rounds, it is used because it is very dense and cheaper than the alternative tungsten.  Most anti-tank rounds that rely on kinetic energy; or hitting armour with a very fast and hard penetrator use depleted uranium.  Including Russian shells!  Depleted uranium is not a nuclear weapon and cannot be turned into a nuclear weapon. The claim is insane and is probably targeted at Putin’s home audience, people with limited access to opposing voices that will challenge the assertion. Another propaganda opportunity preparing the Russian people for a longer, more catastrophic war. 

Then yesterday Putin made another nuclear threat, stating that he intended to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus by July 2023.  Another threat, as predicted, aimed at scaring NATO but lacking in substance.  So what if Putin deploys tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus?  The United States already holds a large stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.  Crossing Belarus in a truck is an overnight trip, or less than an hour’s flight time, so they can be quickly moved forwards; making the threat more symbolic than practical.  

The problem with nuclear weapons though is that their effectiveness is based on their threat; not their actual use. And; we can be sure that if Putin uses tactical nuclear weapons, he will initiate a cataclysmic NATO response, one that will end the game in Ukraine. He will also upset China and India his only significant supporters. Further, if he uses strategic nuclear weapons he dies; and more importantly so does everyone around him.  Are Gerasimov, Shoigu and Medvedev really willing to let Putin kill them, their families and most of the world? Probably not.  NATO and the United States will be closely monitoring Putin’s nuclear weapons and we can be sure that if there is a dangerous change in posture we will be told by the United States, rather than by Putin. So at this stage we should regard this threat as rhetoric. 

Last week’s third prediction, that China will work out a plan to support Russia more, by evading sanctions and providing military equipment and supplies, cannot yet be verified but the meeting was notable for the absence of a public statement of support. Further, the United States has not yet been able to identify significant Chinese military aid that would trigger sanctions.  So it looks like China will continue to buy Russian oil, gas and commodities and help keep its economy afloat but may not be willing to provide high levels of support and suffer large sanctions. However, it is possible that there are covert programmes operating that will take time to be identified.

Two potential benefits China stood to gain from supporting Russia were the legitimisation of force that a successful invasion of Ukraine may have provided; and testing the resolve of the United States and its allies to support a free state against a nuclear armed aggressor.  Useful information if China is planning to re-integrate Taiwan by force.   At this stage the utility of both is long past, so there is no margin in supporting Russia unless it contributes China’s wider strategic goals.  And; currently it seems that China is not ready to risk economic war with the United States and its allies, even if tensions are rising in other parts of the world. Essentially, the key messages from Xi’s visit seem to be that China knows Russia is losing; and even a close personal relationship between Putin and Xi is not enough to risk China’s long-term economic security.  This meeting demonstrated that the limits of ‘unlimited partnership’ have been reached. 

However, the campaign will be won or lost on the battlefield; and how is the strategic situation going to impact on the frontline?

Russia isn’t going to get a ‘lifeline’ from China, there aren’t going to be large stocks of late-model Chinese tanks loaded on rail cars heading west, or train loads of ammunition arriving from China.  Instead, this week video of 70-year-old Russian T 54 and T55 tanks taken out of storage and heading west were circulated.  Russia’s army is culminating, incompetence and corruption have tamed the once fierce Soviet Bear. 

This week the commentator community finally started to accept that the Russian army has culminated and that Bakhmut is only going to fall if Ukraine wants it to; and that the key questions in the campaign are when and where will the Ukrainian blow fall.  On 24 March, The Institute for the Study of War reported that the Kremlin is discussing a Ukrainian offensive and preparing the Russian people for its impacts including that “Russian Security Council Deputy Head Dmitry Medvedev emphasized on March 24 that the Russian General Staff is aware that Kyiv is preparing for offensive operations and that the Russian General Staff is considering its own decisions and responses to prepare for a Ukrainian offensive.”  Basically, that the Kremlin knows that there will be an offensive and they want to make sure that Russians know; and that its impacts on public opinion can be managed. 

Russia’s military bloggers, a strangely influential group are also very active.  Mostly, criticising the Kremlin and the military for their incompetence and worrying about where the offensive will fall. The internet is full of theories including Yevgeny Prigozhin’s theory that the Ukraine will invade part of Russia and capture Belgorod, using the city as a bargaining chip in peace negotiations.  A claim apparently refuted by a Russian military blogger that the Institute for Study of War reported as follows: “A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian actors are disseminating disinformation about plans for a Ukrainian attack towards Belgorod Oblast, in order to draw Russian troops to border areas.” 

This confusion tells us two things; that Ukraine’s domination of the information domain is still complete, and that the likelihood of the Ukrainian offensive being in the north-east is reduced.  Ukraine is working hard to induce confusion and uncertainty in the Russians; and it appears to be working, watching Prigozhin’s breathless analysis video of the great Ukrainian plan that ‘he has uncovered’ was incredible and demonstrates why ex-convict, restauranteurs should not be running military operations.  And; if they are running military operations, why their staff should control their social media channels!  Compare this to Ukrainian messaging.  First, there is very limited information about Ukrainian troop build-ups or activity.  The information that is in the public domain is limited to statements from ‘un-named officials’ indicating only that there is a large offensive coming.  Ukraine’s control of the information space means we are unlikely to guess correctly when and where the offensive will strike.

Russia’s main effort for the last few months has been Bakhmut.  Ukraine has kept the Russian’s engaged in this area inflicting significant attrition on them, destroying both men and material.  Essentially, Ukraine is using the advantages of fighting defensively to slowly ‘bleed’ Russia’s army by encouraging them to keep fighting a tough offensive battle.  This is why the Ukrainian’s did not withdraw, they do not want to allow the Russians a respite to rest and recuperate. And; the Russians keep ‘taking the bait’ attacking again and again. Probably because after investing so much in the battle, already they simply can’t walk away. In recent days there are more reports of Wagner Group forces being exhausted and Russia’s elite airborne soldiers being sent to the area to reinforce the situation indicating the level of attrition being inflicted on the Russians. Ukraine is fighting smart, using the inherent political weakness of Russia’s commanders against them.   

Russia is still active in other areas along the Eastern front, and this week maintained pressure on the Kremina-Svatove line north of Bakhmut. This line represents the final limit of Ukraine’s last push into Luhansk.  Kremina is about 50km north of Bakhmut and is a step towards the important junction at Lyman 30km to the west, captured last year by Ukrainian forces.  South of Bakhmut there is plenty of activity focussed around a town called Avdiivka, about 50km south of Bakhmut.  Russia’s attacks are small, over a relatively large area and are being pushed back by the Ukrainians.  Further south, at Vuledhar Russia’s attacks seem to have culminated.  After months of suicidal frontal assaults this town remains firmly in Ukrainian hands.  

In recent days the trend seems to be that Russian forces are reducing their activity near Bakhmut and starting to try operations to the north and south, launching small local attacks to spoil Ukrainian plans and dominate ground in preparation for a Ukrainian attack.  Early last week, we saw film of columns of Ukrainian vehicles near Chasiv Yar, a key village about 5 km west of the town, evidence of troops moving into the area; either to support the defence or possibly getting ready for a local counter attack. 

In summary last week was very important for the outcome of this war, China demonstrated that at this time it is not ready to openly support Russia.  Even with the recent increase in Sino-American tension, the potential impact of United States, NATO and allied countries sanctions is too high for China to throw Russia a ‘life line,’ a risk highlighted in last week’s column.  This week, that risk is reduced and that is very significant because it means that Putin is going to have to keep fighting with the resources that he currently has; a rabble of un-trained conscripts, low stocks of artillery shells, not enough guided missiles and seventy-year-old tanks being brought out of storage.  Further, China’s position means that Ukraine has time at the operational and tactical levels to develop its plan instead of rushing to gain ground before Chinese material starts arriving. 

Ukraine’s offensive is coming; and it will be sooner than most commentators are predicting.  Recent reports from Ukraine are that the ground is still muddy and wet, and I believe that this practical factor is the key determinant of when Ukraine strikes.  However, in the next few weeks watch for small Ukrainian attacks along the frontline as they probe Russia’s defences and try to conceal where the final offensive will hit.  Then keep a look out for increases in partisan activity and Ukrainian deep-strikes by HIMARS and guided missiles, seeking to smash Russian logistics and command systems.  

Finally, when the strike comes it is likely to be at a place not being talked about in the mainstream media, my pick being south to the Black Sea.   The question is can Russia survive; or will its army in Ukraine collapse completely?  

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer and TDBs military blogger