GUEST BLOG: Ben Morgan – Border raids raise some important questions

Recent Ukrainian activity is forcing a re-think of the situation in Ukraine.  This week, along Ukraine’s northern border there is a range of activity underway including cross-border raids, extensive artillery shelling and drone strikes.  Most recently, Ukrainian attacks and shelling overnight of the villages of Shebekino and Volokonovsky on the border near Belgorod. The Russian governor of the region stating that on 2nd and 3rd June three raids were repelled.  This activity is causing uncertainty and confusion in the Russian oblasts (regions) that border Ukraine. Approximately 4000 people evacuating outlying villages and politicians asking for more protection, including some local officials asking for weapons to defend their villages.  A large public reaction, likely driven by the fact that even close to the border Russians were relatively unaware of the war; and until recently were able to carry on their lives without thinking about it.  

However, in Belgorod and Bryansk this situation has changed and even the Russian army has got into the act destroying the famous three-way intersection of the P124 and P 13 motorways at the border of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.  The fact that the Russians are concerned about the roads being used for raids is an interesting indicator of how worried people living along the border are by this week’s activities. Russia’s response is to escalate its aerial attacks on Ukraine’s cities, sending waves of drones to bomb and terrorise people across Ukraine.  

Further afield, Moscow has suffered drone attacks, including one by 32 drones; a large number.  And; true to form Yevgeny Prigozhin, owner of Wagner Group mercenary company entered the political debate stating that his forces are ready to defend the border; and further will not wait for permission from the Russian Ministry of Defence. A clear political dig at his rival Sergei Shoigu, Minister of Defence who Prigozhin has criticised publicly for not preventing the raids.  Prigozhin’s statements and self-centredness may contribute to the border slipping into a state of general lawlessness.  His forces deploying outside of military control, combined with locals arming themselves may create the conditions for the border to become a ‘bandit country’ consisting of independent pro-Putin and anti-Putin militias all enmeshed in small local conflicts.   A frightening situation for the Kremlin.  

A potential ‘fire’ that Ukraine will no doubt be keen to stoke, because if the border starts to descend into confusion or even a state of lawlessness it strikes at the heart of Putin’s authoritarian regime.  Even dictators exist by the will of the majority, who accept their failings in exchange for security, safety and certainty.  If a dictator can’t provide these things, then their days are numbered.  Unfortunately for Putin, the only way to get the border under control is to get ‘boots on the ground,’ he needs soldiers, artillery, tanks and air defence along the border to secure it as soon as possible. And; where will these resources come from?   That is a tough question because every soldier that leaves Ukraine to defend the border is one less the Ukrainians need to fight when they attack. 

However, the activity on the border raises other important questions.  The first of which is whether this activity is a short-term shaping operation; or whether something more dynamic and longer-term is planned.  Regardless of Ukraine’s half-hearted denials it is clear that these attacks are at least coordinated with and supported by Ukraine. In my opinion it is probable that they are directed by Ukraine, it seems incongruous that Ukraine would allow private armies to operate on their terrain.  The use of artillery both to support raids and for general shelling is not an activity consistent with an unsupported militia group because it involves planning and mobilisation of considerable resources that would require the authorisation of Ukraine’s military.  

It is most likely that the cross-border activity is a short-term Ukrainian shaping operation, designed simply to draw Russian forces away from the defence lines in Ukraine. And; there is evidence to support this proposition because the intensity of artillery and missile attacks increased in the two most likely areas for the offensive to target; Luhansk and the southern coast this week.  The Ukrainian military released information today claiming that their intelligence organisation has discovered conflict between Russia’s military leaders; and that mutinies are becoming more common.  A typical piece of propaganda designed to further undermine Russian confidence and that may be a precursor to an attack. We are also observing Ukrainian politicians make statements indicating an attack is imminent including President Zelenskyy himself telling the Wall Street Journal the attack was coming and warning of the grim consequences.  

However, there is a nagging concern that Ukraine may have more significant plans along the border.  The concern relates to Ukraine’s appreciation of the war and how best to win it.  In these articles we have often discussed Manoeuvre Theory; and the idea that the best way to win a war is to defeat your opponent’s will to fight.  In this case, Ukraine faces a tough battle achieving victory because even with NATO’s support it is vastly outnumbered and with Putin in charge of Russia they face an enemy willing to sacrifice enormous numbers of young soldiers to win.  A battle that cannot be ‘won by the numbers’ because Putin simply holds too many cards.  Therefore, Ukraine’s strategic battle is dominated by defeating Putin’s will to fight rather than by causing attrition.  

The objective of Ukraine’s offensive; and its broader war aims being to outmanoeuvre the Russian army in Ukraine and inflict sufficiently embarrassing defeats that those around Putin either remove him or force him to negotiate. This week’s activities open other asymmetric options; or new and indirect ways to achieve this goal using Ukraine’s distinctive strengths to exploit a Russian weakness.  The new options that should be considered are that Ukraine could make a significant thrust into Russia or create a destabilised border zone that slowly bleeds Russian resources making staying in Ukraine unsustainable for Russia.   

Looking at the first option, Ukraine making a significant thrust into Russia we can see that Ukraine is used to pushing boundaries and forcing ‘red lines,’ and it is currently actively supporting the Russian Volunteer Corps and Russia Freedom Legion’s cross border activities.  By emulating Russian ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ as applied in Crimea in 2014; and reinforcing these groups with Ukrainian ‘volunteers’ Ukraine could potentially quickly capture large areas of Russian land at relatively low cost before reinforcements arrive in the area and secure the border. This would create a terribly embarrassing situation for Putin. One that would be very hard to resolve because taking land back from a motivated defender is very difficult.  Ukraine betting on the fact that retaking the land would be too difficult and that Russia would be forced to ‘horse trade’ for land in Ukraine.  Potentially, winning land back at relatively low military cost. 

However, this option is risky.  It may destroy Ukraine’s current position on the moral high-ground and influence NATO willingness to supply weapons and equipment.  Most importantly, it may initiate rapid and uncontrolled escalation of the war because it provides an opportunity for Russia to claim that Ukraine; and by inference NATO is invading Russia.  In my opinion these factors make it the least likely of the options; but it is still worth considering because it is certainly not beyond the realms of possibility. 

The second option, is more interesting and implies a different Ukrainian approach and may also indicate that Ukraine is not ready to transition to offensive operations. That perhaps Bakhmut cost them more dearly than we have appreciated.  The idea of using Russian Volunteer Corps and Russia Freedom Legion’s cross border raids to create a lawless zone along the border, possibly drawing in Wagner Group and over time creating a patchwork of disconnected fiefdoms along the border is attractive because it is relatively low cost for Ukraine and terribly disruptive for Russia. Ukraine could defend on its current frontline probing and pushing forward minor attacks while using its proxies to cause chaos in the border regions of Bryansk and Belgorod.  Essentially, developing a border campaign that serves as a long-term shaping operation designed to cause embarrassment and eventually make the war in Ukraine unsustainable; forcing Putin’s removal and a negotiated withdrawal; avoiding a bloody campaign in Ukraine.

If this option develops it may indicate that Bakhmut has cost Ukraine more dearly than expected; and that Ukraine does not have the combat power to move now.  Therefore, it will be an interesting couple of weeks as we observe how the situation along the border develops.   It may be that Ukraine has accepted that the war will take time to win and is looking for a smarter way to win without an expensive direct offensive; so instead is husbanding its forces and attempting an asymmetric approach.  Or, it may be that they have suffered more casualties than we have appreciated and need to look for other options because they don’t have enough manpower to prosecute the offensive.  Perhaps they are waiting until they have F16s available to provide air supremacy reducing casualties.  It is impossible to say, all we can do at this stage is to continue to observe.

In summary, the last week has been very interesting and is making me reassess some of my positions.  It seemed unlikely that Ukraine would cross the border and given the lack of United States or NATO reaction to this activity it is likely to continue.  The big question is whether this is a short-term shaping operation to encourage simultaneity (i.e. to over load Russian decision-makers with problems they need to solve putting them under increasing pressure before the offensive starts) and force the re-deployment of Russian soldiers from Ukraine to Belgorod and Bryansk.  Or; whether it is the start of a new, unpredicted decisive operation, designed either to capture Russian territory and force negotiation or to take a longer approach to shaping Russia by slowly creating a chaotic and dangerous border that requires enormous resources to stabilise making the war in Ukraine unsustainable.  Further, the activity around the border raises the possibility of un-expected Russian escalation.   

So, my advice is to keep watching the situation closely because over the next week it seems likely that we will be able to see more clearly how the border situation will affect the war’s progress.