Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update: US Secretary of Defence signals Pacific pivot

Last Wednesday, US Secretary of Defence, Peter Hegseth spoke to the European Union’s committee for coordinating support to Ukraine, the Ukrainian Defence Contact Group.  Hegseth’s speech has been widely reported because it discusses US proposals for ending the Ukraine War, and because it signalled that the US expects European nations to contribute more to the defence of Europe.

However, this speech has wider implications for the Pacific, Hegseth clearly stating that the US is prioritising protecting its borders, and competition with China in the Pacific. Hegseth even saying “The U.S. is prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific.”  Before laying out a new US approach to defence, summed up as follows “Together [Europe and the US], we can establish a division of labor that maximizes our comparative advantages in Europe and Pacific respectively.”

Hegseth’s speech appears to confirm that US defence policy will be focussed on the Pacific, and competition with China.  Perhaps, the speech is also a concession of US insecurity, an admission that the US can no longer risk large-scale conflict in two theatres. In the Pacific, it means that the era of Sino-American competition is far from over, and that we should expect more diplomatic pressure and increasing militarisation in the region. 

Cook Islands and New Zealand’s diplomatic fight, a glimpse of the future?  

Cook Islands and New Zealand are two small, closely linked Pacific nations engaged in a diplomatic fight over the smaller nation’s evolving relationship with China.  This dispute provides insight into several security trends in the South Pacific. 

Background

Cook Islands is a very small Pacific nation that has a close relationship with New Zealand.  Legally, it is an independent nation but in ‘free association’ with New Zealand, the larger nation providing a range of support. For instance, Cook Islands uses New Zealand currency, its people use New Zealand passports and New Zealand is responsible for the smaller nation’s defence and security. Additionally, New Zealand hosts a large expatriate Cook Island community.  Across the Pacific, Niue has a similar relationship with New Zealand there are several similar US arrangements; Marshall Islands, Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia.  

Last week the relationship became very strained after it was revealed that Cook Islands is discussing a partnership deal with China, a deal it had not discussed with New Zealand. 

Cook Islands government issued press release on 7 February describing the deal as “A Joint Action Plan for Comprehensive Strategic Partnership will be agreed upon, serving as a framework for engagement and a roadmap for collaboration in the years ahead.” New Zealand’s Foreign Minister, Winston Peters expressed deep concerns about the situation, using the term ‘blindsided,’ an expression from rugby that means to be tackled from behind to describe the situation.  

Cook Islands Prime Minister, Mark Brown rejects any criticism stating that Cook Islands is within its rights to negotiate with China.  Although Mr Brown recently returned from China, and is releasing information but the details are still uncertain.  

Why are people concerned?

Recently, we have seen a similar reaction to Solomon Islands becoming closer to China.  In that case, Australia was ‘blind sided’ and now it is New Zealand’s turn.  

This situation highlights three security trends that are currently influencing the Pacific region:

• Sino-American military competition.
• Local governance is under pressure.   
• Diplomacy in a post-colonial world. 

The military perspective

Sino-American competition is no secret, around the world the US and China are competing economically and diplomatically, especially in the Pacific. Unfortunately, diplomatic competition is inexorably linked to military competition.  Military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz described war as an extension of diplomacy, and the reverse applies because behind both US and Chinese foreign aid, trade agreements, education programmes, cultural visits and other forms of ‘soft power’ there is also a subtle military agenda. Diplomacy builds political influence that translates into alliances, intelligence and access to territory that has strategic value in case of conflict.  

Cook Islands is located at the centre of Polynesia and has existing infrastructure like harbours and runways. The new partnership agreement might include elements like policing support, or access for Chinese Coast Guard vessels. Security support that could also contribute to Chinese surveillance activities, and the ability to project force into the Pacific if required. 

The negotiations are also noteworthy because of Cook Islands status, Cook Islands has independent foreign policy but New Zealand is responsible for its defence, therefore has diplomatic rights regarding foreign policy.  Although China’s relationship agreement is probably benign, the deal could be interpreted as testing this relationship, to see how New Zealand and its partners will respond.  

Finally, the relationship between this deal and New Zealand’s position on AUKUS is worth considering. China has clearly stated its opposition to New Zealand joining AUKUS, so escalating collaboration with Cook Islands could be a subtle message Chinese about the consequences of supporting the arrangement.  

Indications that local governance is under pressure

Cook Islands is a very small nation, and its leaders are under enormous pressure. It needs modern infra-structure and economic development.  At the same time, it has donors like China, New Zealand or the US willing to provide aid, and is unlikely to say ‘No’ to economic aid. However, this puts pressure on local governance as other countries compete for influence, and to ‘shut out’ competitors. 

Cook Islands is also a leader in the field of deep-sea mining, hosting last year’s 52nd Underwater Minerals Conference, and supporting exploration. Brown is a supporter, telling Cook Island News at the time that “We want to be the country with the most knowledge and understanding of our deep ocean and that will lead us then to whether we make a decision on going ahead with our mineral harvesting.”  Deep-sea mining has the potential to generate huge large amounts of revenue, but has risks.  History shows the potential for social and environmental damage if resource extraction is not well-regulated to protect the environment, and ensure all Cook Islanders are well-compensated.

Additionally, Cook Islands has recently been involved in several ‘grey area’ activities that raise concerns about governance amongst its traditional partners. 

• In April 2024, New Zealand’s 1 News revealed a proposed cryptocurrency bill that would have legalised hacking into any account in the world suspected of holding illegal cryptocurrency. Investigation revealed the bill had not been reviewed by the Cook Islands government’s lawyers, and after reviewing it, the nation’s Solicitor General condemned it as ‘flawed’ and ‘unconstitutional.’ Being able to use a small country’s laws to ‘legally’ access people’s internet accounts around the world would be a very useful intelligence tool for a foreign power, or large company working in Cook Islands.

 

• In December 2024, New Zealand’s 1 News reported Cook Islands plans to issue a new Cook Islands passport.  A plan that created immediate concerns in New Zealand, that advised a Cook Islands passport would not be possible under current constitutional arrangements. Recently, Cook Islands back tracked on the idea but history demonstrates that a Cook Island passport could be used for a range of illegitimate activities. Tonga, Vanuatu and Marshall Islands have all sold passports, sometimes contributing to illegal activities like crime or espionage as ‘bad actors’ acquire legitimate passports. In 2017, the Lowry Institute’s blog The Interpreter stated “Pacific Island passport sales schemes are secretive and difficult to control, primarily because they can generate substantial windfall revenues for local elites, which rarely flow to the general population.”

 

• December also saw a Cook Islands registered ship impounded by Finnish authorities for transporting sanctioned Russian oil, and alleged to have damaged a Baltic submarine cable. An incident that reflects poorly on the nation’s administration’s register of shipping. 

Diplomacy in a post-colonial world 

Like many small Pacific nations, Cook Islands is stepping out from a colonial history. It is keen to assert itself as an independent nation rather than as a part of New Zealand.  This history needs to be managed sensitively by larger former colonial powers, whether it is in the Cook Islands, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Samoa or anywhere else in the region this history impacts. Now is a time for larger nations to listen to, and respect indigenous positions rather than to expect adherence historic relationships. 

Historic powers like the US, Australia and New Zealand can no longer expect smaller Pacific nations to do their bidding. Instead, we are entering new phase of post-colonial diplomacy in which these nations must demonstrate they are a partner of choice.  

What next? 

The current Cook Islands issues are not unexpected and these situations will become more common in the future. Throughout the region small nations are facing similar challenges, and are incentivised financially to play larger powers off against each other. The question is how to respond?  

Currently, the US is distracted, US Aid is under attack from within and aid budgets are frozen. Further, my assessment is that Whitehouse does not have the ‘bandwidth’ to immerse itself into the nuances of South Pacific politics and security.  New Zealand is in a difficult position, and is sure to be under pressure from it ally Australia and from the US to curb Chinese influence.  However, if New Zealand responds too forcefully it risks Cook Islands becoming more involved with China.  And, New Zealand (even with Australian support) does not have the capacity to compete directly with China. So, it will be interesting to see what the details of the agreement are, and how ordinary Cook Islanders. Already, Mr Brown faces a ‘no-confidence’ motion in the Cook Islands parliament, and it will be interesting to see how the situation develops.

Samoa issues cyber security notice

The Samoan government’s National Computer Emergency Response Team issued a statement on 12 February blaming the APT40 team of hackers, allegedly supported by the Chinese government, for a series of recent cyber-attacks This group was subject to advisory notices from the intelligence agencies of Australia, the US, the UK, South Korea, Japan, Germany, Canada and New Zealand. 

This activity represents two trends in the South Pacific. The first trend is that small nations are increasingly becoming targets of cyber espionage and attacks. Groups hacking into government institutions to gather intelligence on behalf of other states, or attacking digital infrastructure for criminal ends.  

The second trend is that Pacific nations are trying work together to respond to these threats, a spokes person from Samoa’s Department of Foreign Affairs and trade acknowledging Australia’s support stating “Through the Cyber Rapid Assistance to Pacific Incidents and Disasters (RAPID) team, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade leads the Australian government’s response to cyber crises as they happen in the Pacific, only after Pacific governments request the assistance.”

The only way small Pacific nations can counter these threats is by working together, openly and transparently with each other. 

Melanesian update 

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia. 

Re-arming the Solomon Islands police force

In a recent a recent post on the Lowry Institute’s blog, The Interpreter, re-arming the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) was discussed. Since 2017, the RSIPF has slowly re-armed, and the Lowry Institute article highlights concerns about the situation.

Solomon Islands has a history of political and ethnic violence, including a short civil war in the early -2000s.  An armed peacekeeping force, Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI) deployed in 2002 and has only recently departed. 

In 2022, a shipment of replica firearms donated by China created controversy, including claims that the guns were not replicas but were functional weapons.  The same year Australia provided a small number of rifles to the RSIPF. In recent years, this discussion has continued including the previous Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare suggesting the nation needed a defence force. 

The Interpreter discussed the situation, reminding readers about how police firearms were stolen and used by militant groups during the 2002 conflict. Arguing that the nation may be better to focus on enlarging an unarmed police force, mitigating the risk of firearms falling into the wrong hands.  This is an interesting and important debate, that will continue for sometime. 

Small nations wanting to strike an independent course will always want to develop armed police units, even defence forces rather than having to rely on larger states like the US, Australia or New Zealand for security.  A trend that is likely to be used in Sino-American competition, both sides providing support to gain advantage potentially increasing the number of firearms in the South West Pacific. 

Violence in Papua New Guinea’s Morobe Province  

A recent Armed Conflict Location and Event Data update, reports violence in Papua New Guinea’s Morobe Province. In retaliation for the death of a man in December, 25 houses were burned down and 200 people made homeless in January.

Another significant violent incident indicating the issues that Papua New Guinea has maintaining the rule of law. Morobe Province is in nation’s north-east quarter, near New Britain Island. It is far away from Enga Provine in Central Highlands where a large conflict erupted last year.  The geographic spread of Papua New Guinean outbreaks of violence is noteworthy because it demonstrates the widespread nature of the problem. 

Cyber-attack in Papua New Guinea

On 13 February, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) reports that on, or around 29 January, Papua New Guinea’s Internal Revenue Commission (IRC), responsible for taxation was struck by a large and sophisticated cyber-attack. The attack shut down operations. 

The IRC issued a notification of a ‘system outage’ but by 13 February had not made a public statement about the attack. The Papua New Guinea government appears to be trying to manage the attack ‘in-house’ using private companies rather than requesting Australian support.  

The government appears to be concerned that about having Australian cyber security experts involved. ABC quoting cyber-security expert Robert Potter, who has extensive knowledge of Papua New Guinea, who stated “It’s always a sensitive time when external partners come in to help … there’s always a huge concern on the Papua New Guinea side about what other embarrassing things might be seen or released as a result of these sorts of attacks.” 

A fair position, any country assisting with cyber security has access to lots of information. However, cyber security threats are increasing in the Pacific and as they become more common and more sophisticated, small nations will need to work together closely to stop them, 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack