Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update: The evolution of land forces in the Pacific: Part Two – ‘Kill webs’ and ‘missile defeat,’ what do these concepts mean for land forces in the Pacific?

The evolution of land forces in the Pacific: Part Two – ‘Kill webs’ and ‘missile defeat,’ what do these concepts mean for land forces in the Pacific.

In Part One – ‘Island Hopping’ we discussed ‘area-denial’ a military term that means using missiles and drones to ‘deny’ areas of land, sea and air to enemy units. The Ukraine War has stimulated lots of discussion about area-denial because combat in this war involves omnipresent surveillance that spots targets for drones or missiles creating a ‘kill web’ over the battlefield.

The ‘kill web’ is a space within which surveillance is combined with immediate strike capabilities. Inside a ‘kill web,’ any large unit will be detected, engaged, and may be destroyed. The impact of a ‘kill web’ is to ‘freeze’ large-scale offensive manoeuvre within its boundaries.

This post discusses how during a peer-to-peer conflict in the Pacific, ‘kill webs’ will be different from those in Ukraine. Then it will examine the doctrine evolving to defeat them, and at how it could shape land operations.

Pacific ‘kill webs,’ deeper and more dangerous

If peer-to-peer conflict eventuates in the Pacific, ‘kill webs’ will be especially large because a feature of the littoral environment is that land tends to be surrounded by large ‘moats,’ or areas of ocean that provide no protective concealment for aircraft and ships moving land forces.

For example, the current ‘kill web’ protecting a defensive position in a Pacific campaign could include the following layers of precision strike:

• Antiship ballistic missiles (ASBM). Like China’s DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle that is launched from a ballistic missile. It carries a nuclear, or large conventional warhead that can sink a large ship and depending on the missile used to launch it, has a range of between approx. 2-12,000km.
• Long-range missiles. This category of weapons includes long-range missiles designed to hit ships at sea like Japan’s Type 12 anti-ship missile or the US Land Based Anti-Ship Missile (LBASM) and Tomahawk cruise missile, that can engage ships up-to approx. 1,600km away.
• Point defence precision-strike missiles. Missiles fired from the ground, ships, aircraft or drones specifically defending the area under attack. Some examples are weapons like the US Harpoon and Precision Strike Missiles that can hits ships within a range of approx. 2-300km.
• Guided tube-artillery and attack drones. The closest layer of the web, swarms of attack drones backed by guided artillery shells. The US Switchblade loitering munition is a good example of a short-range attack drone that would be used for defending specific defensive positions.

Any ‘kill web’ is held together by an extensive digital communications network within which target information and intelligence is constantly shared. Inside the web, ‘sensors’ like satellites, drones, signals intelligence, radar and human observers are all directly linked to ‘shooters’ ready to engage targets.

The best publicly available example of the concept is the US ‘Hellscape’ plan for integrating the ‘sensor- shooter’ chain to create a ‘kill web’ to defend Taiwan. In June 2024, Naval News described the programme as follows, “Hellscape’ envisions a battlefield filled with tens of thousands of unmanned ships, aircraft, and submarines all working in tandem to engage thousands of targets across the vast span of the West Pacific.” Essentially, the network involves every US and allied force surveillance asset; from satellites and long-range drones to soldiers in their foxholes feeding target information back into an integrated intelligence system. The information is collated and used to coordinate and control precision attacks by aircraft, missiles, drones or guided artillery shells.

Currently, we can observe how a much less sophisticated ‘kill web’ is ‘freezing’ movement on Ukraine’s battlefields. The Pacific presents more sophisticated, deeper ‘kill webs’ and defeating them is a key tactical and operational-level consideration. Looking at this array of powerful technology, it would be easy to assume that ground combat was no longer important, but this is not the case.

Why land operations are central to winning a future conflict in the Pacific

Although the Pacific battle space will be truly three-dimensional, winning will still require the ability to seize and hold ground. This is because land masses provide unsinkable bases for surveillance capabilities, communications nodes and for defensive and offensive missiles. Further, land is required for more traditional uses like providing airfields, ports and bases to regenerate forces. Therefore, the seizure and defence of ground will remain at the centre of military planning.

‘Missile defeat,’ a key concept for understanding the future of land war in the Pacific

‘Missile defeat’ is an evolving concept that was described by Lieutenant General Daniel L. Karbler, in a 2023 speech titled ‘Missile Defence to Missile Defeat.’ The general used ‘archers and arrows’ as a metaphor to describe the theory. ‘Missile defence’ he described as intercepting the ‘arrows,’ while ‘missile defeat’ involves stopping the ‘archer’ firing their ‘arrow.’

In August 2025, US Army Space and Missile Defence Commander, Lieutenant General Sean Gainey discussed the concept at the Space and Missile Defence Symposium where he described how potential adversaries were “betting on volume and saturation to overwhelm us.” Before saying that the US Army “must invest in counter-mass, and missile defeat actions,”indicating that American planners are investigating ‘missile defeat’ as a strategy to break a potential opponent’s ‘kill web’ in the Pacific. We can be sure that in China similar planning is underway, and that on both sides this work will revolve around defeating the functions that enable the ‘kill web,’ specifically:

• Enabler 1 – Satellite Observation. Satellite observation is a primary enabler of an area-denying ‘kill web.’ ‘Missile defeat’ strategy requires finding ways to defeat this function, and avoiding satellite observation will become a key planning consideration for land manoeuvre. Cyber-attacks and jamming are likely to be the primary method but land operations could be driven by capturing territory for satellite ground stations, or for positioning anti-satellite equipment. Or to destroy the enemy’s satellite ground stations, jamming equipment or anti-satellite systems.
• Enabler 2 – The Electro-Magnetic Spectrum. A ‘kill web’ relies on the ability to move data between ‘sensors’ and ‘shooters.’ If the enemy’s use of digital data is limited it cannot transfer the information it needs to operate its ‘kill web.’ The Ukraine War demonstrates the importance of controlling or denying the electro-magnetic spectrum. Offensives are now preceded by cyber-attacks and electronic jamming. Special forces units infiltrate jamming devices behind enemy lines to shut down local digital networks. In the Pacific’s littoral environment where land is relatively scarce, ground operations will be specifically mounted to capture territory on which to place electronic warfare equipment, or equipment to provide a friendly force digital network. Likewise, raids or attacks specifically to destroy this equipment could become an important feature of land operations.
• Enabler 3 – Ground. Counter-intuitively a key feature of ‘missile defeat’ is likely to be controlling, or denying ground to the enemy. The ‘archer’ still needs safe ground from which to aim and fire. At long-ranges, targeting ASBM and cruise missiles, ground denial can be achieved using long-range missiles or aircraft. However, at shorter ranges making ground unsafe for missile launchers and their supporting communications and surveillance infrastructure will become a task for ground forces. Likewise, defending friendly force infrastructure becomes an increasingly important task for land forces.

How land combat will evolve in the Pacific

Using ‘missile defeat’ strategies to ‘break’ the enemy’s ‘kill web’ requires ground forces that are capable of sophisticated ground manoeuvre. In the article, ‘Breaking through the modern battlefield’s defensive kill web,’ I argue that defeating modern ‘kill webs’ and restoring manoeuvre to the battlefield requires changes in combined arms tactics and force structure. Here is a link – https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/breaking-through-the-modern-battlefields

In the article, I argue that modern tactical success requires leaders to turn conventional combined arms force structures upside down, and to manoeuvre in the following structure:

• A light weight ‘break in’ force that can infiltrate the enemy’s ‘kill web.’
• A larger ‘exploitation’ force that is equipped to move forward very quickly if a gap appears in the ‘kill web.’ Swamping the area, enveloping the enemy in their defensive positions then establishing local ‘kill web’s that deny nearby land, sea and airspace to the enemy. Creating a safe, temporary bubble within which the ‘echelon’ force can deploy.
• Using ‘echelons’ to hold ground captured by the ‘break in’ and ‘exploitation’ forces.

‘Break In’ formations and tiered coalition land forces

I believe that ‘break in’ formations are already evolving in the Pacific. For example, special forces and light weight littoral formations that can lead an island-hopping campaign are already starting to evolve. (See – https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/pacific-brief-31-august-2025 for more detail about the evolution of these forces).

An observation is that these formations require sophisticated equipment and extensive training. Further, they require excellent digital communications to be supported by long-range weapons. Therefore, they will evolve in the Pacific’s larger and more capable nations for instance; the US, Australia, Japan, some NATO allies and in China.

Notably, the US relies on partners and coalitions to match China’s mass, and an inevitable trend is that different levels of technological sophistication will develop within any US or Australian led coalition. ‘Break in’ formations will probably come from the US, Australia, the UK and Japan. Countries that share common military procedures, are inter-operable and have the sophisticated and secure communication equipment to integrate directly into the US fire control network.

Smaller and less high-tech militaries like Philippines, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea or Fiji will provide a second tier of ground forces. Possibly providing ‘exploitation’ forces, but probably focussing on providing ‘echelons’ to secure ground captured by more technologically sophisticated allied ground forces.

‘Exploitation’ requires a force that can ‘cross the moat’ immediately

A feature of the littoral environment is that important pieces of land are surrounded by large ‘moats’ created by the sea and omnipresent surveillance. Denying satellite and aerial observation is possible but is likely to be time constrained. Therefore, an ‘exploitation’ force will need to move long distances quickly, necessitating deployment by air.

The ‘exploitation force’ is likely to be equipped with lightweight artillery, EW capabilities, air defence, anti-ship missile and drones. However, the ‘exploitation’ force’s aim is not to fight pitched battles reducing enemy positions. Instead, it will secure sea or air access points and establish electro-magnetic dominance and area-denial. Friendly force area-denial provides a secure environment for the following ‘echelons’ to deploy into.

The composition of ‘break in’ and ‘exploitation’ forces

‘Break in’ and ‘exploitation’ forces movement will generally be supported by a multi-domain campaign to temporarily shut down an enemy’s ‘kill web’ within the area of operations. For example:

• Cyber attack on command-and-control networks.
• Kinetic attack on servers, command centres, missile launchers or targeting satellites
• Electro-magnetic jamming to stop satellite acquired targeting information being used for fire-control.

It is unlikely that an enemy ‘kill web’s’ physical and cyber infrastructure will be able to be suppressed indefinitely, so the ‘break in’ and ‘exploitation’ forces will have limited time to ‘cross the moat.’ Therefore, these forces need to be light, air portable and combined arms. Pacific militaries are already developing light weight units characterised by air transportability that feature:

• Lightweight artillery support, especially mortars, High Mobility Army Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and light towed artillery like the M577 or the L118 light gun.
• Light-weight mobility vehicles.
• Lots of drones, including loitering munitions or FPVs to provide immediate local fire support, airborne surveillance drones, and ground drones.
• Electronic warfare assets, to jam the enemy’s local ‘kill web’ or to emplace transmitters for a larger electronic attack.
• Digital transponders, the physical infrastructure needed to build a resilient digital network to support a local ‘kill web.’

It is also unlikely that ‘break in’ and ‘exploitation’ will commit to long-term combat. Instead, they will use shock action to capture vital ground and key terrain then picquet enemy strongholds. The remaining enemy strongholds can be reduced by an ‘echelon’ with more manpower and heavier equipment. This frees up ‘break in’ and ‘exploitation’ formations for their next ‘island hop.’

‘Echelons’ – joint littoral task groups

After ground is captured, it needs to be held along with the surrounding three-dimensional battlespace. This role will be performed by a different force. Probably larger and less well-trained but more heavily equipped so it is likely to be shipborne. An ‘echelon’ called forwards after the ‘exploitation’ force has created a secure bubble for it to move safely, protected by its own side’s ‘kill web.’

• The ‘echelon’s’ roles are to:
• Reduce remaining enemy strongholds.
• Defend the ground that has been captured.
• Deny the enemy use of surrounding air and sea.

Roles that require less sophisticated technology than the ‘break in’ and ‘exploitation’ phases require. However, this task does require plenty of soldiers and the ability to operate as an independent task group. Therefore, we should expect to see the evolution of forces characterised by:

• Larger numbers of soldiers.
• Being seaborne, and utilising a range of small multi-purpose vessels designed for littoral operations that can:

• Carry troops and heavy equipment.
• Provide some measure of air-defence capability, probably using modular missiles and light cannon.
• Can operate helicopters and landing craft to move troops around.
• Can use their decks, davits or cranes to operate air and sea drones.

• Providing its own fire support, so it does not need to integrate into the sophisticated and secure long-range precision-strike ‘kill web that the ‘break in’ and ‘exploitation’ forces use during the initial attack. Instead, the ‘echelon’ force will bring its own attack drones along with rocket and tube artillery.
• More and heavier armoured vehicles.
• A range of patrol assets including small vessels, crewed aircraft and drones able to monitor large areas of littoral space.
• A larger logistics tail, to support its heavier equipment scales.

An inspiration for this force composition came from an article in New Zealand magazine, Lines of Defence titled ‘New Zealand Defence needs a Pacific Reset’ that discussed the development of roughly company sized all-arms task groups, based on small multirole ships. Several task groups operating in dispersed locations could swarm quickly to an area and consolidate a successful attack, freeing up lighter weight forces for their next ‘hop.’ See the article here – https://defsec.net.nz/2025/09/03/new-zealand-defence-needs-pacific-reset/

A small task force like this could use crewed aircraft as well as air, sea and underwater drones to deny large areas of littoral space to the enemy. Ships also provide the lift capacity to bring forward the electronic, surveillance and communications infrastructure required to jam the enemy’s ‘sensors’ and support a local defensive ‘kill web.’

Conclusion

In conclusion, dismantling the enemy’s ‘kill web’ in a Pacific campaign requires a coordinated operational-level programme of ‘missile defeat.’ Ground forces will operate within a multi-domain environment and when the enemy’s satellite downlinks are jammed, cyber-attacks break their digital network and long-range missiles attacks damage their command network the ‘kill web’ will break. At that point we should expect rapid ground force activity, as light-weight fast moving forces capture important ground.

If that ‘space’ can be dominated across the domains, and the ground held, it will be a firm base for the next ‘hop.’ Pacific operations becoming a series of small, fast ground operations predicated on, and timed to take advantage of disruptions in the enemy’s ‘kill web.’ Pacific ground forces need to evolve rapidly to remain competitive in this environment.

Melanesian update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

Australia faces another diplomatic setback, this time it is in Papua New Guinea

Last week, Australia aimed to sign a new defence agreement with Papua New Guinea, during celebrations to commemorate the 50^th anniversary of independence. The agreement known as the Pukpuk Agreement aimed to increase integration of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force into Australia’s military planning, and guaranteed the two nations would support each other in any future conflict. It also allows Papua New Guineans to serve more easily in the Australian military.

However, Australian Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese did not sign the new treaty. Instead, his Papua New Guinean counterpart, Prime Minister James Marape held back, signing a defence communique instead. The Guardian reports that “Albanese downplayed the delay earlier this week, suggesting cabinet deliberations had been held up due to commemorations of PNG’s independence.”

This week, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported that “China has urged Papua New Guinea not to sign any deal that might exclude or restrict third parties from cooperating with the Pacific nation, as Australia scrambles to clinch a landmark defence treaty.” Meanwhile, retired Papua New Guinea general, Jerry Singirok entered the discussion highlighting local concerns about the Pukpuk Agreement, stating “Why can’t they recruit their own? If Papua New Guineans want to join ADF, they should give up PNG citizenship and become Australian.”

Essentially, Australian diplomacy in Melanesia has received two blows in recent weeks failing to clinch security and defence agreements with Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea. Even though Albanese is downplaying the situation in Papua New Guinea, it is likely that Australian diplomats will be stressed. Australia is currently investing heavily in building relationships in Melanesia to block Chinese influence in the area. However, China has deep pockets and has spent a long time investing in relationships with small Pacific nations, so Australia faces a tough challenge.

We are likely to see more of these situations because small Pacific nations understand that they are at the centre of a geo-political battle. A competition they have said they do not want to be involved in preferring to focus on managing climate change and growing their economies rather than choosing sides in geopolitical competition. Therefore, for these nations it is sensible to negotiate hard and get the best deal possible.

China makes large equipment donation to Vanuatu Police

This week as Australia continues to negotiate a security agreement with Vanuatu, China announced it would donate $750,000 of police equipment to the small nation. This activity is like the situation in Papua New Guinea; a small Melanesian nation caught in the rivalry of two larger powers. Both sides trying to extend their influence and block the other, meanwhile Vanuatu’s leadership is keen to get as much aid as possible while focussing on it’s own goals; managing climate change, battling trans-national crime and growing its economy.

This type of activity is likely to become a feature of Melanesian politics, the small nations of the area, understandably, working hard to extract the best deal possible from the situation. Radio New Zealand summing the situation up as follows “Across the South Pacific, climate-vulnerable countries are trying to balance relations between the West and China – seeking to score much-needed funding from both while retaining their hard-won independence.”

French police reinforcements in New Caledonia for Citizenship Day celebrations

New Caledonia celebrated ‘Citizenship Day’ on 24 September, a commemoration of France’s occupation in 1853. The commemorations are politically sensitive because many indigenous Kanaks support independence, and at times there has been violence in the French colony.

This year France sent extra police to the colony to maintain security. New Caledonia has about 2500 police, backed by approx. 24 armoured vehicles, who were reportedly reinforced by another 130 personnel flown in from France this week.

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack