Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update: Norway and Japan sign defence deal

In another example of European defence cooperation with Pacific nations, Japan and Norway signed a new defence agreement on 3 September.  The announcement was made as both nation’s Defence Ministers Minoru Kihara and Bjørn Arild Gram met in Japan last week. 

The agreement is a memorandum of understanding that allows Japan to share defence technology with Norway. The first step is a technology sharing arrangement that will develop over time into a closer military relationship. This will include defence industry collaboration, military liaison and exercising together. 

This deal is interesting because it is another indication that European nations are concerned about Chinese activity in the Pacific and are actively engaging with local militaries to prepare for potential conflict. In 2025, the UK plans to deploy a carrier battle group to exercise in the Pacific. The battle group will include two Norwegian ships. Further evidence that Norway sees the Pacific as vital to its strategic interests, and is willing back up its concerns with deployments to the region. 

The deal is also noteworthy because Norway and Japan both share an interest in the Arctic.  Rising global temperatures make the Arctic more accessible and economic exploitation of the area, for instance as a trade route or for harvesting local resources. Russia and China are already developing the naval capabilities (like icebreakers and bases) required to operate in this region. Further, if a US or NATO-led alliance is keen to blockade Russian or Chinese ships and submarines within in the Arctic Ocean, Norway and Japan are well-located to support the operation.

In these columns, we discuss Europe’s interest and concern about Chinese activity in the Pacific, this deal is another example of the trend. This year we have seen British, German, French, Italian and Spanish ships and warplanes exercise in the Pacific.  Some European nations already support the US by participating in ‘freedom of navigation’ patrols that challenge China’s claims to the Taiwan Strait.  Activities that allow European militaries to practice the administration and logistics of long-range deployment. NATO nations will naturally fit into the US’s Pacific network of alliances and partnerships. We should expect to see more European involvement in US and Australia exercises, allies and partners practicing inter-operability in location, in the Pacific. 

Pacific Islands Forum Update

The 2024 Pacific Islands Forum leaders meeting is over, and this year’s conference included examples of Sino-American tension in the region.  The meeting was notable for efforts to diminish the forum’s relationship with Taiwan. Reducing Taiwan’s diplomatic status is a key ‘soft power’ objective for China.  This activity sits within Chinese hybrid war doctrine, often called ‘Three Warfares’ as an activity called ‘legal war,’ or using diplomacy in international forums to create a legal mandate for future activities.

In this case, China’s policy objective is to get other nations to stop recognising Taiwan’s independence, and accept the Chinese narrative that the island is an errant province that will eventually return to Chinese rule.  By encouraging small Pacific nations not to recognise Taiwan, and reduce its status within the Pacific Islands Forum, China aims to build legitimacy for this narrative. If Pacific nations do not recognise Taiwan, then the argument that the island is not an independent state becomes more compelling. 

The discussion started before the forum when Solomon Islands Prime Minister, Jeremiah Manele raised issues about the membership of ‘non-independent states.’ The forum has members that are colonies, New Caledonia and French Polynesia. Niue and Cook Islands are full and foundation members but are also New Zealand dependencies. The forum also a has other non-independent nation states like Guam and American Samoa requesting full membership. But the discussion was probably started with an intention to include talking about Taiwan’s about status within the forum.   

Taiwan’s situation was also a topic of conversation at the end of the forum, when the traditional post conference statement was released.  The original document contained a reference to Taiwan, a paragraph that according to the Guardian made China’s Pacific envoy Qian Bo, ‘visibly angry’ as he demanded the reference was removed.   Taiwan is a ‘development partner’ of the forum, status that was reaffirmed in 1992 but has not been mentioned in recent end of conference communiques. 

The offending paragraph was quickly removed and the communique re-issued.  Increasing the tension, Chair Mark Brown, Prime Minister of Cook Islands was also covertly recorded by media quietly telling Qian Bo: “We’ll remove it, I’ll talk to you about it later.” Speaking to Radio New Zealand, Pacific security expert Professor Anna Powles said “I don’t think it’s particularly surprising that China did react that way to the inclusion of it in the communique, given their own sensitivities.”  She also raised questions about forum process and transparency, specifically “about the level of influence that external actors have on the Pacific Islands Forum.” 

Another incident raised similar questions about transparency, when a reporter captured a private discussion between the US Deputy Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell and Australian Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese about the Pacific police programme Australia is funding. The conversation was interpreted as the US acknowledging that it had a similar plan but was pulling back to let Australia take the lead on the initiative.  The conversation raised concerns in the media about Australia and the US working together to influence the forum.  

Both situations are relatively minor incidents, but provide insight into diplomatic tensions and they highlight some important issues, including transparency.  If the Pacific is going to avoid becoming a factionalised region, in which small nations separate into competing groups supporting larger nations, it needs strong and legitimate forums for collaboration. The forum provides a structure for collaboration between small nations, and a ‘bridge’ for collective policy when engaging with external powers. The forum also has history on its side, Pacific nations using it for decades to collaborate about security challenges. Essentially, the forum has the potential to become an important part of the region’s security architecture. Therefore, it is vitally important that discussion is open, and decisions are made transparently because the strongest mitigation against the risk of covert influence is transparency. 

Next year’s Pacific Island Forum leader’s meeting is in the Solomon Islands.  A nation that has recently been diplomatically closer to China, so it is likely that Taiwan’s status and recognition within the forum will become a subject for discussion.  Likewise, we should expect to see US and Australian diplomacy aiming to counter these initiatives, creating a diplomatic environment requiring strong, transparent governance.  

Japanese and Australian defence and foreign ministers meet

The defence and foreign ministers of Japan and Australia, met this week, to discuss a range of issues.  Both nations committed to several actions designed to strengthen defence ties, and the regional economy.  A key outcome is a commitment build submarine digital data cables linking Pacific nations, an alternative to similar Chinese cables. The Japan-Australia Pacific Digital Development Initiative, also contributes to improving regional cyber-security by providing more secure physical infra-structure. 

Defence and security issues were also on the agenda, and the post conference statement demonstrated both nation’s opposition to China’s claims to the East and South China Seas. Unilateral claims that are not supported in international law. 

Another outcome of the meeting is that Japanese Self Defence Force liaison officers will be posted to Australia. This liaison provides the basis for developing greater inter-operability between the two nations that is likely to develop into integrated training, Japan using Australian ranges to exercise Tomahawk cruise missiles. Both nations working together to bring the weapon into service, and at the same time integrating their processes, procedures and technology to fight together.  

This meeting is another example of Pacific nations starting to actively prepare for potential conflict.  The statement opposing Chinese actions in the East and South China Seas, mirrors recent ‘freedom of navigation’ patrols that both nation’s navies are conducting in the area and military preparations like liaison and exercises are a natural progression. Diplomacy reinforced by action. 

Melanesian update 

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia. 

Papua New Guinea Prime Minister now faces ‘No Confidence’ vote

Job Pomat, Speaker of Papua New Guinea’s parliament announced on 4 September that he has accepted the opposition’s ‘No Confidence’ motion in the Prime Minister, James Marape. This is the fifth attempt by Papua New Guinea’s opposition to use a ‘No Confidence’ motion to remove the Prime Minister since February 2024.

Unfortunately, votes of ‘No Confidence’ are becoming a common political tactic in the smaller nations of the Pacific.  The use of this political tactic is likely to undermine public trust in government.

Australia supports Papau New Guinea Police

Australian Federal Police officers are providing support and assistance to the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC). This support is helping the RPNGC open two new offices, one in Mt Hagen, the scene of vicious inter-tribal fighting earlier this year. 

Australia’s support will make an important contribution to improving the rule of law in Papua New Guinea. It is also a clear demonstration of Australia’s desire to block Chinese attempts to gain influence in the region by offering support for local police forces. A programme that both the US and Australia are deeply concerned about. 

Politics in the New Caledonian independence movement

The Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front recently appointed Christian Tein as its leader, is the leader of the CCAT faction.  A branch of the largest faction within the independence movement, the independence union. 

Tein is one of the independence activists arrested after May’s violence, and was shipped to France for trail.  He is currently imprisoned in France and it is reported that this appointment has created political tensions within the independence movement as other factions, UPM and Palik protest the change.  Politics within the independence movement adds complexity the chances of successfully mediating a political solution, especially when a key leader is imprisoned overseas.  

France invites Pacific Islands Forum delegation to visit New Caledonia

A French delegation attended the Pacific Islands Forum and has issued a Presidential invite for representatives to visit New Caledonia.  The Prime Ministers of Cook Islands, Fiji and Solomon Islands were appointed by the forum to form a delegation to visit New Caledonia and observe the situation.  The group is known as a ‘troika’ and aims to assess the situation and report back to the forum.  The visit may initiate a larger role for the forum, helping to support the peace process.

The forum has long and successful history of supporting stability in the region, and this visit may be an indication of a future role in mediating the conflict. Additionally, if France works with and supports the forum it legitimises and empowers the institution reinforcing its potentially valuable role in managing Pacific security issues. 

 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack