Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update: Australia’s AI drone fighter MQ-28A Ghost Bat

The MQ-28A Ghost Bat is ‘cutting edge’ technology.  A new AI powered drone fighter plane designed to operate with crewed aircraft providing additional surveillance and attack capability.  The Ghost Bat programme is also ahead of schedule, and completed its first round of demonstration flights last month.

In military jargon, Ghost Bat is a modular platform designed so surveillance and mission equipment can be easily and quickly swapped. This means one drone can perform a range of roles including; long-range surveillance, electronic warfare (jamming enemy radars or communications) or collecting electronic intelligence. The drone has a stealthy shape that makes it harder to spot on radar and a range of approx. 3,700km. 

At the remote Woomera testing range Ghost Bat drones demonstrated their ability to use radar to find and track other aircraft. During this testing phases the Ghost Bat drones operated with an Australian E-7 Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Command (AWAC) aircraft. Aerotime magazine reporting that “The MQ-28 also demonstrated advanced data-sharing capabilities between uncrewed and crewed platforms, enhancing situational awareness for mission commanders and contributing to a connected air combat environment.”

In time, Ghost Bat’s will be armed and Aerotime reported that “The next phase will focus on operational engagement and assessment, including air-to-air weapons testing, planned for later this year or early 2026.”

How would Ghost Bat be used?

The future of combat at sea, in the air and on land is using drones as ‘combat multipliers,’ or equipment that increases the combat capability of humans. In Ghost Bat’s case it is likely that small teams of Ghost Bat drones will support crewed fighters.  Australian F-35s using these drones to extend the range of their radar surveillance, providing decoys, gathering electronic intelligence or to engage enemy aircraft.

This means that the area of sky able to be dominated by one Australian F-35 increases enormously and reduces the vulnerability of the human operating the crewed fighter.  Further, AWACs planes can use drones like Ghost Bat for security, or to increase the range and effectiveness of their surveillance.

Notably, the Ghost Bat programme is also a boost for the Australian aerospace industry. A large percentage of each aircraft will be built in Australia and Pat Conroy, Minister for Defence industry was quoted in the New York Times stating “The dawn of artificial intelligence is giving Australia a chance to be competitive in defense manufacturing.” 

Australia is concerned about conflict with China, a much larger nation with a bigger military.  Drones like Ghost Bat are ‘combat multipliers’ that could significantly increase the effectiveness of Australia’s military making it more competitive.  The programme is also at the forefront of Australia’s push to increase the size of its defence industry.

Russia agrees to train and equip Chinese airborne forces

On 26 September, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a well-respected UK military think-tank, reported that Russia and China have a secret agreement to develop China’s airborne forces. RUSI’s article, “How Russia is Helping China Prepare to Seize Taiwan” is based on information from files released by a hacking collective called ‘Blue Moon.’ The hackers released approx. 800 pages of documents including contracts that outline Russia’s offer to China. After reviewing the leaked documents RUSI analysts concluded the information is authentic and reported the agreement.   

Specifically, RUSI reports that “Russia agreed in 2023 to supply the PLA with a complete set of weapons and equipment to equip an airborne battalion, as well as other special equipment necessary for airborne infiltration of special forces, along with a full cycle of training for operators and technical personnel to use this equipment.” 

The report indicates direct cooperation between Russia and China, activity that concerns many observers. US news service Politco reporting that “RUSI’s findings landed like a bombshell, suggesting that the military-industrial communities of Russia and China are more closely integrated than previously acknowledged. The implications stretch from Russia’s war in Ukraine to growing fears that China intends to invade Taiwan by 2027.”

Why are observers concerned? 

Russia has the capability to train and equip Chinese airborne forces because airborne warfare is a Russian speciality. Historically, the Soviet Union was a pioneer of airborne warfare and it is a skill that Russia has maintained. Specifically, Russia has the technical ‘know how’ to drop paratroopers and heavy equipment like armoured vehicles and artillery.  RUSI reports several offers from Russia to China to shares this experience including; training, specialised parachutes, lightweight armoured vehicles and communication equipment. 

Currently, China is keen to develop its military capabilities and in a future Pacific conflict the ability to move troops long-distances quickly will be vital for success, and the quickest way to move troops is by plane. The US Training and Doctrine Command’s pamphlet “How China Fights in Large-Scale Combat Operations” discusses tactical-level speed during ‘Joint Island Landing Campaigns,’ as follows: 

Emphasis on Speed. Speed will be a critical element for the PLA in a joint island landing campaign. Rapid and continuous assaults will be crucial for establishing defensible beachheads quickly. This speed will be enabled by the PLA’s development of high-water-speed amphibious vehicles like the Type-05 and improved mechanized maneuver and assault capabilities for airborne forces. [Author’s underlining]

Further, airborne assault forces do not require beaches for deployment. China is building a large and capable amphibious fleet but its marines and armoured vehicles can only land on relatively flat beaches. Airborne forces provide more options either for independent interventions, or for capturing key terrain to support an amphibious assault. US Training and Doctrine Command explains how China would use these forces, as follows “Airborne and air assault groups will seize and control key points in the enemy’s rear area or attack enemy units from the rear in coordination with the main forces attacking from the front.” 

Notably, the leaked documents reveal a structured and well-planned approach to capability development. The initial offer to train a battalion indicates the pragmatic approach. A battalion is a unit of approx. 500 soldiers supported by heavy weapons, armoured vehicles, and light artillery.  A typical task for an airborne battalion would be capturing a key target like an airfield or small port. A battalion-sized force is useful for capability development because it is large enough for combined arms activity (i.e. it has its own artillery and vehicles) but is small enough to easily exercise and test. 

The training programme is laid out in the document and involves Russia running individual skills courses in China, before bringing the battalion to Russia for collective training. This allows the Chinese soldiers to practice coordinating battalion level manoeuvre in an airborne context. It is also a chance to practice using the weapons and equipment provided by Russia. It is easy to see how a battalion can become a building block for development of a larger force.  

Another notable point is the emphasis placed on command and control. Russia’s offer includes specialised headquarters vehicles, artillery observation post vehicles, communications equipment, drones and advice about managing airborne operations. Additionally, the documents say a Centre for Technical Maintenance and Repair of Russian Equipment will be established in China. 

In summary, observers are concerned because the leaked documents reveal a detailed and systematic approach to developing and airborne assault capability. China’s wants the capability and Russia has the skills, knowledge and equipment to provide the capability.  

How could China’s new airborne assault troops be used?

Most observers focus on the employment of airborne troops during an invasion of Taiwan. The RUSI article provides an outline of how these forces could be used to support such an invasion, stating“The capacity to airdrop armour vehicles, therefore, on golf courses, or other areas of open and firm ground near Taiwan’s ports and airfields, would allow air assault troops to significantly increase their combat power and threaten seizure of these facilities to clear a path for the landing of follow-on forces.”

However, an airborne assault capability should be seen in a much wider context. In recent articles I have discussed how a key tactical issue on the modern battlefield is ‘breaking into’ an enemy’s defensive position when it is protected by a ‘kill web’ of drones and missiles.  (See – https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/breaking-through-the-modern-battlefields and https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/pacific-brief-25-september-2025 ) On a future battlefield militaries will deny areas of land, sea and airspace to their opponents by building an integrated web of surveillance and strike capabilities.  A web that makes movement impossible. 

Before moving the enemy’s web will need to be shut down using cyber-attacks, electro-magnetic jamming and direct kinetic attack on key digital infrastructure. The ‘shut down’ is likely to be for a short period of time, meaning the faster a force moves the more likely it is to be able to close with its enemy. The fastest way to move is by plane and China has appreciated the usefulness of air mobility on the modern peer-to-peer battlefield. 

Additionally, China has a developing network of security partners around the Indo-Pacific. Historically, airborne forces provide a rapidly deployable reserve that can be used to support partners or reinforce friendly regimes. For example, Russia’s invasion of Afghanistan was spearheaded by parachute forces, deployed to support the local government.  It is only an overnight flight from China to anywhere in the Indo-Pacific region, so an airborne force’s utility is not restricted to supporting an invasion of Taiwan.  It could also be used to quickly occupy islands claimed by China in the South China Sea, or to provide immediate support to a security partner during crisis.  

The development of airborne forces is another example of China’s desire to create expeditionary capabilities.  In recent years China has developed a strong ‘blue water’ navy, large amphibious forces and is now developing airborne forces, all capabilities for long-range projection of military power.

Here is a link to the RUSI article – 

Melanesian update 

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia. 

Papua New Guinea and Australia set to sign defence agreement

Australia has recently been trying to negotiate a defence agreement with Papua New Guinea. The Pukpuk Treaty.  The treaty’s details are not confirmed yet but are thought to include modernisation and enlargement of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, greater integration with the Australian Defence Force and relaxation of immigration laws to allow Papua New Guineans to easily serve in the Australian Defence Force. 

The treaty was supposed to be signed in mid-September during Papua New Guinea’s independence celebrations.  However, Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister, James Marape delayed signing the treaty. 

On 3 October, the situation changed Al Jazeera reporting that “Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister James Marape announced in a statement on Thursday that his government cabinet had given its approval of the deal, and praised the “elevated” ties with Australia.”

Signing the Pukpuk Treaty is a diplomatic ‘win’ for Australia because it secures a firm security foothold in Melanesia.  Considering current Sino-Australian competition, it is likely that China will respond with more diplomatic activity in other parts of Melanesia.

Sino-Australian diplomatic rivalry continues in Vanuatu

Meanwhile in Vanuatu, Australian diplomacy is not as successful. Australia planned to sign the Nakamal Agreement with Vanuatu last month. A $ 500 million deal designed to confirm Australia’s position as the nation’s primary security partner. However, Vanuatu’s government refused to endorse the agreement, starting a period of negotiation and diplomacy. 

In late September, Vanuatu’s Internal Affairs Minister, Andrew Napuat travelled to Beijing and met China’s Minister of Public Security, Wang Xiaohong. A meeting that is likely to increase China’s police assistance programs in Vanuatu. Australian Broadcasting Corporation reports that “Vanuatu has engaged in policing cooperation with China since 2014 and signed a police equipment agreement with Beijing in 2022, but Chinese training teams have taken on a more high profile presence on the ground this year.”   A situation the Australian government is concerned about creating tension between Vanuatu and Australia. 

Australian Pacific Minister, Pat Conroy recently made statements about the situation and Napuat responded with a public rebuke.  The Guardian summarising his position as follows “Vanuatu remains open to signing a wide-ranging deal with Australia but must assert its sovereignty and will not be subject to pressure or “bullying” from larger countries, the country’s internal affairs minister, Andrew Napuat, said.” 

Discussions continue, and it will be interesting to see if a solution can be found.  Vanuatu is keen to ‘keep the door open’ for both Chinese and Australian aid so will be aiming to balance the demands of both parties.  Vanuatu’s situation is not unique and across the Pacific it is likely that Sino-Australian/American competition will continue to be leveraged by small nations to increase foreign aid.  

Exercise Hari’i Humutuk in Timor Leste 

Last month approx. 250 personnel from the US, Australia, Japan and New Zealand travelled to Timor Leste and participated Exercise Hari’i Humutuk. The month-long exercise is an opportunity for these nations to help train Timor Leste’s military, and build security relationships with the new nation.   

This exercise is a small example of how US partners work together in the Pacific to build relationships with smaller nations.  An important element of the ‘soft power’ being used by both sides in the Sino-American competition for influence in the Pacific. China training police forces in Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, the US and its partners doing the same in Timor Leste, both sides looking for opportunities to block the other’s plans.  

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack