BEN MORGAN: Why we should still care about Ukraine in 2026
President Trump’s war with Iran has pushed the Ukrainian War from the world’s frontpages. Public interest switching immediately towards the Persian Gulf, and to the worldwide economic impact of the war. But the war in Ukraine continues, and the essential philosophical nature of the struggle has not changed.
Supporting international law to disincentivise unilateral military action
Putin’s disregard for international law represents a dangerous trend in world politics because it challenges the existing rules-based order, created by the US and its allies after World War Two. The United Nations (UN) and its subordinate agencies and courts provide a structure for international security, trade and finance that although far from perfect has limited armed conflict and created an international economy that has improved the lives of billions of people around the globe.
At the start of 2024, I wrote a post titled ‘Why we should still care about Ukraine.’[i] The post outlines the history and objectives of the international rules-based order and argues that “Ukraine is not a war about land. It is a war about ideas and is a significant authoritarian challenge to the essentially liberal and democratic rules-based order.” Since this article was written, Trump’s unilateral military interventions in Iran and Venezuela raise questions about America’s support for international law and the rules-based order.
Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is certainly not going to plan and is currently a strategic defeat. His military mauled, NATO enlarged and Russia more reliant on China. Meanwhile, Trump has used America’s technological and tactical advantages to attack Iran apparently without a clear strategy, or a traditional legal mandate. A decision that may backfire and that places America at risk of either; losing a war Iran or entering a long and costly conflict.
The trend towards the use of force rather than law is dangerous because it empowers other powerful countries to act aggressively, destabilising the world and undermining philosophical tenets cultivated in international law. For example, universal human rights or the sovereignty of the ‘nation state.’ However, we should be hopeful that countries studying the Ukraine War and Trump’s recent interventions will draw the conclusion that; unilateral use of force is unlikely to be successful.
Notably, the Ukraine War demonstrates that with international support smaller countries can resist the aggression of larger nations – that collective security works. The European Union and NATO provided vital support for Ukraine throughout the war and although the international response has been slow, Russia’s lack of success demonstrates the potential of multi-lateral deterrence. The aid sent to Ukraine is a disincentive for other large countries considering using force. It is an important investment in international security and stability.
Russia is not winning the Ukraine War
Do not believe the disinformation, Russian victory is not inevitable and supporting Ukraine does not prolong the suffering created by this war. In my opinion, Russian defeat is a foregone conclusion. It may take time but it is inevitable because Ukraine is not going to surrender and history provides many examples of how hard it is to defeat a motivated enemy defending its homeland, culture and way of life. For example, even if Ukraine received no external aid Russia’s adventure would probably lead to entanglement in a long guerilla war like Vietnam and Afghanistan, with similar results.
Therefore, the key impact of international aid is to shorten the war, reducing the suffering inflicted on Ukraine and on Russia’s soldiers. For example, if the US released a fraction of the material being used in Iran, to support Ukraine, Russia’s defeat would be swift and decisive.
The aid sent to Ukraine has helped to expel Russia from most of the ground it captured in 2022. At the height of their control, Russian forces held approx. 27% of Ukraine’s total land area (including land taken in 2014’s invasion of Crimea). Today, Russia holds approx. 19% of Ukraine’s total land area and Ukraine has launched several offensives and retaken significant areas including:[ii]
- 7,500 square kilometres of territory in the north-east around Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kursk.
- 590 square kilometres of territory west of the Dnipro River near Kherson.
Notably, the territory captured by Russia since these Ukrainian offensives ended and Russian forces started offensive operations is miniscule. The Telegraph reporting that “In total, Russian forces are estimated to have taken 0.6 per cent of Ukrainian territory in 2024 and 0.8 per cent in 2025.[iii]”
Although Russia continues to advance incrementally, Ukraine has successfully attrited its forces to a point that large-scale offensive manoeuvre is impossible. So, Russia’s armies grind against Ukraine’s frontline making infinitesimal gains in exchange for huge casualties. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies reported in January 2026 that “After seizing the initiative in 2024, Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of between 15 and 70 meters per day in their most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century.”[iv]
Russian forces are unable to concentrate and manoeuvre because Ukraine’s advanced drones form a tight and lethal defensive ‘kill web’ over the frontline. Increasingly, Russian forces are also handicapped by structural breakdowns of their force caused by massive losses. Factors that combine to reduce Russia’s ability to capture ground, and slow its rate of advance.
This month Ukraine claims to have captured more ground that Russia[v], a difficult claim to verify but probably true. Ukraine also claims to be inflicting approx. 35,000 casualties per month on Russia.[vi] Attrition that Russia’s current recruitment rate of approx. 30,000 per month cannot sustain. Russian ‘meat wave’ tactics appear to be slowly but surely defeated by Ukraine’s attritional strategy that focuses on defence, forcing Russia to attack and then inflicting massive casualties. The opportunity cost being incremental Russian advances. However, with Russia’s rate of advance averaging 15-70 metres per day Ukraine has plenty of ground to trade for time. When Russia’s forces are weakened, the strategy is likely to culminate in Ukraine’s transition to offensive action.
In the maritime domain, Ukraine has defeated Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, forcing its ships back into their home ports. And, even there they are not safe from Ukraine’s drones and missiles. In recent weeks, large and well-coordinated attacks on Russia’s naval bases continue to demonstrate Ukraine’s ability to sink Russian ships. Naval News opining that “The back-to-back strikes in Crimea and Novorossiysk demonstrate Ukraine’s sustained ability to threaten Russian naval forces across the entire Black Sea region.” [vii]
In the air war, Russian drones and missiles continue to bombard Ukraine damaging infrastructure and killing civilians. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign targets Russia’s oil and defence industries. Ukraine’s air campaign against Russia’s oil industry appears to be successful and is contributing to a reduction in revenue from oil exports.[viii]
Another noteworthy feature of the air war is that Ukraine has prevented Russia from using its strategic bomber fleet against the nation. Russia’s large strategic bombers laid waste to Syrian cities and the destructive capacity of these machines is considerable, for example in Syria, Russian raids sometimes involved six Tu-22 aircraft with a combined war load of up-to 140,000 kgs / 318,000lbs of bombs. Delivering the same amount of explosive by drone would require 2,800 Shahed drones. Fortunately, for Ukraine’s cities the Russian strategic bomber fleet has spent the war far from the frontline.
After four years of war, it is inevitable that people will question Ukraine’s ability to defeat Russia. But Ukraine continues to fight and the dynamics of the war are changing. Russia can no longer make large advances on land. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is either destroyed or ‘shut up’ in their bases allowing Ukraine to export its goods around the world. Further, Ukraine and its allies are reducing Russia’s revenue from oil. It is a long battle but Ukraine is demonstrating that it is a good investment. Maintaining international aid to Ukraine shortens the war, and demonstrates that the liberal democracies supporting the rules-based order have ‘stickability,’ disincentivising other powers from taking unilateral military action.
Only defeat will stop Putin
In the West people do not understand Putin because he is a man from a different era, who is playing a long game. Philosophically, he is motivated by his personal interpretation of Russian history for motivation and has published several essays including a manifesto in 2000, titled ‘Russia at the turn of the Millenium’ and another in 2021 titled ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.’ Although separated by 20 years, both works demonstrate that Putin is motivated by a romantic picture of ‘historic Russia’ that he seeks to recreate.
Ukraine is part of Putin’s Russia and he has been working at its reunification since at least 2014, when Russia used a text book example of hybrid war to invade Crimea and parts of the Donbas. The 2014 invasion scared and confused Europe’s liberal democracies and they took insufficient action to deter future aggression. By not supporting the rules-based order with an effective response to the illegal invasion of Crimea in 2014; Europe, the US and the world encouraged Putin’s ambitions. The lack of actions reinforced his belief that liberal democracies were weak, more worried about human rights and economic prosperity than about fighting to protect their interests.
Putin’s war for Ukraine started in 2024, and important distinction that Ukraine’s supporters need to understand. This year is not the fourth of the war, instead it is year twelve of a Putin’s plan to secure Ukraine. A plan that he is willing to prosecute for as long as he needs to achieve his goal of subjugating Ukraine. This distinction is vital because it reminds us that Ukraine is not a war about land; it is a war about ideas, specifically Putin’s belief that Ukraine is part of Russia.
Putin’s belief in restoring his vision of ‘historic Russia’ will never go away. Putin is also nostalgic for the Soviet-era when his nation was a ‘super power.’ He has said the that ‘the fall of the Soviet Union was the greatest geo-political disaster in history.” And, it is noteworthy that regardless of Trump’s interpretation of his relationship with Putin, Russia is supporting Iran with targeting information used to strike American forces.[ix] An indication that Cold War rivalries are still in his thoughts, and that he sees the US as a rival.
If Putin is successful in Ukraine, it is likely that the next step will be west into Finland, the Baltic Republics or into parts of Poland that he considers part of ‘historic Russia.’ Therefore, it is vital the world continues to care about Ukraine and maintain its support until Putin is defeated and ceases to be threat.
Conclusion
After four years of war, it is more important than ever to care about Ukraine. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine represents a regression to a medieval way of thinking in which a nation state’s authoritarian ruler can simply uses force of arms to achieve a personal goal. If successful this is a dangerous precedent, that undermines 80 years international rules-based law that has provided security and prosperity for billions of people. It is important that world does not forget Ukraine.
Ben Morgan is TDBs military blogger. If you like this content and want to support it you can ‘Buy me a Coffee’ here – buymeacoffee.com/benmorgan
[i] https://benmorganmil.substack.
[ii] https://www.aljazeera.com/
[iii] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
[iv] https://www.csis.org/analysis/
[v] https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/
[vi] https://www.aljazeera.com/
[vii] https://www.navalnews.com/
[viii] https://www.reuters.com/
[ix] https://www.washingtonpost.
