Ben Morgan – Why we should still care about Ukraine

In Ukraine, the land campaign is static and although people continue to die the war is not producing the exciting stories demanded by news media.  Since October, the Gaza conflict has diverted public attention away from Ukraine and entering its third year Ukraine’s war is now become boring, another conflict slipping further and further down our news feeds. However, the Ukraine War is important because not only is the sovereignty of Ukraine at stake, but also the wider ‘rules-based order’ that has encouraged peace and prosperity since World War Two.

The Ukraine War, may in fact be a turning point in history, possibly sounding the death knell of the modern world’s liberal democratic experiment and signalling the start of regression towards authoritarianism and militarism around the world. 

 

Liberal democracy, authoritarianism and rules-based order 

Liberal democracy is a system of government that arose from the political philosophies of the Age of Enlightenment.  In the 18th century philosophers and scientists challenged the prevailing dogmas of their era arguing for greater individual rights, freedom of religious expression and democratic forms of government.  In the political realm, Enlightenment thinkers challenged the idea of ‘divine right’ or that one person (at the time a monarch) should rule by inalienable right. Instead, governments should be run by ‘the people for the people’ using democratic principles. Philosophically, putting individuals at the centre of political thinking encouraged greater emphasis on human rights. The liberal democratic principles of the Enlightenment shape our modern world.  After fighting two world wars; the First World War that destroyed the power of Europe’s monarchies and the Second World War that stopped authoritarian fascism. The victors applied liberal democratic principles to building a new, modern rules-based order.  

The new order was structured round the United Nations (UN), an organisation founded to provide a diplomatic and legal framework for international relations. This diplomatic forum was designed to ensure peace by providing more transparent and democratic relations between nations; and an international legal system to protect the rights of both states and individuals.  The UN led rules-based order is not perfect but has achieved significant success. It has been more than 80 years since the world last descended into global conflict and in general the number of people killed in war annually has steadily reduced. The stability provided by an international legal framework for global trade and finance that increases prosperity around the world. Today, human rights are valued more, in more places and for greater numbers of people than at any time in history.  

In 1989 the Soviet Union collapsed, ending the Cold War. The fear of nuclear war abated and the world appeared to unite around a shared vision of free trade and democratic social ideas based on the rules-based order.  Europe, the US and its other allies rallied to support the former members of the Soviet bloc encouraging dialogue, and rebuilding economies wrecked by poor management. Throughout the 1990s the UN played a leading role in dispute resolution, initiating and coordinating a range of successful international peace-keeping missions from Bosnia to East Timor.  

In 1992, political scientist Francis Fukuyama published the book ‘The End of History and the Last Man’ opining that the age of conflict between competing ideologies was over, the battle won by liberal democracy. People around the world believed he might be right because after the fall of the Soviet Union, liberal democracy had spread further afield.  Europe and the Baltic States gave up authoritarian regimes. Germany was reunited and there was détente between the US and its traditional rivals Russia and China. Increasing global trade built economic prosperity and greater inter-connectedness that theoretically increased stability, disincentivised war and encouraged nations to become more democratic. 

Later in 1993, Alvin and Heidi Toffler wrote an influential book, ‘War and Anti-War’ the general thesis of which is that the increasing economic and social interdependence of nation states disincentivised war.  Essentially, going to war cost too much, meaning war between nation states would disappear.  The optimism of the 1990s seemed to be confirmed by a pattern of conflict in the 2000s indicating that Fukuyama and the Tofflers were correct.  The first years of the 21st century saw many small conflicts but war between nations was limited.  In Europe the Cold War was finished and the prospect of European nations taking up arms against each seemed absurd. 

Instead, as predicted in ‘War and Anti-War’ non-state actors like Al Qaeda became the greatest threat to security and stability.  Organisations without geographic boundaries, built on ideas, unpredictable and often like Al Qaeda, grounded on fundamentalist theology that rejected the West’s liberal democratic philosophies.  As large-scale conventional war between nations appeared unlikely and the world’s militaries reduced spending and focused on the methods and technologies of counter-insurgency. 

 

The significance of Russia invading Ukraine 

However, not everybody bought into the triumph of liberal democracy and the rules-based order.  In Russia, Vladimir Putin grew powerful and through a series of military adventures in ex-Soviet territories, developed a doctrine of violent intervention that could be used to achieve his political aims. Russian forces intervening in Georgia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Dagestan, Transnistria, Abkhazia and Ukraine often breaking away areas and creating new states more closely allied with Russia.  In Ukraine’s case a 2014 invasion took Crimea and the Donbas, areas that are now Russian client states. 

Although Putin’s Russia had demonstrated its willingness to use force, in late 2021 with Russian forces massed on Ukraine’s borders, many commentators stuck to the optimistic dogma of the 1990s.  Believing that the economic impact of war would prevent Russia from invading. Even in Ukraine, people did not believe Putin would invade thinking instead that Russia’s military build-up was a threat to extract compromises rather than preparation for war.  When Russian tanks crossed Ukraine’s border on 22 February 2022, the world changed.  

The invasion was a nation state’s authoritarian ruler using their country’s force of arms to achieve a personal goal, much like a medieval king.  Putin’s justification, claiming the war is to protect Russian Ukrainians and to de-Nazify Ukraine is supported by few members of the international community.  Recent reports that Russia’s Chief of Defence Force, Valery Gerasimov only knew about the invasion plan hours before it started, demonstrate that the invasion is driven by one person; Putin. This war is a triumph of authoritarian rule within Russia. 

The question now is whether the world will let Putin’s authoritarianism triumph outside of Russia?  

 

Putin’s motivation and plan and Russian expansion west

In the West people do not understand Putin because he is man from a different era. He draws on his personal interpretation of Russian history for motivation, describing the fall of the Soviet Union as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe,” and has published several essays including a manifesto in 2000, titled ‘Russia at the turn of the Millenium’ and in 2021, he published ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.’ Although separated by 20 years, both works demonstrate that Putin is motivated by a romantic picture of a ‘historic Russia’ that he seeks to recreate. Author Orlando Figes discusses the complex history of the nation in his book ‘The Story of Russia.’ On one hand, Russia is the saviour and protector of the Orthodox Church and Figes argues sees itself as the heirs of Rome and Constantinople, remember that Russian monarchs were titled; Tsar or Czar a translation of ‘Caesar.’ On the other hand, Russia is forced to face east, towards the Steppe and for hundreds of years was subject to conflict with the Mongol’s Golden Horde. A history that created a unique culture, part east and part west and possibly contributing to both Putin’s rejection of liberal democratic philosophy and his people’s acceptance or his authoritarian rule.  Putin’s motivation is rebuilding the greatness of ‘historic Russia,’ an empire bridging the gap between West and East, recognisable to Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible and Stalin. An empire that demands international respect. 

Over the years his actions demonstrate this goal. Through the wars of the 1990s he slowly and carefully brought his subjects ‘to heel’ and built his own confidence.  A process often under-appreciated in the West, leading to poor assessments of Russia’s risk to Europe. In 2014 when Russia used a text book example of hybrid war to invade Crimea, Europe was scared and confused but took insufficient action to deter future aggression.  By not supporting the rules-based order with an effective response to the illegal invasion of Crimea; Europe, the US and the world encouraged Putin’s ambitions. Reinforcing his belief that liberal democracies were weak, more worried about human rights and economic prosperity than about fighting to protect their interests.  If Putin is successful in Ukraine, we can be sure that he will continue to work towards rebuilding ‘historic Russia’ at Europe’s expense.  

Ukraine sets a dangerous international precedent

The invasion of Ukraine is a dangerous precedent because it demonstrates the power of authoritarian rule.  When power is centralised in one person, a state can act quickly and decisively with little regard for the suffering of its people.  The Russian ‘meat wave’ attacks on Bakhmut and Avdiivka would never be tolerated in a modern democracy.  Battlefield advantages when facing liberal democracies that are unprepared for conflict. Around the world authoritarian leaders are watching Ukraine and assessing Putin’s success.  

If he achieves his goals in Ukraine, even retaining what he has already taken it empowers others to act aggressively, safe in the assumption that the liberal democracies that support the rules-based order will not respond with force.  Russia’s success increases the risk that China, another authoritarian regime will invade Taiwan or become more aggressive in the South China Sea.  But there is a bigger picture and already we can see a rise in authoritarian government around the world.  An acceptance of the pre-Enlightenment ‘strong man’ style of leadership ruling unilaterally and by inalienable right and answering to no electorate.  In recent years, six states in Africa’s Saheel; Guinea, Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Sudan fell to military juntas.  A form of government known for authoritarian rule, and even in the liberal democracies we see the rise of elected authoritarian parties and candidates.  Across the globe religious fundamentalism, often providing a ‘god given’ mandate for authoritarian rule and rejecting ‘liberal’ ideas about human rights is an increasingly common feature of both politics and conflict.  Dangerous trends that will be exacerbated if Putin is successful in Ukraine. 

 

Summary

In conclusion, Ukraine is not a war about land. It is a war about ideas and is a significant authoritarian challenge to the essentially liberal and democratic rules-based order.  Putin wants the world to look away, to stop supporting Ukraine because if he wins, he demonstrates the weakness of liberal democracy.  Now more than ever it is important we stay interested and make sure that our leaders do too. The consequence of rising authoritarianism and possibly even the collapse of the rules-based order are;  more conflict and less prosperity for everybody, everywhere.

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack