Ben Morgan: Uncertainty and opportunity, what is America’s next move?

Next week, US and Ukrainian officials plan to meet in Saudi Arabia, and the situation continues to evolve rapidly. Early last week President Zelensky worked hard to pacify President Trump, and rebuild his relationship with the Whitehouse. Trump responded by pausing the supply of US military aid and intelligence information to Ukraine. Russia used this pause to launch massive missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian towns and cities.

By the end of the week, Ukraine had offered to sign the proposed mineral deal, and Trump finished the week publicly threatening Russia with more sanctions. European leaders continued to react pragmatically, on one hand trying to de-escalate the conflict between Trump and Zelensky. And on the other, ramping up their support for Ukraine. Europe’s steadfast support diplomatically isolates the US, and may contribute towards Trump issuing sanction threats towards Russia.

In opinion, the most noteworthy activity this week is on the battlefield, where reality is imposing itself on Russian misinformation.

Reality imposes itself on negotiation, Russian victory is not inevitable

Last week, I said the next few weeks would provide information about Russia’s military capability. The key indicator being whether Russia could muster sufficient combat power to influence the campaign, and support the narrative that Russia will inevitably win the war.

Generally, the rate of Russian attacks slowed down last week, and Russia did not advance significantly. However, on 7 March, geo located photographs confirmed a small Russian penetration across the Sumy Oblast border about 5km east of the Kursk salient, near Basivka.

At this critical point in the strategic campaign, the overall lack of activity indicates Russia’s weakness. If Russia re-captured the Kursk salient, or captured Kostyantynivka it would reinforce pro-Russian rhetoric and probably influence US decisions.

However, early this week Ukraine captured Toretsk. An important town because if it is captured it provides a firm base to capture, or at least threaten, the last two, large Donetsk cities held by Ukraine; Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Ukraine’s forces north of these cities are well entrenched and secure, therefore Russian needs a logistics route from the south and east. Kostyantynivka provides the best logistics hub for an advance from this direction.

Since capturing Bakhmut and Avdiivka Russia’s operation in Donetsk has developed roughly as follows:

• After taking Avdiivka in February 2024, Russia paused, then attacked Chasiv Yar in April 2024.
• Russia could not take Chasiv Yar, so started to probe south looking for weaknesses in the Ukrainian line.
• During the second half of 2024, at terrible cost in manpower and equipment Russia drove a salient roughly 30km towards the town of Pokrovsk.
• Pokrovsk is located on a dominating position and dominates road and rail routes heading north to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.
• However, Pokrovsk’s eastern approach is easily fortified, and after and an initial advance the attack stopped and Russian forces tried to outflank the town from the south.
• Incrementally Russia captured large areas of farmland, and a couple of small towns like Kurakhove and Vuledhar.

This year Russia continued to unsuccessfully apply pressure on Pokrovsk Recently, the tempo of these assaults has slowed down, Ukrainian sources reporting Russian daily attacks reducing from 40-60 per day earlier this year to about 20 per day currently. After recently capturing Toretsk, Russia started to move forces north, many commentators assessing that Russia would use this town as firm base from which to attack Kostyantynivka.

However, early this week the Ukrainians reported they have re-captured Toretsk. Further reports indicate that there is battle developing, Ukraine attacking forces ‘fixed’ near Toretsk and destroying relieving forces. Most commentators believe Ukraine has stockpiled US aid, so can maintain the current operational intensity for approximately 4-6 months and is making best use of that time.

This could represent an interesting change in the situation, especially when we consider the stasis around the Kursk salient. Ukraine still holds a significant area of Russian territory in Kursk, a demonstration of Russian weakness. Additionally, there is an increasing number of news reports, video and photographs of Russia soldiers using horses, mules and even camels to bring supplies forward. Further, evidence that the Russian army is weaker than painted in pro-Russian misinformation.

In recent articles I observed that Trump’s goal of stopping the war as possible may not be achievable because peace deals are “made in the real world,” and Ukrainian successes are an uncomfortable reality for those that tell us Ukraine is a lost cause.

Russia’s position

Russia’s political elite and media are enjoying Trump’s activity. A main strategic objective of Russia since the break up of the Soviet Union is to split NATO, and remove US influence from Europe. Putin is keen to elevate the power of Russia, developing sphere of influence in Europe. A goal he cannot achieve if the US is committed to supporting the continent.

Strategically, he may be winning that battle, Trump’s administration either willfully or through incompetence is driving wedges between Europe and the US. This leads to the next question. If the US withdraws from Europe – Can Europe stop Russia?

I believe that the answer to that question is – Yes. It will be difficult, and the war will be longer than it would be if the US supports to support Ukraine but Russia has about a tenth of the economic and military power of Europe. We must dispel the myth of Russian invincibility, that is to often perpetuated by military commentators who are influenced by their studies of history, and allow past Soviet armies to influence their assessments. Or by people deceived by Russia’s propaganda, that tries to paint their military as a formidable, invincible force.

The reality is quite different. Russia’s military has performed poorly by every measure. Its army planned poorly, over-extended itself in the early days of the war and was unable to hold most of the ground captured in 2022. It defeated Ukraine’s 2023 offensive, demonstrating it could fight a defensive battle. However, Ukraine’s 2023 offensive was poorly executed, failing to achieve surprise or concentration of force. In 2024, Russia’s offensives were characterised by exceptionally high losses in exchange for very limited gains.

Likewise, at sea Ukraine has driven the Black Sea Fleet into hiding and effectively removed them from the war. Russia’s air force has been more successful but has suffered some important losses including several Airborne Early Warning and Command aircraft.

This is not to say that Europe should ‘write off’ the Russian threat, instead that Russia’s victory in Ukraine is a far from certain. Any pause in support, or a ceasefire is an opportunity that Russia will take to recover its strength. Putin is engaging with the process because he has too, if he could guarantee victory he would not because ignoring Trump’s call to negotiate demonstrates Russia’s equivalency with the US.

Europe mobilises, but beware of greater uncertainty

European leaders continue to demonstrate their support for Ukraine. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer hosted discussions last week aimed at building a ‘coalition of the willing,’ to support Ukraine. Throughout the week various European offers of support were released including commitments to provide peace-keeping forces to secure a peace deal, and a plan to create a ‘no-fly’ zone over western Ukraine.

Later in the week, Ursula Von de Leye, European Commission President led ten-hours of negotiation that culminated in an E800 billion aid commitment from Europe to support Ukraine. Europe is backing Ukraine, forcing the US to make a clear statement about its policy objectives in Ukraine.

A situation that has serious long-term implications, France, Germany, and Poland’s leaders all openly discussing developing an independent nuclear deterrent. How this discussion develops has a significant long-term impact on global security. Russia’s only advantage over NATO is its large nuclear arsenal.

The UK and France have nuclear weapons but their capabilities are limited, only the US provides the intelligence and targeting assets to make a nuclear war suicidal for Putin, and his inner circle. This war demonstrates that the Kremlin has little concern for Russian lives, so strategic deterrence requires a credible threat against individual leaders. If America’s commitment waivers this situation may change, the threat of a counter-strike obliterating Putin and his inner circle may no longer be certain. And, Putin always the gambler may be willing to take a risk.

The development of an independent European nuclear capability, or worse more European nations developing their own individual capabilities could herald a dangerous era of nuclear proliferation. Smaller states around the world racing to develop independent nuclear arsenals.

At a practical level, would a European nuclear arsenal that was not supported by US targeting intelligence be a credible threat? Eventually, Europe could develop that capability but it will take time and during that period Putin has a ‘window of opportunity’ that could incentivise him to act. A very dangerous situation.

This point demonstrates how fine a diplomatic line Europe’s leaders are treading. If they fail to de-escalate and work with Trump, they risk providing the new administration with a ‘free pass’ to withdraw from NATO. At this point Europe cannot afford to lose the US nuclear deterrent. On the other hand, Trump appears to respect strength and Europe perhaps needs to challenge misinformation about the US getting nothing in return for its defence support.

Summary

Trump’s Whitehouse appears keen to abandon Europe, and it is hard to understand why. Historically, the NATO alliance has provided the era of peace and stability that made Europe and the US rich. On 11 September 2001, the same nations backing Ukraine today stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the US to fight global terror.

The International Stabilisation Force in Afghanistan was eventually led by NATO, soldiers from the UK, France, Canada, Norway, Germany, Denmark and other European countries fought and died with US soldiers. And, when the US was attacked support came from further afield too, Australian and New Zealand soldiers also fighting and dying with US soldiers. Even Ukraine sent 5,000 soldiers to Iraq supporting the US. It is noteworthy, that NATO’s current 2002 Strategic Concepthighlights China’s threat to Europe’s security, demonstrating the recent unified strategic vision of the US and its European allies.

On the battlefield Ukraine is proving Russian mis-information wrong, demonstrating Russia is not invincible and its victory is not certain. If the US is keen to demonstrate that it does not support unilateral aggression, now is a good opportunity to demonstrate that by supporting Ukraine to defeat Russia’s invasion.

In summary, international collective security is important and benefits the US. The current Whitehouse’s foreign policy raises questions like; Whether the US plans to sacrifice the nation’s historic relationships? And if so, what for? Does the administration have a larger strategy to redefine a new global order? At this stage, we simply do not know and that creates dangerous uncertainties across the globe.

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack