Ben Morgan: Ukraine’s Syrskyi strategy is working, what next?

This week ended with no significant change in the frontline. Ukraine is still under pressure but thanks to Russia’s dispersion of its force on multiple fronts is not facing a significant operational threat.

Meanwhile, the big is that European nations and the US are starting to relax their restrictions on using long-range weapons against targets in Russia. Ukraine can now target Russian forces in greater depth, impacting on how the land campaign develops.  Additionally, more European nations are committing to long term military and financial support for Ukraine, signing bi-lateral support agreements.  Arrangements driven by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to guarantee support for Ukraine, allowing it to plan with a buffer against the uncertainty of a potential Trump Whitehouse.

On the ground, Ukraine’s campaign appears to be developing in the manner predicted by General Oleksandr Syrskyi, defending in the north-east and forcing Russian forces to attack and fight a battle of attrition.

US and European nations relax long-range strike restrictions

Ukraine’s supporters are relaxing their restrictions on using long-range missiles against targets in Russia. On 29 May, NATO defence ministers met in Prague and discussed the Ukraine War. Before the meeting, both the UK and France gave Ukraine permission to use weapons they supplied against targets in Russia.

After the meeting an interesting series of events took place. On 30 June, two US B-52 bombers circled the Russian enclave in Kaliningrad.  A B-52 can carry 20 AGM-86B nuclear armed cruise missiles, recently the US has cancelled several similar exercises to alleviate tension.  So, it was interesting that this exercise continued. Some commentators assessed it was a ‘demonstration of resolve,’ sending a clear message that the US is willing to act should Putin use nuclear weapons, signalling American intent to relax restrictions. Then on 31 May President Biden relaxed restrictions on Ukraine’s cross border use of American weapons.

The new policy allows the use of 90km range, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) missiles and US supplied artillery to fire across the border to defend Kharkiv.  But does not allow use of the longer-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATCAMS) or using GMLRS and artillery anywhere else. Germany also relaxed its restrictions on cross border use of their weapons systems on the same day.

Russia’s reaction was predictable, Putin made more nuclear threats, and since the announcement hundreds of drones and missiles have struck Ukraine. Killing civilians and damaging the power network.

The immediate impact of President Biden’s decision will be near Kharkiv, a point at which Russia has large troop concentrations close to the border.  Russian forces will need to disperse and withdraw from the border, increasing the complexity of attack coordination. Likewise, Russian artillery that was located safely over the border can now be attacked.

Longer-term the impact is harder to judge, President Biden’s decision opens the door for future discussions. For instance, ATACMs could be used to target Russian supply and air bases like Rostov-on-Don and Tagnarog, across the Sea of Azov.  Bases that provide air defence and logistics support for forces in Crimea.  Could US policy expand to include targets like these?

The land campaign, what is Ukraine’s plan?

Russia continues to feed soldiers into the battle for Kharkiv Oblast.  Simultaneously, 200km to the south-east Chasiv Yar remains in Ukrainian control.  In February 2024, General Oleksandr Syrskyi was appointed Ukrainian Commander in Chief and stated clearly that his plan was to hold the current frontline and attrit Russian land forces.  Since capturing Avdiivka, Russia has not made any operationally significant advances indicating that Ukraine is achieving this objective. ‘

The ground, why Chasiv Yar should be Russia’s main effort

Contrary to much commentary, Russia does not have limitless resources and needs to prioritise its effort.  Currently, the frontline can be divided into five sectors;

• Kharkiv.
• The Kremina-Svatove Line.
• Chasiv Yar.
• Zaporizhia.
• The Dnipro River.

 

However, it is only at Chasiv Yar that the Russians are close to capturing ground that provides the opportunity for immediate and punishing exploitation.  Sitting on high ground, roughly halfway between Ocheretyne and Lyman this village overlooks the H20 motorway and road and rail junctions in the town of Kostiantynivka. The town’s capture would provide Russia a firm base for future operations that could include:

• Using the H20 motorway to advance north-west toward Kramatorsk putting pressure on Ukrainian forces located in the salient centred on Siversk.
• Advancing south-west and closing the salient centred on Toretsk.

And, either of these provides a firm base for future operations threatening the cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. But Russia is dissipating its effort, attacking in relatively small numbers across all five sectors.

Russian situation – What is the plan?

Some commentators argue Russia’s plan is to attrit Ukraine through constant offensive action.  This is an illogical and tactically flawed assumption because history demonstrates the defender will always inflict greater attrition on the attacker.

Casualty figures are very difficult of confirm but Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) mil-bloggers are relatively consistent setting the attrition rate at between five to eight Russian casualties for every Ukrainian casualty.  Further, OSINT sources estimate that since the beginning of the year Russia has lost approximately 4000 armoured fighting vehicles, compared with Ukraine’s loss of 900.  Roughly, a four to one advantage in Ukraine’s favour.

Russia is approximately three times larger than Ukraine. Its pool of available manpower is roughly 69 million men compared to Ukraine’s 22 million.   Therefore, if the OSINT community is correct the attritional battle is currently running in favour of Ukraine. Most commentators judge that Russia is losing around 1000 casualties per day, a rate of attrition that Russia can currently support because it is mobilising and training about 30,000 soldiers a month.

Based on these figures the war is in stasis and regardless of tactical innovations like glide-bombs, better drones, more integration between long-range weapons and surveillance assts, Mad Max motorcycle units and Turtle Tanks; Russia is not breaking the Ukrainian defensive line in a meaningful way. Instead, Russia’s force is being incrementally worn down without gaining operational advantage.

At this stage Russia is not prioritising its effort to gain operationally significant momentum.  For instance, using the 50,000 soldiers currently fighting near Kharkiv to reinforce their forces at Chasiv Yar, or reducing their numbers at Chasiv Yar and attacking Kharkiv with a larger force. Instead, Russia is dissipating its effort possibly indicating that its campaign strategy is poorly developed.  A situation that is probably exacerbated by a politicised officer corps, individual generals pursuing their own objectives with little centralised control.

Ukraine’s next moves

If I was a staff officer providing advice in the Ukrainian headquarters it would be as follows:

• Keep defending in the north and north-east. The defensive line is holding and Russia has not broken through and captured ground that could provide a base to advance deep into Ukraine, threaten a large city or isolate and destroy a large Ukrainian force.  In war, the attacker generally suffers higher casualties and while Russia continues to dissipate its forces on multiple fronts it reduces the likelihood of an operationally significant victory. Therefore, do not waste limited Ukrainian resources counter-attacking or trying to gain ground.  Let Russia continue to attack and attrit its force, even if it requires tactical withdrawals.
• Build reserves in depth. US and European aid is flowing into Ukraine and new mobilisation laws contribute to more soldiers being available.  Take time to build a strong reserve, that is well-trained and equipped.  This will take time, probably at least a year.  So do not even think about large offensive operations until summer 2025.  By then the impact of attrition on Russian forces will be greater and new opportunities can be created, perhaps reinforcing the foothold across the Dnipro River and threating Crimea from the north.
• Reduce Russia’s battlefield airpower advantage.  Take time to erode Russia’s air advantage. ATACMs and cruise-missile attacks on air bases are already forcing Russia to base aircraft further away. The same weapons and drones are already taking a toll on radars and ground-based command facilities. Patriot missiles and launchers can create a deep ‘air denial’ zone over the battlefield, making the use of Russian airpower to support ground operations more difficult.
• Isolate Crimea using long-range weapons. The peninsular is Putin’s ‘vital ground,’ a term used in tactics describe the ground that a side needs to hold to win. If the vital ground is lost; or becomes untenable the battle is lost.  Ukraine does not have to occupy Crimea to defeat Russia, it only needs to make it untenable and since Crimea is a peninsular with only three access points this goal is achievable. Especially, now that the Ukraine has access accurate long-range missiles.

It seems likely that the land campaign will develop in roughly this manner, Ukraine using the advantages of defence to wear Russia down while taking time to rebuild its own offensive capabilities.  We should expect Ukraine to focus on eroding Russia’s airpower and isolating Crimea by targeting the roads, bridges and railways that supply it.

Summary

At an operational level, Russia’s Kharkiv offensive is failing. Its gains are limited and their opportunity cost is that Russia cannot commit forces to taking Chasiv Yar. Putin has publicly committed to this axis, stating that the objective is creating a buffer zone to protect Belgorod.  A defeat will damage his political credibility, so Russia will probably continue this attack wasting more resource.

Another consequence of the Kharkiv offensive is the US and European relaxation of restrictions on using long-range weapons on Russian soil.  A change in policy that will make Russia’s campaign harder. A key observation is that the Kharkiv offensive is emerging as a serious threat to Russia’s campaign.  This situation indicates that despite evolving tactically, Russia’s highest levels of command still suffer significant problems.

While Russia wastes its resources, Ukraine’s Syrskyi strategy appears to be working. The north and east are holding and inflicting attrition on Russia. In my opinion, Ukraine’s campaign is set to transition to a new phase, isolation of Crimea with long-range weapons.  It is already starting, Ukraine using long-range strikes to damage Russian air defence surveillance networks and to destroy its surface to air missiles. Opening the door for strikes against the bridges and logistics infrastructure that supply the peninsular.  If Crimea can be starved, Putin will have to negotiate or commit to an offensive elsewhere providing an opportunity to destroy a large Russian force.

In conclusion, the war still has a long way to run and we should not expect Ukrainian ground offensives anytime soon.  Instead, Ukraine will be biding its time waiting, inflicting casualties on Russia and using long-range weapons to slowly strangle Crimea.

 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack