Ben Morgan: Ukraine – Lessons from 2023 and what to expect in 2024.

Russia celebrated Christmas and New Year by increasing its air attacks on Ukraine. Missiles and drones stockpiled since September 2023 were unleashed in large attacks across the country.  Ukraine is also active, sinking the landing ship Novocherkassk on 26 December and bombing Russian city Belgorod, a key supply base.  A range of other Russian targets including; airbases and supply hubs in Crimea have also been attacked by aircraft, long-range missiles and drones. On land, the campaign is now concentrated around Avdiivka. Russia continuing to sacrifice manpower and material to take the city. Looking ahead: What does current activity tell us about the war? What lessons can be drawn from 2023? And, how will these factors influence the war in 2024? 

 

The battle for Avdiivka

Russia continues to throw enormous resources at capturing the city. Tactically, it removes a Ukrainian base close to Donetsk city.  This Russian city is only about 10 km east of Avdiivka, so is within range of Ukraine’s artillery and provides a potential base for Ukrainian attacks on Donetsk city. At operational and strategic level, it makes sense for Russia to capture the city so that it can shorten the length of frontline it is defending.  Although a ceasefire appears unlikely, holding Avdiivka, flattening Ukraine’s salient and shortening the frontline would contribute to a more defensible frontline, an advantage if ceasefire negotiations start.   

Since October 2023, capturing Avdiivka has been Russia’s main effort in the land campaign.  The battle developing into a bloody and attritional ‘slug fest,’ commentator Peter Zeihan estimates Russia is losing five men for every one that Ukraine loses.  However, this does not mean that Russia is losing the battle.

Russia’s warfighting doctrine is defined by its willingness to accept losses.  Historically, Russian commanders, politicians and the nation are willing to sacrifice huge numbers of soldiers in battle. Russia has a population nearly five times larger than Ukraine, and its leaders are willing to use this advantage to wear down Ukraine. Therefore, the only metric that Russian commanders are concerned by is whether their forces are moving forwards, if they are then the casualties do not matter.  

Additionally, Putin is using the sacrifice in Avdiivka to demonstrate Russian resolve to Ukraine’s allies.  Essentially, he knows there are cracks appearing amongst Ukraine’s supporters and the slaughter at Avdiivka demonstrates that Russia is completely committed to the war regardless of how long or bloody. Strategically, Putin’s aim is to scare off Ukraine’s supporters or to force negotiation by demonstrating that the war is unwinnable.

 

Sinking the Novocherkassk

Ukraine’s successful attack on the Novocherkassk removed another significant Russian capability from the campaign.  A Ropucha class landing ship, the Novocherkassk is about the same length as a football field and can carry 10 tanks or a dozen armoured personnel carriers and about 340 soldiers. Or more importantly about 500 tonnes of cargo.  At this stage in the war Russia is not using vessels like this for amphibious operations, instead this ship would be used for resupply, and the enormous explosion that destroyed the ship indicates it was laden with ammunition. 

Novocherkassk, was anchored at Feodosia, in the far south east of Crimea a difficult target to attack. Probably, the attack involved Storm Shadow missiles carried by Ukrainian Su 24 attack aircraft. The aircraft flying far to the south and west of Crimea avoiding Russian surveillance before launching their Storm Shadow missiles, that then skimmed metres above the sea towards their target. The attack demonstrates Ukraine’s ability use cruise-missiles, like Storm Shadow to hit targets deep in Russian territory and sends a warning to the remainder of the Black Sea Fleet and Kerch Bridge.  

 

Russia’s air campaign

On 29 December, days after the Novocherkassk was sunk Russia struck back – hard. Launching about a billion dollars’ worth of drones, cruise missiles and long-range rockets that targeted cities across the country. Then on 2 January, Kyiv and Kharkiv suffered hours of aerial bombardment.  Russia’s air campaign could be interpreted as revenge for sinking the Novocherkassk, however, last winter Russia followed a similar pattern of activity using drones and missiles to attack both military targets and civilian infrastructure when cold weather made ground operations difficult. This year’s strategy is similar, although the current campaign involves less frequent but larger and more concentrated attacks.  

Russia’s winter air campaign aims to achieve a couple of objectives; first it is popular in Russia shoring up Putin’s domestic support.  Secondly, Ukraine finished 2023 in a delicate position wondering about levels of NATO and US support, a level of uncertainty that is forcing Ukraine to increase its domestic defence industry.  In his New Year’s address, President Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine’s defence industry will develop to support the war, promising production of at least a million drones.  Although seldom reported, Russia’s air offensive is targeting defence industrial sites. However, the impacts of strikes on defence industry sites not seen in the news because Ukraine limits coverage to make it harder for Russia to use news footage in ‘battle damage assessments,’ an important intelligence tool.  

 

2023’s lessons

The information battle may be the most important ‘domain’ in the strategic campaign

By the end of 2023, Ukraine had retaken approximately half the land Russia occupied in the initial invasion, defeated Russia’s naval forces in the Black Sea and inflicted significant attrition on Russia’s manpower and material.  However, the benchmark for success in the war that Ukraine is held too by international supporters is ground retaken. And, Ukraine’s 2023 offensive did not meet expectations allowing Russia to craft a narrative that encourages the idea it cannot be defeated. It is just too big, too committed and too willing to take casualties.  

Although this narrative is far from reality, providing Ukraine’s supporters remain committed. Ukraine has not yet managed to challenge it and the country’s most significant risk is currently a withdrawal or scale back of US aid. 

 

Concentration of effort – Can we still mass force effectively in the age of constant surveillance

Concentration of effort is one of the ‘principles of war.’ Essentially, that to win a force needs to concentrate more combat power at a specific point and use this local superiority to achieve decision.  American Civil War general Nathan Bedford Forest is famous for summing up this principle in the following statement “I got there first with the most men.”  However, concentrating large amounts of manpower and equipment signals your intentions and provides targets for the enemy. 

Commentators, expected that Ukraine would apply this principle in the 2023 offensive by massing most of its combat power on one axis of advance.  A course of action believed to have been developed in planning wargames and supported by General Mark Miley Chief of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Antony Radakin UK Chief of Defence and General Chris Cavoli NATO Supreme Allied Commander. 

However, Ukraine’s 2023 offensive did not evolve in this manner.  Instead, Ukraine attacked on multiple axes of advance leaving observers to ponder several questions including; Where Ukrainian commanders convinced that concentration of force was impossible?  And, would the offensive have been more successful if greater concentration of force was achieved? Or, does current surveillance technology make effective concentration of conventional forces (like armour and artillery) impossible? 

 

Drones and precision-strike have not replaced manned air-power on the battlefield

When Ukraine’s offensive started, I opined that supported by very good ground-based air-defence, precision-guided weapons and drones the operation could challenge traditional assumptions about the requirement for manned air-power to support ground combat operations.  The offensive’s limited progress demonstrated that manned-airpower cannot be replaced by these systems, yet.  

From a defensive perspective, Russia’s manned aviation including attack helicopters and fighter bombers provided both strike capability and the ability to rapidly lay defensive mine fields using air scatterable mines.  

On the offensive, Ukraine’s ground-based air-defence provided some cover for their operations but lacked the ability to keep Russian attack aircraft sufficiently far from the frontline to stop attacks with ‘stand-off’ glide bombs. Essentially, without manned fighters Ukraine lacked the ability to achieve air-superiority over the battlefield. Additionally, Ukrainian forces lacked the hitting power provided by ground attack aircraft that could have been used to attack Russia’s defensive works if air-superiority was achieved.  

 

Although tech advances, achieving decision on the battlefield still rests on the infantry soldier

Throughout the Ukraine War we have witnessed the deployment of a range of new technology from drones to precision-strike missiles.  However, the conflict also demonstrates that battles are still won by infantry soldiers willing to advance and close with the enemy; or to hold a piece of ground.  Russia’s defensive systems would have been worthless without infantry soldiers willing to endure the hardship of combat to hold their trenches.  Likewise, Ukraine would not have advanced at all without infantry soldiers willing to attack their Russian counterparts. Regardless of technological advances there is certainly still a place for tough, motivated infantry soldiers on the modern battlefield.  

 

Predictions for 2024

Do not expect anything big in the land campaign until at least mid-2024

Russian forces have not demonstrated the capability to breakthrough Ukraine’s lines since taking Bakhmut.  Additionally, Russia is unlikely to mobilise more soldiers until after the presidential elections in March so there is little chance of them being able to generate sufficient combat power for a significant offensive before the middle of next year. 

 Likewise, Ukraine needs time to reconstitute and prepare for future operations.  As well as regenerating its ground combat units Ukraine is currently bringing new F 16 fighters into service. F16s have better radars than Ukraine’s existing fleet of ex-Soviet fighters.  In fact, the F16’s radar can ‘overmatch’ or detect most Russin fighters before they are in range to attack.  This should allow Ukraine to develop local air-superiority allowing use of aircraft to support ground operations. However, Ukraine’s F16s are unlikely to be operational until mid-2024 so my expectation is that there is unlikely to be a large offensive before they are available to support it. 

 

Keep watching the Dnipro River

It is possible that F16s may be available sooner than is publicly stated; and Ukraine still has a foothold on the east bank of the Dnipro River. Therefore, if there is a major move in the land campaign before mid-year it is likely to be in this area.  Based on public source information, Ukraine probably has the forces available to conduct an operation. However, it is unlikely to happen in spring when snow melt and rain make the ground boggy limiting mobility on the east bank.  Therefore, we could see activity in February when the ground is frozen, just before the Russian presidential election.  Even if Ukraine chooses not to move early in the year, we should expect them to hold their bridgehead on the east bank and that it will play a role in any mid-year offensive. 

 

Crimea will continue to be targeted by Ukraine

Crimea is the ‘jewel in Putin’s crown,’ he returned it to Russia in 2014 and has worked hard to make it Russian ever since. So, if Ukraine can make Crimea untenable by starving it; or recapture it Putin suffers a major defeat.  A defeat so bad that it could unseat him politically.  

Likewise, Ukraine can never be secure while Russia holds Crimea. Its location provides too much ability to control the Black Sea and to strike at Ukraine’s southern coast. Therefore, expect to see Crimea remain a focus of Ukrainian operations.  Already this month, Ukraine has attacked air-defence radar and command positions in Crimea including at Saky airbase, Yevpatoria and Sevastopol.  A focus of operations that may suggest Ukraine is preparing for more and bigger attacks on the peninsular.  Russian mil-bloggers are already suggesting that Ukraine’s attacks are a prelude to bigger strike and they are likely to be correct.  

 

A static land campaign means more hybrid war

In 2024 expect all sorts of unconventional hybrid operations from forcing asylum seekers across European borders to cyber attacks or sabotage.  If the war cannot be won on the battlefield in Ukraine both sides will look for other ways to damage their opponents.  This trend could have far-reaching consequences if Russia works with its allies or proxies to divert US and European attention to other conflicts.  

 

US and NATO support will continue; and is likely to increase 

This war is at a dangerous point, the current insecurity of support empowering Putin and offering the hope of victory.  Any Russian victory, even a negotiated peace based on current territory is existentially dangerous for Europe and the US because it encourages further aggression.  Putin is clear the he wants to rebuild the Soviet Union (or Russian Empire) and if the war in Ukraine is successful the Baltic states, Belorussia and many other ex-Soviet territories may face similar aggression.  This in turn increases the risks of escalation to war between NATO and Russia.  A war Russia cannot win conventionally, raising the risk of nuclear confrontation. 

Therefore, the US, Europe and Ukraine’s other international supporters have a clear choice; either commit resources to Ukraine now or face the threat of years of ongoing aggression and increased risk of nuclear exchange. 

Additionally, the outcome of this war is being studied by many other nations around the world and to waiver in support for Ukraine is likely to incentivise aggression in many other parts of the world.  The cost of reducing Ukraine’s support is simply too high, so it is likely that international support for Ukraine will continue or increase. 

Summary 

The war is close to entering its third year and although the ground campaign is static 2024 is likely to be a decisive year.  Political debates in the US and Europe mean that Putin can see a path to victory.  Currently, he is projecting confidence and resolve hoping that Ukraine’s supporters will falter and the US and Europe face some tough decisions.  But I am optimistic that the consequences of not supporting Ukraine are significant enough that support will continue, denying Putin his path to victory.  

 

 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer and TDBs military blogger