BEN MORGAN: The political battle, Russia threatens but Ukraine wins more support

Last week’s most important activity was far away from Ukraine, in Washington, where important political battles were fought. Meetings taking place against the backdrop of the 79^th United Nations General Assembly. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky speaking to the assembly, then meeting with US President Joe Biden, to present his country’s plan for victory.

Putin pre-empted this meeting, issuing a threatening statement re-defining Russia’s policy for using nuclear weapons.  A threat reinforced later in the week by Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister while speaking to the UN General Assembly.  The General Assembly provided an opportunity to for all present to discuss the war, President Zelensky spoke, warning about Russian plans to attack nuclear power plants and re-stating Ukraine’s start-point for peace negotiations, a withdrawal of Russian forces. China, the US and Russa discussed the war and articulated their nation’s positions.

On the sidelines, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Li and Brazilian foreign policy adviser Celso Amorim were working hard to build a coalition amongst the nations of the ‘Global South,’ ready to advocate for a Sino-Brazilian peace plan.  And, rounding out his political advocacy President Zelensky met with ex-President Donald Trump.

‘On the ground’ in Ukraine fighting continued with little change in the front lines, except for a couple of noteworthy developments near Vuledhar and Kupyansk.

Putin’s nuclear rhetoric

On 25 September, Putin made a statement about Russia’s policy for using nuclear weapons. A statement preceded on 1 September by Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov’s warning that changes were coming. However, the timing of last week’s announcement was also clearly planned to deter the US from allowing Ukraine to use the long-range weapons it supplies against targets in Russia.

Although Putin’s statements sharpened definitions of Russian nuclear ‘trigger’ they were still vague, and designed to create uncertainty.  Previous doctrine, stated that Russia could respond with nuclear weapons if a threat puts ‘’the very existence of the state in jeopardy,” a relatively high threshold, envisaging an existential threat to Russia.  Additionally, previous doctrine assumed that the nuclear weapons would only be used against a similarly armed attacker. Russia’s nuclear deterrent existing to deter other nuclear powers, rather than non-nuclear states.

Therefore, a key change to the policy is that the threshold for a nuclear response is no lower. Now defined as an attack that is a “critical threat” to Russian sovereignty, rather than one that puts “the very existence of the state in jeopardy.” Further, the new policy also allows for nuclear attacks against a non-nuclear power, if it is supported by another nuclear armed power.  For instance, an attack posing a “critical threat” to Russia’s sovereignty, if carried by a non-nuclear power (Ukraine) with “participation or support of a nuclear power” (the US, Britan or France) could be now defined as “joint attack on the Russian Federation” making all parties subject to potential nuclear retaliation.

It is important, when we analyse Putin’s statement, that we look at the context and assess the implications carefully.  The use of the term “joint attack,” is important because Putin is setting up the definitional framework for targeting Ukraine’s nuclear-armed supporters.  It is a ploy to intimidate the US, UK and France by providing a basis in policy for Moscow to potentially target Ukraine’s nuclear-armed allies. However, it is important to note that Putin’s statements last week still need to be formally confirmed in published policy.

On 28 September, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia’s nuclear warnings.  Specifically, highlighting the risk “trying to fight to victory with a nuclear power,” another statement designed to threaten Ukraine’s supporters. The statements are a clear indication that Putin is very concerned about the land campaign and that he knows the release of ATACMs, Storm Shadow and other long-range precision missiles could greatly affect the war.

But, would this concern necessarily lead to the use of nuclear force, either in Ukraine or against a supporting nation?

Most experts and commentators believe that Putin is unlikely to escalate to using nuclear weapons. Putin has two choices for using nuclear weapons, either tactical weapons or a strategic strike. The strategic strike option is suicidal, therefore is highly unlikely.  Are the men that keep Putin in power keen to die, with their families and friends to ‘win’ this war? My guess is that they are not.

The use of tactical nuclear weapons has very limited military utility, and is likely to initiate a ferocious response from NATO. A situation liable to be catastrophic for Putin because his military is smaller, less modern and worse trained than NATO.  Additionally, the use of any nuclear weapon has been strongly discouraged by Putin’s key international supporters India and China meaning they are unlikely to curb a NATO response.  It simply does not make sense to use tactical nuclear weapons. However, Putin is clearly evolving his rhetoric, making it more nuanced and detailed to increase its effect.

Ukraine presents ‘victory plan’ to US President, a win for Ukraine?

On 26 September, President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US President Joe Biden and with presidential candidate Kamala Harris, and presented his nation’s plan for victory. So far there is little information about the details but we can speculate about the key requests; more weapons, relaxation of the restrictions on using long-range missiles and support to develop Ukraine’s defence industrial base.

Immediately, before the meeting on 25 September, the US Department of Defence announced a large aid package that includes bombs, HIMARS missiles, artillery ammunition, anti-tank missiles and armoured vehicles. Then on 26 September, President Biden ordered all remaining Department of Defence security assistance funding, roughly $ 8 billion, allocated to Ukraine.  This package includes key items like glide bombs (Joint Standoff Weapons), Patriot missiles, a new Patriot launcher battery, other air defence missiles and training for another 18 F-16 pilots in 2025. President Biden is clearly keen to do everything he can to support Ukraine, while he remains in officer.

In coming weeks, details of Ukraine’s ‘victory plan’ will emerge and we can assess the situation more accurately. However, at this point we can probably count President Biden’s commitment as a victory for Ukraine.

Chinese diplomacy

Early in the week, the Wang Li, China’s Foreign Minister spoke to the UN General Assembly, warning against escalation or expansion of the war, sending a message to the US about relaxing restrictions on long-range missile strikes in Russia. Then, on 26 September Wang Li and Brazilian foreign policy adviser Celso Amorim hosted delegates from 17 countries at a sideline meeting to discuss development of a Sino-Brazilian peace plan.  This activity has not produced a tangible result at this stage, but provides an interesting insight into the evolution of the relationship between China and the countries of the ‘Global South.’

Zelensky meets Trump

After a great deal of procrastination, ex-President Trump invited President Zelensky to meet with him. The meeting does not seem to have produced any useful outcome other than reinforcing the assessment that, if elected Trump will force Ukraine to accept a peace deal.

The land campaign, not much movement this week

Last week, the campaign saw mostly positional fighting, small battles fought to achieve minor tactical objectives.  For instance, the Russian’s slowly filling in and broadening their salient near Pokrovsk, or fighting around Kursk.  Neither side making tactically significant progress, and the situation in most places seems to be slowing down as the protagonists prepare for the winter, the exceptions being near Kupyansk and Vuledhar.

In the north-east, near Kupyansk, the Oskil River runs north-south providing a natural barrier.  Russia has tried unsuccessfully to reach the river since their forces withdrew from the area in late-2022.  If they can reach the river, Russia may be able to encircle nearby Ukrainian forces on the east bank. Further, the river provides a secure defensive line in a relatively flat area. On 26 September, a large Russian attack was defeated in this area.  The attack involved about 50 armoured vehicles and several hundred soldiers, and is the largest in the area since the start of 2024.

This attack and other more minor tactical activities mean that the Institute for the Study of War, assessed on 28 September that “Russian forces may be intensifying their efforts to reach the Oskil River, although Russian advances on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River will likely continue to be relatively gradual.” Based on historical evidence, Russian forces in this area are willing to operate at a slower tempo, resting and reconstituting but maintaining consistent pressure.

Further south, the important town of Vuledhar is currently under considerable pressure from Russian forces. Vuledhar sits on high-ground, at the junction point of the Donetsk and Zaporizhian Oblast borders controlling the local area and road networks.  The town has been attacked unsuccessfully several times by Russian forces during the campaign, and more recently the Russians have been slowly trying to encircle it from the east and west.  And they now control the main roads that supply the town form these directions, an alternative supply line from the north exists but uses a poor-quality road.  Winter is approaching and the road supplying Vuledhar from the north is likely to become impassable, so keep an eye on Vuledhar, because it may fall quickly if the Ukrainians decide to withdraw.

Summary

In summary, my key thoughts this week relate to the broader geo-political situation. It seems unlikely that Russia can defeat Ukraine. Eventually, bankrupt and after the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands more young soldiers, it might secure the borders of Donetsk Oblast. Putin, proclaiming victory after securing a land corridor to Crimea and all of Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk).

However, this will take a long time because there are still 10,607 square kilometres of Donetsk remaining in Ukrainian hands, and Russia’s average monthly rate of advance since March this year is about 153 square kilometres per month. Unless Russia can radically change its tactics, they are looking at roughly five years of fighting.  Additionally, many indications point to Russia’s inability to sustain operations beyond 2025, that they are running out of equipment that cannot be replaced quickly by their ailing defence industry.

Russia’s situation is not desperate and we are unlikely to see an immediate collapse, but based on the campaign to date, we are also unlikely to see the vast leadership overhaul required to produce an effective military.  This situation produces a long trajectory of suffering because Ukraine is not going to surrender, and while there are soldiers to sacrifice Putin will not give up. This week’s politics are important because Ukraine’s supporters can shorten this trajectory by supplying Ukraine and supporting them to defeat Russia.

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack