BEN MORGAN: Russian hybrid war, and Trump’s demands that may threaten NATO unity

In Donetsk, Ukraine’s forces held their line last week despite Russian pressure. Ukraine still holds the important small towns that are the key terrain in this battle, Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka. Unless one of the sides launches a surprise offensive this battle is likely to define the 2025 campaign season. If Russia can capture one of these towns, it will have an advantage next year. If on the other hand, Ukraine can hold the line it will inflict significant attrition on Russia and damage Putin’s ‘inevitable victory’ narrative.

While the battle in Donetsk grinds on, the war evolved in to two important ways last week. One, that was completely predictable, Russia escalating its hybrid war campaign by flying drones over Poland. The second was President Trump’s surprise statement about sanctions.

Russian hybrid operations ‘step up’

Russia’s key strategic goal is to reduce the level of support that Ukraine receives. The easiest way to achieve this goal is to reduce US support. The US is geographically distant from Ukraine, and its current political leaders are defined by their dislike of Europe, the concern that NATO countries ‘freeload,’ and by their focus on China. Further, they are supported by a domestic audience that easily ‘buys’ Russian disinformation.

Another Russian approach involves trying to split NATO and create division amongst the allied nations. NATO has 32 members and some are small so struggle to maintain their military commitments. Most do not share borders with Ukraine or Russia, and some like Spain, Portugal, Canada and the US are very far away from the conflict. Additionally, within the alliance there are countries that have relatively friendly relationships with Russia, for example Hungary and Turkey. NATO is a large, diverse organisation facing the potential of a war with Russia and maintaining unity is difficult.

Russia’s approach to achieving this objective is to use a range of hybrid war techniques. A good model for understanding Russia’s tactics is provided by Australian writer David Kilcullen. He describes Russian hybrid warfare using the terms ‘liminal war’ and ‘liminal manoeuvre.’ Kilcullen writes that Russia’s hybrid operations can be characterised by two factors ‘detection’ and ‘attribution.’

Specifically, he argues that Russian strategists know that their adversaries are democratic alliances constrained when responding to Russian activity by their public accountability. Essentially, that although NATO and US governments may be able to ‘detect’ Russian hybrid activity, before they act, there is a need to prove or ‘attribute’ that the action was deliberately initiated by Russia. A feature of democratic governance that Russia uses against the US and Europe.

Hybrid aggression falls into a range of areas that escalate from clandestine activities like spying or secret election tampering through to overt conflict. Kilcullen argues that between covert activity being detected, and then proven, there is a ‘liminal zone’ between a democratic enemy knowing it is under attack and it being able to respond with military force. This is the zone that Russia is aiming to manoeuvre within and the liminal zone has two sub-sections, an area or period of ‘covert operations’ during which attacks or intelligence activities are detected but cannot be attributed, and one of ‘ambiguous action.’

During the later, attacks or intelligence activities are detected and attributable but their intent is difficult to define. For example, in 2014 an army of ‘little green men’ or unidentifiable soldiers crossed the border from Russia into Crimea. Russia claimed this force was a group of volunteers supporting pro-Russian groups in Crimea, and not acting on behalf of the state. An overtly aggressive action that Russian propaganda cloaked in ambiguity making it hard for Ukraine’s supporters to develop a cohesive and immediate response.

On the night of 9-10 September, Russian attack drones crossed the Polish border and navigated across the countryside before being intercepted. This is an important probing attack, Russia using an ambiguous action to test NATO.

The operation’s primary objective is to create fear and uncertainty amongst NATO members because the flight can be interpreted in several ways including demonstrating that Russia may be willing to risk war with NATO. A key part of this threat is the subtext of nuclear escalation. Throughout the conflict Russia has successfully used the threat of nuclear escalation to limit support for Ukraine, stoking fears that any military response to Russian activity could trigger a nuclear response.

Like 2014’s ‘little green men,’ Russia seeks to cloak this intrusion in ambiguity by claiming that the drones are a Ukrainian deception operation. This contributes to uncertainty making it harder for politicians and military leaders to interpret Russia’s intent.

However, the intrusion into Polish airspace is enough of a threat to get NATO members to consider if they are willing to risk war with Russia. But it is not enough to trigger an immediate escalation to using Article 5 provisions. Russia is carefully stage-managing the situation to create a debate within the alliance based on ambiguous information.

Some NATO nations will argue against escalating concerned about the cost of a long confrontation or the threat of war with Russia. While other nations will interpret the attack as a Russian mistake, or an example of hybrid war. In summary, Russia is using this intrusion to try and create debate, hoping for a policy split to arise that may lead to disagreement about other things, like supporting Ukraine.

The Polish drone incident is a good example of a hybrid tactic using a relatively minor operation to create fear of a larger threat. It was sufficiently dangerous to arouse concern, but not dangerous enough to guarantee a military response from NATO. The last thing Russia needs is for NATO to become engaged in this conflict, so we can sure that this operation was carefully planned to ensure there was sufficient ambiguity that this did not happen.

NATO’s response

Poland immediately requested a special meeting under Article 4 of the NATO Treaty to discuss whether Russia drone incursion presented grounds to invoke Article 5, or the use of NATO force against Russia.

On 12 September, NATO responded announcing plans to strengthen defences on Europe’s eastern flank. NATO already has a significant military presence on its eastern flank and the current plan involves improving the coordination of forces in place, and bringing a small number of new assets into the area. Reuters reporting that “NATO’s announcement detailed a modest number of additional military assets – including two F-16 fighter jets and a frigate from Denmark, three Rafale fighter jets from France, and four Eurofighter jets from Germany. Spain said it would provide air assets and Britain said it would detail its contribution soon.”

The notable element of NATO’s response is not the numbers of planes; instead, it is the clear identification of Russian intent that removes ambiguity, and demonstrating a unified response. NATO leaders need to make sure Russia understands that its actions are understood, and that there will be a proportional response.

NATO leaders understand that Russia’s activity is part of a larger hybrid strategy designed to test the alliance’s resolve and reduce its ability to support Ukraine. At this stage, the alliance appears to be taking sensible proportional steps to counter Russia’s activity. But Russian hybrid war operations are likely to become more common, so NATO will need to start looking ahead and planning for further incidents.

Exercise ZAPAD, is it a prelude to an attack?

On 12 September, Exercise ZAPAD a large Russo-Belarusian joint exercise started. It is the first ZAPAD since the Ukraine War started and is reported to involve approx. 30,000 forces about a third of which will be in Belarus. Exercise ZAPAD has been discussed by commentators because large exercises can be used to conceal redeployment of forces, or to concentrate forces before an offensive.

In this case, it seems unlikely that Russia intends to progress from an exercise into an attack on Ukraine, or Poland. Instead, this exercise is likely to be an opportunity for Russia to present the narrative that it is easily managing to prosecute the war in Ukraine, and therefore is certain to win. The exercise demonstrating that Russia can maintain ‘business-as-usual’ activities like large exercises while continuing to fight in Ukraine.

Trump’s latest actions surprise risks splitting the US- NATO relationship

Since the Alaska Summit, Trump has made several statements condemning Russia’s bombing campaign and unwillingness to negotiate. But Trump’s statements have not transferred into action, like imposing meaningful economic sanctions on Russia.

On Saturday 13 September, Trump stated on Truth Social that “I am ready to do major Sanctions on Russia when all NATO Nations have agreed, and started, to do the same thing, and when all NATO Nations STOP BUYING OIL FROM RUSSIA.” Trump also opined that NATO countries should impose 50-100% tariffs on China, a supporter of the Russian war effort.

The BBC summarised Trump’s position as follows, “US President Donald Trump has said he is ready to impose tougher sanctions on Russia, but only if Nato countries meet certain conditions which include stopping buying Russian oil.”

It is interesting to ponder Trump’s motivation because Europe’s consumption of Russian oil and gas has plummeted since the war started. In 2022, 45% of European oil and gas came from Russia, a figure that is now 13% or roughly a 300% drop in consumption.

Regardless of Trump’s motivation, this demand will damage relationships with European leaders. Rather than working together with his allies Trump is dictating policy to them, and nobody wants to be treated like that.

However, the biggest risk in this demand relates to Turkey, the NATO nation that consumes the most Russian oil. Turkey’s President Erdoğan has a close relationship with Putin, and the nation’s sphere of interested pushes into Central Asia so it works closely with Russia outside of the NATO framework.

Turkey is a weak link because it needs Russian oil and gas, and this could create disunity as the alliance responds to Trump’s message. Turkey arguing not to sanction Russia because of the impact on NATO economies, an argument that might get traction leaving NATO split on a key foreign policy issue.

My assessment is that NATO leaders will accept the situation to keep America ‘in the tent,’ including finding a way to ‘buy off’ any nation like Turkey that needs Russian oil or gas. However, this type of demanding, unilateral behaviour will breed discontent that will manifest at some time in the future when the US needs Europe.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the land campaign remains static, Russia unable to ‘break into’ Ukraine’s defences. This situation may change because Russia is committing huge resources to the battle for Donetsk. But right now, Ukraine is holding the line and inflicting casualties on Russia.

Strategically, Trump surprised his NATO allies with a unilateral demand to stop using Russian oil and gas in exchange for the US sanctioning Russia. A strange pre-requisite for US action, but one that NATO must manage even though it will further undermine his relationship with America’s traditional allies. A big risk because if Sino-American conflict erupts, the US will need Europe in its corner.

Finally, this week is noteworthy because Russian hybrid war is escalating. The drone overflight in Poland is not a mistake, or a Ukrainian deception operation it is a carefully planned provocation designed to test NATO unity and resolve. An example of Russian ‘liminal manoeuvre’ that should be studied carefully, so that NATO is ready to respond to similar incidents in the future.