Ben Morgan: Russia puts pressure on Ukraine

Russian offensive activity intensified last week. In places, Ukrainian forces have stepped back and their Commander in Chief, General Oleksandr Syrskyi has acknowledged the pressure his forces are under and that Russia “will likely make significant tactical gains in the coming weeks.”    

However, this situation is not unexpected.  Russian commanders are under intense pressure to produce results, 9 May is Victory Day, the nation’s celebration of the crucial role it played in World War Two.  More importantly, Russian commanders need to gain ground before US and European aid starts to make a difference on the battlefield.  Russian leaders were probably confident that US military aid would be blocked by Congress and will now be very concerned about the impact of this aid on their plans.

The land campaign, an overview 

Fighting continues along the entire frontline.  However, the campaign continues to concentrate around the north-east and Russia’s current focus of operations is securing as much of the Donbas (Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts combined) as possible.  The cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk are the last two large Donbas cities held by Ukraine so are certainly long-term objectives.

Ukraine’s Land Forces Commander, Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk spoke to Time magazine last week and discussed Ukraine’s assessment that Russia’s main effort in 2024 is to capture Donbas. General Pavlyuk discussed Russia’s plans to attack Kharkiv and was unsure how serious Russia is about this new operation.  General Pavlyuk’s discussion concurs with the assessments made in these columns and reinforces that the north-east is the key area to watch in the land battle. 

Further evidence that the north-east is Russia’s focus for the immediate future, is the movement of more elite VDV (airborne) units from Zaporizhia to Donbas.   On 2 May, Ukrainian sources reported that elements of the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions started moving from near Orikhiv to the Donbas.  Throughout the war airborne units have been deployed to reinforce failing defences or to lead attacks, so this redeployment is consistent with the assessment that Russia’s operational aim is to capture Donbas.  

The key battle, and probably Russia’s main effort, remains the fight for Chasiv Yar.  This town sits on high ground providing observation of the surrounding area, especially of local motorways.  Chasiv Yar is now centrally located between a salient centred on Siversk and another new salient centred on Toretsk.  The new salient near Toretsk is developing because of successful Russian operations near Orcheretyne.  Holding Chasiv Yar would allow Russia to support capture of either salient, so this village is going to become increasingly important in the next few weeks. However, even as far south as Vuledhar Russia launched large attacks, probably aiming to draw Ukrainian forces away from locations further north.

This week it is fair to claim that Russia does have ‘the initiative,’ because its offensive operations are starting to create dilemmas for Ukrainian commanders.  Essentially, Russian operations are developing quickly, this forces Ukrainian commanders to make decisions at speed increasing the chances they will make a mistake that can be capitalised upon. 

Ocheretyne, providing Russia options and creating a dilemma for Ukraine

Over the last couple of weeks Russia has successfully expanded a relatively small ‘break in’ into a larger salient near Ocheretyne. Russia’s advance used the rail line linking Stepove and Ocheretyne as its axis and Russian forces ‘broke in,’ or penetrated Ukraine’s defensive line. Then they expanded the breach, before pushing forwards.  In military parlance, the sides of the base of a salient are called the ‘shoulders.’  Expanding and securing the shoulders is a tactically sound first step that makes an enemy counter attack less likely to succeed and provides a wider frontage for the attacking force to push forwards. 

Last week, Russia was able to advance further and now holds a salient about 8km deep.  Currently, its forces are widening the salient to make it more secure from counter-attack. The new salient is important because Ukrainian forces further east, near Toretsk risk isolation.  If Russia secures Chasiv Yar it has a base from which it can isolate Ukrainian forces that are in; either the new Toretsk salient or in the existing Sviersk salient. 

Russia’s recent success changes the tactical picture, putting Ukraine under more pressure and forcing their commanders to make quick decisions.  Is it best to try and hold ground and risk isolation? Or to withdraw? Perhaps it is best to wait and see how the fight at Chasiv Yar develops?  But this means risking sudden isolation of forces near Siversk and Toretsk.  Forcing Ukraine to make decisions like these means that Russia currently has the tactical initiative, able to choose how the campaign develops. 

‘Turtle tanks,’ another Russian innovation

Recently, the military channels on the internet have been full of pictures of Russian ‘turtle tanks,’ another interesting tactical innovation. Essentially, a turtle tank is a Russian T72 with what looks like a barn built over it. The ‘barn’ is there to protect the tank from attack drones and often electronic jamming devices are also bolted to the roof.  Turtle tanks look funny and contribute to negative perceptions about the Russian army.  

However, a more detailed examination of the turtle tank demonstrates important features of Russian military organisation. Turtle tanks are obviously a response to the development of Ukrainian tactics.  Ukraine has less artillery ammunition, so has started to use small ‘First Person View’ (FPV) drones to fulfil roles artillery traditionally performs. Breaking up armoured formations is one of these roles.  

The turtle tank is a breaching vehicle, designed to cross open ground dominated by FPV drones and bring is firepower to bear of Ukrainian defensive positions.  Probably working in conjunction with artillery fire to suppresses Ukrainian direct fire anti-armour weapons like Javelin and NLAW, the turtle tank can advance, using its main gun to demolish Ukrainian defensive positions.  It is unlikely to encounter Ukrainian armour that is kept away by Russian drones and direct fire anti-armour weapons so its gun does not need a 360-degree arc of traverse. It is like a medieval battering ram, protected from above by its armoured ‘barn.’

And, turtle tanks are proving successful, contributing to Russia’s recent advances.  Further, Russia’s ability to rapidly operationalise lessons learnt across their force means that these vehicles are appearing across the frontline.  Previously, we have discussed Russia’s ability to quickly assimilate operational lessons and disseminate them across their forces. Turtle tanks are a great example of this capability.   (See- Another year of war. What have we learned?) 

Ukraine strikes back, the depth battle

Currently, Russia has the initiative in the ground battle but the arrival of Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) rockets in Ukraine is already making an impact on the battlefield. In mid-March, before the US military aid package was confirmed in Congress about 100 ATACMS had already arrived in Ukraine.  This batch of missiles was funded by savings in previous aid packages and is not funded from the US $ 61 billion approved by Congress. 

Almost immediately after the aid package became law, a further shipment arrived in Ukraine. The arrival of ATACMs provides Ukraine with another sophisticated long-range strike weapon, one that has immediately been used attacking Russian targets in depth.   ATACMs has a range of approximately 300 km, meaning that all of Russian held Ukraine is within range. Further, Russian air defence has proved relatively ineffective intercepting similar long-range missiles.  And, as well as its speed and flight profile making it difficult to intercept, ATACMs is a large enough platform to carry sophisticated jamming and evasion technology. 

ATACMs warheads carry either a large load of cluster munitions or a single large warhead.  The cluster bomb variants are designed to destroy aircraft on the ground, vehicles and personnel. They distribute bomblets over a radius of about 100m from where they detonate.  The single warhead is designed to destroy individual targets like bunkers or bridges.  It is probably not large enough to destroy the Kerch Bridge but could damage smaller roads, bridges or infrastructure like fuel depots and railway lines.  

The impact of ATACMs is already apparent. On 1 May, 100 Russian soldiers were killed in the Luhansk town of Kuban when a training activity was hit by ATACMs.  The day before twelve ATACMs strikes hit Russian airfields and air defence systems across Ukraine and in Crimea. Another attack on 3 May hit more targets in Crimea killing Russian soldiers and knocking out Russia’s air-defence network in Dzhankoy. Strikes like these force Russia to move its tactical support aircraft further back from the frontline. The Ukrainian Centre for Defence Strategies is reporting many re-deployments including the following: 

• Nine Sukhoi Su-30 fighters and four Mikoyan Mig-31 fighters moved from bases close behind the lines to Privolzhsky about 800km further east.
• A dozen Sukhoi Su-25 ground attack aircraft moved from frontline bases to new bases at Armavir and Budenovsk 400km and 640km further east
• Five Su-30SMs and five Sukhoi Su-24M bombers leaving Saki airbase in Crimea and relocating further east to Eisk airbase before probably moving further east. 

In recent months, part of Russia’s tactical success is close air support.  Ukraine’s shortage of air defence missiles encouraging Russia to use ground attack aircraft close to the frontlines, supporting their offensive. By forcing Russian planes further from the frontline, Ukraine reduces Russia’s air power because aircraft must fly further between their bases and targets. For instance, a Su-25 ground attack fighter based 160km behind the frontline can probably make an attack, return to its base, refuel and rearm twice in an hour.  If is operating from a base 400km from the frontline it can probably only make one sortie in an hour effectively halving its time over the battlefield.

A situation exacerbated by the Russia’s limited tanker capabilities.  Unlike the USAF, Russia does not have large fleets of tanker aircraft that provide ‘on station’ refuelling allowing planes to loiter close to the battlefield for long periods of time. The biggest immediate impact of ATACMS is therefore likely to be a significant reduction in Russian close air support. 

Summary 

In summary, this week Russia has the tactical initiative and has consolidated a new foothold near Ocheretyne. it remains to be seen how far they can advance while they have this advantage. It is clear they are keen to exploit the situation, and elite soldiers are already moving to the area.  

Russia is also doing the basics right, for instance turtle tanks appear to be working in carefully planned combined arms manoeuvres. The Russians are getting better tactically and evolving so Ukraine is going to remain under pressure for sometime yet. 

So, be ready for more Ukrainian withdrawals as the Donbas frontline settles down. Ukraine is reducing one of Russia’s advantages, using ATACMS to force Russian close air support to operate at greater range, reducing its effectiveness.  And, although Russia has the initiative it has not (yet) achieved exploitation, for instance we are not seeing a collapse in Ukraine’s lines and Chaisv Yar remains in Ukrainian hands. So, we should expect the situation in the north-east to stabilise in the next few weeks.  Then the campaign to develop into its next stage, the isolation and attrition of Crimea.

 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack