BEN MORGAN: Pokrovsk, does Ukraine have bigger plans there?

Putin remains completely committed to Pokrovsk, and although the Russian advance is slow it is persistent.  In Kursk, Ukrainian forces are still progress but gains are limited and reduce daily. Early in the week, Ukraine raided Belgorod, a neighbouring Russian oblast. The attack was small and does not appear to have developed into a larger operation.

Russian ally Belarus massed troops on Ukraine’s northern border early last week. An action that has not evolved into a significant threat, most commentators believing that Belarusian President Lukashenko’s hold on power is too weak to allow him to enter an unpopular and costly war. It seems more likely that Lukashenko’s manoeuvre is designed to appease Putin and is unlikely to go further than posturing.

The ‘big picture,’ how is the campaign developing

At strategic level, both sides continue extensive air campaigns trying to damage each other’s war fighting capacity.  Russia and Ukraine are both launching large and powerful airstrikes using drones and cruise missiles.  The size and scale of these attacks is noteworthy, hundreds of drones and missiles regularly crossing the border, and Ukraine is targeting Moscow more frequently.

Meanwhile in Ukraine, the campaign is still a ‘battle of wills’ as Russia continues contain the situation in Kursk and pursue its main effort, capturing Pokrovsk.  However, Ukraine’s campaign may have more to it than initially appreciated. The offensive in Kursk, looks like an operational-level manoeuvre to draw reserves away from the battle of Pokrovsk.  However, recent activity and widely dispersed Ukrainian activity may a indicate larger plan. This week we several important but under reported Ukrainian achievements, should be noted.

Bulk fuel supplies to Crimea and southern Ukraine interdicted

On 22 August, Ukraine sank the Conro Trader, a large rail ferry used to transport fuel from Russia to Crimea.  The vessel is part of a small fleet of rail ferries that are needed because the Kerch Bridge was damaged by Ukrainian attacks in October 2022 and August 2023 so is not capable of handling heavy rail traffic.

Unfortunately for Russia, the Conro Trader’s sister ships are both out of commission, being repaired. This means that Russia faces a significant logistics problem, getting large quantities of fuel to Crimea. Russia will be able to get some fuel to the peninsular, using fuel bladders or even jerry cans but this is hard to coordinate, and is resource intensive. And, without easy access to fuel Russia’s defence of Crimea becomes more difficult.

Ukraine targets Russian oil, especially oil going to Crimea

On 26 August, Gazpromneft-ONPZ, Russia’s largest oil refinery located in the city of Omsk, 2,000 km east of Moscow in Siberia was bombed by Ukraine, starting a large fire.  Ukraine’s successful attack will impact on production, and by demonstrating that Ukraine can threaten distant targets will draw air defences away from the front line.

Ukraine’s persistent campaign against Russian oil storage facilities in Proletarsk, a city in Rostov Oblast is also paying dividends.  The city’s oil storage facilities a main supply hub for Russian units in Crimea and southern Ukraine.  When this article was written the storage tanks had been on fire for nearly two weeks.

Ukraine’s campaign against Russian air power

In previous articles I discussed Ukraine’s strategy to degrade Russian airpower, for months Ukraine has targeted Russian radar surveillance networks, Airborne Early Warning and Command (AWAC) aircraft, communications hubs and missile launchers.  Now we may be starting to see the impact of this campaign. Evidence for this position is provided by Ukraine’s access to, and ability to attack important facilities like oil refineries and storage areas.  Additional evidence is the destruction of Russian glide bomb stores and Ukraine’s use of air assets to destroy the bridges over the Syem River in Kursk.

Further, US intelligence reports that 90% of Russia’s combat aircraft are re-deployed to airfields outside of ATACMs range, adding another 2-300km to their flight distance to target.

Strategically, it appears that Ukraine may be developing several options leveraging off the success of its work to isolate Crimea and degrade Russian airpower.   My assessment is that Ukraine preserved significant forces after its unsuccessful 2023 offensive (See ‘Russia’s tactical evolution. What next?’ dated 15 Apr 2024). An assessment strengthened by Ukraine opening the Kursk offensive.   If this assessment holds, Ukraine may still have manoeuvre forces available for another operation.

Options Ukraine may be exploring

Ukraine has audacious commanders, who are willing to think unconventionally and take sensible risks. They use surprise to mitigate risk, shaping the battlefield then attacking. The 2022 Kherson and Luhansk Offensives were examples of audacious operational-level manoeuvre. The Kursk Offensive is another example, and these operations are similar because the all used surprise to draw Russian forces out of set piece battles and into complex battles of movement, where they are more easily defeated.  This form of manoeuvre is dependent on reserves, soldiers that are not committed to the current battle that can be used elsewhere either to strengthen a defence or to start a new attack. If Ukraine has reserves available, three potential options have been discussed by commentators.

• Option 1 – Reinforce the Kursk salient.  Ukraine can either send more troops into the current salient trying to expand it, or it could strike elsewhere along the border. Last week, Ukraine’s forces have been reported attacking along the Belgorod border indicating that Ukraine has troops available. An attack on Kursk’s neighbouring oblasts could increase the threat posed by the incursion.
• Option 2- Counter attack in Donetsk. Another option could be a counter attack, or an operation to cut the Russian salient advancing towards Pokrovsk.
• Option 3 – Raid Crimea.  Without doubt Ukraine is isolating the peninsular and has reduced fuel supplies into the area, reducing force sustainability. Crimea’s air defence and surveillance networks are compromised. The Black Sea Fleet has been driven into the Sea of Azov and the far eastern edges of the Black Sea.  This combination of factors may create the opportunity for amphibious raids on the Crimean Peninsular, not an invasion but a series of large raids demonstrating Russian weakness.

In my opinion, Ukraine reinforcing the Kursk attacks, or committing more forces to attacks along the Russian border is unlikely because the effects of surprise haves dissipated. Ukrainian advances are demonstrably slowing down and Russia has enough conscripts, national guardsmen and security forces to soak up these attacks.  Raiding Crimea is also unlikely; it is a romantic option that appeals to some commentators who discuss the political impact an operation of this nature could yield.   I believe that the political impacts of Russian military embarrassments are given too much weight in most analysis. Putin has suffered embarrassment after embarrassment without significant loss of political power. Land access to Crimea is heavily fortified so a raid requires an amphibious operation, that is difficult to conduct.

Currently, it seems that the defining battle of the summer is taking shape in Donetsk and that if Ukraine has reserves, this is where they will be employed.

What to expect in the next few weeks, keep watching Pokrovsk

The Russian salient pushing west towards Pokrovsk is now 25-30 km long, and it has been argued that there is an opportunity to counter attack its flanks. Ukrainian forces cutting the tip of the salient off and isolating Russian forces.  Looking at the ground and assessing the force required, I believe this option is unlikely to eventuate.  The salient’ s southern flank is secured by rivers, lakes and canals and it’s northern flank has similar geography. Further, the salient’ s width means that a very large force would be required to attempt this type of counter attack.

Instead, it appears Ukraine is preparing for a defensive battle and establishing an ‘Engagement Area’ in which to defeat the advance. Currently, Russia is pushing through Ukraine’s first defensive line about 14 km east of Pokrovsk, demarcated by Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, and Selydove.  The line does not appear to be collapsing and behind this line is a series of ridges and high ground that overlook a ‘bowl’ of relatively open country.  This bowl reminds me of tactics training because the area looks like an ‘engagement area’ a place that enemy forces are drawn into, to be attacked with long-range weapons. The high ground providing observation, maximising the effect of fire.

Therefore, it seems likely that Ukraine has a defensive plan that involves drawing Russia into a tough fight for Pokrovsk.  After being attrited attacking the first defensive line, the Russians are being channelled into an engagement area.  The engagement area is 30-35km from Russia’s main line creating logistics issues that will be exacerbated by Ukraine’s air and missile campaign that can hit deep behind the lines.

If Ukraine has reserves then they will be employed near Pokrovsk, and rather than trying to cut off the tip off the salient, my assessment is that Ukraine will be looking to stop the offensive and destroy Russian units.  This plan would see an advancing Russian force required to operate in a fast-moving battle.  Ukrainian reserves counter attacking, supported by planned direct and indirect fire from the high ground.  A type of fighting in which Ukraine has the advantage.

Even if Ukraine does not have reserves, it will be tough for Russia to fight through this engagement area, slowing down the advance.

But what if Pokrovsk falls, what is the impact on Ukraine?

Pokrovsk falling is a serious setback, for Ukraine, in its fight to hold Donetsk. The town is an important supply hub, but even if it is captured Russia still has a difficult fight ahead of it trying to capture Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. Russia has essentially suspended offensive operations along the remainder of the frontline and in Kursk to prosecute the advance to Pokrovsk.  The Russian war machine is at its limits, and even if Pokrovsk falls Russia is far from winning the war.

Summary

At this stage, my advice is to keep watching the area around Pokrovsk. Ukraine’s operation in Kursk is an attempt to shape the battle for this town at operational-level, and there also appears to be a tactical-level shaping operation.  Ukraine inflicting casualties on Russia while it shapes the next phase of the battle, destroying Russian forces in an engagement area immediately east of Pokrovsk.

And, this battle will demonstrate Ukraine’s actual capacity because either Russia will grind forwards through the engagement area, indicating that the defenders lack reserves. Or Ukraine will commit reserves to a battle on ground of their choice.  A battle shaped by the redeployment of combat power and logistics support from other parts of Donetsk, interdiction of fuel supplies and degradation of Russian airpower.  A situation that could lead to a severe Russian defeat.

The battle for Pokrovsk will provide more information about both sides’ capacity, and its outcome will shape the war in coming months.  So, my advice is to keep a close eye on Pokrovsk.

 

 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack