Ben Morgan: Pokrovsk and Kursk: Approaching a decision, Russia is not winning

Although most of last week’s media discussion focussed on whether the US will allow Ukraine to use long-range missiles supplied by the US, UK and France against targets deep inside Russia, this war will be decided ‘on the ground.’  And the ground that is most important is Pokrovsk, where Russia’s summer offensive will culminate, either in victory if the town falls before winter. Or in defeat, if after losing tens of thousands of casualties, the town remains in Ukrainian hands.

The US, UK, Ukraine discussion about removing restrictions on the use of Western supplied long-range missiles like ATACMs and Storm Shadow is important too. However, the key issue is how this change would impact on the current campaign.  Putin made headlines by stating that removing limitations on the use of these weapons would be akin to a declaration of war by NATO.  Statements designed to scare the Ukraine’s supporters, by creating the fear of Russian nuclear escalation or attacks on NATO countries.

However, these threats are unlikely to be more than desperate rhetoric. The reality of the situation is that Russia is barely able to prosecute the war in Ukraine, let alone fight NATO.  A nuclear escalation is unlikely, the real power of nuclear weapons lies in their threat or using them by surprise.  For instance, if Putin was going to use tactical nuclear weapons it would have been at the start of the war. At a time when NATO was unprepared, if he does use them now, NATO’s response is likely to be swift and catastrophic. Recently, China and India have both warned Russia against a nuclear escalation.  The only other option is a strategic nuclear attack, and the result for Russia is assured nuclear annihilation. The evidence for Putin being suicidal is slim, meaning this option is unlikely.    

So, instead we should focus on the land campaign, specifically Russia’s dilemma and if there is evidence that Ukraine’s plan in Kursk is working. 

The ‘Big Picture’ 

At operational-level, the campaign’s decisive question remains whether the Kursk offensive draws sufficient Russian combat power away from the battle for Pokrovsk to defeat the advance.  Ukraine faced a difficult situation mid-year, after Russia re-structured command of its Central Group of Forces in Donetsk. This re-structure saw a much more flexible tactical approach and Russian forces probed along the frontline roughly between Chasiv Yar and Vuledhar, seeking a point of weakness.  Pokrovsk became the Central Group of Forces main effort, and a 25-30km long salient now extends toward the town. Pokrovsk is important because it sits on the junctions of the following transport routes:

• The E50, a large highway linking the town to Dnipro. 
• The T0504 that Ukraine uses to supply its forces in Chasiv Yar, Kostyantyivka, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. 
• The T0515 that joins the T0514 and that runs north to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.
• A major rail junction with lines linking all of these areas.

Additionally, Pokrovsk and its neighbouring towns and villages sit on high-ground, behind which is roughly 100km of relatively open ground before the next potential defensive belt, near Pavlohrad.  Taking Pokrovsk would let Russia interdict Ukrainian supply routes into Donetsk, and threaten an advance west towards Dnipro, about another 50km west of Pavlohrad.  Probably, a hollow threat based on Russia’s current level of capability but capturing Dnipro would solidify Russia’s hold on the coastal land bridge. Pokrovsk’s loss does not guarantee Russia victory, but would make Ukraine’s defence of Donetsk much harder.

Meanwhile, Ukraine planned its own operational-level manoeuvre to counter Russia’s plan.  An advance into Russia capturing ground and forcing redeployment of Russian reserves from Donetsk to defend or to counter-attack. Ukraine chose the Kursk Oblast and the operation achieved surprise. Ukraine now holds approximately 1200 square km of Russian territory. However, the big question remains – Has the Kursk offensive forced Russia to re-deploy enough reserves to defeat the advance on Pokrovsk. 

In recent weeks, it appears that Ukraine is planning to inflict heavy losses on Russia near Pokrovsk. Depleting the Central Grouping of Forces by drawing reserves away, then forcing them into a tough battle of attrition. If Russia commits to the battle without enough reserves it may end up stuck, lacking combat power for spoiling attacks to cover a withdrawal. Ukraine using surprise at Kursk and the advantages of defence at Pokrovsk to inflict casualties on Russia, an example of sophisticated operational-level manoeuvre. 

Last week, we started to see evidence that Ukraine’s plan may be working. The Institute for the Study of War reporting on 14 September that Ukrainian sources believe that Russia’s force in Kursk Oblast has grown from roughly 11,000 soldiers to approximately 40,000.  Further, that Russia’s force is estimated to grow to about 60-70,000 soldiers. The Institute’s analysis is that “The reported growth in the size of the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast is reflective of how operational pressures caused by the incursion have forced the Russian military command to redeploy elements from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and commit newly generated forces from within Russia to the area instead of the frontline in Ukraine.”  In last week’s column we noted reports of units from garrisons in the south and east of Ukraine appearing in Kursk. 

Both indicators that Russia is losing combat power from the fight in Donetsk, but neither are conclusive and we still need to wait and see how the battle develops, especially the potential battle of attrition at Pokrovsk.

Pokrovsk, the battle develops as predicted 

My appreciation is that Pokrovsk is unlikely to fall, my reasoning based on Russia’s rate of advance, reports that reserves are being drawn north to Kursk, and an analysis of the ground at Pokrovsk.  Essentially, Russia’s assault on Pokrovsk is now reaching an area that is likely to be Ukraine’s main defensive belt.  A defensive scheme that appears well-prepared and designed to draw the Russians into a battle of attrition.  

Initially, Russian forces advanced quickly towards Pokrovsk. Then they slowed down as they hit the first defensive line demarcated by Hrodivka, Novohrodivka and Selydove.  A defensive line anchored to the north and south by high ground and water features. The key bastion in the north is Vozdvyzhenka and its counterpart in the south is Selydove.  If they want to advance west, Russian forces are squeezed between them into an open ‘bowl’ that provides good opportunities for attack by fire, or using artillery, drones, missiles, and long-range direct fire weapons to attrit the attackers before they reach the urban area.

In the last two weeks Russia has advanced only a small distance west, towards Pokrovsk. Instead, as predicted Russian forces are swinging south, avoiding Ukraine’s engagement area. Attempting an indirect approach and looking to turn the southern flank.  This is a sensible course of action and will result in the capture of the lots of tactically unimportant ground to the south-east of Selydove. However, this activity will not accelerate the capture of Pokrovsk. 

But what about Russia’s counter-attack in Kursk? 

Recently, a Russian counter-offensive in Kursk is being discussed.  However, looking at the situation, my assessment is that this operation is not an offensive but an attempt to ‘break out’ some, or all of the soldiers trapped by Ukraine’s destruction of the Syem River bridges.  The development of the operation between 12-15 September, indicates a coordinated operation designed to open a gap in Ukraine’s lines.  

The operation started on 12 September with an attack from the north, outside the area Ukraine has enclosed. Probably using the town of Korenvo as a firm base and assembly area.  The axis of attack changed direction on 14-15 September, heading east. A manoeuvre designed to create a wider gap for retreating Russian soldiers.  Currently, Russia’s operation has opened a gap about 6-7km wide. 

Russian operations in Kursk are not a major counter attack, and will not at this stage threaten Ukraine’s position in the region.  Russia does not have enough combat power in the region to drive Ukraine out. Aa situation the Institute for the Study of War highlighted on 14 September, stating; “A Russian counteroffensive operation to retake territory seized by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast will very likely require even more manpower and materiel than Russia has already concentrated in the area and therefore additional Russian redeployments from Ukraine.”

And, how would less restrictions on long-range missiles effect the campaign?

When this article was written, it seemed most likely that limitations on striking targets in Russia would be relaxed considerably for Storm Shadow cruise missiles, but not for American ATACMs. This situation is very fluid, and we need to wait to see the final agreement, that could include approval for some types of targets inside Russia but not others.  

Ukraine’s key benefits from any relaxation of US limitations on using these weapons are likely to be:

• Reducing the threat posed by Russia’s glide bombs.
• Pushing Russian tactical-level logistics hubs further back, to reduce support on the frontline. 
• Eliminating key Russian operational-level logistics hubs.
• Destruction of enemy air-defence assets and pushing thing further back from the front line, degrading Russian air power. 

Any relaxation of restrictions is likely to see Ukraine ramp up its operations to destroy glide bomb stockpiles, Storm Shadow’s 500km range allowing it to hit these facilities far behind the frontline. Storm Shadow is also likely to be used to attack operational-level logistics hubs, depending on policy perhaps even facilities in cities like Rostov-on-Don or Belgorod. Additionally, Russia’s concentration of forces in Kursk required movement of logistics facilities, and when these organisations move it is noted by intelligence assets.  This means there is likely to be a period of intense attacks on Russian logistics hubs near Kursk, that are currently out of range.

If ATACMs missiles are authorised to be used in Russia, it is likely that they will be used against fleeting tactical targets.  Like smaller logistics elements deployed forward to support the tactical battle or air-defence missile launchers that venture to close to the frontline. 

Summary 

Last week, I said keep watching Pokrovsk because it is developing into the summer’s key battle. The situation there is developing as predicted, Russia slowing down consolidating and looking to turn the flank. However, I believe it is unlikely they will be successful, so if Russia want to capture Pokrovsk before winter its forces need to advance east, and suffer casualties fighting through Ukraine’s defensive scheme.  And, herein lies the dilemma that Russian commanders face, to capture Pokrovsk quickly means considerable sacrifice, if it is possible at all with current resources. Soldiers and equipment that could be used next summer, or to defeat the Kursk incursion.  

Russia may be able to take Pokrovsk, but it may not. And if it does not, the losses suffered may make re-capturing Kursk impossible without a mass mobilisation.  A situation that to-date Putin has tried to avoid at all cost.  It is possible that we are watching a defining battle of the war, Putin is obviously deeply concerned. His threatening rhetoric betraying this concern. So, keep watching Pokrovsk. My pick is that Russia’s generals will be forced to ‘throw the dice’ and try to capture the city at all cost.  If they fail, it could signal the end of Putin’s war. 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack