Ben Morgan: Miyamoto Musashi and Ukrainian strategy

Last weekend’s peace conference in Switzerland produced few tangible results. However, the conference dialogue demonstrates subtle shifts in the international order. Several nations criticised the lack of Russian involvement and the summit’s ‘joint declaration’ was not signed by Brazil, India, South Africa and Saudi Arabia. A group of nations often cited as leaders within the ‘Global South,’ an emerging group of mostly Southern Hemisphere nations, without clear commitments to either the US, Russia or China. An observation of the conference is that it may be further evidence of the emergence of a new multi-polar world. 

Putin played down the conference and issued a ceasefire plan with conditions amounting to Ukraine’s unconditional surrender. Putin then spent the week obliquely threatening nuclear escalation. Putin’s statements probably indicate his lack of confidence in his own forces and concerns about the West’s continuing support for Ukraine.  The threats are probably designed to scare NATO countries away from supporting Ukraine. 

This week Putin visited North Korea and signed a military partnership agreement, a deal that may backfire because it has angered South Korea. An economic power house, South Korea has to-date avoided supplying lethal aid to Ukraine.  However, the threat of Russian ballistic missile technology heading to North Korea sparked a very angry South Korean response.  A response that is likely to change the current policy and see the country providing lethal military aid to Ukraine. A dire prospect for Russia because South Korea’s defence industry is enormous.  Putin’s response to South Korea was more threats, warning South Korea that supplying Ukraine would be a “big mistake.”  South Korea produces some of the best military equipment in the world and if it throws its industrial might behind Ukraine, Russia will feel the impact. 

Putin’s trip to North Korea is clear indication that the war is not going as planned.  North Korea is an isolated pariah state with little to offer, other than large stockpiles of Soviet era ammunition and equipment.  It is an indication of Russia’s desperation that they are looking for aid from North Korea.  

 Additionally, while visiting North Korea Putin continued to discuss the idea of a ‘Eurasian economic and security alliance’ as a counter to NATO and the US.  My assessment is that this idea’s time has passed, that nations like India, Brazil and South Africa do not need Russian or American leadership.  Instead, the world is becoming multi-polar and more complex.

The land campaign, still Putin’s biggest problem

Putin’s forces failed to take advantage of the ‘window of opportunity’ provided by US aid being held up in Congress to make either operationally significant manoeuvre; or to create conditions for future operationally significant manoeuvre.  Now that US aid is arriving, Russia is highly unlikely to advance. 

In my opinion, commentary that argues Russia is winning the land campaign by attrition is wrong.  Currently, without full national mobilisation Russia is recruiting and training about 30,000 soldiers per month.  My assessment is that if it was politically acceptable, Putin would mobilise and that not doing so indicates he cannot. This rate of recruitment means that Russia’s current daily casualty rate of 1000-1200 casualties per day is marginally sustainable. But, any increase in Ukrainian lethality or Russia launching more attacks increases casualty rates, and reduces Russian sustainability.

Last week, there was plenty of fighting but no movement on the frontline. Chasiv Yar, the piece of ground most likely to unlock operationally significant manoeuvre for the Russians remains firmly in Ukrainian hands.  South of Chasiv Yar, Russia is making notable attacks near Marinka and Toretsk. The objective is probably to reduce the Ukrainian salient, centred on Toretsk. If captured, the salient could provide a firm base for an advance from the south against Chasiv Yar.  Another area with notable fighting is the Svatove-Kremina Line Russia continuing, unsuccessfully, to probe west. 

Further north, Russia’s Kharkiv offensive appears to have collapsed. A group of approximately 400 Russian soldiers cut off in Vovchansk has been bombed into submission, a small group of survivors surrendering on Saturday.     

Currently, Russia can maintain continuous small attacks along the frontline keeping Ukraine’s forces ‘fixed’ and preventing the generation of new Ukrainian forces for local counter-attacks.  This situation will probably continue through this summer, Putin hoping for this year’s American and European elections to return governments less likely to support Ukraine. 

‘Attacking at the corners,’ Miyamoto Musashi and Ukraine’s wider strategy

In ‘The Book of Five Rings,’ Japanese strategist, Miyamoto Musashi states that “It is difficult to move strong things by pushing directly, so you should ‘injure the corners.’ In large-scale strategy, it is beneficial to strike at the corners of the enemy’s force. If the corners are overthrown, the spirit of the whole body will be overthrown.”  Ukraine is currently facing the physical mass of a large and powerful enemy. Even though Russia cannot develop enough combat power for operationally significant manoeuvre, its ‘mass’ makes a direct Ukrainian thrust impossible.  

General Oleksandr Syrskyi understands this situation, his strategy is for Ukraine to defend, absorb Russia’s attacks and let the enemy exhaust itself.  A strategy that appears to be working, Russia is making no progress in the land campaign despite suffering high casualties.  Meanwhile, Ukraine is striking at Russia’s ‘corners,’ the hard to defend extremities that can be attacked by small forces.  The ‘corners’ are:

• Crimea’s air defence network.
• Russia’s oil industry infrastructure.
• Russian military operations in Africa and Syria.

Crimea’s air defence network

Strategically, Crimea is the ‘vital ground’ of the war, if it is captured or becomes untenable Russia loses.  The last Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) figures I reviewed estimated that Russia has lost approximately fifteen S400 air defence missile systems in Crimea. The S400 is Russia’s equivalent to the US Patriot missile system.  This is an estimate and impossible to verify but even half that number is a significant figure since Russia started the war with approximately 90-100 of these weapons.

We have previously discussed Ukraine’s operations to degrade Russian air defence and isolate Crimea, describing how HIMARs and ATACMs missiles are used against these weapons and older S 300 systems.  

Crimea’s importance means that every S400 destroyed in Crimea needs to be replaced. Originally, the Far East Military District was stripped of these systems but as loses increase they are starting to be drawn from areas actively engaged in the campaign.  

Russia’s logistics and oil infrastructure is increasingly vulnerable to air attack because the air defence network is over-stretched.  By continuing to hunt out air defence systems in Crimea, Ukraine forces Russia to replace them weaking defences elsewhere.

Attacking Russian oil production 

Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s oil production and distribution networks are shown on the map in orange. The extent of these attacks is impressive, Ukraine consistently hitting targets across an arc of approximately 1500km, and deep within Russia. The campaign has a measurable impact on Russian oil production and distribution, reducing export revenue and increasing petrol prices in Russia. 

African and Syrian operations

Since 2023, there have been reports of Ukrainian special forces teams operating in Sudan and Syria, specifically targeting Russian military units in these areas. Russia has a considerable military presence in both nations and earns valuable revenue from other operations across Africa. Ukraine is using special forces to target Russians in Sudan and Syria using drones, Improvised Explosive Devices and sometimes direct engagements.  

By engaging in Sudan and Syria, Ukraine causes security issues that require scarce soldiers and equipment to manage.  A few dozen special forces soldiers, probably supported covertly by partner nations, can tie down large numbers of Russia’s most valuable and useful soldiers.  Further, Russia’s private military contractors provide valuable foreign exchange and access to lucrative resource deals that may be jeopardised if their use comes with Ukrainian attention.

The Sahel region of Africa is probably already an area of operations in this emerging covert war. The area has recently suffered several political and military coups, creating instability. Power vacuums that Wagner Group is probably already active within. French President Emmanuel Macron sounded the alarm about their presence in Mali and Niger earlier this year.  Therefore, it seems likely that Ukrainian special force operations will start to spill over into other Sahel nations as they pursue their Russian adversaries. 

An assessment of the Syrskyi strategy 

By attacking Russia’s ‘corners,’ far from the battlefields of Donbas, Kharkiv and Zaporizhia, Ukraine is trying to draw combat power away from the land campaign.  For instance, sucking scarce air defence missiles into Crimea means there are less to defend the nation’s oil depots and refineries. Ukrainian special forces operations in Africa and Syria require a security response, more soldiers and equipment that cannot then be used in Ukraine.  Additionally, using Wagner Group mercenaries is a less attractive option for other nations when their ‘baggage’ includes Ukrainian special force operators.

Essentially, attacking at the ‘corners’ makes sense because for a relatively low investment Ukraine can continue to hurt Russia economically, militarily and psychologically.  However, to maximise the benefit of these operations requires an understanding of ‘tempo’ or the rhythm of the campaign. A factor Musashi stresses in the ‘Book of Five Rings’ stating “You must see the rhythm of distance, and the rhythm of reversal. This is the main thing in strategy.”  Attacking at the ‘corners’ must be synchronised with Ukraine’s combat power in the land campaign, so that when Russia is weak Ukraine can strike.  Or as Musashi said “To defeat the enemy you must follow up the attack when the corners have fallen.”  

Summary 

Euromaidan Press recently assessed Russia’s long-term viability based on OSINT information.  (See the article here- https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/06/22/resources-of-war-can-russia-sustain-its-war-in-ukraine-for-years-infographics/ )   Although Euromaidan Press is a Ukrainian source, the assessment stood out because OSINT strongly indicates that in 2025-26 Russia’s stocks of spare artillery barrels will start to run out.  Firing artillery shells down a metal tube is enormously mechanically stressful, and artillery barrels have a limited life span.  Additionally, they are also expensive and time consuming to produce so when Russia’s barrels run out, their tactics will have to change.

When any army loses its artillery advantage, its combat power reduces.  A situation exacerbated by Russia’s reliance on this arm and by Ukraine’s strategy; attrition on the frontline and attacking at the ‘corners’ to wear Russia down.  By summer 2025, Russia’s casualties will be nearing 1 million personnel, its air defence will be degraded, and it will be needing to reduce volumes of artillery fire.  Ukraine on the other hand is likely to have re-constituted a strong reserve, will be fielding F 16 and Mirage 2000 fighters and be able to generate the combat power for strategic manoeuvre.

It will take time but Russia can be defeated and driven out of Ukraine, providing NATO, the US and other supporters continue to back Ukraine. 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack