BEN MORGAN: Considering the impact of the US presidential election on the Ukraine War

Post US election, the war appears to be entering a strategic showdown. A test of will between Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky, in which both protagonists try to assert their aims on President Trump.  

Zelensky by holding on, and building support in the international community that may allow Ukraine to continue the conflict, regardless of US support. He knows that Ukraine may not be able to defeat Russia by itself, but that if he can keep going Ukraine may be able to break the Russian economy, and cut away the silovaki’s (strongmen) support for Putin. 

Likewise, Putin is playing tough, apparently rejecting President Trump’s initial diplomacy and refusing to accept negotiation based on the current frontlines.  Speaking on 7 November to the Valdai Club, a Russian political ‘think tank,’ Putin said he was open to restoring Russo-US relations but was clear, the US must start the process. The speech also implied that Russia would only consider a reset if the US made significant concessions like dropping its sanctions regime and stops supporting Ukraine with weapons. 

The Washington Post reported on 10 November, that President Trump called Putin and warned him against escalation. A call the Kremlin denies, spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stating “This is completely untrue, it is pure fiction. That is, this is simply false information. There was no conversation.” And, in subsequent days there has been plenty of debate and discussion about what a ‘Trump Peace Plan’ could look like.  However, no details have been confirmed, Reuters saying on 10 November that “Trump himself has declined to rule out the possibility that Ukraine may have to cede land to Russia and has been notably vague when discussing the conflict.” Since then, no concrete proposals have been published, the new administration focussed on the Gaza conflict. 

However, most commentators agree that the key building blocks are likely to include a cease-fire along the current line of control, Ukrainian neutrality (i.e. not being allowed to join NATO) and implementation of a de-militarised buffer zone.   Three points that neither side appears willing to concede at this point. 

 

The situation at operational-level, how it effects strategic decision-making

In the two weeks since the US election the key features of the operation-level campaign can be summarised as follows:

• The election has not changed the overall structure of the campaign.  The protagonists are still engaged in a large ‘turning movement,’ Russia focussed on the east, specifically the capture of Donetsk. Ukraine, holding the line in the east inflicting attrition while it tries to draw Russian forces away from Donetsk, by attacking into Kursk.  

Key areas like Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar, that dominate local transport networks supplying Ukrainian defences near Sloviansk and Kramatorsk are still in Ukrainian control.  However, Russia is very active near Vuldehar and Kurakhove, in the southern part of Donetsk.  Flattening out the frontline in a series of company strength attacks this week. 

• There is still no clear winner. Russia continues to maintain its ‘full court press,’ attacking along the length of the frontline, and is making progress. The UK Ministry of Defence estimates that in September and October 2024, Russia has captured approximately 1,500 square kilometres of territory.  This sounds like a lot, but to put this advance into perspective, the Sydney region in Australia has a land area of 12,367 square kilometres, and Auckland city in New Zealand has an urban area of about 605 square kilometres.  In exchange for this territory, the UK Ministry of Defence estimates that Russia has lost approximately 80,000 casualties, 200 tanks and 650 armoured fighting vehicles. 

Recent events indicates that it is unlikely Russia has the capability to transition to offensive manoeuvre at operational-level.  Neither, the capture of Vuledhar about a month ago, or the capture of Selydove more recently resulting in a pursuit or even limited exploitation. A strong indication that Russia does not have sufficient combat power in reserve for large operations. Meanwhile, in Kursk, Russia continues to throw soldiers at the Ukrainian salient without significant success. 

Essentially, my appreciation of the operational situation is that in the short-term, neither side is positioned to transition to operationally significant manoeuvre. Essentially, that both sides are stuck. Russia able to maintain tactical-level pressure along the length of the frontline but unable to exploit breakthroughs. Ukraine able to defend, slowly giving ground and inflicting crippling attrition on Russian forces, but lacking the combat power to attack. 

The situation at operational-level means that both sides have time strategically and that trying to force a US-led solution is unlikely to be successful, at this stage.  However, there are strategic factors at play that will change this situation over time. 

Key strategic-level factors

President Trump’s plans are likely to be influenced the two key strategic considerations:  

• Ukraine does not need US support to keep fighting.  Ukraine may not be able to drive Russia out of its territory without US support, but it can certainly keep fighting. Twenty-seven European nations have committed to long-term financial and military aid packages, their governments understanding the risks that this war poses to regional stability.  This week France announced that it would send Mirage 2000 fighters to Ukraine, backed by a comprehensive training and integration programme, learning lessons from the fractured introduction F-16s. Since, only a handful of the 85 promised have made it into frontline service. Likewise, German weapons manufacturer Rheinmetall is establishing ammunition production lines in Ukraine and further afield, nations like Australia and South Korea remain committed to supporting Ukraine. Therefore, it seems likely that Ukraine can maintain sufficient combat power to fight and make Russia continue to pay dearly for any new ground it captures.

It should be noted that Ukraine has problems, there are reports that its people are weary of the war and that its military is ‘bleeding out.’ Regardless of these reports we have not yet witnessed collapses in Ukrainian forces on the frontline, or significant domestic political pressure to end the war being reported. So, while both factors need to be considered it does not seem likely that Ukraine is imminently ready to concede. 

• Russia has a year, or two of material left. The Russian economy is small, and is currently ‘over-heated’ because of the war. Putin’s government had a large ‘war chest’ of cash reserves at the start of the war, accumulated to buffer sanctions. This money has been driven into the economy paying for more equipment, and offering large incentives to men joining the military. This influx of cash into the economy has driven up inflation and made the economy less efficient.  Further, approximately one million military aged men have left the country, creating a labour shortage that aggravates the Russia’s inflationary pressures.  

In a Foreign Policy article titled, Russia’s War Economy Is Hitting Its Limits, academics Marc De Vore and Alexander Mertens argue that “No matter how many workers it tries to shift to the defense industry, the Kremlin cannot expand production fast enough to replace weapons at the rate they are being lost on the battlefield. Already, about around half of all artillery shells used by Russia in Ukraine are from North Korean stocks.” A summary that concurs with many other commentators. 

Russia’s current strategy, using large numbers of soldiers to maintain constant pressure along the whole frontline cannot be maintained forever. The trucks that get soldiers to the front, the tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery that support them in their attacks, are all running out and Russia’s defence industry does not appear able to replace them.   

• NATO’s impact on the US defence industry. Another factor that President Trump is likely to be considering is the potential impact of his decision of US arms exports.  The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 2023 fact sheet, trends in International Arms Transfers states that “A total of 28 per cent of US arms exports went to states in Europe in 2019–23, which was up from 11 per cent in 2014–18.”  In 2023, Europe imported roughly, US$ 66 billion of US weaponry.   

If President Trump pulls out of NATO, or does not support the alliance’s policy with regards to Ukraine European countries may lose confidence in the US, and look elsewhere for a more secure armaments supply chain. The threat of war with Russia, or with other authoritarian regimes is worrying NATO countries many of which are increasing defence budgets.  Defence procurements are long-term commitments between nations, a warship, fighter plan or tank requires years maintenance support and a supplier that is in any way unpredictable or aligned with your position may be a liability. 

Additionally, new arms manufacturers are keen to take market share from the US. France, Italy, Spain and the UK are all European nations that sit within the top ten international arms exporters, and further afield countries like South Korea and Brazil are for competing for market share.  It seems likely that pulling support for Ukraine may not be ‘putting America’s arms industry first,’ a factor that the new president may currently be considering.  

 

Summary 

President Trump’s election is unlikely to be end of Ukraine, in fact it may be the opposite. President Trump now faces an awkward dilemma. Putin appears unwilling to give up his maximalist aims, probably aiming to bully or cajole the new president into accepting a more favourable deal. Likewise, Ukraine is unlikely to stop fighting even if US support is withdrawn. 

The reality is that President Trump cannot force either party to stop fighting, or change their conditions for a ceasefire. The most powerful leverage President Trump has is the supply of weapons to Ukraine, and there are two broad options available to apply that influence.  In simplistic terms, the US can either stop supplying weapons to Ukraine, or it can increase the supply.  The first option is risky because it puts the US at odds with traditional allies and potentially tests the confidence of a group of countries that account for about a third of America’s arms exports. 

The second option, providing Ukraine with more support has many advantages.  The American defence industry benefits, and frozen Russian assets or ‘lend lease’ arrangements could lighten the burden on US taxpayers. Additionally, it mitigates the risk that European nations lose confidence in America, and either develop their own arms industries, or look further afield for their weapons requirements.  In my opinion, lobbyists for the US defence industry are probably working hard to ensure the new president considers these factors.

Therefore, if I was advising Vladimir Putin, my advice would be to ‘take the deal.’ 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack