BEN MORGAN: A bad week for Russia strategically but can Ukraine hold on?

On the frontline, bloody attritional fighting continues and Russia continues to advance. However, at strategic-level several trends are developing that are likely to impact in Ukraine’s favour.   Russia’s economy is starting to falter, European nations are not responding to Putin’s rhetoric, American aid will continue to flow for the next couple of months and overseas conflicts demand Russian attention. 

This week’s question is whether Ukraine can hold on at operational-level long enough for these trends to impact on Russia’s warfighting capacity

The situation at operational-level

At operational-level, Ukraine appears to be on the backfoot.  Its offensive in the north, near Kursk, is contained and is slowly being reduced. Russia is accumulating force in the area, including deploying large numbers of North Korean soldiers into the area. Initial reports indicate that the North Koreans are suffering large casualties in combat, and that there is an issue with desertion. Although these reports are from Ukrainian sources, they ring true.  North Korea’s military has no recent military experience, poor training and old-fashioned equipment. Further it is likely that these soldiers are being used as cannon fodder, increasing the likelihood of desertion. 

However, North Korean soldiers are contributing to Russia plan, and the Ukrainian salient is slowly being reduced. Further south there is also noteworthy Russian success, after capturing Vuledhar, Russia has slowly advanced north-west in the area around Kurakhove. Russian forces incrementally, advancing and enveloping small areas.  It easy to see how this activity will progress, Russian forces advancing roughly west in the broken country flanking the N 15 Highway, biting off sections of Ukrainian territory. See the map below. 

Further north, closer to Pokrovsk, Russian forces are advancing along the Sdona River. Although slow, this advance is consistent and creates opportunities to attack Pokrovsk from the south along the ridgeline the town sits on, rather than through the open country immediately east of it. The biggest question is whether Russia will try to link these advances before attacking Pokrovsk, by securing the large bowl of open country that separates them. See the area indicated by a ‘?’ on the map.  This area of open country is bounded by high ground (highlighted in grey) and waterways in the north. Holding it could provide a defensible ‘bound’ from which to flank Pokrovsk from the south, or to push west threatening Zaporizhia. 

A tactical-level lesson for operational-level planners 

The Ukraine war is ‘flipping’ the way staff planners consider the effect of ground on tactical and operational-level battles. Historically, military planners saw opportunity for manoeuvre in large areas of open ground.  Combined arms forces using open ground to manoeuvre quickly.  Open ground provides range for direct fire weapons, easier movement and simplifies coordination of forces.  Large areas of open ground provide ‘movement corridors,’ through which a force can manoeuvre quickly. 

However, in Ukraine we see a different type of manoeuvre, tactical movement is not through open ground. Instead, both sides edge forward using broken country, like forests and urban areas for tactical movement, safe from drones. Russia’s recent envelopments in the south provide useful examples.  The advance along the N15 Highway is not being conducted using rapid movement across open terrain but rather by infiltration through the difficult terrain on either side of the road. Likewise, Russia is currently flanking Pokrovsk from the south using difficult terrain along the Sdona River as a movement corridor.

This change results from the use of drones that provide constant battlefield surveillance, and the opportunity to easily target enemy forces in open country.  Unless a solution to the massive use of drones is developed Western armies need to be carefully re-thinking how they fight. For instance, supporting movement with indirect fire and airpower becomes more difficult in complex terrain. By necessity manoeuvre units (infantry and armour) operating in complex terrain are more dispersed and therefore harder to coordinate. Likewise, providing logistics support becomes much harder.  

Putin’s threats are not working 

In recent weeks the decreasing potency of Putin’s threat is becoming apparent. European leaders no longer reacting to vague threats and nuclear sabre-rattling. Instead, their attitudes are hardening as they accept that deterring conflict requires being prepared for war. 

Evidence of this new attitude includes recent civil defence instructions, issued in Norway, Finland and Sweden. An initiative cited in comments made by the UK’s Chief of Defence Force, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, at a recent security conference in Berlin. Admiral Radakin’s position being that the UK needs to follow this example, and be prepared for war.  A position echoed by the UK’s Defence Secretary, John Healey.  Last week, German and UK intelligence chiefs confirmed Russia’s programme of hybrid war, highlighting the security threat this activity poses to Europe.  Indications that across Europe attitudes are hardening and political leaders are preparing for potential confrontation. 

The impact of this situation is hard to predict, but the most likely outcome is Putin will escalate further.  However, it unlikely to involve a direct attack on NATO or us of any kind of nuclear weapon. If Putin was willing to risk war with NATO he would have acted sooner, when he had the psychological initiative. Now both sides understand that open conflict would result in a catastrophic Russian defeat.

Instead, Putin’s escalation will involve various forms of hybrid war, and information operations.  The new tough stance European leaders are taking will make hybrid operations more difficult.  Essentially, at strategic-level Putin’s bluff has been called, weakening his position in future negotiations because the Trump Whitehouse now has good insight into his rhetoric.

US military aid 

Earlier this year, US law makers approved roughly US$ 9 billion of additional aid for Ukraine, and in the last months of his administration President Biden is racing to deliver it to Ukraine.  

By early December, roughly US$ 7 billion remained and last week, the US announced another US$ 725 million military aid package for Ukraine. National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan discussed the package on 2 December saying the president has asked the Department of Defence to deliver the aid before mid-January 2025. The plan will deliver hundreds of thousands of additional artillery rounds and thousands of additional missiles to Ukraine direct from US inventories.

The aid is likely to reinforce Ukraine in the short term, allowing it continue inflicting attrition on Russian forces for another couple of months.  An important consideration because there is unlikely to be a significant change in the operational situation before the new Trump administration takes power.  Essentially, this aid reduces the chances of a sudden Russian advance providing for an opportunity to argue that Ukraine is about to collapse. 

Georgia and Syria

In October, the pro-Russian Georgian Dream party won control of the nation’s parliament and is in conflict with the pro-European President, Salome Zurabishvili.  Recently, the new government slowed down Georgia’s application to join the European Union, igniting large protests. In 2008, Russia supported separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, fighting a brief war with Georgia and annexing these territories. This history means that the current situation is very tense, Georgian’s concerned about Russian influence in their country.  

Later in the week, the sudden capture of Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city by force led by Tahrir al-Sham, a Sunni Islamist group added another strategic consideration.  Syria has been in a state of constant civil war for more than a decade but in recent years the nation’s leader Bashar Al-Assad has managed to enforce stability, with strong Russian support. 

Tahrir al-Sham’s offensive was unexpected, and has achieved a major coup by capturing Aleppo. The Assad regime relies on Russian support, and in return provides a naval base on the Mediterranean for Russia. The Tartus base is important strategically for Russia, especially since an impact of the war in Ukraine is enactment of the Montreux Convention, that stops Russian warships crossing the Dardanelles. Russian warships cannot enter the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, or vice versa.

Strategically, this is a very difficult situation for Putin because losing Russian naval access to the Mediterranean reduces his influence in the region. Essentially, if the base is lost any Russian warship operating in the Mediterranean would need to operate from a base in either the Baltic or Artic Ocean. Not impossible, but difficult and severely limits the projection of Russian naval power in the Mediterranean. Further, losing the naval bases at Tartus makes supplying Russian forces in Syria more difficult.  

Worse, the Tahrir al-Sham offensive is getting closer to Tartus forcing Russia to decide if it will send forces to Syria to support the Assad regime.  Then there is the question of Georgia, should Russia intervene there to support the pro-Russian government. Currently, this seems unlikely because Russia does not have sufficient deployable military force.  It already requires North Korean soldiers to reinforce operations in Ukraine.  The Institute for the Study of War reporting on 5 December that “Russia is evacuating naval assets from its base in Tartus, Syria, which may suggest that Russia does not intend to send significant reinforcements to support Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s regime in the near term.” 

Essentially, Russia faces two difficult international situations that need to be addressed, or it risks losing prestige and the ability to project military power.  Remember that in September 2023, Azerbaijan took advantage of Russia’s situation to launch a small offensive in the Nagorno-Karabakh region regaining territory protected by Russian peacekeepers. Failing to respond to the situations in Georgia and Syria may undermine Russia’s position and possibly tempt other states within the Russian sphere of influence to take advantage of the situation.  

Strategically, Russia probably does not have the resources it needs to respond.  Elite airborne and marine units are required in Ukraine, conscripts cannot be used overseas and the pool of potential ‘contract’ soldiers is exhausted.  Russia’s lack of deployable military resources means Putin’s historic use of force to impose his will is not available and a he risks a significant loss of international status.   

Summary 

It is impossible to know whether Ukraine can ‘hold on’ and prevent the loss of an operationally significant area of land in the next couple of months. However, they will certainly benefit from the large amount of American aid being delivered.  And if Ukraine can hold on, the strategic situation is developing in their favour.  Putin’s nuclear threats and ‘redlines’ used to serve as an effective deterrent, shaping the flow of aid to Ukraine. Now as European attitudes towards Russia are harden, his threats are becoming less effective.  

Putin also needs to respond to two international situations, in Georgia and in Syria that are likely to result in him ‘losing face’ because he does not have the resources to respond effectively.  If he cannot support pro-Russian regimes in Georgia and Syria, the aura of Russian power will be tarnished and other nations or ethnic groups tired of Russian domination are likely to take advantage of the situation. 

It does not matter what the international community thinks of Putin, but if he is seen as weak within Russia’s ruling elite, his days are numbered.  Ukraine may be reluctantly giving ground but if it can stay the course, this

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack