BEN MORGAN: Pacific Brief – Lots of activity in the South China Sea
Exercise Balikatan is a large US-led exercise is scheduled to run in the South China Sea from 20 April to 8 May 2026. The exercise focuses on littoral conflict and involves practicing amphibious operations, both offensive and defensive. It is also large involving approx. 17,000 personnel from the US, Philippines, Japan, Australia, Canada, France and New Zealand. The exercise participants will practice inter-operability on land, sea and in the air; or managing different nations military resources together under a joint command structure. The exercise demonstrates the capability and resolve of the Philippines, and its allies and partners to deter conflict.
This year’s exercise is noteworthy for several reasons. The first is that it includes a large contingent of Japanese personnel, 1,400 soldiers, sailors and aircrew. Japan’s commitment includes several large warships:
- JS Ise a large helicopter carrier that can also be used by F-35 fighter planes.
- The landing ship JS Shimokita.
- The destroyer JS Ikazuchi.
Notably, Japan will also deploy and test its Type 88 surface-to-ship missile system. A powerful weapon that is easily deployed with a published range of approx. 100 km.[i] It is the first time Japanese military personnel have deployed to Philippines since World War Two, and is another indication of how Japan’s position regarding sending troops overseas is evolving to meet Japan’s security concerns.
The South China Morning Post quoted John Bradford, from the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies who said the deployment indicates Japan’s defence priorities because “Japan is increasingly concerned by the likelihood of a Taiwan military crisis” and that “counter-landing and missile defence are exactly the capabilities they would need to exercise to defend their [Japan’s} southwestern islands.” [ii] Japan’s increasing willingness to deploy military personnel overseas, even on exercise, worries China because of the nation’s history of Japanese military occupation during the 20th century.
The second notable consideration is that earlier this month China blocked Philippines access to the Scarborough Shoal by sinking barges in an entrance channel.[iii] Scarborough Shoal is a small group of reefs and tiny islands claimed by both countries. Philippines has complained about this action, and tensions are high around the shoal. This means that the South China Sea is likely to be subject to more surveillance and military activity, and the large US-Philippines exercise adds another layer of risk.
Thirdly, this year’s exercise may indicate issues with US relationships in the region. The South China Morning Post noted on 15 April 2026, the paucity of South East Asian nations participating, and stated “Analysts say that hesitation helps explain Balikatan’s place in the region: for some Asean members, it is a reassuring sign of US commitment, but joining it risks looking like a strategic choice in the sharpening rivalry between Washington and Beijing.”[iv] An interesting observation that could indicate strained relationships with the US, or a perception that it is better to retain China’s favour within this group of nations.
In summary, several factors are impacting simultaneously in the South China Sea. A large exercise, combined with China’s activity around the Scarborough Shoal makes the situation in the area complex. Therefore, the next couple of weeks are be more tense than normal in the South China Sea.
The rise of ‘intermediate’ powers in the Pacific – Canada
Current US foreign policy is unpredictable, and an impact of this trend is that ‘intermediate’ powers like Australia and Japan are emerging as security leaders in the Pacific. Canada is another example of an emerging ‘intermediate’ power that may develop more influence in the Pacific. Canada’s Prime Minister, Mark Carney is a well-regarded economist whose career includes a praise-worthy performance as Governor of Canada’s central bank during the 2008 financial crisis, and who later led the UK’s central bank.
Carney’s foreign policy emphasises free-trade and a cosmopolitan approach to international affairs. At the Davos World Economic Forum conference in January 2026, Carney made a powerful address highlighting the “rupture” of the global rules-based order caused by large powers being “submitted to no limits, no constraints.” Carney made a call for ‘intermediate powers’ “… to build a new order that encompasses our values, such as respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the various states.” [v]
And like Japan and Australia, Carney’s Canada is working hard to mitigate the economic and military risk of current US foreign policy. For example, Carney is the first Canadian prime minister to visit China in more than a decade and during that visit, in January 2026, he negotiated a trade deal between the two countries. Then in March 2026, Carney visited India and agreed trade deals between the two nations’ nuclear and tech industries. Two deals with rising ‘heavy-weight’ powers that opened new markets and help to mitigate the impact of US tariffs on the Canadian economy.
Carney is also working closely with European leaders and met Finland’s President Alexander Stubb in mid-April 2026. A discussion that included Canada’s potential to join the European Union.[vi] A trade block membership that also reduces the economic risk of US actions.
But from a security perspective the evidence suggests that Carney is committed to improving his nation’s security relationship with NATO, and Canada’s historic partners. Security is now a Canadian concern; whether it is China’s increasing assertiveness in Asian waters, Sino-Russian pressure in the Artic or even a threat from the US. This month Canada announced that for the first time since the 1980’s its defence budget would be the 2% of GDP demanded by NATO, and the government has announced approx. $42 billion in new defence spending.[vii] A significant portion of this expenditure will be on infrastructure in the Arctic where approx. $35 billion is allocated for new bases, roads and airports.[viii]
Canada is also investing in other areas like new rifles for the army, and the expansion of its regular and reserve forces. Canada’s Chief of Defence Force, General Jennie Carignan stating recently that “We have to get ready for large-scale conflicts, more conventional, so we need a different military to do that and different capability.”[ix] A commitment echoed by investment in the nation’s defence industrial base. In early 2026, Canada announced the Defence Industry Strategy and the establishment of a new Defence Investment Agency.[x]
Canada already has an interest in Pacific security and a naval presence, the Canadian ‘Maritime Forces Pacific’ includes approx. five Hallifax Class frigates, three Victoria Class submarines and a large Artic Offshore Patrol Vessel. Canada already contributes warships and aircraft to monitoring UN sanctions on North Korea, and to ‘freedom of navigation’ patrols in the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas. It also participates in the largest regular Pacific military exercises the bi-annual RIMPAC and Talisman Sabre, the first led by the US and the second by Australia.
So, while the Artic is likely to remain Canada’s primary security focus, we should expect to see an increasing relationship with Australia, New Zealand and Japan. For instance, in March Carney addressed the Australian parliament and spoke about the risk both countries face because of changes in the global order. He also acknowledged that both countries are “strategic cousins” with a shared history and values that provides the basis for working together to mitigate that risk.[xi]
In the two prime ministers’ joint statement at the end of Carney’s visit we can see how Canada and Australia plan to work together. For instance, both countries committed to improving inter-operability and training together more in the Indo-Pacific region. Notably, they also committed to more defence industry collaboration including sharing tech to support building a new Artic Over-the-Horizon Radar to monitor Canada’s northern airspace. [xii]
Therefore, in the Pacific we should closely watch the rise of ‘intermediate’ powers like Canada, Australia and Japan. We should expect to see more defence industry collaboration, intelligence sharing, military exercises and these nations working together to develop collective security arrangements that do not rely on the US.
Australia and New Zealand strengthen cyber-resilience
Australia and New Zealand are long-term allies and are currently committed to strengthening this relationship. A great deal of work is being done by both nations defence forces to increase both parties’ capabilities and joint inter-operability.
New Zealand and Australia have both increased defence spending and are delivering a programme of work to achieve these goals. A plan referenced in a 17 March 2026 joint-statement by the two nations defence ministers that stated a shared commitment to “…being able to operate seamlessly as an increasingly integrated, combat capable Anzac force by 2035.” [xiii]
A key element of modern military capability is cyber-infrastructure. A nation’s digital networks are now the primary form of communication across almost all military activities. Militaries share information about everything including intelligence, targeting information, campaign plans, operational orders, training exercises, logistics and personnel records, across a range of digital platforms. The security of these platforms is vital to success, and is a pre-requisite for inter-operability because allies need to be sure that any data they share will be secure.
On 20 March, the New Zealand Defence Force announced that Australia “…will provide New Zealand with enhanced technical support and access to the Persistent Cyber Training Environment – Unclassified (PCTE-U), a US Department of Defense-developed platform that delivers cutting-edge, realistic cyber training and exercise design.”[xiv] By sharing this tool Australia helps to ensure that New Zealand remains digitally inter-operable.
Melanesian Update
A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.
New Zealand Defence Force supports Papua New Guinea
This month New Zealand sent Hercules aircraft, helicopters and the landing ship HMNZS Canterbury to Papua New Guinea.[xv] The mission is partly to provide aid after Cyclone Maila’s impact on the small nation, but is also an opportunity for the New Zealand Defence Force’s ‘Deployable Joint Interagency Task Force’ to build relationships and exercise with the Papua New Guinea Defence Force.
The Deployable Joint Interagency Task Force’s role is to work with other nation’s defence, humanitarian and law enforcement agencies to respond to events like natural disasters. The idea is to be able to rapidly deploy a headquarters that can support coordination of the military contribution to relief efforts.
This activity is a good example of a smaller regional power, New Zealand, working with an even smaller partner, Papua New Guinea, to respond to a natural disaster and to plan for future events. Activities by which the New Zealand Defence Force will build strong local relationships within Papua New Guinea.
Solomon Islands political troubles continue
The Solomon Islands parliament is not functioning after a large group of MPs resigned from Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele’s coalition, called the Government of National Unity and Transformation. The resignations cited a lack of trust in Manele, and initiated a ‘No Confidence’ motion. Manele’s coalition tried to continue governing with a minority government.
A decision that was referred to the Solomon Islands High Court, that decided parliament should be called and that the ‘No Confidence’ motion needed to be addressed. However, the person with the power to call parliament, the Governor General, Sir David Tiva Kapu is refusing too until an appeal against the decision is heard by the nation’s High Court. [xvi]
It is a difficult situation that demonstrates the instability of Melanesian governments. Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands all suffering multiple ‘No Confidence’ motions in recent years that have disrupted their ability to govern. The lack of strong, stable state institutions is a security issue because it creates opportunities for external political influence or internal corruption. Supporting good governance in Melanesia is a sound investment in regional security.
Ben Morgan is TDBs Military Blogger. a defence and security analyst specialising in modern warfare, military adaptation, and operational-level conflict analysis. He posts at Substack. If you like this content and want to support it you can ‘Buy me a Coffee’ here – buymeacoffee.com/benmorgan
[i] https://www.navalnews.com/
[ii] https://www.scmp.com/news/
[iii]https://www.reuters.com/
[iv] https://www.scmp.com/week-
[v] https://www.weforum.org/
[vi] https://www.cbc.ca/news/
[vii] https://www.cbc.ca/news/
[viii] https://www.cbc.ca/news/
[ix] https://news.sky.com/story/we-
[x] https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/
[xi] https://www.bbc.com/news/
[xii] https://www.pm.gov.au/media/
[xiii] https://www.beehive.govt.nz/
[xiv] https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-
[xv] https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/army/
[xvi] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/
