Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update: Discussing Geopolitical and Military Activity in the Pacific

The Pacific geopolitical update is getting darker by the week. Japan is hardening its eastern flank, Australia is building the kind of amphibious force you don’t create unless you expect trouble close to home, and Melanesia remains as politically fragile as ever. The Pacific is being militarised in real time — and pretending otherwise won’t make it go away.

Why the Pacific is suddenly bristling with military preparation

Japan strengthening its security position 

Japan is clearly concerned about security, specifically the threat it believes China poses to its southern islands and to freedom of navigation in the South and East China Seas. Recently, Japan’s interest has focussed on the Senkaku islands in Okinawa prefecture. 

In any future conflict it is essential for Japan’s security to retain the Senkaku Islands because they are positioned to control access between the East China Sea and Pacific Ocean. The islands could also be used to blockade Taiwan, or to challenge a Chinese blockade. The area’s air defences are being strengthened, and last year Japan’s elite Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade was moved closer to the islands.

However, China’s recent projection of carrier task groups into the Pacific appears to be causing changes in Japanese defence policy.  Asia Times reported in early-March that “Japan is considering a significant expansion of its military presence on remote Iwo Jima as growing Chinese naval activity beyond the First Island Chain raises concerns about the vulnerability of Pacific bases such as Okinawa.” Japan’s plan includes upgrading the runway and dock facilities on the remote island. Reporting also indicates that permanently basing military aircraft on the island is also being considered.  

In March 2026, media reported that the Japanese Self Defence Force plans to base advanced anti-ship missiles on Minamitorishima, another tiny island even further east of Japan, approx. 2,000 km from the mainland.  

Iwo Jima and Minamitorishima are a long way from Taiwan or China but reinforcing these islands contributes to deterrence because they provide bases for surveillance or for ‘area denial’ operations; either with anti-ship missiles or aircraft.  Japanese forces on Iwo Jima and Minamitorishima can work together to deny vast areas of ocean to an adversary’s naval forces. 

Another reason to base military forces on these remote islands is to mitigate risk. Chinese, North Korean or Russian aggression is likely to start with pre-emptive strikes on Japanese bases.  Japan’s mainland bases are close to the Asian mainland so would receive very little warning of an attack. The 2,000-3,000 km these islands are from China, North Korea or Russian ensures plenty of warning time before any attack. Bases on the mainland are also more difficult to protect or reinforce because of the proximity of civilian activity. 

Japan’s push east is happening in conjunction with a wider diplomatic strategy. Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi recently announcing the creation of a new ‘office’ to support the development of relationships with Pacific nations. Koizumi stating that “Strengthening the defence system on the Pacific side is an urgent task.” The new office’s job will be to develop new ways to reinforce the Japanese Self Defence Force’s capabilities in the Pacific.

 Previously, speaking at a meeting of Pacific foreign ministers in Tokyo, Koizumi called for stronger defence ties with small Pacific nations. Japan is clearly seeking to deter China, both militarily and diplomatically.  In a direct military sense, the expansion of these eastern military bases is likely to be a response to Chinese carrier task groups starting to operate in the Pacific. Now the US security position is less predictable, Japan must consider options to defend its possessions. Basing forces on them is a logical way to deter aggression.   Notably, US unpredictability probably also contributes to Japan’s decision to compete for influence in the wider Pacific. Current US foreign policy is not popular amongst small Pacific nations, so countries with a vested interest in securing the region like Japan and Australia are ‘stepping up’ diplomatic activities trying to fill the void left by the US. 

Australian Littoral Manoeuvre Group is now operational

Australia is focussed on developing the ability to fight effectively in the South West Pacific’s littoral environment. Its 2023 Defence Strategic Review outlined the requirement for a new force structure that includes “A fully enabled, integrated amphibious-capable combined-arms land system.” 

In late-March, the Australian Defence Force conducted a parade to recognise the establishment of the new Littoral Manoeuvre Group, a combined arms force that contributes to meeting the objectives of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review. The Littoral Manoeuvre Group is run by the Australian Army but focuses on maritime skills like moving personnel, vehicles and supplies from the sea onto the shore.  

The Littoral Manoeuvre Group is headquartered in Brisbane, where 35th Water Transport Squadron and the Littoral Riverine Survey Squadron will be based.  Another two landing craft battalions will be based in the Northern Territory and Queensland, supporting the Australian Army’s manoeuvre brigades located in Darwin and Townsville. 

The emphasis on littoral manoeuvre demonstrates how concerned Australia is about conflict close to home. Any force hoping to manoeuvre in the archipelagos of Melanesia and the Pacific requires the specialised equipment and skills found in the new Littoral Manoeuvre Group.  By developing a large centralised ‘hub’ for littoral operations Australia ensures that specialist equipment and skills; like landing craft and the crews to drive and manage them are available for use by its own forces and their allied contingents. 

Exercise Kakadu 2026 

Throughout March, Australia hosted Exercise Kakadu 2026 a large naval exercise involving ships and aircraft from 18 other nations. The exercise involved 20 ships and supporting aircraft. It covered a large geographic area from Darwin and Cairns in the north of Australia, to Jervis Bay in New South Wales. During the exercise the multi-national fleet practiced manoeuvring together, re-supply at sea and a range of other operational skills. 

Exercise Kakadu is a bi-annual exercise that started in 1993, but the increasing size of the activity and the diversity of participation are both noteworthy. For example, this year’s exercise included increased use of drones, Defence Connect reported that the “RAN’s recent Exercise Kakadu included multiple unmanned aerial systems alongside manned maritime patrol aircraft. And multilateral efforts – like planned trilateral drills with the US and UK – will trial AI-driven maritime drone swarms in 2024.”

A key focus of this activity is likely to be investigating integrating smaller sea and air drones into Australia’s maritime surveillance network. The country already operates two very advanced and capable surveillance platforms, the P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and the large, long-range MQ-4C Triton drone.  

However, even these sophisticated platforms struggle to monitor littoral environments – full of islands and civilian vessels. Therefore, there is a requirement for smaller more versatile drones that can fly low amongst islands or investigate civilian craft.  The aim being to integrate smaller drones with satellite surveillance and long-range assets like Poseidon or Triton to monitor Australia’s long coastline, and its wider area of interest.  And, although there is little in the media about this work it is likely that Exercise Kakadu provided a good opportunity to test new ideas and equipment.

Another notable point is the diversity of exercise participants, and how they are indicative of the current tensions in the region.
Some notable insights are that:

• The US sent two Arleigh Burke Class, AEGIS equipped air defence destroyers, powerful warships that are a unique American contribution to any potential multi-national task group.  This exercise is an opportunity for these warships to practice working in an Australian-led task group with partners like New Zealand, Canada and Philippines.  
• India sent the stealth frigate INS Nilgiri to participate in exercise, a deployment that demonstrates the nation’s desire to form a closer military relationship with Australia and its Pacific partners. 
•  A French offshore patrol vessel FS Auguste Benebig also participated, a reminder that France retains a strong interest in the Pacific region. 

Exercise Kakadu was an opportunity for Australia to work with existing and potential partners and practice operating together, whether it is for low-level law enforcement or to prepare for high-end conflict.  However, the increasing size, scale and operational complexity of regional exercises demonstrates local tensions as countries like Australia rehearse with their allies and partners, practising military skills and aiming to deter potential adversaries. 

Melanesia remains the region’s soft underbelly

Melanesian Update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia. 

Australian military support for Papua New Guinea – an unexpected hitch

Australia is keen to build a closer security relationship with Papua New Guinea. The two nations signed the Papua New Guinea – Australia Mutual Defence Treaty often called the Pukpuk Treaty in October 2025.  

Currently, Australia is planning to re-equip the Papua New Guinea Defence Force with new rifles, replacing a hodgepodge of different weapons procured over many years. The Papua New Guinea Defence Force’s current arsenal includes several different rifles some of which are old, or are low-quality copies of US weapons. This makes supporting the Papua New Guinea Defence Force harder because armourers maintaining the rifles need to be familiar with different weapons and getting replacement parts for a wide range of rifles is difficult.

A long-term Australian objective is to integrate the Papua New Guinea Defence Force into its network of partnerships and alliances, and supplying new rifles that meet Australian Defence Force standards is a sensible step towards that goal. If the Papua New Guinea Defence Force is using rifles supplied by Australia it is easier to support it using the existing Australian Defence Force logistics chain.

However, Radio New Zealand reported last month that Papua New Guinea’s Chief of Defence Force, Rear Admiral Philip Polewara has warned about the security issues associated with Australia supplying 3,500 new rifles to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force.  Papua New Guinea is a small nation with limited state infrastructure that suffers from frequent tribal conflicts. Polewara is concerned because the nation lacks secure armouries and already has a history of firearms from both the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and police finding their way into the hands of tribal militias.  For example, a 2005 Australian report found that of 7,000 SLR automatic rifles provided to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force by Australia in the 1970’s-1980’s only a minority were accounted for. 

This situation demonstrates the issues that need to be considered before providing military support to smaller nations. Successful aid requires a range of support. In this case, upgrading or building new armouries and helping the Papua New Guinea Defence Force establish robust audit processes and checks to prevent these weapons falling into the wrong hands. 

Polewara is demonstrating his professionalism by highlighting this issue. Historically, in many countries aid has been accepted without considering these issues and Polewara’s honesty and commitment to working effectively with Australia is notable. 

Solomon Islands experiences more political tension

Since mid-March, the Solomon Islands parliament has been rocked by MPs resigning from Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele’s coalition called the Government of National Unity and Transformation. On 16 March 2026, ten MP’s resigned including several ministers. The resignations cited a lack of trust in Manele and leave him governing with a minority government. Manele’s coalition holds 22 seats while the new opposition bloc holds 28. 

This situation highlights the potential for political instability in Melanesia.  For example, Manele’s tenure as Prime Minister includes surviving two previous ‘No Confidence’ motions.  It is also noteworthy that Manele has appointed former Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare as his Deputy Prime Minister.  A surprising decision considering that last April Sogavare had resigned from Manele’s coalition, and supported a ‘No Confidence’ motion. 

Politics in Melanesia is often unstable; Vanuatu, Papuan New Guinea and Solomon Islands all suffering multiple ‘No Confidence’ motions in recent years. A situation that does not make for stable governance and creates opportunities for external political influence or internal corruption. Supporting good governance in Melanesia is a sound investment in regional security.

Ben Morgan is TDB’s military blogger. If you like this content and want to support it you can ‘Buy me a Coffee’