This week the White House issued a new National Security Strategy. An important event because the National Security Strategy helps guide US foreign and security policy. The strategy signals the Trump administration’s position on a variety of security matters, so is currently the subject of considerable scrutiny.
The document is written in a partisan and hagiographic style that is unusual for national strategies. For example, the introduction criticises previous administrations stating that “After the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country.” Before discussing President Trump’s “necessary, welcome correction” to US foreign policy, changing this approach.
The strategy several controversial positions and the Guardian summed up international reaction as follows “The document shocked US allies, warning that immigration to Europe would cause “civilizational erasure,” reviving the Monroe doctrine in the western hemisphere, and downgrading the US’s responsibility for great power competition with China and Russia.”
In this post I intend to focus on the strategy’s implications for the Pacific and the Pacific region’s security debate is defined by Sino-American competition. China is an ascendant economic and military power that is also increasingly assertive about its territorial claims. Several countries in the region are locked in territorial contests with China including US allies or partners Japan, Philippines and Taiwan. Further afield, Australia is competing to limit Chinese influence in the South West Pacific. China’s foreign policy is becoming more assertive and this trend makes armed confrontation more likely. Since, the US is the only country with sufficient military power to compete with China, the question of whether it is willing to support its local partners is the basis of security discussions in the Pacific. The strategy provides an indication of how the Trump administration plans to answer this question.
The strategy’s focus narrows from the wider Indo-Pacific region to Asia
Notably, the strategy no-longer uses the heading ‘Indo-Pacific.’ Instead, it discusses ‘Asia,’ and specifically references the ‘First Island Chain.’ Terminology that indicates the White House is narrowing its focus towards North Asia; China, North Korea, Taiwan, Philippines and Japan.
The strategy discusses economic and potentially military competition with China extensively, but is focussed on the former stating that “In the long term, maintaining American economic and technological pre-eminence is the surest way to deter and prevent a large-scale military conflict.” However, the US is not backing away from a military presence in the Pacific and remains committed to military deterrence in the South China Sea, or to prevent an invasion of Taiwan.
My assessment is that this subtle change in terminology indicates a shift away from the South West Pacific. Although there is plenty of Sino-American and Sino-Australian competition in Polynesia and Melanesia this is not referenced in the strategy. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect less American foreign aid or security and law enforcement support being provided in the South West Pacific. A reduction in US support may see China become more assertive. For example, more warship patrols and building more diplomatic relationships in places like Solomon Islands and Cook Islands.
Australia is a major power in the South West Pacific, and clearly wants to limit Chinese influence in the area. Australia cannot compete with China alone so is already expanding its defence partnerships. For instance, exercising more often with NATO countries and developing closer security relationships with countries like Japan, South Korea and Philippines. The new US strategy is likely to encourage Australia seek more new partners able to support them in the South West Pacific.
On 7 December, Australia and Japan’s defence ministers announced a new ‘Framework for Strategic Defence Coordination’ that is probably the start of more extensive cooperation between these powers. Cooperation that is likely to see more Japanese involvement in the South West Pacific, as like Australia it seeks to reinforce its security relationships.
The US wants its allies and partners to spend more on defence
The strategy also requires greater security commitments from US partners and allies, stating “We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone. Our allies must step up and spend—and more importantly do—much more for collective defense.” A strong signal that the nations seeking US protection need to contribute to their own defence. It reflects the transitional approach that the Trump administration has consistently applied to diplomacy.
This trend is likely to continue and we should expect that larger nations like Australia and Japan will put more pressure on their smaller partners and allies to increase defence spending. The new strategy indicates that Pacific nations need to accept that America is no longer guaranteed to protect their interests against aggression. The old ‘cosmopolitan’ US worldview that saw the US as a principal-based leader in world affairs is gone, replaced by a pragmatic, transactional approach to engagement. Therefore, nations like Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines and other smaller Pacific nations will look towards each other for security.
The larger Pacific nations competing with China for territory or influence will also start looking further afield for security support. Already, NATO warships, aircraft and soldiers are making regular trips to the Pacific. Likewise, India is being courted and this year the nation’s warships visited the Pacific. The trend will continue as the Pacific’s larger powers look beyond the US for security support.
The strategy is disjointed
The strategy is disjointed and does not reflect America’s actual activities. For example, the Pacific region is full of small nations subsidised by aid from larger nations. This is a form of ‘soft power’ and by donating aid a larger nation gains influence. ‘Soft power’ is an important weapon in any nation’s arsenal, providing influence without hostility or conflict.
And, the new US strategy states “We want to maintain the United States’ unrivaled “soft power” through which we exercise positive influence throughout the world that furthers our interests.” However, the practical applications of US ‘soft power’ are not discussed, and the Trump administration’ has cut foreign aid, including 83% of USAID programmes. A large cut in the application of ‘soft power’ at a time when Sino-American competition is tense. Likewise, the new US tariff regime impacted negatively on many Pacific nations, and the re-introduction of US nuclear testing has been criticised by Pacific nations and leaders. A range of actions that contradict the strategy by reducing US ‘soft power.’
Further evidence of the strategy’s disjointedness includes juxtaposing sentiments like the US having “a pre-disposition to non-interventionism” with discussions about US intervention. For example, in the ‘Western Hemisphere’ section the strategy says “The United States must also resist and reverse measures such as targeted taxation, unfair regulation, and expropriation that disadvantage U.S. businesses. A statement that indicates the strategy includes US involvement in the politics of its neighbours.
This observation is reinforced by the ‘Making Europe Great Again’ section. A key claim of this section is that Europe is in decline both economically and as a ‘civilisation.’ Therefore, a US objective is “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations [my underlining].” A statement implying direct intervention in European politics. In another example, the strategy states “America encourages its political allies in Europe to promote this revival of spirit, and the growing influence of patriotic European parties indeed gives cause for great optimism [my underlining].” A statement that may imply US intervention supporting European political movements.
The inconsistencies are important because they undermine US credibility. The Trump administration talks about ‘peace through strength’ and a poorly written, disjointed national security strategy does not indicate strength. Instead, it indicates internal conflicts within the White House that are likely to manifest in inconsistent policy decisions that create instability and uncertainty.
And, stability and consistency are something China can offer potential partners. The new strategy will be analysed intensely by Pacific nations, several of which ‘sit on the fence’ regarding Sino-American competition. This document may push some of these nations closer to China, a nation with consistent, coherent and logical foreign policy. This means we can probably expect China to gain more influence in small Pacific nations looking for consistent foreign aid. Likewise, Indonesia the largest non-aligned nation in the region already has a close relationship with China, and this strategy may encourage it to get stronger.
A focus on the Western Hemisphere, and a revival of ‘Monroe Doctrine’ may help the Pacific
In 1823, US President James Monroe declared that the Americas were an American sphere of influence and that European powers could no longer establish colonies. ‘Monroe Doctrine’ protected new democratic nations in Latin America, and secured US trade networks in the region.
In 2025, Trump’s security strategy states that the US will “ assert and enforce a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine,” and expands on this idea when it discusses US policy. The plan involves prioritising the development of a US economic and security ‘sphere of influence’ across the Americas, including deployment of military resources to the region.
In the Pacific, the focus on the Western Hemisphere is likely to include an increase in US law enforcement interventions in the Pacific drug trade. The strategy states “A more suitable Coast Guard and Navy presence to control sea lanes, to thwart illegal and other unwanted migration, to reduce human and drug trafficking, and to control key transit routes in a crisis.”More Coast Guard and naval vessels operating in the seas around Central America could reduce the flow of drugs into the South West Pacific. An intervention that has security benefits for several small Pacific nations that have become trafficking hubs.
Summary
The strategy is further evidence of the US moving to a transactional approach to international relationships. Instead, of US foreign policy being based on a set of ethical principles like supporting democracy, free speech and protecting human rights the Trump administration’s strategy encourages case-by-case transactional decision-making.
A way of working that undermines America’s ability to build strong relationships because it makes US support conditional, and therefore potentially inconsistent. This increases tensions because China’s foreign policy objectives are clear and consistent making it easier for nations to negotiate confidently with it. If China’s influence increases, the US and its allies and partners are liable to feel less secure, increasing the possibility of over reactions leading to poorly thought through escalations.
China’s interests compete with those of several nations in the Pacific including; Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines and Australia. This competition, combined with a transactional and inconsistent US foreign policy will encourage larger nations in the Pacific to work together for security. Probably led by Japan and Australia the largest and most militarily capable nations. Further, countries like Japan and Australia are also likely to work more closely with NATO, its member states or other large powers like India. A trend that creates a more complex security environment that is harder to interpret.
On the other hand, the strategy’s focus on the Western Hemisphere includes more resources being used to curb the flow of drugs from South and Central America. This change will help mitigate a significant regional security threat.
Below are two excellent reviews of the 2025 US National Defence Strategy.
William Spaniel – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i0qcZ-_3Wu0&pp=ygUPd2lsbGlhbSBzcGFuaWVs
Anders Puck Nielsen – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YAh-xEteBz4
Melanesian Update
A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.
Australia funds new internet cables for Papua New Guinea
This week Papua New Guinea announced Google will build three new undersea internet cables. The project is funded by Australia and the undersea cables will connect northern and southern Papua New Guinea and Bougainville.
The project will cost AS $120 million and is part of the ‘Pukpuk Defence Treaty’ that was signed in October this year. The cables will upgrade internet access within the nation and replace existing cables installed by Chinese company Huawei in 2018.
This work is an example of Australian ‘soft power,’ an investment in local infrastructure that is specifically linked to diplomatic objectives. In this case, reducing China’s influence in Papua New Guinea. The project is also important because secure digital infrastructure is now a vital element of security planning and the project will reduce the nation’s (and Australians supporting Papua New Guinea) reliance on Chinese communications infrastructure.
Papua New Guinea, Australia and Indonesia discuss border buffer zone
Recently Australia has signed new defence agreements with Indonesia and with Papua New Guinea. During these negotiations, Indonesia’s foreign ministry expressed concerns about Australia’s ‘Pukpuk Defence Treaty’ with Papua New Guinea, worried about the implications of the treaty on relations with China.
Although these concerns appear to be mitigated, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported that Indonesia raised concerns about policing the border with Papua New Guinea’s Defence Minister, Dr Billy Joseph. Now the three countries are discussing options, including the possibility of a new 10 km buffer zone along the border. It will take time for the situation to clarify, but this tri-lateral discussion is a positive sign that Australia, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea are working together to manage security issues, a good sign for regional stability.
Chinese police support in the Solomon Islands
On 11 December, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published a useful article reviewing China’s programme supporting the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) – ‘China’s evolving approach to police training in Solomon Islands.’ Across Melanesia, Sino-Australian diplomatic competition is intense, and Solomon Islands is at the forefront of this contest. A key method both countries use to increase their influence is support for local police forces, including providing equipment and training.
In terms of hybrid war strategies, police forces are an excellent way to build influence in a host nation. Police forces are a central activity of any national government so have considerable social and political influence, additionally they collect enormous amounts of intelligence about individuals and communities. Therefore, being the ‘partner of choice’ for police support to Solomon Islands is important for both China and Australia.
The IISS article provides a balanced review of Australia, New Zealand and China’s activity supporting the RSIP. Notably, it provides a good overview of what external support for the RSIP looks like, and how it is provided. The article reminds observers that Australia provides the most support before discussing how Chinese support has evolved in recent years.
Solomon Islands is strategically located and Sino-Australian competition there is unlikely to disappear, and this article provides useful insight into the situation.
Read the full article here – https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/charting-china/2025/12/chinas-evolving-approach-to-police-training-in-solomon-islands/
Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack
