BEN MORGAN: Russian manoeuvre offensive culminating?

Since the last update, the land campaign has remained relatively static, both sides locked in an attritional struggle. In the north, near Kursk, Russia is making limited progress trying to reduce the Ukrainian salient.  Meanwhile, Pokrovsk remains in Ukrainian hands, along with other key towns like Chasiv Yar.  Across the frontline my key observation is that the campaign is stagnating, neither side able to achieve manoeuvre, instead fighting an attritional campaign.

However, the ground campaign’s lack of movement provides useful insight into Russia’s strategic predicament. Putin appears over-extended as experts point to the war’s strain on Russia’s economy and its once feared military needs North Korean help to maintain the war effort.  

Meanwhile, more details of Ukraine’s victory plan were made public, after President Zelensky briefed his nation’s parliament.  Although, the details are still sparse the plan provides more insight into Ukraine’s strategic planning. 

Ukraine’s victory plan

Last week, President Zelensky briefed Ukraine’s parliament on the plan, that includes the following actions:

• That NATO invites Ukraine to become a member.
• Development of a comprehensive, non-nuclear deterrent capability to stop Russian aggression, forcing Russia to negotiate.
• Increasing Ukraine’s military capabilities so that it can defend itself, specifically providing more long-range precision-guided missiles without restrictions, so that it can defeat Russia. 
• Strategic economic partnerships between Ukraine, the US and other supporters to build the nation’s economy.  Ukraine’s partners receiving access to the nation’s natural resources in exchange for their investment. 
• Post-war Ukraine becomes a member of NATO, its recent experience and soldiers helping to strengthen the alliance.

The President’s speech did not provide a lot of detail, but certainly indicates Ukraine’s position. It needs the support of the US and Europe to secure long-term peace. That Ukraine is clearly planning for a long period of post-war hostility with Russia, and is therefore seeking NATO membership to secure its borders after any peace treaty is agreed.  The likelihood of NATO offering Ukraine membership while the war is being fought is practically zero, because it would immediately bring the alliance into direct conflict with Russia. 

President Zelensky’s thinking is more short-term when he discusses developing a comprehensive deterrent capability, and in his speech, he said leaders in the US, Germany, France and the UK understand the request. My assessment is that he envisages a comprehensive air-defence system like Israel’s ‘Iron Dome,’ backed by long-range missiles like Tomahawk that can accurately engage targets deep inside Russia with large explosive payloads.  A system that the President believes can make fighting Ukraine prohibitively expensive, compelling Russia to negotiate. 

An important point because President Zelensky’s plan does not involve any loss of Ukrainian territory to Russia. It does not seek to compromise or to bargain, instead the plan’s objectives are to build Ukraine’s military and economic capability to the point that Russia is forced to concede.  At which point peace will be secured in the long-term, by NATO membership.  

Essentially, the plan does not put new ideas on the table but is a clear statement of Ukraine’s intent to fight until Russia is defeated.  

North Korean troops in Ukraine

The deployment of North Korean troops in Ukraine has recently been confirmed. Ukrainian media sources reported on 15 October that 3,000 North Korea soldiers were preparing to join Russia’s 11th Airborne Brigade. On 17 October, Ukraine’s General Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that 11,000 North Koreans are in the process of being deployed to Ukraine. Then on 18 October. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service indicated that roughly 1,500 North Korean special forces soldiers are in Russia conducting pre-deployment training for operations in Ukraine.  

Many commentators are exercised by this development, often interpreting this activity as part of a larger trend towards global conflict.  This view is unlikely to be correct, North Korea stands to gain considerably from supporting Russia but is unlikely to be forging an alliance ready for World War Three. Instead, North Korea is certain to be getting some benefit, for instance tech support or new military hardware. Supporting Russia probably also inflates the ego of Kim Jong Un, who by doing so elevates his position internationally by coming to Putin’s aid. Additionally, since North Korea’s military lacks combat experience, sending soldiers to fight in Ukraine is an opportunity to develop military skills and test equipment. 

The impact of North Korean troops on the battlefield will be minimal, their key contribution to the war effort will be allowing Putin to put off national mobilisation for a little longer. North Korean soldiers are poorly trained as well as having archaic equipment, so it is unlikely they will be very effective in combat. Probably, they will suffer high casualties and may start to surrender or defect relatively quickly. 

The operational-level situation

At operational-level the 300-km-long see-saw battle continues, Russia trying to capture all of Donetsk in the east, while Ukraine aims to draw forces away by attacking in the north near Kursk.

Currently, at operational-level the ground campaign is stagnating and turning into a battle of will, both sides engaging in positional fighting and trading small amounts of ground for high casualties. In campaign terms, this situation is a win for Ukraine because it is inflicting attrition on Russia without losing ground.  A situation that indicates their casualties are not high enough to force withdrawals, and with Ukraine’s preference for limiting casualties this is an indication that losses are sustainable.  

The weather in Ukraine is starting to turn, and autumnal rain is being reported.  This means that we are soon likely to see a brief respite in the campaign as both sides take advantage of the weather to rest and reconstitute their forces.  It will provide a time for reflection; revaluation, and we should expect changes in campaign strategy when the ground freezes in February. 

Tactical-level fighting

Kursk 

In the north, near Kursk, a difficult battle has raged over the last two weeks.  Russia is believed to have committed roughly 50,000 new soldiers to this sector, and is trying to envelop the tip of Ukraine’s foothold, an area near the town of Korenevo.  See the map below, Russia has developed its initial spoiling attack that stopped Ukraine reaching Korenevo and the Syem River and has preserved a corridor to withdraw forces trapped south of the river.  

After making the spoiling attack, some Russian forces advanced east, aiming to meet up with a similar attack from the north to cut off Ukrainian soldiers near Korenevo. Since then, this battle has flowed back and forth, with Ukraine vigorously counter attacking. 

This fighting continues to sway back and forth, and as this article was written, Russia did not appear to be able to complete the envelopment.  The most noteworthy feature of this tactical battle is its impact on the operational-level campaign, because it is likely to draw more Russian troops away from battles elsewhere.

Pokrovsk 

Like other areas on the frontline, fighting around Pokrovsk has been positional in the last few weeks.  In early September, I predicted that Russia would not take Pokrovsk. (See; Pokrovsk, it looks like General Syrskyi has bad news for Russia) and as winter approaches, this assessment is being confirmed.

Russia maintain pressure in this area but is clearly avoiding a direct attack from the east, its forces ‘propping,’ static while they wait for the situation to evolve. Instead of advancing west towards Pokrovsk they are engaged in small battles to close off Ukrainian salients, and are probing south, looking for a way around the town. Russia’s recent activity is focussed on the area south of Selydove. This turn of events is predictable because immediately east of Pokrovsk is a large, low-lying bowl of open country that creates an excellent engagement area for the Ukrainian defenders.  The nature of the ground means that Russia would require significant resources to advance directly west into Pokrovsk. 

The fact that Russian forces are not moving west indicates that Russia does not have the resources to advance through the engagement area and take Pokrovsk. An assessment supported by recent successful local Ukrainian attacks near Hordivka and Novohrodivka, that were reported by the Institute for the Study of War on 17 October and confirmed by geo-located video footage.  Successful small attacks in these areas demonstrate that Russian forces near Pokrovsk are tired and weaker than they need to be to advance on the town. 

Russian planners may see this as a temporary situation, accepting a natural lull in tempo while they prepare forces for mid-winter when the ground freezes, or for a new attack in the summer.  However, it may also be that Russian manpower and equipment shortages impacting and the offensive has culminated.  

What fighting in other areas tells us about the campaign

Along the frontline there are other areas that are experiencing combat including:

• Vuledhar.
• Parts of Zaporizhia, particularly near Orikhiv and Velyka Novasilika. 
• Kupyansk.
• Chasiv Yar.
• Toretsk.
• Vovchansk.

This fighting provides more information about Russia’s current situation. For instance, two weeks ago Russia captured the fortress town of Vuledhar.  The town is situated on high ground dominating its local area, about 50 km south of Pokrovsk.  After its capture there has been very limited Russian forward movement.  Additionally, Ukraine successfully counter-attacked and regained territory near Torestsk on 15 October.  Both situations are noteworthy because they indicate Russia lacks soldiers in reserve, either to counter attack or to take advantage of the loss of Vuledhar.

Summary 

The last two weeks contained some impressive headlines, about Ukraine’s victory plan and North Korean soldiers deploying to Ukraine. Reflecting on them though, it seems that the biggest story currently is that Russia appears to be culminating. Russia’s forward progress is reducing and contrary to recent historic precedent Ukraine is achieving small offensive victories.  

Holding Russia is a victory for Ukraine, every step Russia advances takes enormous amounts of blood and treasure.  Commodities that are limited even in Russia, and in the Kremlin, there will be an inevitable stocktake when the rain comes, and fighting must stop for the year.  Russia has failed to take Pokrovsk, its advance in Donetsk is painfully slow and Ukraine continues to occupy about 1100 square km of Russian territory.  

Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to maintain the pressure forcing Russia to pay dearly for every metre of ground it takes and its European partners are ramping up their support. New NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte working to speed up delivery of 40 billion euros of military aid promised by members. Germany, Canada, Netherlands, Denmark and the Baltic republics all announcing large military aid packages last week. An indication that regardless of post-election changes in American policy, Europe is committed to supporting Ukraine.  

Putin’s options are slowly but surely reducing, and every dollar of military aid provided by the US, NATO or by other countries speeds up that process. 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack